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Charles Percy Adlai Stevenson III George Ball J. William Fulbright Jesse Jackson Georgie Anne Geye, 



TIEYDtR 



People and Institution 
Confront Israel's Lobb 



Tin 

SPEAK OU 

BY PAUL FINDLEY 

A Congressman from Illinois for twenty-two years 




James Ennes 



Miriam Ward Philip Klutzmck Dean Francis Sayre Paul McCloskey Sheila Scoville 




They Dare to 
Speak Out 



PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS 
CONFRONT ISRAEL'S LOBBY 



by Paul Findley 



Lawrence Hill Books 



To our grandchildren 

Andrew, Cameron, Henry, and Elizabeth 

may they always be able 

to speak without fear 



Contents 





Preface 






Introduction: A Middle West 






Congressman Meets the Middle East 


1 


One 


King of the Hill 


25 


Two 


Stilling the Still, Small Voices 


50 


Three 


The Deliberative Body Fails to 






Deliberate 


84 


Four 


The Lobby and the Oval Office 


114 


Five 


Penetrating the Defenses at Defense— 






and State 


139 


Six 


The Assault on "Assault" 


165 


Seven 


Challenges to Academic Freedom 


180 


Eight 


Tucson: Case Study in Intimidation 


212 


Nine 


Church and State 


238 


Ten 


Not All Jews Toe the Line 


265 


Eleven 


Beyond the Banks of the Potomac 


287 


Twelve 


Repairing the Damage 


315 


Thirteen 


America's "Intifada" 


333 




Chapter Notes 


361 




Index 


379 



Preface to the 1989 Edition 



One day in early December 1982, 1 was called to the Republican cloak- 
room, an area just off the floor of the House of Representatives where 
Congressmen may receive telephone calls, have a light lunch, or watch 
television. The House was engaged in the post-election "lame duck" 
session, finishing up legislative business which had been put off by cam- 
paign pressures. Waiting on the phone was a prominent citizen I had 
known and admired for years. He expressed his regret at my defeat at 
the polls the previous month, then made the surprising suggestion that 
I write a book about Israel's lobby. He even suggested the title. 

That telephone call started me down a fascinating trail that absorbed 
most of my time and energies for the next two years and culminated in 
this volume. The journey elicited great support from many people and 
entailed, from others, many frustrations. TTie magnitude and diversity 
of cooperation I received were surprising. The frustrations were not. 
Although there were many dark moments when I harbored evil thoughts 
about my friend for luring me into writing this book, there were rewards 
aplenty, and now I wish I could thank him by name in this space for 
making the suggestion. I cannot, for I promised him anonymity. 

I can name only one of the five people who contributed the most 
in the preparation of my manuscript — Robert W. Wichser, a good friend 
and for fourteen years director of my Washington staff, who perished 
in flood waters in December 1985. While the other four are enthusiastic 
about the text and convinced the book meets a long-standing need, they 
unanimously asked that their names not be mentioned in these acknowledg- 
ments. Recognizing the Israeli lobby's potential for malice, they agreed 
that such mention might jeopardize their careers. One said bluntly, "In 
helping you, I'm taking a big chance. If this gets out, I will be fired 
from my job." Others who helped expressed similar concern. Much of 
the information provided here is volunteered by career government offi- 
cials who want the public to be aware of how the lobby functions but 
insist that their own names be withheld. These requirements tell a lot 
about the sensitivity of the subject matter. 

Happily, I can acknowledge by name several people who provided 
yeoman support. I am especially indebted to Washington journalist Donald 
Neff , former Middle East correspondent for Time magazine and author 
of Warriors at Suez and Warriors for Jerusalem, and George W. Weller, 



v«7 Preface 

former foreign correspondent for the Chicago Daily News who now lives 
in Rome, for their extensive and valuable suggestions on organization 
and style. If you detect a professional touch here and there, credit these 
gentlemen. My gratitude also extends to a number of my former col- 
leagues in Congress and many citizens around the United States and else- 
where who provided both encouragement and cooperation, especially 
former Senator James Abourezk. 

I must also thank the word processor to which I was glued for eighteen 
months. The attachment was so constant that my wife, Lucille, occa- 
sionally described herself— without really complaining— as a Wang 
widow. In fact, when she first learned that I was thinking of writing this 
book, she offered to live on beans and water if need be to see the project 
to completion. 

The Spartan diet was unnecessary, thanks to a grant provided by 
Sangamon State University, Springfield, Illinois, and funded by the Ameri- 
can Middle East Peace Research Institute, a nonprofit organization based 
in Boston, Massachusetts. The grant covered most of the expenses I 
encountered in the preparation of the text. During this period I also 
received helpful income by speaking at chapter meetings of the American- 
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. 

My quest for a publisher began in March 1983 and was predictably 
long and frustrating. Declining to represent me, New York literary agent 
Alexander Wylie forecast with prophetic vision that no major U.S. pub- 
lisher would accept my book. He wrote, "It's a sad state of affairs." 
Bruce Lee of William Morrow and Company called my manuscript "out- 
standing," but his company concluded that publishing it "would cause 
trouble in the house and outside" and decided against "taking the heat." 
Robert Loomis of Random House called it an "important book" but 
reported that the firm's leadership decided the theme was "too sensi- 
tive." Twenty other publishers also said no. 

In July 1984, veteran publisher Lawrence Hill agreed to take the 
gamble. When he died in March 1988, I lost a friend, and the cause 
of human rights lost an able advocate. He would rejoice, I am sure, that 
this book now appears in a new updated edition. 

The response since publication of the first edition in June 1985 has 
been substantial. Despite informal but effective attempts to curtail its sale 
in the early months, They Dare to Speak Out became a best seller— nine 
weeks, for example, among the Washington Post top ten. Thanks in great 
measure to the enthusiasm of readers themselves, over 70,000 copies 
have been sold. Scores of readers made bulk purchases for distribution 
to their friends, business associates, and public libraries. It elicited reviews 
in fifty-two periodicals, invitations to appear on over eighty television 



Preface ix 

and radio programs, including NBC's "Today Show" and PBS's "Late 
Night America," and lectures on twenty-five campuses. 

In another heartening response, more than eight hundred readers have 
taken the trouble to locate me by telephone or mail. Most of them, con- 
cerned over the damage being done by Israel's lobby, ask, "Where do 
we go from here?" 

Many, I hope, will support the Council for the National Interest, 
Post Office Box 53048, Washington DC 20009, the newly-formed 
citizens' lobby mentioned in the last chapter of this new edition. Other 
worthy groups include the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Commit- 
tee, Suite 500, 4201 Connecticut Avenue NW, Washington DC 20008; 
the Arab American Institute, Suite 501, 918 16th Street NW, Washing- 
ton DC 20006; the National Association of Arab Americans, 2033 M 
Street NW, Washington DC 20036; The American Educational Trust, 
1900 18th St. NW, Washington DC 20009, toll-free 1-800-368-5788; 
and the National Council on U.S. -Arab Relations, Suite 515, 1735 Eye 
Street NW, Washington DC 20006. 

To keep up to date on Middle East developments, I suggest the 
monthly Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Box 53062, Washing- 
ton DC 20009; the monthly Israeli Foreign Affairs, Box 19580, 
Sacramento CA 95819; the fortnightly Middle East International, Suite 
306, 1700 17th Street NW, Washington DC 20009; the quarterly Arab 
American Affairs, Suite 411, 1730 M Street NW, Washington DC 20036; 
the quarterly Journal of Palestine Studies, Georgetown Station, Post Office 
Box 25301, Washington DC 20007. 

Paul Findley 
1040 West College 
Jacksonville, IL 62650 
June 1, 1989 



Introduction 



A Middle West Congressman 
Meets the Middle East 



"How did a Congressman from the corn-hog heartland of America get 
entangled in Middle East politics?" people ask. Like most rural Con- 
gressmen, I had no ethnic constituencies who lobbied me on their 
foreign interests. As expected, I joined the Agriculture Committee 
and worked mainly on issues like farming, budget and welfare reform. 

Newly appointed in 1972 to the subcommittee on Europe and the 
Middle East, I had represented the Springfield, Illinois, area for 12 
years without attracting much attention at home or abroad. 

Eight short years later, my involvement in Middle East politics 
would bring me infamy among many U.S. Jews, notoriety in Israel and 
applause throughout the Arab world. By 1980, in urban centers of pro- 
Israel activism— far from the local Jews in central Illinois who knew 
and trusted me, I found myself in the most expensive Congressional 
campaign in state history. Thanks to a flow of hostile dollars from both 
coasts and nearby Chicago, I became "the number one enemy of Is- 
rael 9 ' and my re-election campaign the principal target of Israel's lobby. 

Prodded by a professor at Illinois College, I had already begun to 
doubt the wisdom of United States policy in the Middle East when I 
first joined the subcommittee. For the most part, I kept these doubts 
private, but not because I feared the political consequences. In fact, I 
naively assumed I could question our policy anywhere without getting 
into trouble. I did not realize how deeply the roots of Israeli interests 
had penetrated U.S. institutions. 

Congressmen generally heard only the Israeli case. Arab Ameri- 
can lobbies, fledgling forces even today, were nonexistent. Arab em- 
bassies, which even today hire public relations experts only with 
reluctance, then showed little interest in lobbying. Even if a Congress- 

1 



2 They Dare to Speak Out 

man had wanted to hear the Arab viewpoint, he would have had 
difficulty finding an Arab spokesman to explain it. 

My personal involvement with Middle East politics started with a 
constituent problem that had no direct connection with the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. It began in the spring of 1973 when a letter arrived from Mrs. 
Evans Franklin, a constituent who wrote neighborhood news for a 
rural weekly newspaper I once edited. In this letter, she pleaded for my 
help in securing the release of her son, Ed, from a faraway prison. He 
had been convicted of espionage and sentenced to five years' solitary 
imprisonment in Aden, the capital of the Marxist People's Democratic 
Republic of (South) Yemen. After reading her plea, I had to consult a 
map. I knew only that Aden once had been a major British base. 

Had it not been for a series of cancelled airline flights, his mother 
told me, Franklin would never have set foot in Aden. Returning from 
Ethiopia to his teaching post in Kuwait, he was rerouted through Aden 
and then delayed again by the cancellation of his departing flight. His 
luck worsened. A camera buff and unaware of local restrictions, he 
photographed a prohibited area. The Adenese were still nervous about 
blonde-haired visitors, remembering the commando raid the British 
had conducted shortly after they left Aden six years earlier. When 
Franklin snapped the pictures, he was immediately arrested, kept in an 
interrogation center for months, and finally brought to trial, convicted 
and sentenced. My efforts to secure his release proceeded for the most 
part without aid from the State Department. Our government had had 
no relations, diplomatic or otherwise, with Aden since a 1969 coup 
moved the regime dramatically to the left. This meant the State Depart- 
ment could do nothing directly. I asked a friend in the Egyptian embassy 
in Washington to help. Franklin's parents, people of modest means 
living in a rural crossroads village, sent a request to Salim Rubyai Ali, 
South Yemen's president, seeking executive clemency. I sent a similar 
request. Our government asked the British to intervene through their 
embassy in Aden. There was no response to any of these initiatives. 

In December 1973 I visited Abdallah Ashtal, Aden's ambassador 
to the United Nations in New York, to ask if I could go personally to 
Aden and make a plea for Franklin's release. Ashtal, a short, hand- 
some, youthful diplomat who was taking evening graduate courses at 
New York University, promised a prompt answer. A message came 
back two weeks later that I would be welcome. 

If I decided to go, I would have to travel alone. I would be the first 
Congressman— House or Senate — to visit Aden since the Republic was 
established in 1967 and the first United States official to visit there 
since diplomatic relations were severed in the wake of the coup two 
years later. Although this was an exciting prospect, it also caused me 



Introduction 3 

some foreboding. Moreover, I had no authority as an envoy. South 
Yemen, sometimes called the Cuba of the Arab world, was regarded by 
our State Department as the most radical of the Arab states. A State 
Department friend did nothing to relieve my concern when he told me 
that Aden's foreign minister got his job "because he killed more oppo- 
nents than any other candidate." 

Troubling questions came to mind. How would I be received? I 
discussed the trip with Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., assistant secretary of 
state for Near East and South Asia affairs. I asked him, "If they lock 
me up, what will you do first?" He smiled and said, "Look for another 
Congressman to come get you out!" 

Still, I was probably the only person able to help. Franklin's 
mother told me, "I doubt if Ed can survive five years in a Yemen jail." 
My wife, Lucille, expressed deep concern over the prospects of the 
trip but agreed that I had little choice but to go. 

I also thought the trip might be an opportunity to open the door to 
better relations with a vital but little-known part of the world. With the 
imminent reopening of the Suez Canal, better relations with Aden 
could be important to United States interests in the Indian Ocean. 
After all, Aden, along with French-held Djibouti, was a guardian of a 
world-famous and vitally important strait, the gateway to the Suez 
Canal. If the Soviets, already present with aid missions and military 
advisers, succeeded in dominating the Aden government, they could 
effectively control the canal from the south. It was obvious that, be- 
yond the release of Franklin, the United States needed good relations. 

I decided that I must go. The trip was set for late March 1974. 

From Middle East scholars, I learned that Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger, who was soon to begin shuttle negotiations between 
Israel and Egypt, was held in high esteem in Aden. I asked him for a 
letter that I could take with me which would be as explicit as possible 
about United States-Aden relations. A personal letter arrived three 
days before I left. In it, Kissinger said he welcomed my "humanitarian 
mission" to Aden and added: "Should the occasion arise, you may wish 
to inform those officials whom you meet of our continuing commitment 
to work for an equitable and lasting Middle East peace and of our 
desire to strengthen our ties with the Arab world." 

The letter was addressed to me, not to the Aden government. It 
was a diplomatic "feeler." I hoped it would convince any officials I met 
that the United States wanted to establish normal relations. 

A good traveler always brings gifts. At the suggestion of an Egyp- 
tian friend, I secured scholarships from three colleges in Illinois to 
present to South Yemeni students. I also located and had specially 
bound two Arabic language translations of Carl Sandburg's biography 



4 They Dare to Speak Out 

of Lincoln, The Prairie Years. In addition, I also carried two small 
busts of Lincoln — my most celebrated constituent — hoping he would 
be known even in Aden. 

I left Washington early enough to visit Syria before heading south 
to Aden. Syria had not had normal diplomatic relations with the United 
States since the 1967 war with Israel, and despite its growing impor- 
tance, no member of the House of Representatives had visited there for 
five years. To my surprise, President Hafez Assad of Syria agreed to 
receive me without advance appointment. Perhaps he was intrigued 
with the presence of a United States Congressman who said he had an 
open mind about Middle East issues. 

Assad received me in the spacious second-floor reception room of 
his offices. A tall, thickset man with a prominent forehead and a warm, 
quiet manner, Assad made his points forcefully but without a hint of 
hostility. While sipping small cups of rich Syrian coffee, he voiced his 
pain over United States support of Israel's actions: "We are bitter 
about the guns and ammunition you provide to Israel, and why not? 
But bitterness is not hostility. In fact, we have very warm feelings 
about the American people. Despite the war, the Syrian people like 
Americans and have for years." 

While sympathizing, I took the initiative, urging him to restore full 
diplomatic relations and to take a page from the public relations book 
of the Israelis. I suggested that he come to the United States and take 
his case directly to the American people over television. 

Assad responded, "Perhaps we have made some mistakes. We 
should have better public relations. I agree with what you say and 
recommend, but I don't know when I can come to the United States." 

As I rose to leave, Assad said, "You have my mandate to invite 
members of your Congress to visit Syria as soon as possible. They will 
be most welcome. We want those who are critical as well as those who 
are friends to come." 

While I later extended Assad's invitation personally to many of 
my colleagues and, in a detailed official report, to all of them, few 
accepted. The first Congressional group did not arrive until 1978, four 
years later. 

After my interview with Assad, I was driven late at night from 
Damascus to Beirut for the flight to Aden. As our car approached the 
Syria-Lebanon border, I could hear the sound of Israel's shelling of 
Lebanon's Mt. Hermon, a sobering reminder that seven years after the 
1967 war the fighting still continued. 

In 1974, Beirut was still the "Paris of the Middle East," a western- 
like city with a lively night life and bustling commerce. A new Holiday 
Inn had just opened near the harbor. Every street seemed to boast two 



Introduction 5 

international banks, at least three bookstores and a dozen restaurants. 
A year later the Holiday Inn became a battleground between Phalangist 
militia, backed by Israel, and the Lebanese left coalition, including 
Palestinians, helped by various Arab governments and by Moscow. Its 
walls were ripped open by shells, its rooftop pavilion littered with the 
bodies of fallen snipers. The vicious civil war, which began in 1975, had 
turned Beirut into a city of rubble. 

But even in 1974, the Palestinians in the refugee camps did not 
share the prosperity of the city. I passed the hovels of Sabra and 
Shatila, where, nine years later, the massacre of hundreds of Palestin- 
ian civilians would shock the world. My embassy escort said, "These 
miserable camps haven't improved in 20 years." 

I also passed the Tel Zaatar refugee camp, whose wretched inhabi- 
tants would soon suffer a fate even more cruel. A year later that camp 
was besieged for 45 days by rightist "Christian" militias, armed and 
advised by Israel's Labor government. Fifteen thousand Palestinians 
died, many of them after the camp surrendered. Virtually every adult 
male survivor was executed. That slaughter was little noted by the 
world press. Hardly anyone, save the Palestinians, remembers it. 

At that time, the spring of 1974, I had no premonition of the 
tragedies to follow. I boarded the Aden-bound plane at Beirut with just 
one person's tragedy on my mind — that of Ed Franklin. 

Mission in Aden 

In Aden, to my surprise and pleasure, I was met by a delegation of 
five youthful officials, three of them cabinet ministers. Mine was the 
only gray hair in sight that night. The group had stayed up until 2 a.m. 
to meet the plane. "Welcome. We have your quarters ready," said the 
government's chief of protocol. Good news! This meant, I felt, that I 
would not be stuck off in a hotel room. My quarters turned out to be a 
rambling old building which years ago, in imperial days, was the resi- 
dence of the British air commander. A tree-shaded terrace — a rarity in 
Aden — looked over the great harbor, a strategic prize ever since white 
men first rounded the Cape of Good Hope in the sixteenth century. 
Blackbirds chattered overhead. 

I received permission to visit Franklin at 7:15 that first night. I 
found him under guard in an apartment on the second floor of a small 
modern building. When I entered, he was standing by a couch in the 
livingroom. We had never seen each other before. 

"I presume you are Congressman Findley." 

Despite the emotion of the occasion, I smiled, sensing how Dr. 
Livingston must have felt years before in Africa. 



6 They Dare to Speak Out 

After 16 months of confinement, Franklin was thin, almost gaunt. 
His trousers were several sizes too big, his blonde hair was neatly 
combed, his face cleanly shaved and he was surprisingly well tanned. 
He looked much older than his 34 years. 

We were able to talk alone. I said, "You're thin, but you look 
well." He answered, "I'm very glad you came, and I feel pretty well. 
Much better now that you're here. A few days ago when I used a 
mirror for the first time in months, I was shocked at how I look." He 
said he had got the tan from daily exercise in the prison yard, adding 
that he had been transferred to the flat two days before, obviously 
because authorities did not want me to see the prison. 

"Here is a box of food items your family asked me to deliver." 
When I said that, his face, which until then had displayed no emotion, 
fell. "I guess this means I am not going home with you." 

I said, "I don't know." 

Franklin changed the subject. "I had to leave my Bible at the 
prison. I hated to, because I like to read it every day." 

I said, "Many people have been praying for you." 

He responded, "Yes, I knew at once, even before I got word in 
letters from home. I could feel it." 

Franklin told me he had not been physically abused but said the 
food was terrible and some of the rules bothered him. "I am not al- 
lowed to have a pen and paper. I like to write. I once wrote poetry on a 
sack, but then my pencil was discovered and taken from me. I don't 
know why." Still, he seemed to hold no grudge against his captors. "I 
like the Arab world. Maybe someday when the American embassy is 
reopened, I could even get a job here." 

I assured him: "I'll do my very best to secure your release, or at 
least shorten your term. That's why I'm here, and I'll try to see you 
again before I leave. I'll also try to get approval for you to have pencil 
and paper." 

On the way back to my quarters, I passed on Franklin's request for 
writing materials to my escort officer, who answered simply, "I will 
report your request." I spent Friday, a Moslem day of worship, touring 
the nearby desolate countryside. The main tourist attraction is an an- 
cient, massive stone well built to store the area's scarce rainfall. That 
evening the British consul, a compassionate man who had occasionally 
delivered reading material to Franklin, joined me for dinner. The Brit- 
ish long ago understood the importance of maintaining diplomatic rela- 
tions even with hostile regimes and, shortly after their stormy 
departure from Aden, they had established an embassy there. 

Saturday morning Foreign Minister M. J. Motie came to my quar- 
ters for a long discussion of United States-Yemen relations. The plight 



Introduction 7 

of the Palestinians under Israeli occupation was at the top of his 
agenda, Franklin at the top of mine. He charged, "The United States is 
helping Saudi Arabia foment subversion along Yemen's borders." I told 
him I was troubled by this charge, was unaware of such activity and I 
hoped to help improve relations. Motie responded, "While the past is 
not good, the present looks better, but we need a substantial sign of 
friendship. For example, we need aid in buying wheat." 

After the discussion, I spent a long and fruitless afternoon trying 
to fill a shopping list my family had sent with me. The bazaar had little 
but cheap Japanese radios and a few trinkets. It had even fewer shop- 
pers. I returned to the guest house, finding, to my astonishment, an 
assortment of gifts, each neatly wrapped — among them a jambia, the 
traditional curved Yemeni dagger, and a large ceremonial pipe. The 
gifts were accompanied by a card: "With the compliments of the presi- 
dent." 

Were these gifts merely sweeteners to take the place of Franklin on 
my homeward journey? Or were they a harbinger of success? I dared 
not believe the latter. I had received no hint that the government would 
even shorten Franklin's sentence, but, at least, it acceded to his re- 
quest for paper and pencil. 

My second visit with Franklin was more relaxed than the first. He 
accepted the pencils and paper I brought him with the comment, "I 
hope I won't need them except for tonight." I responded that I had no 
reason to hope he would be able to leave with me, but, strictly on my 
own hunch, felt that he would be released soon. 

I met with President Ali the night before my scheduled departure 
inside the heavily guarded compound where the president both lived 
and had his offices. I was ushered into a long reception hall adorned 
with blue flowered carpeting and gold drapes down three sides. The 
fourth side opened into a large courtyard. Two rows of ceiling fans 
whirred overhead. In the center of this large hall was a lonely group of 
gold-upholstered sofas and chairs. 

By the time I reached the circle of furniture, President Ali, the 
foreign minister of Aden and an interpreter were walking through the 
same door I had entered. I needed no introduction. I had seen Ali's 
picture many places around Aden, but frankly it did him little justice. 
He was a tall, well-built man of 40. His black hair had a touch of gray. 
His skin was dark, his bearing dignified. He was soft-spoken, and two 
gold teeth glistened when he smiled. 

After exchanging greetings, I thanked him for his hospitality and 
for the gifts. Then I launched into my own presentation of gifts: first, 
the Lincoln book and bust, then the scholarships. 

What he was waiting for, of course, was the letter from Kissinger 



8 They Dare to Speak Out 

which would indicate the weight the United States gave my mission. 
When I handed it to him, I tried to broaden its importance. 

"Perhaps your excellency will permit me to explain,'* I said. This 
letter presents formally the desire of the U.S. to re-establish diplomatic 
relations. This is important. Our government needs these relations in 
order to understand Aden's policies and problems. The president of 
the United States and the secretary of state are limited in foreign pol- 
icy. They can do only whatever the Congress will support, so it is also 
important for Congressmen to gain a better understanding of Aden's 
situation and of the Arab world in general." 

Ali responded: "Aden is the shining example of the Republic. 
Other areas of our country are quite different. The people are much 
poorer." I gulped. I had seen only Aden, Ali's "shining example" which 
struck me as very poor, so I could only guess at conditions elsewhere. 

While I took notes, Ali told me that the anti-poverty efforts of his 
government were handicapped by "subversion" from neighboring 
states. He said, bluntly, "The belief is held by the people of our country 
that all suffering, all damage caused by subversives, is really the work 
of the United States government. All military equipment we capture is 
United States equipment." Some of it, he said, was outside this build- 
ing for me to examine. 

I interjected that this information was not known in the United 
States, underscoring the need for diplomatic relations, so this sort of 
injury would stop. He nodded. "I favor relations with the United 
States, but they must relate to grievances now seen by my people." He 
added, "Aden does not wish to be isolated from the United States." 

Ali thanked me for the gifts, indicating the interview was over. I 
sensed this was my long-awaited opportunity, my chance to launch into 
an appeal for Franklin. 

It was not needed. Ali interrupted by saying simply, "Regarding 
the prisoner, as soon as I heard of your interest in him, I saw to it that 
he received preferential treatment. I have carefully considered your 
request and your desire that he be released. I have decided to grant 
your request. When you want him, you may have him." 

I could scarcely believe what I had heard. "When you want him, 
you may have him." I was so overcome with joy I half-stumbled leav- 
ing the room. Franklin was free. In fact, he was waiting at my quarters 
when I returned. We were on the plane at 6 o'clock the next morning, 
headed for Beirut, New York and then St. Louis — where a joyous 
family welcomed Franklin home. 

I am convinced the main reason for Franklin's release was the 
decision by the government to probe ever so cautiously for better 
relations with the United States. Caution was necessary, because there 



Introduction 9 

were those in both nations who did not wish to see relations improved. 
Ali was the least Marxist of a three-man ruling junta. In the State 
Department, even some "Arabists," still resentful over the Yemeni ex- 
pulsion of the United States presence years before, rejected Aden as 
nothing but a "training ground for PLO terrorists/' Others, such as 
Kissinger, felt differently. Ed Franklin had provided the opportunity to 
begin the probing. 

But the United States government fiddled, hedged and delayed 
three years. Jimmy Carter replaced Gerald R. Ford in the White 
House, and Cyrus Vance became secretary of state. Our government 
turned down Aden's request to buy wheat on credit, then refused to 
consider a bid to buy three used airliners. The United States kept 
putting off even preliminary talks. At a second meeting with me in 
September 1977— this time in New York where he addressed the United 
Nations — Ali restated his desire for renewed relations with the United 
States and suggested that I report our discussion to Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance. I did so, and after my report, Vance and Foreign Minister 
Motie of South Yemen agreed to exploratory talks. To me, this ap- 
peared like a momentous breakthrough. The talks were to begin in 
Aden in just a few weeks, shortly after New Year's Day. Sadly, pro- 
crastination took over. 

No precise date for the meetings had been set when I returned to 
the Middle East with a number of other Congressmen in January 1978. 
I altered my own itinerary long enough for a side trip to Aden. Before I 
left the group, we met with Secretary of State Vance, whose travels 
happened to cross ours, and with Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Fahd — 
a large, impressive man who spoke eloquent English and was to be- 
come the Saudi monarch. Fahd spoke approvingly of my efforts in 
Aden and asked me to tell officials in Aden that Saudi Arabia was ready 
to resume sending them economic aid. 

"It's a Good Omen" 

When I arrived, the scene in Aden had improved. South Yemen 
had already exchanged ambassadors with its former arch-enemy, Saudi 
Arabia — even though the two nations still had disputes over territory. 
Aden had also just agreed to diplomatic relations with Jordan. The 
local radio station no longer harangued American and Saudi "imperial- 
ists." This time my wife, Lucille, accompanied me. We were assigned 
to the same guest house I had used before, where the principal change 
was the presence of a well-stocked refrigerator. 

President Ali received us in the same spacious hall, along with an 
honor guard. Although he avoided comment on Saudi Arabia's offer of 
aid, Ali spoke of Crown Prince Fahd with great warmth. 



10 They Dare to Speak Out 

Then he added, "We are looking forward to the expected arrival of 
the diplomatic delegation from the United States before the end of the 
month." I am sure my face fell. I knew the delegation was not coming 
that month. In fact, the mission had been delayed indefinitely. A few 
days before, Vance had told me the bad news but had not explained why. 
When I expressed the hope that Ali had been notified of the delay, 
Vance had replied, "We will take care of it." But, unfortunately, no one 
did. 

Ali was left waiting, day by day, for a group that did not arrive. I 
did not feel free to tell him of the change, so I listened and tried to look 
hopeful. I knew the delay would strengthen his critics who opposed 
reconciliation with the United States. 

I changed the subject: "Some of our strategists say you have let 
the Soviets establish a naval base here. Do you have a comment?" 

He strongly protested: "That is not true. We do not allow the 
Soviets, or any foreign nation, to have a military base in our territory. 
But we do cooperate with the Soviets because they help us." Ali con- 
cluded our discussion by giving me a message to take to Washington: 

Please extend my warm greetings to President Carter. Kindly inform him that 
we are eager to maintain smooth and friendly relations between Democratic 
Yemen and the United States. We recognize that President Carter is concerned 
about maintaining friendly relations with all countries. We feel that is a positive 
policy. We believe our relations should be further strengthened. 

As we parted, I gave Ali a pottery vase our daughter, Diane, had 
made for him. He said, "That's very nice. Please thank your daughter. I 
admire it." Then he stepped to the door to admire something else, rain, 
which is a rarity in Aden. 

"It's a good omen," he said. 

I left Aden more convinced than ever that diplomatic relations 
would help the United States and our friends in the region. The United 
States and Saudi Arabia had a common interest in minimizing the 
Soviet presence in South Yemen. We needed a diplomatic mission 
there. Back in Washington, I missed no opportunity to press this rec- 
ommendation on Secretary Vance and on the White House staff. 

At the White House a month later I was able to make a personal 
appeal to President Jimmy Carter. Carter said he was "surprised and 
pleased" by Ali's message. 

"His words are surprisingly warm," he observed. "We've been 
hoping to improve our situation there." I urgently argued that there 
should be no further delays: "Another cancellation would be baffling to 
President Ali, to say the least." 



Introduction 1 1 

Carter thanked me, and, as Vance had earlier, told me he would 
"take care of the matter." 

Carter was true to his word. Five months after my last meeting 
with Ali, a team of State Department officials arranged to visit Aden on 
June 26, 1978, for "exploratory talks" to discuss in a "non-committal 
way" the resumption of diplomatic negotiations. Ali was to meet them 
on the day of their arrival. 

It was too late. Aden's Marxist hardliners decided to act. Con- 
cerned by Ali's probing for improved relations with the United States 
and Saudi Arabia, radicals seized fighter planes, strafed the presi- 
dential quarters, took control of the government, and on the day the 
U.S. delegation was scheduled to arrive, arrested Ali. He was executed 
by a firing squad. Ambassador Ashtal called from New York to tell me 
the delegation would still be welcome, but the mission was scrubbed. 
The group, after traveling as far as Sa'ana, capital of North Yemen, 
returned to Washington. Distressed over the execution of Ali, I asked 
Ashtal for an explanation. He told me, "It's an internal matter of no 
concern to the outside world." 

Still, Ali's fate concerned me deeply. And still does. I have often 
wondered whether my goodwill and his merciful act toward Ed Frank- 
lin contributed to his downfall. 

My journeys to Aden had broader personal importance than my 
ultimately unsuccessful efforts to re-establish diplomatic relations. 
After years on Capitol Hill, I had heard for the first time the Arab 
perspective, particularly on the plight of the Palestinians. I began to 
read about the Middle East, to talk with experts and to begin to under- 
stand the region. Gradually, Arabs emerged as human beings. 

The word of my experiences got around, and soon my office be- 
came a stopping place for people going to and from the Middle East — 
scholars, business people, clerics, government officials. It was unusual 
for anyone in Congress to visit Arab countries and take an interest in 
their problems. I began to speak out in Congress. I argued from what I 
considered to be a U.S. viewpoint — neither pro-Israel nor pro-Arab. I 
said that our unwillingness to talk directly to the political leadership of 
the Palestinians, like our reluctance to talk to President Ali in Yemen, 
handicapped our search for peace. Diplomatic communication with 
other parties, however alien, however small, is a convenience to our 
government. It does not need to be viewed as an endorsement. Thus, I 
asked, why not talk directly to PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, the ac- 
knowledged political voice of the Palestinians? One reason, I dis- 
covered, was that Henry Kissinger, who had provided help on my long 
road to Aden, had, yielding to an Israeli request, agreed not to com- 



12 They Dare to Speak Out 

municate formally with the PLO until they recognized the right of 
Israel to exist — a tough demand, especially in light of Israel's flat re- 
fusal to accept a new Palestinian state as its neighbor! 

I decided to communicate with Arafat to help break the ice. I had 
first met the PLO leader in January 1978 during that Congressional 
mission to the Middle East when I saw Ali for the last time. Joining me 
were several colleagues, Democrats Leo Ryan of California, who was 
later to die in the violence at Jonestown, Guyana, and Helen Meyner of 
New Jersey. A Republican Congressman also attended, but, fearful 
that the news would cause him problems with Israeli activists in his 
district, asked me not to mention his presence. Before the meeting, I 
had many of the same misgivings that I felt before going to Aden four 
years earlier. I was wary, because meeting Arafat crossed the chalkline 
which Kissinger, at Israel's demand, had drawn. 

•7 Stand Behind the Words" 

When I crossed the line, to my surprise I discovered that Arafat, 
who received us in a heavily guarded second-floor apartment, was not 
a wild-eyed, gun-waving fanatic. He spoke softly and listened atten- 
tively. He met us bare-headed — he was nearly bald. This took us by 
surprise, because in public he was always attired in the Palestinian 
headdress or military cap. To questions about PLO terrorism, he re- 
peated his usual litany, but coming from the depth of his experience it 
seemed somewhat more forceful: "I am a freedom fighter. We are 
fighting for justice for our people, the four million Palestinians dispos- 
sessed and scattered by three decades of war." 

Later that year, I had a second and more productive meeting with 
Arafat. This time I was alone. We met in the same apartment as before. 
With him were Abu Hassan, his security leader who was soon to die in 
a car-bombing, in Beirut, and Mahmoud Labadi, his public affairs 
officer, who later deserted Arafat and joined Syrian-supported hardlin- 
ers. Such was the ferment in that tortured group. I wanted Arafat to 
clarify the terms under which the PLO would live at peace with Israel. 
Was he ready to recognize Israel? In a four-hour discussion late into 
the night, he provided the answer. Working carefully word by word, 
and phrase by phrase, he fashioned a statement and authorized me to 
report it publicly. 

I wrote the words and read them back several times so he could 
ponder their full meaning. When it was done I asked Arafat if he would 
sign his name on the paper bearing the words. He answered, "No, I 
prefer not to sign my name, but I stand behind the words. You may 
quote me." 



Introduction 13 
The declaration Arafat gave me follows: 

The PLO will accept an independent Palestinian state consisting of the West 
Bank and Gaza, with a connecting corridor, and in that circumstance will 
renounce any and all violent means to enlarge the territory of that state. I 
would reserve the right of course to use non-violent, that is to say diplomatic 
and democratic means, to bring about the eventual unification of all of Pales- 
tine. We will give de facto recognition to the State of Israel. We would live at 
peace with all our neighbors.— Damascus, November 30, 1978. 

I was elated — perhaps too much so. Arafat's pledge contrasted 
sharply with the harsh rhetoric of earlier Palestinian public statements 
which called, in effect, for the elimination of the state of Israel. It was 
not, of course, everything Israel or the United States would want, but 
it was an encouraging start. If true, it belied the image of the fanatic 
who believed only in violence. During the long interview we covered 
many points, and, determined to protect my credibility, I asked Arafat 
to identify statements he did not wish to make public. The carefully- 
drafted pledge was not one of these. He wanted the world to know, 
and, clearly, he expected a positive response from President Carter. To 
use one of the PLO leader's favorite expressions, he had "played a 
card" in authorizing me to transmit this statement. It was a step beyond 
anything his organization had officially proclaimed. 

Tragically, it brought no reaction from the U.S. government. I later 
learned that Secretary of State Vance privately recommended that the 
administration "take note" of it, though no public announcement was 
made. In subsequent public interviews, Arafat — always a nimble ac- 
tor — sidestepped questions about the pledge. 

Nevertheless, Carter's newly-appointed special ambassador to the 
Middle East, Robert Strauss, a prominent Democrat who had previ- 
ously been chairman of the Democratic National Committee, was in- 
trigued with my communication with Arafat and became a frequent 
visitor to my office. I often thought that bringing Arafat and Strauss 
together would be important to the peace process. 

The fact that Strauss is Jewish would have helped thousands of 
Jews in Israel to put aside their government's hard line. But Strauss, 
despite his unique intimate relationship with Carter and his demon- 
strated ability to negotiate complicated problems on both the interna- 
tional and domestic scene, never received full presidential backing on 
the Middle East. Late in his diplomatic mission, just before he was 
shifted to the chairmanship of Carter's ill-fated campaign for re- 
election, Strauss told me, "If I had had my way, I would have been 
talking directly to Arafat months ago." 

I found myself being drawn deeper and deeper into Middle East 



14 They Dare to Speak Out 

politics. Early one Sunday morning in August 1979, Assistant Secre- 
tary of State Harold Saunders called me in Illinois to ask for my help. 
At Arafat's behest, Kuwait was demanding consideration of a United 
Nations resolution sympathetic to the Palestinians. The United States, 
because of Israel's objections, would not support this resolution but 
did not want to go on record against it. The vote was scheduled for the 
following Tuesday. Given more time, Saunders hoped to find a formula 
which would satisfy both the Arab states and the United States. Mindful 
of President Carter's rule against even informal talks with the PLO, he 
carefully avoided directly asking that I call Arafat. Nevertheless, I 
knew Saunders well enough to grasp the purpose of his call. He hoped I 
could persuade Arafat to cancel the scheduled vote. 

My call to Arafat's office in Beirut went through instantly, unusual 
for the chaotic Beirut exchange. I urged Arafat to delay the U.N. 
confrontation, arguing that this would cost him nothing while winning 
him the gratitude of the United States. Two hours later Arafat sent 
word to Kuwait causing the vote to be postponed. This spared the U.S. 
an embarrassing public spat with Arab friends. That same weekend, 
Carter's ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, acted less 
cautiously than Saunders and met on the same issue with Zuhdi Terzi, 
the PLO observer at the United Nations. So firm was Carter's edict 
against talking with the PLO that this incident led to Young's resigna- 
tion. 

I was soon on the phone again with the State Department. This 
time my help, through Arafat, was needed in getting the U.S. hostages 
out of our embassy in Tehran. In our 1978 meeting, the PLO leader had 
told me of his close relationship with the revolutionaries in Iran, and I 
saw this crisis as an opportunity for Arafat to help in a humanitarian 
cause and perhaps open the door for peaceful negotiations on a broader 
scale. This time Arafat was away from headquarters, but I had a long 
talk with his deputy, Mahmoud Labadi, whom I had met during my 
second interview with Arafat. 

He reminded me that Arafat had taken my advice on the United 
Nations confrontation but, in Labadi's words, "got nothing in return." 
He was right. No compromise resolution was ever accepted, and 
Arafat got little thanks. Labadi told me he disagreed with me regarding 
the situation in Iran but would report my arguments and recom- 
mendation carefully to his leader. Once more Arafat cooperated. He 
sent an envoy to Khomeini, and, according to Saunders, that envoy 
successfully arranged the release of the first eleven hostages. 

For this, the Carter Administration thanked Arafat privately — 
very privately. Publicly, Carter spokesmen did nothing to discourage 
the unfounded speculation that the PLO had actually conspired with 



Introduction 15 

Iran to seize the hostages. CBS's Marvin Kalb reported darkly that 
"someone" had been heard speaking Arabic (Iranians speak Farsi, a 
different language altogether) inside the embassy compound. This 
somehow seemed to mean that the PLO was responsible. Yet the re- 
verse was true. Just before he left office, Secretary of State Vance told 
me that he was in "almost daily" communication with Arafat and his 
staff enlisting PLO help during the protracted Iranian hostage ordeal, 
but he never said so in public. 

On several occasions during off-the-record meetings at the White 
House, I pleaded with the president to acknowledge publicly the mod- 
erate cooperative course chosen by Arafat and warned that failure to 
do so would strengthen more radical forces. Carter listened but never 
followed my advice. I learned later that Vice President Walter Mon- 
dale, more than any other personality in the Administration, had ar- 
gued persuasively against any public statements which acknowledged 
PLO cooperation. 

Mahmoud Labadi never forgave Arafat for this cooperation. Three 
years later he deserted the PLO leader and joined the rebels laying 
siege to Arafat in Tripoli. In explaining his defection, Labadi de- 
nounced Arafat by denouncing the aid Carter had ignored, "He 
[Arafat] gave far too many concessions to the U.S. and to the Israelis 
and he got nothing back. We think that we should step up armed 
resistance against the Israeli occupation." Labadi and his defecting 
comrades turned their weapons against Arafat, predicting — wrongly — 
that military measures could deliver for the Palestinian people what the 
PLO chief's diplomacy apparently could not. 

Throughout 1979 and 1980, while deploring Palestinian violence, I 
also did my utmost to get the Carter Administration to pressure Israel 
to halt its repeated military attacks on Lebanon. Israel had begun 
periodic heavy bombing of villages and even areas in Beirut. The 
bombings were killing innocent civilians. Also, the planes and bombs 
were supplied by the United States. Finally Secretary of State Vance 
took an unusual step. He issued a formal written report to Congress 
stating that Israel "may have violated" the United States law which 
declared that United States-supplied weapons could be used only in 
self-defense. While the Administration did not take the next logical 
step of suspending military aid to Israel because the law was violated, 
the "may have violated" announcement made a point. It was one of 
those rare occasions when a United States administration has pub- 
licly rebuked Israel. 

Behind the scenes, Carter was tougher— but not for very long. He 
sent a diplomat to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin's office dur- 
ing the summer of 1980 with a warning that U.S. aid to Israel would be 



16 They Dare to Speak Out 

imperiled if Israel's air attacks against Lebanon continued. The ul- 
timatum got results. Begin backed down, immediately phoned his Air 
Force chief and ordered the attacks stopped. 

Later that summer Carter's resolve faded as the November elec- 
tions approached. Israel resumed its use of U.S.-supplied weapons 
against Lebanon, but Carter fell silent. My protests were lonely on 
Capitol Hill and largely ignored by the makers of policy in the Adminis- 
tration. 

My efforts did not, however, go unnoticed elsewhere. I became 
something of a curiosity, if not a celebrity, appearing on national televi- 
sion, interviewed on the radio and quoted in newspapers and maga- 
zines internationally. At times it was heady stuff. Ed Franklin's mother 
must have marveled at how her letter had changed my life. 

Turmoil in the Middle West 

While I was organizing my one-man peace initiative, my critics 
were organizing to put me out of office. Partisan critics back home, 
who had watched my re-election margins reach landslide proportions — 
I received 70 percent of the votes cast in 1978 — correctly surmised that 
my unusual activities in foreign policy would provide them with the 
money to attack me in the upcoming elections. Beginning in the spring 
of 1979, an aggressive former state legislator, David Robinson, strongly 
encouraged by pro-Israel activists, began campaigning fulltime for the 
Democratic nomination for the Congressional seat I had held for nine- 
teen years. Then, three months before the March 1980 primary, David 
Nuessen, the popular Republican mayor of Quincy, Illinois, entered 
the primary election, challenging my renomination in a professionally 
managed campaign that was supported substantially by pro-Israel 
political action committees and individuals. The contributions financed 
a relentless pummeling that bruised me more than I realized. I 
squeaked through the Republican primary with only 55 percent of the 
vote. 

It was a year of surprises, the greatest being the reaction to my 
candidacy of Dr. Arthur Burns, former chairman of the Federal Re- 
serve Board and now ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Just after the primary election, I explained my campaign plight during a 
telephone conversation on legislative matters, and Burns responded 
generously, "We simply cannot afford to lose you. Your re-election is 
very important to the entire nation." Gratified, I made a modest re- 
quest: "If you would put those sentiments in a letter that I could use in 
the campaign, that would be a great help." 

His endorsement was not a high priority objective. In fact, I did 



Introduction 17 

not even think to ask for it until he praised my record. But I expected 
Burns to agree without hesitation. Why not? The courtesy was routine 
for a Republican as senior as I, and Burns had been not only a lifelong 
and outspoken Republican, but a close friend throughout my career in 
Congress. Several years earlier, at my request, he had spoken at the 
commencement program of my alma mater, Illinois College. Our views 
on economic and fiscal issues were the same. 

His answer was the deepest wound of a traumatic year: "Oh, I 
couldn't do that. It's your views on the PLO. I'm sorry." 

I was stupefied. I am used to surprises — and disappointments — 
but this refusal left me speechless. 

A lesson? No event, before or since, disclosed to me so forcefully 
the hidden leverage of the Israeli lobby on the U.S. political scene. This 
great, kind, generous Jewish elder statesman, a personal friend for 
twenty years, could not ignore the lobby and say a public good word 
for my candidacy. I report this episode because, when a great man like 
Arthur Burns feels he must keep his views private, lesser men and 
women who would speak out face an enormous challenge. 

Meanwhile, Democrat Robinson solicited campaign contributions 
through advertising in Jewish newspapers from coast to coast, stirring 
up interest by calling me a "practicing anti-Semite, who is one of the 
worst enemies that Jews and Israel have ever faced in the history of the 
U.S. Congress." He drew funds from each of the fifty states. In all, the 
campaign cost $1.2 million — the most expensive in Illinois history. We 
each spent about $600,000. University students from New York and 
California, as well as other states, came to central Illinois to staff 
Robinson's phone banks and handle other campaign chores. 

"Dirty tricks" dogged me even when I wasn't campaigning and 
away from my district. The Chicago Council on Foreign Relations 
asked me to speak on foreign policy, and midway through my lecture 
on foreign policy one evening in Chicago, a man shouted from a door- 
way: "We've received a call. There's a bomb in the room." The crowd 
of 500 made a fast exit. The police later found a pipe loaded with 
bubble gum placed in the grand piano on the stage. Later, Robinson 
activists drove all the way to Detroit, Michigan, where I was a delegate 
to the Republican convention, to picket and to amuse onlookers with 
the chant, "Paul, Paul, he must go. He supports the PLO." 

Trapped on a Bus with Percy 

At first, my plight escaped the attention of the Reagan presidential 
campaign. In fact, when his scheduling office learned that I was having 
a fund-raising luncheon in Springfield, his manager asked if Reagan 



18 They Dare to Speak Out 

could stop by since he would be nearby that day. That unsolicited 
warmth quickly chilled. When he was scheduled to visit Illinois, New 
York City organizers warned Reagan's managers: "Appear friendly 
with Findley and you lose New York." This led them to take unusual 
measures to keep their candidate a safe distance from me. 

Springfield, located in the heart of my district, posed a problem, 
because it is the home of the first Republican president, Abraham 
Lincoln, and therefore a Mecca for Republicans. During a day in Il- 
linois, a Republican presidential candidate simply could not pass by 
Springfield. The Reagan camp was concerned about how to make the 
expected pilgrimage and still keep me at arm's length. 

Greg Newell, chief of scheduling, first planned to finesse the prob- 
lem by having Reagan deliver a major address from Lincoln's home at 
the very moment he knew I would be attending my major fundraiser of 
the year halfway across town. Just for insurance, Newell made it a 
deep finesse by moving Reagan's Springfield appearance all the way 
across town to the Lincoln Tomb instead of the home. He also 
scrubbed Reagan's speech, a decision to minimize press interest in the 
Springfield stop. 

I realized, however, that many of my supporters would also want 
to see Reagan when he came to town. To accommodate them (and 
ensure good attendance at my own function), I rescheduled my fund- 
raiser early enough so those attending — myself included — could attend 
the Reagan appearance at the tomb. 

Reagan's manager passed an order quietly, or so they thought: 
"Under no circumstance is Findley to get near Reagan," even though 
elsewhere in Illinois, Congressional candidates were to appear on 
speaking platforms with him. Learning of the order, my manager, Don 
Norton, vented his outrage to Reagan headquarters. The Reagan team 
shifted gears again. This time they declared that all Congressmen were 
to be treated alike during the day in Illinois. None was to share the 
speaking platform with Reagan. Congressman Ed Madigan, irritated 
when told he must either speak before Reagan's arrival in Bloomington 
that day or wait until Reagan had left the platform, made no speech at 
all. 

At Springfield, Reagan campaign staffer Paul Russo had only one 
assignment, but it was an important one. He was to keep me out of 
camera range when Reagan was nearby. I was literally coralled behind 
a rope 50 feet away while Reagan was photographed in the ceremonial 
"rubbing Lincoln's nose" on a statue at the tomb entrance. 

At the next stop, a coal mine near Springfield, Russo's team tried 
to keep me on a bus and in the process trapped my friend, Senator 
Charles H. Percy, too. The purpose was to keep only me away from 



Introduction 19 

Reagan during his remarks to the crowd. But Percy had the misfortune 
to be on the bus with me, so he too was detained. Together we managed 
to force the door open but only after Reagan had concluded his re- 
marks and left the area. 

Bob Hope Backs Out 

The "panic" even spread to Hollywood. Bob Hope, who never 
wavered under enemy fire on war fronts in World War II and Korea and 
withstood heavy criticism for his support of President Nixon's Viet- 
nam policies, encountered a new and more devastating line of fire when 
he agreed to appear at a fund-raising event for me in Springfield. 

Two years earlier I had organized a 75th birthday party for Hope in 
the House of Representatives. It was the most fun-filled moment in the 
House I can remember. Hope and his wife sat in the gallery as one 
Congressman after another voiced their praise of the great entertainer. 
The tributes filled 14 pages of the Congressional Record. 

Gratefully recalling the unique party, Hope agreed to help in my 
1980 campaign. His manager, Ward Grant, knowing from the start that 
I was being opposed by pro-Israel activists because of my work on 
Middle East policy, declared, "We need men in Congress who speak 
their mind." 

Coast-to-coast pressure quickly brought a change. Don Norton 
recalls an urgent telephone message he received from Hope's manager: 

Grant told me that Hope was getting tremendous pressure from Jews and non- 
Jews all over the country. He said it's gone to the point where Hope's lawyer of 
35 years, who is Jewish, has threatened to quit. The pressure was beyond 
belief, like nothing they had ever experienced before, and Hope just couldn't 
come. 

Stunned, Norton pleaded that the event was widely publicized, all 
arrangements made, tickets sold and enthusiasm high. His plea was to 
no avail. When Norton told me of the crisis, I tried repeatedly to get a 
phone call through to Hope himself, hoping to persuade him to recon- 
sider. 

Failing to get a call through, I wrote a confidential letter, giving 
Hope details of my unpublicized endeavors the year before to promote 
understanding between PLO leader Yasser Arafat and Robert Strauss, 
President Carter's special emissary to the Middle East. I sent him 
copies of messages I had transmitted at the request of the two leaders. I 
asked Hope to keep the information confidential, because then — as 
now — our government was maintaining a public posture of refusing to 
communicate with the PLO. This letter brought no response, nor were 
my phone calls answered. 



20 They Dare to Speak Out 

A happy surprise. Strauss, himself Jewish and a prominent Demo- 
crat, agreed to help. Encountering Strauss one afternoon on the steps 
of the House of Representatives, I explained my problem and asked 
him if he would be willing to talk to Hope and explain to him that I got 
in hot water with certain Jews simply by trying to work for my country 
and for peace in the Middle East. 

By then Strauss had left his diplomatic post and was serving as 
chairman of Carter's ill-fated campaign for re-election. In a remarkable 
gesture of magnanimity to a Republican in the midst of a hotly con- 
tested election, Strauss agreed, adding: "Maybe I can help him under- 
stand the 'crazy' pressure he's getting." He gave me phone numbers 
where Hope could reach him. 

In a wire to Hope I said: "[Strauss] will be glad to talk with you or 
anyone about the value of my work and what he described as the 'crazy 
pressure' you have been receiving." 

By then, however, the "crazy" pressure had taken its toll, and 
Hope never made the call. I still have a souvenir of my chat with 
Strauss. It bears the phone number he gave me and my record of his 
parting words: "I wish you the best. I hope we both make it November 
4, because we need to work together on the problems that remain." 

A few days later, I finally got a call through to Hope. He was not 
his usual bubbly self. I assured him it had never occurred to me that he 
would have such an avalanche of protest calls, but now that the event 
had been scheduled it would hurt if he failed to come. 

Hope interjected, "I read those letters you sent me. You should go 
public on this. Defend yourself with the facts." I said, "I just can't do 
that. It is highly secret information, and releasing it might hurt the 
peace process Carter is trying to advance." He paused, then said, "I 
just don't need this problem. I've been getting all these calls. It's too 
much pressure. I don't want to get involved." 

Hope did not come, but, happily, only one ticket holder asked for a 
refund. The sell-out crowd heard a stirring address by Congressman 
Guy Vander Jagt, who filled in at the last minute. 

Lobby pressures also intruded when former President Gerald R. 
Ford agreed to appear in my behalf, this time in Alton, Illinois. 

The first sign of trouble was a call from Pfcdm Springs in which 
Ford's secretary reported that the former president had to cancel his 
date because his staff had mistakenly booked him to speak at a meeting 
of the Michigan Bar Association the same day. There was no other time 
that Ford could help me, the caller said, before election day. To deter- 
mine if some accommodation was possible, my assistant, Bob Wichser, 
called the Michigan Bar Association, only to learn that there was no 
conflict — no event was scheduled. 



Introduction 21 

I was puzzled* I had worked closely with Ford during the 16 years 
he was Republican leader of the House, noting with admiration that he 
had never let disagreement on a policy issue keep him from cam- 
paigning for Republican Congressmen seeking re-election. When I 
finally reached Ford by phone, he said: "Paul, I've got to be up front 
with you. I've got to be candid. My problem is your relationship, your 
activities with the PLO and Arafat." 

The day before, Reagan had lambasted Carter for refusing to 
brand the PLO a terrorist organization. "This puts me in a difficult 
position," said Ford. "I'm trying to help Reagan. If I come out and 
support you, at every press conference, I will be badgered and dogged 
with the question of how I could campaign for Reagan and then go and 
support Findley with his views on the PLO." 

Despite these setbacks and the nationwide campaign against me, I 
won in 1980 with 56 percent of the vote. I felt that the worst was over — 
what more could the pro-Israeli activists do? Thus, I continued my 
peace endeavors. I did not anticipate the severe new challenges related 
to the Arab-Israeli dispute that were yet to come. In late 1981 a federal 
court, responding to shifts in population, ordered boundary changes in 
my district that eliminated Jacksonville, my old hometown, and added 
Decatur, the city with the nation's highest unemployment. Marginally 
Democratic before, my district was now substantially so. Then, too, 
recession fever was high and farmers were restless. 

When election time came around again two years later, I was 
unopposed in the primary, but a strong Democratic opponent, Richard 
Durbin, emerged in the general election. More experienced and popu- 
lar, he quickly picked up the resources Robinson had amassed, includ- 
ing Robinson's list of nationwide contributors. The Associated Press 
reported that: "Israel's American supporters again are pouring money 
into an emotional drive to unseat Central Illinois Representative Paul 
Findley." On the plus side, Reagan lieutenants were helping this time. 
My former House colleague, Vice-President George Bush, brushed 
aside pro-Israeli complaints from Texas and appeared at an event in my 
behalf in Springfield. 

This time re-election was not to be. I lost by 1 ,407 votes, less than 
one percent of the total cast. In a vote that close, almost any negative 
development could account for the difference. The attack by pro-Israel 
activists was only one of several factors. Nevertheless, the American 
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), Washington's principal pro- 
Israel lobby, claimed credit for my defeat. In a report to a Jewish 
gathering in Austin, Texas, a few days after election day, Thomas A. 
Dine, the organization's executive director, said his forces brought ISO 
students from the University of Illinois to "pound the pavements and 



22 They Dare to Speak Out 

knock on doors" and concluded, "This is a case where the Jewish 
lobby made a difference. We beat the odds and defeated Findley." He 
later estimated that $685,000 of the $750,000 raised by Durbin came 
from Jews. With my supporters raising almost exactly the same sum, 
the contest once again set a new state record for total spending. 



No Ready Answers 

The campaign to remove me from Congress had started early in 
1979 and covered most of the next four years. It attracted the attention 
and resources of people in every state in the Union. Reports from 
friends suggested its national scope. Senator Bob Dole of Kansas, for 
six years my colleague on the House Agriculture Committee, said he 
heard pro-Israel leaders in Kansas speak with great emotional intensity 
about my candidacy both before and after election day. Clarence 
Palmby, former undersecretary of agriculture, learned that my defeat 
was the principal 1982 political objective of the partners in a large New 
York City law firm. 

After my twenty-two years in Congress, losing was, of course, a 
disappointment. But my main reaction was wonderment. I was puzzled 
by the behavior of the pro-Israel activists. Why did they go to such 
trouble to eliminate me from Congress? Why did people from all over 
the country who did not know me personally and very likely knew little 
of my record dig so deeply in their own pockets — many of them con- 
tributing $1,000 to my opponents? What sustained this commitment for 
a four-year period? 

Israeli activists could find few flaws in my voting record. Over the 
years I had voted consistently for aid to Israel. Sometimes I was highly 
critical of Egypt and other Arab states. Even when I was trying to get 
President Carter to suspend aid, as a temporary device to force Israel 
to halt its attacks on Lebanon, I had voted for all measures in Congress 
which authorized future Israeli military and economic assistance. In- 
terestingly, many Israelis shared my views. According to polls, so did 
many U.S. Jews. Beyond Middle East policy, I had supported causes 
most Jews applauded: civil rights, community action programs, equal 
rights for women, a freeze on nuclear weapons and normalization of 
relations with China. 

Moreover, I was but one of 435 Members of the House of Repre- 
sentatives. While senior among the Republicans, I was just one of nine 
on the Foreign Affairs subcommittee dealing with the Middle East. 
More often than not I stood completely alone when I criticized Israel, 
whether I spoke in committee or on the floor of the House of Repre- 



Introduction 23 

sentatives. Surely they realized that I posed no serious threat. Could 
Israel's supporters not tolerate even one lonely voice of dissent? 

Or was the lobby's purpose to make an example of me in the 
Elizabethan manner? (According to legend, Queen Elizabeth occasion- 
ally hanged an admiral, just as an example to the others). Was I chosen 
for a trip to the political gallows to discourage other Congressmen from 
speaking out? 

I could not reconcile the harsh tactics I had experienced with 
traditional Jewish advocacy of civil liberties, a record I had admired all 
my life. In Congress, I had worked closely in support of human rights 
causes with Jewish Congressmen like Allard Lowenstein, Stephen Sol- 
arz and Ben Gilman. In my wonderment, I pressed Doug Bloomfield, a 
friend on the AIPAC staff, for an explanation. He shrugged, "You were 
the most visible critic of Israeli policy. That's the best answer I can 
give." It was hardly adequate. 

The unanswered question led to others. 

Do other Congressmen have similar experiences? To be sure, 
those who speak out are few in number, but it seemed implausible that 
the lobby would target me alone. I wanted the facts. 

Beyond Congress were the president and the vast array of "mov- 
ers and shakers" in the executive branch. What pressures, if any, do 
they experience? A lobby formidable enough to frighten off a presi- 
dential campaign team and a former president of the United States — as 
Reagan and Ford had been in my 1980 election — must have great lever- 
age at the highest levels of government. 

What of other occupations? The lobby had intimidated Bob Hope. 
Did it have similar power over people in different professions? On 
campus, for example, does the tradition of academic freedom give 
immunity to teachers and administrators from the kind of pressure I 
had received from the pro-Israeli activists? Do clergymen escape? 
How about people in business, large and small? And, vitally important 
in our free society, is there intimidation of reporters, columnists, edito- 
rial writers, publishers, the commentators on television and radio? 

Deep questions. To me, crucial questions. 

There were no ready answers, so I decided to seek them. I began 
my quest by calling at the Capitol Hill offices of the American Israel 
Public Affairs Committee. 



Chapter 1 



King of the Hill 



Washington is a city of acronyms, and today one of the best-known in 
Congress is AIPAC. The mere mention of it brings a sober, if not furtive 
look, to the face of anyone on Capitol Hill who deals with Middle East 
policy. AIPAC — the American Israel Public Affairs Committee — is 
now the preeminent power in Washington lobbying. 

In 1967, as a fourth-term Congressman just named to the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee, I had never heard of it. One day, in private 
conversation in the committee room, I voiced a brief criticism of Is- 
rael's military attack on Syria. A senior Republican, William S. 
Broomfield of Michigan, responded with a smile, "Wait till 'Si' Kenen 
over at AIPAC hears what you've said." He was referring to I. L. 
Kenen, the executive director of AIPAC, whose name was just as 
unfamiliar to me as the organization he headed. I learned later that 
Broomfield was not joking. AIPAC sometimes finds out what Con- 
gressmen say about Middle East policy even in private conversations, 
and those who criticize Israel do so at their political peril. 

AIPAC is only a part of the Israeli lobby, but in terms of direct 
effect on public policy it is clearly the most important. The organiza- 
tion has deepened and extended its influence in recent years. It is no 
overstatement to say that AIPAC has effectively gained control of 
virtually all of Capitol Hill's action on Middle East policy. Almost 
without exception, House and Senate members do its bidding, because 
most of them consider AIPAC to be the direct Capitol Hill representa- 
tive of a political force that can make or break their chances at election 
time. 

Whether based on fact or fancy, the perception is what counts: 
AIPAC means power— raw, intimidating power. Its promotional litera- 
ture regularly cites a tribute published in The New York Times: "The 
most powerftil, best-run and effective foreign policy interest group in 

25 



26 They Dare to Speak Out 

Washington." A former Congressman, Paul N. "Pete" McCloskey puts 
it more directly: Congress is "terrorized" by AIPAC. Other Congress- 
men have not been so candid on the public record, but many House 
and Senate members privately agree. 

AIPAC s preeminence is relatively new. Only a few years ago the 
Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations was regarded 
as the strongest pro-Israel voice in Washington, speaking as it did for 
the leadership of the 38 main Jewish groups. The Anti-Defamation 
League, American Jewish Committee and AIPAC were generally in its 
shadow. The latter two organizations have about 50,000 members each. 
The Anti-Defamation League is technically subordinate to B'nai B'rith 
with its worldwide membership of 500,000, but it raises its own funds 
and has attained substantial independence. Although prominent in 
their younger years, Washington representatives Hyman Bookbinder 
of the American Jewish Committee and Dave Brody of the Anti- 
Defamation League are now substantially eclipsed by AIPAC. 

The Washington presence is only the most visible tip of the lobby. 
Its effectiveness rests heavily on the foundation built nationally by 
U.S. Jews, who function through more than 200 national groups. A 
professional on the AIPAC staff says: 

I would say that at most two million Jews are interested politically or in a 
charity sense. The other four million are not. Of the two million, most will not 
be involved beyond giving some money. 

Actually, those who provide the political activism for all organiza- 
tions in U.S. Jewry probably do not exceed 250,000. The lobby's most 
popular newsletter, AIPAC's Near East Report, goes to about 60,000 
people, a distribution that the organization believes is read by most 
U.S. citizens who take a responsibility in pro-Israeli political action, 
whether their primary interest is AIPAC, B'nai B'rith, the American 
Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, the Jewish National 
Fund, the United Jewish Appeal or any of the other main national 
groups. The newsletter also goes without charge to news media, Con- 
gressmen, key government officials, and other people prominent in 
foreign policy. AIPAC members get the newsletter as a part of their $35 
annual dues. 

In practice, the lobby groups function as an informal extension of 
the Israeli government. This was illustrated when AIPAC helped draft 
the official statement defending Israel's 1981 bombing of the Iraqi nu- 
clear reactor, then issued it the same hour as Israel's embassy. 

No major Jewish organization ever publicly takes issue with posi- 



King of the Hill 27 

tions and policies adopted by Israel. Thomas A. Dine, executive direc- 
tor of AIPAC, spoke warmly of President Reagan's peace plan when it 
was announced in September 1982, but as soon as Israel rejected the 
plan, Dine fell silent. 

This close coordination sometimes inspires intragovernment 
humor. "At the State Department we used to predict that if Israel's 
prime minister should announce that the world is flat, within 24 hours 
Congress would pass a resolution congratulating him on the dis- 
covery," recalls Don Bergus, former ambassador to Sudan and a re- 
tired career diplomat. 

To Jewish organizations, however, lobbying Washington is serious 
business, and they look increasingly to AIPAC for leadership. Stephen 
S. Rosenfeld, deputy editor of The Washington Post editorial page, 
rates AIPAC as "clearly the leading Jewish political force in America 
today." 

AIPAC's charter defines its mission as legislative action, but it 
now also represents the interests of Israel whenever there is a per- 
ceived challenge to that country's interests in the news media, the 
religious community, on U.S. college campuses — anywhere. Because 
AIPAC's staff members are paid from contributions by American citi- 
zens, they need not register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act. 
In effect, however, they serve the same function as foreign agents. 

Over the years the pro-Israel lobby has thoroughly penetrated this 
nation's governmental system, and the organization that has made the 
deepest impact is AIPAC, to whom even the president of the United 
States turns when he has a vexing political problem related to the Arab- 
Israeli dispute. 

The Ascendancy of Thomas A. Dine 

Faced with rising public opposition to the presence of U.S. 
Marines in Lebanon, President Ronald Reagan in October 1983 sought 
help from the American Israel Public Affairs Committee. The terrorist 
bombing which killed more than 200 Marines asleep in their barracks at 
the Beirut airport was yet to come. Still, four Marines had already 
died, three by sniper fire, and Congressional concern was rising. 
Democratic Congressman Sam Stratton of New York, a veteran known 
for his "hawkish" views, called the Marines "sitting ducks" and pre- 
dicted heavy casualties. He wanted them out. 

Others cited the War Powers Resolution and questioned whether 
the president had authority to keep forces in a hostile environment 
such as Beirut for more than 90 days without the express approval of 



28 They Dare to Speak Out 

Congress. Some Congressmen began drawing parallels between the 
Marine presence in Lebanon and the beginnings of the disastrous U.S. 
experience in Vietnam. 

President Reagan objected, as did his predecessors, to the restric- 
tions imposed by the War Powers legislation. If he accepted its terms, 
he would have to withdraw the forces within 90 days or get Congress to 
approve an extension. If he insisted that the law did not apply because 
the situation was not hostile, events might quickly prove him wrong 
and, regardless, he would have a rebellious Congress on his hands. 

He decided to finesse the problem. He asked Congress for legisla- 
tion letting him keep the existing force of Marines in Lebanon for 18 
months. This would please the "strict constructionists" who felt the 
chief executive must live with the War Powers Resolution. It would 
suit his own needs, because he was confident that the orderly removal 
of the Marines would occur within the 18-month period. 

Thanks to extraordinary help from an unlikely quarter, Reagan's 
plan had relatively clear sailing in the House of Representatives. 
Speaker Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, the most prominent elected Demo- 
crat in the nation, gave the legislation his strong support. To O'Neill, it 
was a question of patriotism, and enough Democrats answered his call 
to assure passage in the Democrat-controlled body. 

But the Senate, although controlled by his fellow Republicans, 
posed a more difficult problem for the president. A "nose count" 
showed a close vote and probably even defeat. The president decided 
he needed help and enlisted the cooperation of Thomas A. Dine, the 
slender, aggressive, dark-haired young Capitol Hill staff veteran who 
has headed AIPAC since 1981. 

Reagan's appeal to Dine for support on the Marine issue was 
without precedent. The pending bill contained no money for Israel, and 
AIPAC and other Israeli lobby groups had kept hands off the Lebanon 
controversy. Pro-Israeli forces did not want other Americans to blame 
Israel if the Marines should encounter more trouble. Certainly Israel 
already bore responsibility enough for U.S. problems in Lebanon. It 
had discreetly but effectively helped to engineer the original Marine 
presence in Beirut by agreeing to withdraw its forces from Beirut in 
favor of a multinational force provided the United States were in- 
cluded. (The multinational force would have been unnecessary had 
Israel not invaded Lebanon in the first place.) Though AIPAC privately 
wanted the Marines to stay in Lebanon, under the circumstances its 
leadership preferred to stay in the background. 

The White House call to Dine was exceptional for another reason: 
Reagan needed help with Senators who were normally his most stal- 
wart supporters. The president was unsure of the votes of twelve Re- 



King of the Hill 29 

publicans, among them John Warner of Virginia, Dan Quayle of 
Indiana, William Cohen of Maine and James A. McClure of Idaho. All 
were generally regarded as "hawkish" on military questions and, ex- 
cept for McClure, strong supporters of Israel. Learning of the presi- 
dential plea, one AIPAC staffer said: "If the White House is worried 
about those votes, the bill is going down." 

Despite its reluctance to get involved publicly in the sensitive 
issue, AIPAC made the calls. Nine of the twelve Senators, including 
the four mentioned above, voted with the president and helped him win 
a narrow 54 to 46 victory. 

AIPAC's role in the outcome was not noted in most media reports 
on the dramatic event, but an elated President Reagan called Dine 
personally to express his thanks. Michael Gale, then handling White 
House relations with the Jewish community, provided a transcript of 
the conversation with the suggestion that AIPAC publicize it. AIPAC 
declined, preferring to maintain its low profile on the issue, so Gale 
gave the text to Wolf Blitzer of The Jerusalem Post, who formerly 
wrote for AIPAC's Near East Report. The Post quoted Reagan as 
saying to Dine, "I just wanted to thank you and all your staff for the 
great assistance you gave us on the War Powers Act resolution. . • . I 
know how you mobilized the grassroot organizations to generate sup- 
port." 

"Well, we try to use the telephone," responded Dine. "That's part 
of our job. And we wanted to do it and will continue to do it. . . . We 
want to work together, obviously." 

Work together they have. The Reagan executive branch estab- 
lished a relationship with AIPAC of unprecedented intimacy. It was not 
the first time the White House or the State Department had turned to 
the lobbying group for help. Although these high level approaches are 
little known even on Capitol Hill, they actually occur every time 
foreign aid legislation is up for a vote. Whoever controls the White 
House finds that securing Congressional approval of foreign aid is a 
challenge and, as the legislation includes economic and military aid to 
Israel, naturally looks to AIPAC for help. Except for a few humanita- 
rian and church-related organizations, AIPAC serves foreign aid's only 
domestic constituency. 

Without AIPAC, foreign aid legislation would not be approved at 
the $7 billion-plus level of 1983 and might have difficulty surviving at 
all. A candid tribute to the lobby came from John K. Wilhelm, the 
executive director of the presidential commission that made recom- 
mendations in late 1983 on the future direction of foreign aid. Briefing a 
world hunger board at the State Department in January 1984, Wilhelm, 
a career veteran in the Agency for International Development, said the 



30 They Dare to Speak Out 

active support of the pro-Israeli lobby was "vital" to Congressional 
approval of foreign aid. In the early 1960s when aid to Israel was 
modest — less than $100 million a year— a foreign-aid bill squeaked 
through the House of Representatives by a scant five votes. AIPAC 
was then in its infancy. 

AIPAC also crafted the strategy which produced a $510 million 
increase in 1983 aid for Israel — an increase which was astonishing 
because it came just after the indiscriminate bombing of Beirut and the 
failure of Israeli forces to halt the massacre of Palestinian refugees in 
the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, events that aroused unprece- 
dented public criticism of Israeli policy. 

The administration opposed the increase but was outmaneuvered. 
By the time Judge William Clark, at the time National Security Adviser 
to President Reagan, sent an urgent appeal to Republican Senator 
Mark Hatfield to block the increase, the issue was settled. AIPAC had 
already locked in support by persuading a majority on the Appropria- 
tions Committee that the add-on was a simple question of being for or 
against Israel. No one wanted to champion the negative side. 

AIPAC had already confounded the administration on the House 
side, where the White House had argued against the increase for 
budgetary reasons, contending it would be at the expense of other 
needy countries. This argument was demolished when AIPAC lobby- 
ists presented elaborate data showing how the extra aid to Israel could 
be accomplished without cutting support for other countries. An 
AIPAC lobbyist summed up: "The administration lobbyists really 
didn't do their homework. They didn't have their act together." By 
1984 the aid level had risen to over $2 billion a year — all of it in grants 
with no repayment — and the approval margin was 112. 

In February 1983, Secretary of State George Shultz named a 
"blue ribbon" panel of prominent citizens to recommend changes in the 
foreign aid program. Of the 42 on the commission, 27 were Senators or 
House members with primary responsibility for handling foreign aid 
legislation. The others had prominence in administering foreign aid in 
years past. 

Only one full-time lobbyist was named to the panel: AIPAC's 
executive director, Thomas A. Dine. It was the first time to my knowl- 
edge that a lobbyist had been selected for such a prestigious govern- 
ment assignment, and Dine's selection was particularly surprising 
because it put him in a close working relationship with the handful of 
people who formulate and carry out policy on the very matter AIPAC 
was set up to influence — aid to Israel. 

A more enviable position for a lobbyist could hardly be imagined. 
Former Senator James Abourezk, head of the American-Arab Anti- 
Discrimination Committee, commented: 



King of the Hill 31 

It would make as much sense to let the president of Lockheed Corporation 
serve on a Defense Department board which decides what planes our air force 
will buy. 

In November, Dine took an even bigger step up the ladder of 
Washington prestige and influence. He was invited to the White House 
for a private meeting with National Security Adviser Robert C. McFar- 
lane, President Reagan's closest advisor on day-to-day policy in the 
Middle East. On the agenda were two foreign policy topics of great 
sensitivity: the Lebanese situation and the proposal to help Jordan 
establish a rapid deployment force. Both of these issues, of course, 
were of vital interest to Israel. Dine's invitation came just a week after 
he received the President's jubilant phone call. 

In January 1984 Washingtonian magazine listed Dine among the 
most influential people in the nation's capital. 

Dine's reputation has even stirred Arab capitals. In mid-March 
1984 King Hussein of Jordan publicly blamed AIPAC, in part, for the 
decline in U.S. influence and leadership for peace in the Middle East. 
He also criticized the inordinate influence of the Israeli lobby on U.S. 
presidential candidates. He said the candidates had to "appeal for the 
favors of AIPAC, Zionism and Israel." 

One development which especially provoked the king was that, for 
ten days beginning in mid-March 1984, Dine personally took part in 
direct foreign policy negotiations with Undersecretary of State Law- 
rence S. Eagleburger and National Security Adviser McFarlane. Dur- 
ing one session, Eagleburger offered to withdraw a widely publicized 
proposal to sell antiaircraft missiles to Jordan if AIPAC would drop its 
support of legislation requiring the removal of the U.S. embassy in 
Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. 

By then, King Hussein's sharp criticism of the United States — and 
AIPAC — had appeared in U.S. newspapers, and Dine knew it had 
strengthened Congressional opposition to the sale. At the time 
Eagleburger made his proposition, AIPAC already had 48 Senators 
committed in opposition and received pledges from six more the next 
day. Thus AIPAC was able to kill the sale without cutting a deal on 
other issues. 

After he rejected Eagleburger' s offer, Dine promised that AIPAC 
would cease active opposition to a proposal to help Jordan establish a 
rapid deployment force and would lobby to work out a compromise on 
the bill to transfer the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem if the 
administration would take two important steps: first, refuse to sell 
Stinger antiaircraft missiles to Saudi Arabia, and, second, issue a 
public letter announcing that it would engage in no further indirect 
communications with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Although 



32 They Dare to Speak Out 

the public letter did not appear, the administration backed away from 
the Stinger sales to both Saudi Arabia and Jordan. 

Dine emerged from these negotiations with his prestige greatly 
enhanced. Richard Murphy, assistant secretary of state for Near East 
and South Asia affairs, the official charged with the development and 
administration of United States policies relating to the Middle East, 
was not invited to the Eagleburger-McFarlane-Dine negotiations, nor 
was he notified of the administration decision to cancel the proposed 
sale of Stinger missiles until twelve hours after AIPAC received the 
information. 

The Washington Post concluded that the episode "raised questions 
about the propriety of the administration's making deals on foreign 
policy issues with a private, special-interest organization. 9 ' Dine had a 
ready response: "We think it's better to be strong and criticized, than 
weak, ignored and not respected." 

In part, the unprecedented presidential consideration was a tribute 
to Dine's combination of ingratiating manner, tough, relentless spirit 
and sheer dynamism. Under Dine, AIPAC's membership has risen 
from 11,000 to over 50,000, and its annual budget from $750,000 to 
more than $3,000,000. 

Dine's influence is felt in power centers beyond the Oval Office. 
He receives calls from presidential candidates as well as presidents and 
reports that former Vice-President Walter Mondale "bounces ideas off 
us" before he issues statements on Middle East policy. 

Most Congressional actions affecting Middle East policy are either 
approved or initiated by AIPAC. 

Broadening the Network 

To accomplish these feats for Israel — sometimes cooperating with 
the president of the United States, sometimes not— AIPAC director 
Dine utilizes a team of hard-driving, able professionals and keeps them 
working together smoothly. 

He keeps policy lines clear and the troops well-disciplined. 
AIPAC's role is to support Israel's policies, not to help formulate 
them, so AIPAC maintains daily telephone communication with the 
Israeli embassy, and Dine meets personaUy with embassy officials at 
least once a week. 

Though AIPAC has a staff of only 60 — small in comparison to 
other major U.S. Jewish organizations — it taps the resources of a broad 
nationwide network of unpaid activists. Annual membership meetings 
in Washington are a major way to rally the troops. Those attending 
hear prominent U.S. and Israeli speakers, participate in workshops and 
seminars, and contribute financially to the cause. The conferences at- 



King of the Hill 33 

tract top political talent: the Israeli ambassador, senior White House 
and State Department officials, prominent Senators and House mem- 
bers. Recent conferences featured Senators Paul Laxalt of Nevada, 
Joseph Biden of Delaware, Robert Kasten of Wisconsin, Christopher 
Dodd of Connecticut, Robert Packwood of Oregon, Robert Dole of 
Kansas, and Daniel Inouye of Hawaii. 

The White House is also well represented at such conferences. 
Vice-President George Bush recently assured AIPAC delegates that 
the Reagan administration will keep fighting against anti-Semitism at 
the United Nations and criticized the three Democratic presidential 
candidates— Walter Mondale, Gary Hart and Jesse Jackson — for being 
"soft on anti-Semitism." 

More than 1,200 representatives from 41 states attended AIPAC's 
1983 national gathering. They heard Congressman Jack Kemp of New 
York, chairman of the Republican caucus in the House of Representa- 
tives, describe himself as "a de facto member of AIPAC." Forty-three 
House members and sixteen Senators attended the conference ban- 
quet. 

Art Chotin, deputy executive director of AIPAC, reported to the 
group that during the previous year ten different statewide workshops 
on political involvement had given the "pro-Israeli community" the 
"skills they need to have an impact." Ten more were planned for 1984. 
Chotin illustrated the national impact of these local events by pointing 
out that a 1982 workshop in New Mexico had helped elect Democrat 
Jeffrey Bingaman to the Senate. Bingaman, described by Chotin as "a 
strong pro-Israeli voice in Washington," was among the 100 "pro- 
Israeli citizens" attending the 1983 affair. 

Tightly scheduled workshops, similar to the national conferences, 
are conducted annually in each of five regions. The "capitals" are 
Atlanta, Fort Worth, Hollywood, Des Moines and Chicago, and from 
each a chairperson coordinates all AIPAC regional activities. To help 
these outreach programs, AIPAC now has full-time staff located in 
New York, New Jersey and California. 

Chotin told the conference that during the 1982 Congressional 
elections, 300 candidates "came to visit AIPAC" to explain their posi- 
tions on "foreign aid, arms sales to Arab nations, and the general 
nature of U.S.-Arab relations." 

Ties with other interest groups are carefully cultivated. Christian 
outreach was announced as AIPAC s newest national program, and 
Merrie White, a "born-again Christian," was introduced as the director 
of relations with the Christian community. According to Chotin, the 
goal was nothing less than to "bring that community into AIPAC." He 
noted the presence of 50 Christians representing 35 states as evidence 
of progress already made toward this end. White helped organize the 



34 They Dare to Speak Out 

annual Religious Roundtable Prayer Breakfast for Israel the following 
February (see chapter nine). Chris Gersten, AIPAC's political director, 
came to the position after seven years as special assistant to the presi- 
dent of the International Union of Operating Engineers. 

AIPAC's coast-to-coast outreach is enhanced by its speaking pro- 
gram. Its officers, staff members and representatives filled over 900 
dates in 1982 alone. Receptions are held in scores of smaller cities. 
"Parlor briefings" in the homes of Jewish leaders nationally help raise 
money to supplement revenue from membership dues. Social events 
on Capitol Hill help spread the word to the thousands of high school 
and college students who work as interns in the offices of Senators and 
Congressmen or in committee offices. 

Tours of Israel which other Jewish groups arrange help to establish 
a grassroots base for AIPAC's program. For example, in April 1982, 
the Young Leadership Mission, an activity of United Jewish Appeal, 
conducted 1,500 U.S. Jews on one week tours. "The visitors were 
given a view of the magnificence you will find in any country," ob- 
serves an AIPAC staff member. He said the tour had profound impact: 
"It built spirit for the cause, and it raised money. The pitch for fiinds 
was the final event. It came right after the folks walked out of the 
memorial to the Holocaust." The effect was awesome: "The tour direc- 
tors have it down to a science," he reports. "They know how to hit all 
the buttons." The United Jewish Appeal and Israel share the proceeds. 
Larry Kraftowitz, a Washington journalist who attended a similar tour, 
calls the experience "profound." He adds, "I consider myself more 
sympathetic to the New Jewish Agenda goals [than current Israeli 
government policy], but I must say I was impressed." 

Tours are not just for Jews. Governors, members of state legisla- 
tures, and community leaders, including news media personnel, are 
also given the opportunity for expense-paid tours of Israel. Trips are 
also arranged for leaders nationally, especially those on Capitol Hill. 
While AIPAC does not itself conduct the tours, it facilitates the 
process. Over half the membership of Congress has traveled to Israel, 
about half going on what is deemed official business at the expense of 
the U.S. government. With few exceptions, Jewish organizations or 
individuals paid the expenses of the rest. 

Another group of potentially influential — but often overlooked — 
Washington functionaries that AIPAC tries to influence is made up of 
Congressional staffers. AIPAC works with Israeli universities who ar- 
range expense-paid tours for staff members who occupy key positions. 
These annual trips are called the Hal Rosenthal program, named for a 
staff aide to former Republican Senator Jacob Javits who was gunned 
down by a Palestinian terrorist on the first such trip. By 1984 over 50 
Congressional staffers had participated. 



King of the Hill 35 

AIPAC is as successful at keeping lawmakers from visiting Arab 
countries as it is in presenting only Israel's views. When the National 
Association of Arab Americans, working through the World Affairs 
Council of Amman, invited all Congressmen and their spouses to an 
expense-paid tour of Jordan with a side trip to the West Bank in 1983, a 
notice in AIPAC's Near East Report quickly chilled prospects for par- 
ticipation. It questioned how Amman, without Israeli cooperation, 
could get the tourists across the Jordan river for events scheduled in 
the West Bank. It also quoted Don Sundquist, a Republican Congress- 
man from Tennessee, as expressing "fear" that if any of his colleagues 
accepted the trip they would be "used" by anti-Israeli propagandists. 
Only three Congressmen made the trip. A 1984 tour was cancelled for 
lack of acceptances. 

AIPAC's outreach program is buttressed by a steady stream of 
publications. In addition to "Action Alerts" and the weekly Near East 
Report, it issues position papers and monographs designed to answer, 
or often discredit, critics, and advance Israel's objectives. 

The most controversial publication of all is an "enemies list" is- 
sued as a "first edition" in the spring of 1983. A handsomely printed 
154-page paperback entitled The Campaign to Discredit Israel, it pro- 
vides a "directory of the actors": 21 organizations and 39 individuals 
AIPAC identified as inimical to Israeli interests. 

Included are such distinguished public servants as former Under- 
secretary of State George W. Ball, retired ambassadors Talcott Seelye, 
Andrew Killgore, John C. West and James Akins, and former Senator 
James Abourezk. There are also five Jewish dissenters and several 
scholars on the list. 

Seemingly unaware of the AIPAC project, the Anti-Defamation 
League of B'nai B'rith almost simultaneously issued its own "enemies 
list": Pro-Arab Propaganda in America: Vehicles and Voices. It too is 
identified as a "first edition," and lists 31 organizations and 34 individu- 
als. These books are nothing more than blacklists, reminiscent of the 
worst tactics of the McCarthy era. 

A similar "enemies list" is employed in AIPAC's extensive pro- 
gram at colleges and universities (see chapter seven). 

"They Get the Word Out Fast 9 * 

Through "Action Alert" mailings AIPAC keeps more than one 
thousand Jewish leaders throughout the United States informed on 
current issues. An "alert" usually demands action to meet a legislative 
challenge on Capitol Hill, requesting a telephone call, telegram or, if 
need be, a personal visit to a reluctant Congressman. 

The network can have almost instantaneous effect. One day I 



36 They Dare to Speak Out 

whispered to a colleague in the Foreign Affairs Committee I might offer 
an amendment to a pending bill cutting aid to Israel. Within 30 minutes 
two other Congressmen came to me with worried looks, reporting they 
had just had calls from citizens in their home districts who were con* 
cerned about my amendment. 

Paul Weyrich, who worked as a Senate aide before becoming a 
political analyst, details the effectiveness of AIPAC: 

It's a remarkable system they have. If you vote with them, or make a public 
statement they like, they get the word out fast through their own publications 
and through editors around the country who are sympathetic to their cause. 

Of course it works in reverse as well. If you say something they don't like, you 
can be denounced or censured through the same network. That kind of pres- 
sure is bound to affect Senators' thinking, especially if they are wavering or 
need support. 

This activism is carried out by an elaborate system of officers, 
committees and councils which give AIPAC a ready, intimate system 
for political activity from coast to coast. Its nineteen officers meet once 
a month to confer with Dine on organization and management. Each of 
its five vice-presidents can expect eventually to serve a term as presi- 
dent. A large executive committee totaling 132 members is invited to 
Washington every three months for briefings. A national council lists 
over 200 names. These subgroups include the leadership of most ma- 
jor U.S. Jewish organizations. 

The AIPAC staff is not only highly professional and highly 
motivated but also thoroughly experienced. Director Dine worked in 
several Capitol Hill jobs, first on the staff of Democratic Senator Ed- 
ward Kennedy, later on the Foreign Relations Committee under Demo- 
cratic Senator Frank Church of Idaho, and finally as staff director on 
foreign policy for the Senate budget committee. 

AIPAC's four lobbyists are Douglas Bloomfield, Ralph Nurnber- 
ger, Esther Kurz and Leslie L. Levy. All but Levy worked in foreign 
policy for a Senator or Congressman before joining AIPAC. Levy came 
to AIPAC as a student intern and advanced within the organization. 

Bloomfield, once an intern under Democratic Senator Hubert 
Humphrey of Minnesota, worked for 10 years for Democratic Con- 
gressman Ben Rosenthal of New York. Nurnberger worked for several 
years on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for Republican 
Senator James Pearson of Kansas. Kurz worked, in succession, for 
Democratic Congressman Charles Wilson of Texas, and Republican 
Senators Jacob Javits of New York and Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania. 

The four divide up the membership of the House and Senate. 
Actually, only a handful of legislators are keys to success, so each of 



King of the Hill 37 

the four lobbyists needs to watch carefully only about thirty lawmak- 
ers. They concentrate on legislators from the twelve states which have 
a Jewish population of at least three percent: New York, New Jersey, 
California, Massachusetts, Ohio, Illinois, Michigan, Pennsylvania, 
Maryland, Delaware, Florida and Connecticut. 

The movement from Congressional staff job to AIPAC also occa- 
sionally works the other way. A few veterans of AIPAC have moved to 
government assignments, among them Jonathan Slade, now with 
Democratic Congressman Larry Smith of Florida, and Marvin Feuer- 
werger, who was with Democratic Congressman Stephen Solarz of 
New York before he joined the Policy Planning Staff at the State De- 
partment. Both Smith and Solarz are members of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, and both are passionate supporters of Israel. 

Lobbyists for AIPAC have almost instant access to House and 
Senate members and feel free to call them at their homes in the eve- 
ning. Republican Congressman Douglas Bereuter of Nebraska, an ex- 
ception, will receive no lobbyists, AIPAC or otherwise, but the doors 
are wide open to AIPAC lobbyists at the offices of almost all other 
Congressmen. A Congressional aide explained why: 

Professionalism is one reason. They know what they are doing, get to the point 
and leave. They are often a useful source of information. They are reliable and 
friendly. But most important of all, they are seen by Congressmen as having 
direct and powerful ties to important constituents. 

The result is a remarkable cooperation and rapport between lobby- 
ist and legislator. Encountered in a Capitol corridor one day, an AIPAC 
lobbyist said, "Tomorrow I will try to see five members of the House. I 
called this morning and confirmed every appointment, and I have no 
doubt I will get in promptly." Two days later, even he seemed some- 
what awed by AIPAC's clout. He reported, "I made all five. I went 
right in to see each of them. There was no waiting. Our access is 
amazing." 

This experience contrasts sharply with the experience of most 
other lobbyists on Capitol Hill. One veteran lobbyist reflected with 
envy on the access AIPAC enjoys: "If I can actually see two Congress- 
men or Senators in one long day, it's been a good one." 

Despite its denials, AIPAC keeps close records on each House and 
Senator member. Unlike other lobbies, which keep track only of a few 
"key" issues voted on the House or Senate floor, AIPAC takes note of 
other activities, too — votes in committees, co-sponsorship of bills, 
signing of letters and even whether speeches are made. "That's depth!" 
exclaims an admiring Capitol Hill staff member. 

An illustration of lobby power occurred October 3, 1984, when the 



38 They Dare to Speak Out 

House of Representatives approved a bill to remove all trade restric- 
tions between the United States and Israel; 98.5 percent (416) voted 
affirmative, despite the strong opposition of the AFL-CIO and the 
American Farm Bureau Federation. The vote was 416 to 6 on legisla- 
tion that normally would elicit heavy reaction because of its effect on 
markets for commodities produced in the United States. 

As they voted, few were aware of a Commerce Department study 
which found that the duty-free imports proposed in the bill would cause 
"significant adverse effects" on U.S. producers of vegetables. Because 
the White House wanted the bill passed, notwithstanding its effects on 
jobs and markets, the study was classified "confidential" and kept 
under wraps. One Congressman finally pried a copy loose by com- 
plaining bitterly — and correctly — to the White House that AIPAC had 
secured a copy for its own use. 

"I Cleared It with AIPAC" 

Until his defeat in an upset on November 6, 1984, Congressman 
Clarence D. "Doc" Long, a 74-year-old Democrat of Maryland, 
exemplified the strong ties between AIPAC and Capitol Hill. He deliv- 
ered for Israel as chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee 
which handles aid to Israel. 

The tall, gray-haired, former economics professor at Johns Hop- 
kins University trumpeted his support: "AIPAC made my district their 
number one interest." AIPAC supported Long for a good reason: He 
held the gavel when questions about funding Israeli aid come up. The 
lobby wanted him to keep it. Chairmanships normally are decided by 
seniority, and next in line after Long is David Obey of Wisconsin, who 
earned lobby disfavor in 1976 by offering an amendment to cut aid to 
Israel by $200 million. "Doc" Long never had any misgivings about aid 
to Israel and helped his colleagues defeat Obey's amendment, 342 to 
32. 

Sitting at a table in the House of Representatives restaurant during 
a late House session in 1982, Long explained, 

Long ago I decided that I'd vote for anything AIPAC wants. I didn't want them 
on my back. My district is too difficult. I don't need the trouble [pro-Israeli 
lobbyists] can cause. I made up my mind I would get and keep their support. 

The conversation turned to one of Obey's questions about the high 
levels of Israeli aid. Long said, "I can't imagine why Dave would say 
things like that." A colleague chided: "Maybe he's thinking about our 
own national interest." 

In September 1983, Long led a battle to get U.S. Marines out of 



King of the Hill 39 

Lebanon. He proposed an amendment which would have cut funding 
for the operation in 60 days. John Hall, a reporter who knew Long's 
close ties with the lobby, asked Long, "Are you sure this amendment 
won't get you in trouble?" Without hesitation, the Congressman re- 
plied: "I cleared it with AIPAC." He was not joking. Though this was 
not the first Congressional proposal to be cleared in advance with the 
Israeli lobby, it was the first time the clearance had been specifically 
acknowledged in the public record. The proposal to cut aid to Lebanon 
provoked a lively debate but, opposed by such leaders as Speaker 
"Tip" O'Neill and Lee Hamilton of Indiana, chairman of the Subcom- 
mittee on Europe and the Middle East, the measure failed, 274-153. 

Although heavily supported by pro-Israeli interests — 18 pro-Israel 
political action committees chipped in $31,250 for Long's 1982 re- 
election campaign — Long denies a personal linkage: 

Nobody has to give me money to make me vote for aid to Israel. I've been 
doing that for 20 years, most of the time without contributions. 

The money and votes Israel's supporters provided to Long's can- 
didacy were insufficient in 1984. Although pro-Israel PACs gave him 
$155,000 — four times the amount that went to any other House candi- 
date—Long lost by 5,727 votes, less than three percent of those cast. A 
factor in his defeat was advertising sponsored by people prominent in 
the National Association of Arab Americans which attacked Long for 
his uncritical support of Israel's demands. Obey, Long's likely succes- 
sor as chairman, was the only Democrat on the panel who did not 
accept money from pro-Israel political action committees. 

Outreach on an International Scale 

AIPAC not only champions Israel's causes in the U.S., but its 
international ambitions as well. The lobby recently began an interna- 
tional outreach program, serving Israel's interests by facilitating U.S. 
aid to other countries. In 1983 it tried to help Zaire, Israel's new Afri- 
can friend. Israel wanted Zaire to get $20 million in military assistance 
requested by President Reagan, but AIPAC decided against assigning 
the lobbying task to its regular staff. Instead, it secured the temporary 
services of a consultant who button-holed members of the House Com- 
mittee on Foreign Affairs. The amendment failed, but the effort helped 
to pay Israel's obligation incurred when Zaire extended full diplomatic 
recognition to Israel the previous year. 

Columnists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak viewed the initia- 
tive as the first step in an Israeli program "to broker aid favors for other 
pariahs on the congressional hit list to enhance its influence." They 



40 They Dare to Speak Out 

described this new effort by Israel as M an exercise of domestic political 
power by a foreign nation that raises troubling questions." 

While branching out internationally, AIPAC maintains strong in- 
fluence in domestic partisan campaigns. It took a major role in the 
intense 1984 contest for the Senate in North Carolina, which involved 
an expensive showdown between Jesse Helms, the Republican incum- 
bent, who is proud to be viewed as the apostle of conservatism, and 
Democratic Governor Jim Hunt, who sees himself as a leader in the 
progressive politics in the "New South." These adversaries were of 
one mind, however, in soliciting the pro-Israel vote, and the endeavor 
led Helms into surprising activity. The contest took on special national 
importance because Helms, as second-ranking Republican on the Sen- 
ate Foreign Relations Committee, could have chosen to head the com- 
mittee after the defeat of Senator Charles Percy (see chapter three). 

In his program to win pro-Israel support, Helms had to overcome 
major obstacles. In a 1979 speech, Helms had warned that Israeli West 
Bank policies were "the block to a comprehensive settlement" of the 
Arab-Israeli dispute* During Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, 
Helms made a speech in which he suggested that the United States 
might ultimately need to "shut down" relations with Israel. 

High on Helms's hate list is foreign aid, which he considers to be 
the "the greatest racket of all time." He proclaims proudly, "I have not 
voted to send one dime overseas for these programs." 

Because aid to Israel is included in the foreign aid he opposed, Hunt 
charged that Helms had voted against Israel no fewer than 25 times. He 
also criticized Helms sharply for voting in favor of controversial mili- 
tary sales to Saudi Arabia. 

Hunt's campaign team sought to exploit these "mistakes" with a 
letter to pro-Israel financial prospects mailed in an envelope conspicu- 
ously labeled: "Caution: the enclosed information is extremely damag- 
ing to the state of Israel." The damage was identified as the prospect 
that Helms might become an anti-Israel chairman of the Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee. This form of fiindraising brought good results: a 
Helms staff member said, "We calculate that 60 percent of Hunt's 
money is from the Jewish community." By mid-August Hunt had re- 
ceived $130,350 from pro-Israel political action committees, Helms 
zero. 

Helms launched a counterattack designed to mend his relations 
with backers of Israel. In May he personally introduced a visiting 
Likud member of the Israeli parliament on the Senate floor and had the 
text of his guest's foreign policy statement inserted in the Congres- 
sional Record. He seemed to contradict an earlier statement criticizing 
Israeli policies in occupied areas when he told the Senate that the 



King of the Hill 41 

United States "should never pursue any plan that envisions a separa- 
tion of the West Bank from Israel." 

Helms' s skill in playing both sides was demonstrated in his stand 
on a proposed bill to move the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to 
Jerusalem. Although he declined to co-sponsor the bill because of 
"grave legal questions" and its "uncertain" constitutionality, Helms 
urged President Reagan to order the removal of the embassy without 
special legislation. 

In a remarkable countermove, Helms' s campaign sent a fund ap- 
peal to Jewish citizens which expressed anguish that any Jew would 
consider opposing Helms in light of his "friendship" for Israel. 

In the contest, the most expensive non-presidential campaign in 
history, Helms spent over $13 million and Hunt over $8 million. When 
the polls closed, Helms had eked out a narrow victory. 

Beyond AIPAC to the PACs 

AIPAC differs from most lobbies, in that it avoids endorsing candi- 
dates publicly and does not raise or spend money directly in partisan 
campaigns. Campaign involvement is left officially to pro-Israel polit- 
ical action committees (PACs). Over 3,000 PACs are registered under 
federal law, and almost all are directly affiliated with special-interest 
lobbies. There are 75 PACs which focus on support for Israel, though 
none lists an affiliation with AIPAC or any other Jewish organization. 

Prior to 1979, pro-Israeli financial support to candidates and party 
organizations came entirely from individuals. Some of these individu- 
als focused heavily on an Ohio Congressional race in 1976, the candi- 
dacy of Mary Rose Oakar, who was to become the first person of 
Syrian ancestry elected to Congress. A popular member of the Cleve- 
land city council, she confronted a field of twelve male Democrats and 
an avalanche of Jewish money in the primary election race. Pro-Israeli 
interests selected State Senator Tony Celebreze, regarded as a 
"comer" in Ohio politics, as the candidate with the best chance to 
nudge her from the nomination. 

During the campaign Dennis Heffernan, a fundraiser for Cele- 
preze, was asked by a surprised and uneasy colleague to explain why 
more than thirty "Jewish-appearing" names were each recorded as 
donating $1,000. 

"What's going on here?" he asked, wondering aloud if his friend 
Celebreze had "caved in" to a special interest. He asked bluntly: "Is 
Tony selling himself out, or is this money given in a worthy cause?" 
Heffernan responded, "Well, is Israel a worthy cause?" 

Oakar found the focus by pro-Israel forces "upsetting." She ex- 



42 They Dare to Speak Out 

plained, "I hadn't said a word about the Middle East, so it had to be 
because of my ethnic background. My father served in World War II 
and my brother in the Army later, but you would think we were less 
American." 

The money helped Celebreze defeat the other eleven men, but 
Oakar won the nomination. Noting the district was overwhelmingly 
Democratic, the pro-Israel group sensed a hopeless situation and made 
no fight against Oakar in the fall or in subsequent elections. 

The prominence of "Jewish-appearing" names in the Ohio race 
may have been a factor in encouraging Jews nationally to organize the 
first pro-Israel political action committees in 1979. By 1982 they had 
mushroomed to a total of thirty-one. Pro-Israel PACs contributed more 
than $1.8 million dollars to 268 different election campaigns during the 
1981-82 Federal Election Commission reporting cycle, putting them in 
the highest political spending range. By mid-August 1984, the list had 
increased to 75 PACs, and they had accumulated $4.25 million for the 
1984 federal elections. 

None of them carried a name or other information which disclosed 
its pro-Israeli interest, nor did any list an affiliation with AIPAC or 
other pro-Israeli or Jewish organization. Each chose to obscure its pro- 
Israel character by using a bland title, like the "Committee for 18," 
"Arizona Politically Interested Citizens," "Joint Action Committee for 
Political Affairs," or the "Government Action Committee." Yet all are 
totally committed to one thing: Israel. 

"No one is trying to hide anything," protests Mark Siegel, director 
of the pro-Israeli National Bipartisan Political Action Committee and a 
former White House liaison with the Jewish community. He insists that 
the bland names were chosen because "There are those in the political 
process who would use the percentage of Jewish money [in a given 
race] as a negative." The PAC Siegel heads was formed originally to 
help in the late Senator Henry Jackson's 1978 presidential bid. 

Norman Silverman, who helped to found the Denver-based Com- 
mittee for 18, is more explicit, saying the name selection became "an 
emotional issue." Some of the organizers, mainly younger people, 
wanted Jewish identity plainly set forth in the name. "Others," Silver- 
man noted, "said they didn't want to be a member if we did that." 

Whatever their names, pro-Israel PACs enlarge the opportunities 
for individual supporters of Israel to back candidates. An individual 
may contribute up to $5,000 to a political action committee but only 
$1,000 to a candidate in each election. PACs, in turn, may contribute 
$5,000 to a candidate in each election. Individuals often contribute the 
$1,000 limit directly to a candidate and also the $5,000 limit to a PAC 
supporting the same candidate. The Wall Street Journal, reviewing the 



King of the Hill 43 

growth of pro-Israel PACs in August 1983 reported that Lawrence and 
Barbara Weinberg of Beverly Hills, California, gave $20,000 to the 
Citizens Organized Political Action Committee, based in Los Angeles, 
over a period that encompassed both the primary and general elections 
in 1982 and gave $2,000 to Democrat Richard J. Durbin, the man who 
defeated me in 1982. The PAC also contributed $5,000 to Durbin. That 
kind of generosity is not ignored by your average politician. 

The largest pro-Israel PAC is the National Political Action Com- 
mittee (NatPAC), headquartered in New York with Marvin Josephson, 
head of a theatrical and literary talent agency, as chairman. Its Wash- 
ington-based executive director is Richard Altman, who previously 
worked as political director of AIPAC. It draws money heavily from 
the entertainment industry and got off to a fast start in 1982 when 
Woody Allen signed its first nationwide fund-raising appeal. The Na- 
tional Journal rates it as the nation's largest non-labor, non-business 
political action committee. 

In 1982, NatPAC raised $1.04 million and spent $547,500 on 109 
candidates for Congress. It gave the $5,000 legal limit to each of 31 
Senate candidates. Twenty-eight of these were elected. On the House 
side, 57 of the 73 candidates it supported won. In the wake of those 
successes, NatPAC ran a full-page advertisement in The New York 
Times inviting further support and declaring that it was "helping to 
elect officials in all fifty states who realize that Israel's survival is vital 
to our own." 

A recent fund-raising letter carried an appeal by Republican 
Senator Robert Packwood of Oregon and Democratic Senator Patrick 
Moynihan of New York, both ardent supporters of Israel: "If you be- 
lieve, as we do, that Israel is a great strategic asset to the United States 
and its most reliable ally in that part of the world, please read this 
letter." The letter asked for support so NatPAC can "take on the 
Petrodollar interests." 

Five colleagues help Josephson decide which candidates receive 
funds. They are Barry Dillar, chairman of Paramount Pictures Corpora- 
tion, George Klein, a New York City developer, James Wolfensohn, a 
New York investment banker, Martin Peretz, editor of The New Repub- 
lic, and Rita Hauser, a New York lawyer who is prominent in the work 
of the American Jewish Committee. 

Executive director Richard Altman calls NatPAC a "grassroots 
movement." By late 1983 he had signed up over 20,000 members, with 
his goal for 1984 goal set at 100,000. NatPAC strives for "ecumenical 
fund-raising," he says, noting the presence of Methodist Bob Hope 
among the one hundred prominent Americans listed as charter mem- 
bers. 



44 They Dare to Speak Out 

He is candid: "Money makes the political engine run. To elect a 
friend, you have to pay for it — and we're not the only ones who know 
that." 

Altman declares that participating in PACs "is quintessential^ 
both American and Jewish, as an expression of our involvement in 
political life." 

Small PACs sometimes focus on candidates far from their locales. 
Robert B. Golder, a Philadelphia businessman, organized the Delaware 
Valley Political Action Committee (Del-Val PAC) in 1981, recruited 160 
members, and dispensed $58,000 to 32 widely scattered candidates. 
Twenty-eight of them won. Golder explains that his goal is to elect pro- 
Israel Congressmen "in faraway places who don't have Jewish con- 
stituencies." For example, his PAC sent $1,500 to Jeffrey Bingaman, 
the Democrat elected to the Senate in 1982 from New Mexico. In late 
1983 it sent $5,000 to Tom Corcoran, the unsuccessful challenger of 
Republican Senator Charles Percy of Illinois. A 12-person executive 
committee decides where the money is spent. 

A San Francisco-based PAC concentrates on contests outside 
California. Melvin Swig, who is chairman of the Bay Area Citizens 
Political Action Committee, says: "There are enough people locally 
who do enough for their constituency. We look for areas that have less 
Jewish visibility than others, places where there are fewer Jews." 

Golder explains the aims of such groups: 

We feel we are getting more Jewish people involved. . . . Look how much we 
can get from the United States government by being politically active. This is 
the key thing about PACs. We're trying to get those candidates [elected] who 
will vote 'Yes' on foreign aid. 

Golder, Swig and other PAC leaders receive guidance from 
AIPAC, which keeps them up to date on votes cast and statements 
made by Senate and House members as well as positions taken on the 
Middle East by candidates seeking office for the first time. 

AIPAC sometimes drops all pretense at staying apart from fund 
raising. For instance, a pro-Israel political action committee was orga- 
nized in Virginia in 1983 during a workshop sponsored by AIPAC. 

Financial help does not stop at United States borders. Jewish 
Americans living in Israel are solicited for political action in the United 
States. Newton Frolich, a former Washington lawyer who moved to 
Israel eight years ago, is heading a Jerusalem-based political action 
committee. In June 1984, his committee mailed a solicitation letter to 
some 11,000 U.S. families living in Israel and expects to approach, in 
all, the estimated 50,000 U.S. citizens living there, many of whom also 
claim Israeli citizenship. His organization is called Americans in Israel 



King of the Hill 45 

Political Action Committee. Through the committee, he explains, 
Americans in Israel can "keep making their contribution" to the U.S. 
political process. The contribution comes back, of course, in the form 
of enormous U.S. grants to Israel — greater than to any other country. 

A lobby veteran who is now engaged fulltime in fund-raising wor- 
ries about appearances. AIPAC's former executive director, Morris J. 
Amitay, feels that smaller local PACs are best and fears that large well- 
publicized national PACs may create the impression that Jews exercise 
too much political power. He operates the relatively small Washington 
Political Action Committee, which dispensed $89,075 in 158 races dur- 
ing the 1982 campaigns. 

Too much or not, Jewish influence in fund raising is widely recog- 
nized. In August 1983 the Wall Street Journal reported, 

Several ranking Congressmen — most of whom wouldn't comment on the rec- 
ord for this story — say they believe the political effect of Jewish PAC money is 
greater than that of other major lobbies because it is skillfully focused on one 
foreign policy issue. 

Focused it is. The pro-Israel PACs concentrate exclusively on 
federal elections and focus heavily on Senate races and on House 
members who occupy key foreign policy assignments. 

PAC leader Mark Siegel says the PACs concentrate on the Senate, 
because it is the "real battleground" on questions of foreign policy. In 
1982, they invested $966,695 in Senate races, with $355,550 going to 
key House contests. 

Guided by AIPAC, PACs choose their targets with care. When 
Lynn Adelman, a Jewish state senator in Wisconsin, in 1982 mounted 
the first primary election challenge that Democrat Clement J. Zablocki 
had experienced in thirty years, AIPAC recommended against an all- 
out effort. AIPAC was unhappy with Zablocki's record, but did not 
consider him a problem; furthermore, it concluded that Adelman 
could not win. Adelman received only $9,350 from thirteen pro- 
Israel political action committees. The contest made national news, 
because Zablocki was chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Commit- 
tee, through which all Israeli aid measures must go (see chapter two). 
Despite AIPAC's low-key recommendation, a letter soliciting funds for 
Adelman cited two "gains" if Zablocki lost: "Adelman' s election not 
only means a friend of Israel in Congress, but also that the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee will have a friend of Israel as its new chair- 
man," referring to Dante Fascell of Florida, the Democrat who was 
next in line to succeed Zablocki. Zablocki was re-elected by a two-to- 
one margin. 

Meanwhile, Fascell, the "other friend" cited in the fund-raising 



46 They Dare to Speak Out 

appeal, was receiving strong support from pro-Israel PACs in his suc- 
cessful campaign for re-election in a Florida district that includes part 
of Miami. TWenty-two of these PACs provided Fascell with a total of 
$43,250, the second highest amount to a House candidate that year. 
These funds helped him survive a challenge by a former television 
newsman. 

My successor, Richard Durbin, topped all House candidates, re- 
ceiving $103,325 from pro-Israel political action committees. Other 
House Members receiving in excess of $10,000 were Sam Gejdenson of 
Connecticut, $30,175; Clarence Long of Maryland, $29,250; Ike Skel- 
ton of Missouri, $20,000; Martin Frost of Texas, $18,300; Thomas Lan- 
tos of California, $15,500. Most of the big money went to Senate races. 
Eighteen Senators who were elected in 1982 received over $10,000 
from pro-Israel PACs. Five received more than Congressman Fascell. 
The top 10 were: George Mitchell, Democrat of Maine, $77,400; James 
Sasser, Democrat of Tennessee, $58,250; David Durenberger, Repub- 
lican of Minnesota, $56,000; Robert Byrd, Democrat of West Virginia, 
$55,500; Paul Sarbanes, Democrat of Maryland, $48,500; Chic Hecht, 
Republican of Nevada, $46,500; Quentin Burdick, Democrat of North 
Dakota, $44,775; Lowell Weicker, Republican of Connecticut, $42,075; 
Jeffrey Bingaman, Democrat of New Mexico, $36,575; Howard Met- 
zenbaum, Democrat of Ohio, $35,175; Dennis DeConcini, Democrat of 
Arizona, $32,000; and Donald Riegle, Democrat of Michigan, $29,000. 
Eight others received in excess of $10,000 each. 

Ip, the 1984 elections, by July 1 pro-Israel PACs had distributed 
$1.49 million to Senate candidates and $684,465 to House candidates. 

That year, Paul Simon, Democratic challenger to Republican 
Senator Charles Percy, topped the Senate list with $147,870. Next in 
line were Carl Levin, Michigan, $140,063; James B. Hunt, North 
Carolina, $130,350; Rudolph E. Boschwitz, Minnesota, $95,100; 
George J. Mitchell, Maine, $77,400; James Sasser, Tennessee, $58,250; 
Albert Gore, Tennessee, $57,450; Thomas Harkin, Iowa, $57,250; 
David Durenberger, Minnesota, $56,750 and Robert C. Byrd, West 
Virginia, $55,500. Mitchell, Sasser, Durenberger and Byrd will not be 
up for re-election until 1988. All but Boschwitz and Durenberger are 
Democrats. Sixteen other Senators received over $30,000. 

Of 17 House Members who received $10,000 or more, 1 1 were on 
panels which handle foreign aid. One of them, Lee Hamilton of In- 
diana, chairman of the Middle East Subcommittee, received all but 
$500 of the $14,500 in pro-Israel PAC money that went to Indiana 
House contests. The top House recipients: Clarence Long, Maryland, 
$97,500; Charles Wilson, Texas, $21,750; Ben Erdreich, Alabama, 
$21,250; Ronald L. Wyden, Oregon, $18,000; Mark Siljander, Michi- 
gan, $16,800; Dante Fascell, Florida, $16,750; Robert G. Torricelli, 



King of the Hill 47 

New Jersey, $16,500; Harry M. Reid, Nevada, $15,500; Cardiss Col- 
lins, Illinois, $14,250; Lee Hamilton, Indiana, $14,000. All but Siljan- 
der are Democrats. 

Despite the dramatic growth of these PACs — a development that 
has occurred entirely since 1979 — most of the contributions to candi- 
dates still come directly from individual pro-Israel activists. 

Democratic candidates are especially dependent on contributions 
from Jewish sources. A non-Jewish strategist told Stephen D. Isaacs, 
author of Jews and American Politics: "You can't hope to go anywhere 
in national politics, if you're a Democrat, without Jewish money." In 
1968, 15 of the 21 persons who loaned $100,000 or more to presidential 
candidate Hubert Humphrey were Jewish. According to Isaacs, the 
Democratic National Committee, whose principal charge is the ad- 
vancement of Democratic Party prospects for the White House, for 
years received about 50 percent of its funds from Jewish sources. 

After the 1982 election — a year before he was elected chairman of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee after the sudden death of Zablocki — 
Fascell remarked: 

The whole trouble with campaign finances is the hue and cry that you've been 
bought. If you need the money, are you going to get it from your enemy? No, 
you're going to get it from your friend. 



"Our Own Foreign Policy Agenda" 

Much of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee's work in 
1982 centered on expanding grassroots support, enlarging outreach 
programs to the college and Christian communities, and helping pro- 
Israel political action committees sharpen their skills. These efforts 
were largely aimed at increasing the lobby's influence in the Senate. 
AIPAC wanted no repetition of its failure to block the 1981 AWACS 
sale to Saudi Arabia. 

One way in which AIPAC increases the number of its Senate 
friends is illustrated by its interventions in a critical race in Missouri. 
AIPAC stood by a friend and won. Republican Senator John C. Dan- 
forth, an ordained Episcopal minister, was opposed for re-election by a 
Jewish Democrat, Harriett Woods. In the closely fought contest, the 
non- Jewish Danforth found that an unblemished record of cooperation 
brought him AIPAC support even against a Jewish challenger. The help 
was crucial, as Danforth won by less than one percent of the vote. 

AIPAC also weighed in heavily in Maine, helping to pull off the 
upset victory of Democratic Senator George Mitchell over Republican 
Congressman David Emery. The Almanac of American Politics rated 
Mitchell "the Democratic Senator universally regarded as having the 



48 They Dare to Speak Out 

least chance for re-election." He had never won an election. Defeated 
for governor by an independent candidate in 1974, he was appointed to 
fill the Senate vacancy caused when Senator Edmund Muskie resigned 
in 1980 to become President Carter's Secretary of State, 

Encouraged by AIPAC, 27 pro-Israeli political action committees, 
all based outside Maine, contributed $77,400 to Mitchell's campaign. 
With this help Mitchell, who has Lebanese ancestry, fooled the profes- 
sionals and won handily. In a post-election phone call to AIPAC direc- 
tor Thomas A. Dine, Mitchell promised: "I will remember you." 

In another example, Republican Senator David Durenberger of 
Minnesota received for his 1982 re-election bid $57,000 from 20 pro- 
Israeli political action committees, with $10,000 of this total coming 
from the Citizens Organized PAC in California. This PAC contributed 
$5,000 during a breakfast meeting four months after he voted against 
the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia, and added $5,000 more by 
election day. Directors of the PAC include Alan Rothenberg, the law 
partner of Democratic National Chairman Charles Manatt. 

In close races, lobby interests sometimes play it safe by support- 
ing both sides. In the 1980 Senate race in Idaho, for example, pro- 
Israeli activists contributed to their stalwart friend, Democrat Frank 
Church, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but also 
gave to his challenger, Republican Congressman Steven D. Symms. 

One reason for the dual support was the expected vote in the 
Senate the next year on the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia— during the 
campaign both Symms and Church were listed as opposing it. With the 
race expected to be close, the lobby believed it had a friend in each 
candidate and helped both. 

Symms defeated Church by a razor-thin margin; but the invest- 
ment in Symms by pro-Israel interests did not pay off. By the time the 
new Senator faced the AWACS vote he had changed his mind. His vote 
approving the AWACS sale helped to give AIPAC one of its rare legisla- 
tive setbacks. 

In a post-election review in its newsletter, Near East Report, 
AIPAC concluded that the new Senate in the 98th Congress would be 
"marginally more pro-Israel." As evidence, it noted that two of the five 
new Senators were Jewish: Frank Lautenberg, Democrat of New 
Jersey, and Chic Hecht, Republican of Nevada, each "with long rec- 
ords of support for Israel." It could also count as a gain the election of 
Democrat Jeffrey Bingaman of New Mexico, who defeated Republican 
Senator Harrison Schmitt. Voting for the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia 
and opposing foreign aid had given Schmitt bad marks, and AIPAC 
gave its support to his challenger, Bingaman, in the campaign. 

Because favored candidates need more money than PAC sources 



King of the Hill 49 

provide, AIPAC also helps by providing lists for direct mail fundrais- 
ing. The appeal can be hard-hitting. An example is the literature mailed 
in early 1984 on behalf of Republican Senator Rudy Boschwitz of Min- 
nesota. Fellow Republican Lowell Weicker wrote the introductory let- 
ter, citing him as a "friend of Israel in danger." He noted Boschwitz's 
key position as chairman of the subcommittee "that determines the 
level of aid our country gives to Israel," and praised his efforts to block 
military sales to Saudi Arabia. The appeal included tributes by Senator 
Bob Packwood and Wolf Blitzer, Washington correspondent for The 
Jerusalem Post. 

AIPAC has convinced Congress that it represents practically all 
Jews who vote. Columnist Nat Hentoff reported this assessment in the 
New York Village Voice in June 1983 after a delegation of eighteen 
dissenting rabbis had scoured Capitol Hill trying to convince Congress- 
men that some Jews oppose Israeli policies. The rabbis reported that 
several Congressmen said they shared their views but were afraid to 
act. Hentoff concluded: "The only Jewish constituency that's real to 
them [Congressmen] is the one that AIPAC and other spokesmen for 
the Jewish establishment tell them about." 

An Ohio Congressman speaks of AIPAC with both awe and con- 
cern: 

AIPAC is the most influential lobby on Capitol Hill. They are relentless. They 
know what they're doing. They have the people for financial resources. 
They've got a lot going for them. Their basic underlying cause is one that most 
Americans sympathize with. 

But what distresses me is the inability of American policy-makers, because of 
the influence of AIPAC, to distinguish between our national interest and Is- 
rael's national interest. When these converge — wonderful! But they don't al- 
ways converge. 

After the 1982 elections, Thomas A. Dine summed up the 
significance of AIPAC's achievements: "Because of that, American 
Jews are thus able to form our own foreign policy agenda." 

Later, when he reviewed the 1984 election results, Dine credited 
Jewish money, not votes: "Early money, middle money, late money." 
He claimed credit for defeating Republican Senators Charles Percy of 
Illinois and Roger Jepson of Iowa and Democratic Senator Walter Hud- 
dleston of Kentucky, all of whom incurred AIPAC wrath by voting for 
the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia. 

Dine said these successes "defined Jewish political power for the 
rest of this century." 



Chapter 2 



Stilling the Still, Small Voices 



The youthful Congressman from California listened as his House col- 
leagues expressed their views. His earnest manner and distinctive 
shock of hair roused memories of an earlier Congressman, John F. 
Kennedy. For more than an hour, between comments of his own, Rep- 
resentative Paul N. "Pete" McCloskey yielded the floor to other Con- 
gressmen, 23 in all. While they cooperated by requesting from Speaker 
"Tip" O'Neill allocations of time for the debate, most of them did so in 
order to avoid a sticky issue. They were ducking legislative combat, not 
engaging in it. 

Real debate was almost unknown on the subject McCloskey had 
chosen — aid to Israel. Most Congressmen, fearing lobby pressure, 
carefully avoid statements or votes that might be viewed as critical of 
Israel. Not McCloskey. Admired for his courage and independence, he 
began opposing the Vietnam war long before most Americans, with- 
stood the lobbying of Greek Americans to cut off military aid to Tur- 
key, consistently supported controversial civil rights measures, and 
now challenged conventional wisdom on Middle East policy. He and I 
were members of a tiny band of Congressmen willing to criticize Israel 
publicly, and both of us would soon leave Capitol Hill involuntarily. 

On that June afternoon in 1980, most of McCloskey's colleagues 
provided him with debate time — and joined him in the discussion — 
because they saw this as the only way to keep him from forcing them to 
vote on an amendment cutting aid to Israel. Some of them privately 
agreed with McCloskey's position but did not want his amendment to 
come to a vote. If that happened, they would find themselves in the 
distressing circumstance of reacting to the pressure of Israel's lobby by 
voting against McCloskey's amendment — and their own conscience. 

In offering his amendment, McCloskey called for an end to the 
building of Israeli settlements in the territory in the West Bank of the 

50 



Stilting the Still, Small Voices 51 

Jordan river which Israel held by force of arms. To put pressure on 
Israel to stop, he wanted the U.S. to cut aid by $150 million— the 
amount he estimated Israel was annually spending on these projects. In 
the end, tough realities led him to drop his plan to bring the amendment 
to a vote: 

Friend and foe alike asked me not to press the amendment. Some of my friends 
argued that if I did get a roll call, the amendment would have been badly 
defeated. If that happened, they argued, Israel would take heart — saying 
"Sure, somebody spoke out, but look how we smashed him." Every Jewish 
Congressman on the floor of the House told me privately that I was right. 

Representative James Johnson, a Republican from Colorado and 
one of the few to support McCloskey, was aware of the pressure other 
Congressmen were putting on him. Johnson declared that many of his 
colleagues privately opposed Israel's expansion of settlements but said 
Congress was "incapable" of taking action contrary to Israeli policy: "I 
would just like to point out the real reason that this Congress will not 
deal with the gentleman's amendment is because [it] concerns the na- 
tion of Israel." 

It was not the first time peer pressure had stopped amendments 
viewed as anti-Israeli, and McCloskey was not the first to back down to 
accommodate colleagues. Such pressure develops automatically when 
amendments restricting aid to Israel are discussed. Many Congressmen 
are embarrassed at the high level of aid — Israel receives one-fourth 
of all U.S. foreign aid — and feel uncomfortable being recorded as 
favoring it. But, intimidated by Israel's friends, they are even less 
comfortable being recorded in opposition. How much of the lobby's 
power is real, and how much illusion, is beside the point. Because they 
perceive it as real, few Congressmen wish to take a chance. Worrying 
endlessly about political survival, they say: "Taking on the Israeli 
lobby is something I can do without. Who needs that?" On several 
occasions, sensing I was about to force a troublesome vote on aid to 
Israel, a colleague would whisper to me, "Your position on this is well 
known. Why put the rest of us on the spot?" 

Most committee action, like the work of the full House, is open to 
the public, and none occurs on Israeli aid without the presence of at 
least one representative of AIPAC. His presence ensures that any criti- 
cism of Israel will be quickly reported to key constituents. The offend- 
ing Congressman may have a rash of angry telephone messages to 
answer by the time he returns to his office from the hearing room. 

Lobbyists for AIPAC are experts on the personalities and proce- 
dures of the House. If Israel is mentioned, even behind closed doors, 
they quickly get a full report of what transpired. These lobbyists know 



52 They Dare to Speak Out 

that aid to Israel, on a roll call vote, will receive overwhelming sup- 
port. Administration lobbyists count on this support to carry the day 
for foreign aid worldwide. Working together, the two groups of lobby- 
ists pursue a common interest by keeping the waters smooth and frus- 
trating "boat rockers" like McCloskey. 

Assaulting the Citadels 

For McCloskey, compromise was an unusual experience. 
Throughout his public career he usually resisted pressures, even when 
his critics struck harshly. 

This was true when he became nationally prominent as a critic of 
the Vietnam war — an effort that led him in 1972 to a brief but dramatic 
campaign for the presidency. His goal was a broad and unfettered 
discussion of public issues, particularly the war. The wrong decisions, 
he believed, generally "came about because the view of the minority 
was not heard or the view of thinking people was quiet." He contended 
that the Nixon administration was withholding vital information on a 
variety of issues. He charged it with "preying on people's fear, hate and 
anger." 

When McCloskey announced for president, his supporters sighed, 
"Political suicide." His opponents, particularly those in the party's 
right wing, chortled the very same words. Although the Californian 
recognized that his challenge might jeopardize his seat in Congress, he 
nevertheless denounced the continuation of the war: "Like other 
Americans, I trusted President Nixon when he said he had a plan to 
end the war." McCloskey agonized over the fact that thousands of U.S. 
soldiers continued to die, and United States airpower, using horrifying 
cluster bombs, rained violence on civilians in Vietnam, Laos and Cam- 
bodia. 

McCloskey knew war's effects firsthand. As a Marine in Korea he 
was wounded leading his platoon in several successful bayonet assaults 
on entrenched enemy positions. He emerged from the Korean war with 
a Navy Cross, Silver Star and two Purple Hearts. He later explained 
that this wartime experience gave him "a strong sense of being lucky to 
be alive." It also toughened him for subsequent assaults on entrenched 
enemies of a different sort — endeavors which brought no medals for 
bravery. 

For protesting the war, McCloskey was branded "an enemy of the 
political process," and even accused of communist leanings. "At least 
fifty right-wing members of the House believe McCloskey to be the 
new Red menace," wrote one journalist. The allegation was ridiculous, 



Stilling the Still, Small Voices 53 

of course, but party stalwarts in California clearly were restive. So 
much so, according to the California Journal, that he "needed the 
personal intervention of then Vice-President Gerald R. Ford to save 
him in the 1974 primary." 

His maverick ways exacted a price. He was twice denied a place 
on the Ways and Means Committee. Conservatives on the California 
delegation rebuffed the liberal Republican's bid for membership, even 
though he was entitled to the post on the basis of seniority. 

By the time of his ill-fated 1980 amendment on aid to Israel, 
McCloskey had put himself in the midst of the Middle East con- 
troversy. After a trip to the Middle East in 1979, he concluded that new 
Israeli policies were not in America's best interests. He was alarmed 
over Washington's failure to halt Israel's construction of West Bank 
settlements — which the Administration itself had labeled illegal — and 
to stop Israel's illegal use of U.S.-supplied weapons. The Congress- 
man asked, "Why?" 

The answer was not hard to find. The issue, like most relating to 
the Middle East, was too hot for either Congress or the White House to 
handle. A call for debate provoked harsh press attacks and angry con- 
stituent mail. To McCloskey, the attacks were ironic. He viewed him- 
self as supportive of both Jewish and Israeli interests. As a college 
student at Stanford University in 1948, he had helped lead a successful 
campaign to open Phi Delta Theta fraternity for the first time to Jewish 
students. He reminded a critic, Earl Raab of the San Francisco Jewish 
Bulletin, that he had "voted for all the military and economic assistance 
we have given to Israel in the past." McCloskey also vigorously de- 
fended Israel's right to lobby: "Lobbying is and should be an honorable 
and important part of the American political process." He described 
the American Israel Public Affairs Committee as "the most powerful 
[lobby] in Washington," insisting there was "nothing sinister or devi- 
ous" about it. 

Still, McCloskey had raised a provocative question: "Does 
America's 'Israeli lobby' wield too much influence?" In an article for 
the Los Angeles Times he provided his answer: "Yes, it is an obstacle 
to real Mideast peace." McCloskey cited the risk of nuclear confronta- 
tion in the Middle East and the fundamental differences between the 
interests of Israel and the United States. He observed that members of 
the Jewish community demand that Congress support Israel in spite of 
these differences. This demand, he argued, "coupled with the weak- 
ness of Congress in the face of any such force, can prevent the presi- 
dent, in his hour of both crisis and opportunity, from having the 
flexibility necessary to achieve a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace." 



54 They Dare to Speak Out 

He pleaded for full discussion: 

If the United States is to work effectively toward peace in the Mideast, the 
power of this lobby must be recognized and countered in open and fair debate. 
I had hoped that the American Jewish community had matured to the point 
where its lobbying efforts could be described and debated without raising the 
red flag of anti-Semitism. ... To recognize the power of a lobby is not to 
criticize the lobby itself. 

The article appeared shortly before McCloskey's bid for his par- 
ty's nomination for the 1982 Senatorial race in California. It was an 
unorthodox opening salvo, to say the least, and most of the reaction 
was critical. One of the exceptions was an analysis by the Redlands 
Daily Facts (California) which called his campaign a "brave but risky 
business." The newspaper described him as "the candidate for those 
who want a man with whom they will disagree on some issues, but who 
has the courage of his intelligent convictions." 

On the other hand, Paul Greenberg, in a syndicated article in the 
San Francisco Examiner, wrote that McCloskey had accused the Is- 
raeli lobby of "busily subverting the national interest" and linked him 
with notorious anti-Semite Gerald L. K. Smith. This time, McCloskey 
did not need to fight back. A few days later, the same newspaper 
published an opposing view. Columnist Guy Wright noted that Green- 
berg had accused McCloskey of McCarthy era tactics without quoting 
"a single line from the offensive speech." Wright observed that this 
was itself a common tactic of McCarthyism. He cited with approval 
several of McCloskey' s recommendations on foreign policy and con- 
cluded: "Now I ask you. Are those the ravings of an anti-Semite? Or 
fair comment on issues too long kept taboo?" 

Such supportive voices were few. An article in the B'nai B'rith 
Messenger charged that McCloskey had proposed that all rabbis be 
required to register as foreign agents, declaring that he had made the 
proposal in a meeting with the editors of the Los Angeles Times. The 
author assured his readers that the tidbit came from a "very reliable 
source," and the charge was published nationally. The charge was a 
complete fabrication, and Times editor Tony Day was quick to back up 
McCloskey's denial. 

The Messenger published a retraction a month later, but the ac- 
cusation lingered on. Even the Washington office of the Israeli lobby 
did not get the retraction message. In an interview about McCloskey 
two years later, Douglas Bloomfield, legislative director for AIPAC, 
apparently unaware of the retraction, repeated the accusation as fact. 
Such false information may have colored his view of McCloskey, 



Stilling the Still, Small Voices 55 

whom he described as "bitter" with "an intense sense of hostility" 
toward Jews: 

I hestitate to use the term that he was anti-Semitic. Being anti-Israeli is a 
political decision. Being anti-Semitic is something totally different. I think he 
did not just creep over the boundary. 

Despite the Messenger's retraction, there was no letup in criticism 
of McCloskey. The Messenger charged McCloskey with denigrating 
"the Constitutional exercise of petitioning Congress," with "obstreper- 
ous performances," and with marching on a "platform of controversy 
unmindful of the fact that the framework of his platform is dangerously 
undermined with distortion, inaccuracy and maybe even malicious 
mischief." Another Jewish publication published his picture with the 
caption, "Heir to Goebbels." An article in the Heritage Southwest 
Jewish Press used such descriptive phrases as "No. 1 sonovabitch," 
"obscene position against the Jews of America," "crummy" and 
"sleazy" in denouncing him. 

Although used to rough and tumble partisanship, McCloskey was 
shocked at the harshness of the attacks. No rabbis or Jewish publica- 
tions defended him. One of a small number of individual Jews who 
spoke up in his behalf was Merwyn Morris, a prominent businessman 
from Atherton, California. Morris argued that "McCloskey is no more 
anti-Semitic than I am" — but he still switched his support to McClos- 
key's opponent in the Senatorial election. 

Josh Teitelbaum, who had served for a short time on McCloskey's 
staff and was the son of a Palo Alto rabbi, resigned from McCloskey's 
staff partly because he disagreed with the Congressman's attitude to- 
ward Israel. But he also defended his former employer: "McCloskey is 
not anti-Semitic, but his words may give encouragement to those who 
are." 

McCloskey's views on Israel complicated — to put it mildly — 
campaign fund raising. Potential sources of Jewish financial support 
dried up. One former supporter, Jewish multimillionaire Louis E. Wolf- 
son, wrote: "I now find that I must join with many other Americans to 
do everything possible to defeat your bid for the U.S. Senate and make 
certain that you will not hold any future office." 

Early in the race, when McCloskey was competing mainly with 
Senator S. I. Hayakawa for the nomination, he felt he had a chance. 
Both were from the northern part of the state, where McCloskey had his 
greatest strength. After Hayakawa dropped out and Pete Wilson, the 
popular mayor of San Diego, entered the contest, McCloskey's pros- 
pects declined. 



56 They Dare to Speak Out 

When the primary election votes were counted, McCloskey had 
won the north but lost the populous south. He finished 10 percentage 
points behind Wilson. Still, his showing surprised the experts. Polls 
and forecasters had listed him third or fourth among the four conten- 
ders right up to the last days. Congressman Barry Goldwater Jr., the 
early favorite, emerged a poor third, and Robert Dornan, another Con- 
gressional colleague, finished fourth. 

The final tally on election day was close enough to cause a number 
of people to conclude that without the Jewish controversy McCloskey 
might have won. All three of McCloskey' s opponents received Jewish 
financial support. Stephen S. Rosenfeld, deputy editorial page editor of 
the Washington Post, drew a definite conclusion: "Jewish political par- 
ticipation" defeated McCloskey. 

The lobby attack did not end when the polls closed, nor did 
McCloskey shun controversy. On September 22, 1982, a few days after 
the massacre of hundreds of Palestinians in the refugeee camps at 
Beirut, McCloskey denounced a proposed new $50 million grant for 
Israel in a speech on the House floor. He warned that the action "might 
be taken as a signal of our support for what Israel did last Thursday in 
entering West Beirut and creating the circumstances which led directly 
to the massacre." Despite his protest, the aid was approved. 

In the closing hours of the 97th Congress, after 15 years as a 
member of "this treasured institution," McCloskey invoked George 
Washington's Farewell Address in his own farewell, citing the first 
president's warning that "a passionate attachment of one nation for 
another produces a variety of evils." 

McCloskey found this advice "eminently sound" and said that 
Congress, in action completed the day before, had demonstrated a 
"passionate attachment" to Israel by voting more aid per capita to that 
country "than we allow to many of the poor and unemployed in our 
own country," despite evidence that "Israel is no longer behaving like a 
friend of the United States." 



McCloskey 9 s Academic Freedom 

With his political career interrupted, if not ended, McCloskey 
planned to return to a partnership in the Palo Alto law firm he helped 
John Wilson, a fellow graduate of Yale Law School, establish years 
before. "Many of my old clients are still clients," he said, "and I 
wanted to go back to them. I never thought of going anywhere else." 

But others had different thoughts about McCloskey's future. Ken 
Oshman, president of the Rolm Corporation, the firm's biggest client, 
warned that his company "might take their law business elsewhere" if 



Stilling the Still, Small Voices 57 

McCloskey were to rejoin the firm. The senior partners invited 
McCloskey to lunch and told him the episode would not cause them to 
withdraw their invitation, but they wanted McCloskey to be "aware of 
the problem." McCloskey's response, "I don't want to come back and 
put you under that burden." In a letter to Oshman, McCloskey ex- 
pressed his dismay. In reply, the industrialist said his company really 
wouldn't have taken its business elsewhere but reiterated his dis- 
agreement with McCloskey's views on Israel. 

McCloskey accepted a partnership with the San Francisco law 
firm of Brobeck, Phleger and Harrison, but the pressures followed him 
there. The firm received a telephone call from a man in Berkeley, 
California, who identified himself only as a major shareholder in the 
Wells Fargo Bank, one of the law firm's major clients. He said that he 
intended to go to the next meeting of the shareholders and demand that 
the bank transfer its law business to another firm. The reason: the San 
Francisco firm was adding to its partnership a "known anti-Semite" who 
supported the Palestine Liberation Organization and its chairman, Yas- 
ser Arafat. McCloskey's partners ignored the threat, and the bank did 
not withdraw its business. 

A tracking system initiated by the Anti-Defamation League of 
B'nai B'rith assured that McCloskley would have no peace, even as a 
private citizen. The group distributed a memorandum containing de- 
tails of his actions and speeches to its chapters around the country. 
According to the memo, it was designed to "assist" local ADL groups 
with "counteraction guidance" whenever McCloskey appeared in 
public. 

Ttouble dogged him even on the campus. McCloskey accepted an 
invitation from the student governing council of Stanford University to 
teach a course on Congress at Stanford. Howard Goldberg — a council 
member and also director of the Hillel Center, the campus Jewish 
club — told the group that inviting McCloskey was "a slap in the face of 
the Jewish community." Student leader Seth Linfield held up prepara- 
tion of class materials then demanded the right to choose the guest 
lecturers. McCloskey refused, asserting that the young director had 
earlier assured him he could choose these speakers himself. 

Difficulties mounted as the semester went on. Guest speakers 
were not paid on time. McCloskey felt obliged to pay such expenses 
personally, then seek reimbursement. His own remuneration was 
scaled downward as the controversy developed. Instead of the $3,500 
stipend originally promised, Linfield later reduced the amount to 
$2,000 and even that amount was in doubt. According to a report in the 
San Jose Mercury News, the $2,000 would be paid only if Linfield was 
satisfied with McCloskey's performance. One student, Jeffrey Au, 



58 They Dare to Speak Out 

complained to school authorities that the controversy impaired 
academic quality. Responding, Professor Hubert Marshall wrote that 
he viewed the student activities as "unprecedented and a violation of 
Mr. McCloskey's academic freedom." 

McCloskey reacted sharply to his critics at Stanford: 

It's a kind of reverse anti-Semitism. It is the Jewish community saying we 
don't want this person teaching at Stanford and, if he does teach, we don't 
want him using this material. 

The San Francisco Chronicle observed that McCloskey's appoint- 
ment had provoked interest beyond the university campus, noting that 
"Jewish leaders around the Bay Area expressed concern when Stan- 
ford's student government voted narrowly to hire McCloskey." 

By mid-May, the controversy elicited action by the university pro- 
vost, Albert H. Hastorf, who apologized in a letter that made news 
from coast to coast. He expressed the hope that McCloskey might 
derive "some small compensation" in knowing that his case "will cause 
us to revise our procedures so that future guest professors and other 
instructors at Stanford will enjoy the special protections that their 
positions warrant." With the apology came a payment which brought 
his stipend for the course to the $3,500 agreed to originally. 

McCloskey told the Peninsula Times-Tribune, "Stanford doesn't 
owe me an apology." He said his satisfaction came when all but one of 
the fifty students rated his class "in the high range of excellence," but 
he warned that other schools might face trouble. He noted that the 
American Israel Public Affairs Committee "has instructed college stu- 
dents all over the country to take [similar] actions." (see chapters six 
and seven) 

The end of the course did not terminate McCloskey's activities in 
foreign policy. Throughout 1983 and into 1984, while engaged in the 
practice of law, he filled frequent speaking dates on the Arab-Israel 
dispute in the United States, flew several times to Europe and the 
Middle East, and wrote numerous newspaper and journal articles. 

While castigating Israeli policies, he also appealed to Palestinians 
and other Arabs to recognize the right of Israel to exist and on one 
occasion even traveled to Europe to make the appeal. In September 
1983 he addressed the International Conference on the Question of 
Palestine at Geneva, urging the Conference to endorse all United Na- 
tions resolutions concerning the Middle East conflict. This, he ex- 
plained, would put the group on record in support of Palestinian rights 
but also in support of Israel's right to exist on the land it occupied 
before the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. He offered amendments designed to 
lift a pending declaration from the level of "partisanship" to that of 



Stilling the Still, Small Voices 59 

"fairness and truth," thus giving the conference effect beyond its mem- 
bership and answering "the doubters and faint hearts" who had boy- 
cotted it. 

McCloskey urged a call for the security of Israel, as well as justice 
for the Palestinians, and forecast that such action could "change 
American public opinion and ultimately the actions of the U.S. Con- 
gress." The conference rejected his advice. 

"It Didn't Cripple Us" But— 

While McCloskey, a leader in the white Republican establishment, 
battled for universal human rights and against further United States 
involvement in the Vietnam war, a black Baptist preacher from the 
District of Columbia, known nationally as a "street activist," pursued 
the same goals within Democratic ranks. 

Both were members of the House of Representatives, good 
friends, and both undertook controversial journeys to Lebanon in be- 
half of peace. Both paid a price for their activism, but the preacher 
survived politically, while the ex-Marine did not. The preacher is the 
Reverend Walter Fauntroy. Working for justice in the Middle East — not 
their record of activism for civil rights at home or opposition to the 
Vietnam war — caused trouble for both of them. 

In large measure, Fauntroy's problems began over another black 
leader's endeavors for justice in the Middle East. Andrew Young re- 
signed under fire as the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations in 
August, 1979, after it was revealed that he had met with the PLO's U.N. 
observer, Zuhdi Labib Terzi. Many blacks were outraged by the resig- 
nation, blaming it on Israeli pressure and, like Young, found unreason- 
able the policy which prohibited our officials from talking even 
informally with PLO officials. 

Relations between American blacks and Jews — long-time allies in 
the civil rights movement — had already been strained by dis- 
agreements over affirmative action programs intended to give blacks 
employment quotas and by Israel's close relations with the apartheid 
regime in South Africa. The resignation of Young, the most prominent 
black in the Carter Administration, intensified the strain. "This is the 
most tense moment in black and Jewish relations in my memory," said 
the Reverend Jesse Jackson shortly after the resignation. 

During the civil rights movement of the 1960s, Fauntroy, one of the 
blacks most disturbed by the resignation, had worked with Young in 
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) under the Rev- 
erend Martin Luther King, Jr. They had acquired the nickname "The 
Brooks Brothers" because of their habit of wearing suits and neckties 



60 They Dare to Speak Out 

on civil rights marches while most of the others were dressed more 
casually. 

To show support for Young and disagreement with United States 
policy, Fauntroy and SCLC President Joseph Lowery traveled to New 
York in the fall of 1979 to meet with Terzi. Fauntroy said he hoped to 
help establish communication between Arabs and Israelis and so pro- 
mote a nonviolent solution to Middle East problems, adding, "Neither 
Andy Young nor I, nor other members of the SCLC, apologize for 
searching for the relevance of Martin Luther King's policies in the 
international political arena." 

While Terzi said he was "happy and gratified" at the meeting with 
the black leaders and hoped "much more will be learned by the Ameri- 
can people/* prominent members of Washington's Jewish community 
were upset. 

"I don't think a responsible Congressman should have any truck 
with terrorists," complained Rabbi Stanley Rabinowitz. Although most 
Jews echoed this sentiment, a few stood by Fauntroy. Prominent Jew- 
ish businessman Joseph B. Danzansky said Fauntroy "has a right to do 
what he thinks his position entitles him to do." Danzansky, a friend and 
political ally of Fauntroy, added, "I'd be very shocked if there were any 
trace of anti- Jewish feeling. I have confidence in him as a human be- 
ing." 

In an attempt to calm the critics and demonstrate their "fairness,** 
Fauntroy, Lowery and other SCLC leaders met with U.S. Jewish lead- 
ers and with Israel's U.N. ambassador, Yehuda Blum. Afterwards, 
Fauntroy told reporters that the black leaders were "asking both par- 
ties [in the Middle East dispute] to recognize each other's human rights 
and the right of self-determination." But pro-Israel interests saw the 
outcome differently. Howard Squadron, president of the American 
Jewish Committee, emerged from the meeting to say that the SCLC 
contact with Terzi was "a grave error lending legitimacy to an organiza- 
tion committed to terrorism and violence." 

Against this tense background, black leaders from across the 
United States convened in New York to express their concern over the 
Young resignation and to affirm their right to speak out on matters of 
foreign policy. 

Some said they were making "a declaration of independence" in 
matters of foreign policy. Fauntroy said: 

In every war since the founding of this nation, black citizens have borne arms 
and died for their country. Their blood was spilled from Bunker Hill to Viet- 
nam. It is to be expected that should the United States become drawn into war 
in the Middle East black Americans once more will be called upon to sacrifice 



Stilling the Still, Small Voices 61 

their lives. [His words were prophetic of the sacrifices blacks were soon to 
make in Lebanon. While blacks constitute only 10 percent of the total U.S. 
population, 20 percent of the Marines killed in the terrorist truck bombing at 
Beirut— 47 of 246— were black.] 

Even as they chafed at the criticism of their involvement in the 
Palestinian question, black leaders worried about how it would affect 
their efforts to advance civil rights in the United States. Jewish Ameri- 
cans had long been active in advocating civil rights and were often a 
major source of financial support for those efforts. Three of the four 
original organizers of the NAACP were Jewish. The Washington Post 
reported that during their meetings several black leaders "stressed the 
need to present a unified front on the self-determination issue, while at 
the same time acknowledging that some black organizations 9 heavy 
reliance on Jewish philanthropy might temper their views." The valid- 
ity of this concern was borne out by reports that Jewish contributors 
had informed the NAACP and the Urban League that they would no 
longer be providing financial support. 

"It didn't cripple us," says Fauntroy, who also serves as chairman 
of the board of the SCLC. "It just made us more resourceful and more 
sensitive to our need to put principle above politics on questions that 
bear on nonviolence and the quest for justice." It hurt fund raising for 
his personal campaign: "No question about that. Some of my former 
close supporters flatly stated to me that they were not going to contrib- 
ute to my candidacy because I had taken the position that I did." 

He demonstrated his persistence three weeks later when he joined 
Lowery on a controversial trip to the Mideast. As they departed, Low- 
ery declared their determination to "preach the moral principles of 
peace, nonviolence, and human rights." 

In a meeting with Yasser Arafat, they appealed for an end to vio- 
lence, asking the PLO leader to agree to a six-month moratorium on 
violence. Arafat promised to present the proposal to the PLO's execu- 
tive council. 

Fauntroy recalls the dramatic moment, "We asked Dr. Harry Gib- 
son of the United Methodist Church to pray. Then a Roman Catholic 
priest said a prayer in Arabic. We wept. At the end of the prayer, 
someone — I don't know who — started singing 4 We Shall Overcome/ 
and Arafat just immediately crossed his arms and linked hands." 

Jews in the United States, who had joined with blacks in singing 
the same hymn during the tense days of the civil rights movement in 
America, found this episode offensive and were alarmed at photos 
showing Fauntroy embracing Arafat. Some feared the emotional meet- 
ing symbolized a new black alliance with the PLO and a betrayal of 



62 They Dare to Speak Out 

their own support of blacks. They rejected the black leaders' insistence 
that they were impartial advocates of peace. 

The controversy deepened when Fauntroy, on his return from the 
Middle East, announced that he had invited Arafat to speak in the 
United States at an "educational forum" to be sponsored by the SCLC. 
It would be the first in a series where opposing views could be con- 
sidered. 

He explained, "It would offer an opportunity for the American 
people to hear both sides of the conflict, to understand it and to in- 
fluence our government." Predictably, the announcement sparked criti- 
cism. Rabbi Joshua Haberman of Washington Hebrew Congregation 
declared that the Arafat visit would "fuel the flames that have been 
festering." 

At a news conference at his New Bethel Baptist Church, Fauntroy 
described his mission for peace and said he would persist: "I am first 
and foremost a minister of the gospel, called to preach every day that 
God is our father and all men are our brothers, right here from this 
pulpit." He added: "I could not be true to my highest calling if, when an 
opportunity to do so arose, I refused." 

He challenged his critics: "So let anyone who wishes run against 
me. Let anyone who wishes withdraw his support. It doesn't matter to 
me. 

Nor did Fauntroy budge when an issue close to his heart became 
threatened — the proposed Constitutional amendment to give full Con- 
gressional representation to the people of the District of Columbia. 
With the amendment pending before several state legislatures, Faun- 
troy's critics said his peacemaking efforts would jeopardize approval. 
He said he would not be moved by "people who are narrow and who 
want to protect our self-determination rights in the District of Colum- 
bia but refuse to see the right of other people who are also children of 
God." 

Fauntroy's resolve was to be tested during the Maryland legisla- 
ture's consideration of the issue. Before the vote on this wholly unre- 
lated matter, two Jewish delegates, Steven Sklar and David Shapiro, 
who had supported the amendment the previous year put Fauntroy on 
notice. They warned Fauntroy that unless he condemned the PLO they 
would defeat the amendment by reversing their own votes and per- 
suade others to join them. Fauntroy rejected the demand, but the news 
coverage got twisted. In an editorial entitled "Groveling for the DC 
Amendment," the Washington Post reported that Fauntroy had prom- 
ised to issue the required statement and chided him accordingly: "a 
handful of Maryland delegates have got Walter Fauntroy jumping 
through a hoop." Fauntroy called the Post story "a total fabrication." 



Stilling the Still, Small Voices 63 

The amendment was subsequently approved by a single vote, but with- 
out the support of delegates Sklar and Shapiro. 

Fauntroy's Middle East problems took on a new dimension in mid- 
October when Vernon Jordan, president of the National Urban 
League, delivered a speech denouncing contacts between black leaders 
and the PLO as "sideshows" that distracted attention from the "vital 
survival issues facing American blacks at home." Some black leaders, 
including civil rights activist Bayard Rustin of the A. Philip Randolph 
Institute and a number of NAACP representatives, aligned themselves 
with Jordan. Before leaving for Israel to express solidarity, Rustin said 
he wanted Israelis to know that "there are great numbers of black 
people who want the United States to give Israel whatever support it 
needs." 

Other blacks supported Fauntroy and angrily denounced Jordan, 
accusing him of "selling out to the Jewish-Israeli lobby." 

"Any civil rights organization that cannot take a stand without 
being worried about its white money being cut off doesn't deserve to be 
a civil rights organization," said the Reverend George Lawrence of the 
Progressive National Baptist Convention. "We understand where Ver- 
non is coming from. ... He doesn't want his bread cut off. We support 
the right of Israel to exist, too. But we also support justice for the 
Palestinian people." 

Even before these exchanges among black leaders, Fauntroy an- 
nounced that he had withdrawn his invitation to Arafat to visit the 
United States, citing the PLO failure to order a moratorium on vio- 
lence. Even so, he said he would continue his peace efforts: "We think 
it is ludicrous to suggest that an appeal to the PLO to end its violence 
against Israeli men, women and children and to recognize the right of 
Israel to exist is tantamount to supporting terrorism and the destruc- 
tion of Israel." Fauntroy added that he favored a 10 percent reduction 
in U.S. military aid to Israel, which, he said, would "send a message to 
Israel" not to use U.S.-supplied weaponry "on non-military targets." 

While considered unbeatable in the District of Columbia, Faun- 
troy's Middle East stand provoked minor competition in his bid for re- 
election in 1982. Announcing her intention to seek Fauntroy's 
Congressional seat, Marie Bembery emphasized that she wanted "to 
protest Walter Fauntroy putting his arms around PLO leader Yasser 
Arafat and singing, 'We Shall Overcome.'" She declared that she 
would take no position on the Middle East conflict, stating that the 
District of Columbia's delegate should "take care of problems here 
first." 

A month later, during the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, she raised 
the issue again at a candidates' forum at the Washington Hebrew Con- 



64 They Dare to Speak Out 

gregation. She baited Fauntroy: "I must say that I am shocked that 
Fauntroy would have the temerity, the gall to even show up at this 
forum, given his history of insensitivity to, and blatant misrepresenta- 
tion of the Jewish community." Later in the evening, she said that if 
Washington's delegate were Jewish and hugged the Grand Dragon of 
the Ku Klux Klan, there was "no way he could come back to D.C. and 
tell me he represents me as a black resident and voter of the district." 

Fauntroy, speaking later to the same tense audience, stated, "I am 
a supporter of Israel and Israel's right to exist, and I have the same 
sensitivity to the people in diaspora who are the people of Palestine. I 
continue to support the right of the Palestinian people to a homeland 
today." 

Both candidates gave crisp responses when they were asked if 
they supported the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Fauntroy responded, 
"No." When Bembery said, "Yes," the audience stood and applauded. 
The challenger's campaign fell far short on primary election day, with 
Fauntroy receiving 85 percent of the vote. In the heavily Democratic 
district, Fauntroy was unopposed in the November general election. 

In the summer of 1983 Fauntroy found himself again embroiled in 
black-Jewish controversy. As chairman of the twentieth anniversary 
commemoration of the Rev. Martin Luther King's march on Washing- 
ton, Fauntroy cooperated in a vain effort to win broad Jewish support 
for the celebration. He agreed with other leaders to revise a "foreign 
policy position" paper for the march to eliminate phrases offensive to 
Jewish leaders. The final version dropped a sentence saying there is 
general opposition to U.S. policy in the Middle East, as well as phrases 
referring to "Palestinian rights" and calling on both Israel and the 
United States to talk directly with the PLO. Despite these concessions, 
most national Jewish groups refused to participate. 

Reflecting on the problems created by his quest for self- 
determination of people in the Middle East, as well as in the District of 
Columbia, Fauntroy calls it "a growing experience" and plans to push 
ahead on both fronts. 



"Three Calls Within 13 Minutes" 

Few members of the House of Representatives, besides McClos- 
key and Fauntroy, have criticized Israeli policy in recent years. To a 
great extent this results from the vigilance and skill of that govern- 
ment's lobby on Capitol Hill which reacts swiftly to any sign of discon- 
tent with Israel, especially by those assigned to the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee. 

A young man working in 1981 in the office of the late Democratic 



Stilling the Still, Small Voices 65 

Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal of New York, who was then the 
leader of the House's "Jewish caucus," witnessed firsthand the 
efficiency of this monitoring. 

Michael Neiditch, a staff consultant, was with Rosenthal in his 
office one morning when, just before 9 a.m., the phone rang. Morris 
Amitay, then executive director of AIPAC, had just read the Evans and 
Novak syndicated column that morning in the Washington Post and he 
didn't like what he read. The journalists reported that Rosenthal had 
recently told a group of Israeli visitors: "The Israeli occupation of the 
West Bank is like someone carrying a heavy pack on his back — the 
longer he carries it, the more he stoops over, but the less he is aware of 
the burden." Rosenthal had personally related the incident to Robert 
Novak. Although he used the descriptive image "ever so gently," ac- 
cording to Neiditch, it caused a stir. 

Amitay chided Rosenthal for speaking "out of turn." About five 
minutes later, Ephraim "Eppie" Evron, the Israeli ambassador to the 
United States, called with the same message. Then, just a few minutes 
later, Yehuda Hellman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish 
Organizations called. Again, the same message. Neiditch remembers 
that Rosenthal looked over and observed, "Young man, you've just 
seen the Jewish lobby's muscles flex." Neiditch recalls: "It was three 
calls within 13 minutes." 

Another senior committee member, an Ohio Congressman who 
was more independent of Israel's interests than Rosenthal, never- 
theless found his activities closely watched. Republican Charles Wha- 
len fdSt the pressure of the lobby when he accepted a last-minute 
invitation to attend a February 1973 conference in London on the Mid- 
dle East. It was held under the auspices of the Ford Foundation. No 
Israeli representative was present, but to his surprise, on his return to 
Washington, Whalen was called on by an Israeli lobby official who 
demanded all of the meeting's details — the agenda, those present, why 
Whalen went and why Ford had sponsored it. 

Whalen recalls, "It was just amazing. They never let up." Whalen 
believes it was the last such conference Ford sponsored. "They got to 
them," Whalen speculates and adds that the experience was a turning 
point in his own attitude toward the lobby: "If I couldn't go to a 
conference to further my education, I began to wonder what's this all 
about." 

A Minnesota Democrat had reason for similar wonderment after 
he left Congress. Richard Nolan, now a businessman in Minneapolis, 
discovered the reluctance of his former colleagues to identify them- 
selves with a scholarly article on the Middle East. He individually 
approached fifteen Congressmen, asking each to insert in the Congres- 



66 They Dare to Speak Out 

sional Record an article which discussed the potential for the de- 
velopment of profitable U.S. trade with Arab states. Written by 
Ghanim Al-Mazrui, an official of the United Arab Emirates, it pro- 
posed broadened dialogue and rejection of malicious stereotypes. 
Under House rules, when such items are entered in the Record, the 
name of the sponsoring member must be shown. 

Nolan reports, "Each of the fifteen said it was a terrific article that 
should be published but added, 'Please understand, putting it in under 
my name would simply cause too much trouble.' I didn't encounter a 
single one who questioned the excellence of the article, and what made 
it especially sad was that I picked out the fifteen people I thought most 
likely to cooperate." The sixteenth Congressman he approached, De- 
mocrat David E. Bonior of Michigan agreed to Nolan's request. The 
article appeared on page E 4791 of the October 5, 1983, Record. It was 
one of those unusual occasions when the Congressional Record con- 
tained a statement that might be viewed as critical of policies or posi- 
tions taken by Israel or, as in this case, promoting dialogue with the 
Arabs. 

It was one of several brave steps by Bonior which may make him a 
future target of Israel's lobby. Speaking before the Association of 
Arab American University Graduates in Flint, Michigan, two months 
before the 1984 election, Bonior called for conditions on aid to Israel, 
declaring that the United States has been "rewarding the current gov- 
ernment of Israel for undertaking policies that are contrary to our 
own," including Israel's disruption of "U.S. relations with long stand- 
ing allies such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia." 

"An Incredible Burst of Candor" 

Even those high in House leadership who represent politically safe 
districts are not immune from lobby intimidation. They perceive lobby 
pressure back home and sometimes vote against their own conscience. 

In October 1981 President Reagan's controversial proposal to sell 
AWACS (intelligence-gathering airplanes) and modifying equipment for 
F-15 fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia was under consideration in the 
House. Congressman Daniel Rostenkowski, chairman of the Ways and 
Means Committee and one of the most influential legislators on Capitol 
Hill, got caught in the Israeli lobby counterattack. It was the first test 
of strength between the lobby and the newly-installed president. Under 
the law, the sale would go through unless both Houses rejected it. The 
lobby strategy was to have the initial test vote occur in the House, 
where its strength was greater, believing a lopsided House rejection 
might cause the Senate to follow suit. 



Stilling the Still, Small Voices 67 

Under heavy pressure from the lobby, Rostenkowski cooperated 
by voting "No." Afterwards he told a reporter for Chicago radio station 
WMAQ that he actually favored the sale but voted as he did because he 
feared the "Jewish lobby." 

He contended that the House majority against the sale was so 
overwhelming that his own favorable vote "would not have mattered." 
Overwhelming it was, 301 to 111. Still, the Israeli lobby's goal was the 
highest possible number of negative votes in order to influence the 
Senate vote, and, to the lobby, Rostenkowski' s vote did matter very 
much. 

Columnist Carl Rowan called Rostenkowski's admission "an in- 
credible burst of candor." While declaring "it is as American as apple 
pie for monied interests to use their dough to influence decisions" in 
Washington, Rowan added, "There are a lot of American Jews with lots 
of money who learned long ago that they can achieve influence far 
beyond their numbers by making strategic donations to candidates. . . . 
No Arab population here plays such a powerful role." Rostenkowski, 
however, was not a nuyor recipient of contributions from pro-Israeli 
political action committees. In the following year, his campaign re- 
ceived only $1,000 from such groups. 

While the lobby is watchful over the full membership of the 
House, particularly leaders like Rostenkoswki, it gives special empha- 
sis to the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, where the initial 
decisions are made on aid, both military and economic. 

Allegiance to Israeli interests sometimes creates mystifying voting 
habits. Members who are "doves" on policy elsewhere in the world are 
unabashed "hawks" when Israel is concerned. As Stephen S. Rosen- 
feld, deputy editor of the editorial page of the Washington Post, wrote 
in May 1983: 

A Martian looking at the way Congress treats the administration's aid requests 
for Israel and El Salvador might conclude that our political system makes 
potentially life-or-death decisions about dependent countries in truly inscruta- 
ble ways. 

Rosenfeld was intrigued with the extraordinary performance of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee on one particular day, May 11, 1983. 
Scarcely taking time to catch its breath between acts, the panel re- 
quired the vulnerable government of El Salvador to "jump a series of 
extremely high political hurdles" in order to get funding "barely ade- 
quate to keep its nose above water," while, a moment later, handing to 
Israel, clearly the dominant military power in the Middle East, "a third 
of a billion dollars more than the several billion dollars that the admin- 
istration asked for it." One of Israel's leading partisans, Congressman 



68 They Dare to Speak Out 

Stephen J. Solarz, spoke with enthusiasm for the El Salvador "hurdles" 
and for the massive increase to Israel. 



"Nobody in the Leadership Will Say No" 

Israel's lobby is especially attentive to the person occupying the 
position as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and, because of 
his or her ability to control the agenda at legislative meetings, takes a 
close interest when a vacancy occurs in the chairmanship. 

In January 1977, activists for the lobby found reason for concern 
when Clement J. Zablocki of Wisconsin, after waiting eighteen years as 
second-ranking Democrat on the Foreign Affairs Committee, was in 
line to take over after the retirement of Chairman Thomas E. Morgan. 
A group of younger Democrats, led by Benjamin S. Rosenthal of New 
York, tried to keep Zablocki from the chairmanship. They based their 
challenge on allegations contained in a closely-held 38-page report pre- 
pared by Rosenthal's staff which contended that Zablocki had voted 
against too many Democratic foreign policy initiatives and had dubious 
Korean connections. 

Zablocki dismissed the Korean charges as "outright lies/* and the 
Congressional Quarterly voting study reported that he had voted with 
his party 79 percent of the time in the previous Congress. Zablocki 
declared that the real complaint of Rosenthal and his associates was "a 
feeling that I was not friendly enough toward Israel." Yet, with the 
exception of one key vote, he had always supported aid to Israel. He 
told columnist Jack Anderson, who had publicized the Rosenthal re- 
port: "I'm not anti-Semitic, but I'm not as pro-Israel as Ben Rosenthal. 
Even [then Israeli Prime Minister] Rabin doesn't satisfy Rosenthal." 

Despite the lobby's opposition, Zablocki was elected chairman, 
182 to 72. But the experience may have dulled his enthusiasm for 
Middle East controversy, as he did not again issue statements or cast 
votes opposing lobby requests. An aide said Zablocki could hardly be 
blamed, since the House leadership, principally Speaker "Tip" O'Neill, 
discourages opposition to Israel: "Nobody in the leadership will say no 
to the Israeli lobby. Nobody." 

"Outdoing the United Jewish Appeal" 

Stephen J. Solarz, a hard-working Congressman who represents a 
heavily Jewish district in Brooklyn, prides himself on accomplishing 
many good things for Israel. Since his first election in 1974, Solarz 
established a reputation as an intelligent "eager beaver," widely- 
traveled, aggressive, and totally committed to Israel's interests. In 



Stilling the Still, Small Voices 69 

committee, he seems always bursting with the next question before the 
witness responds to his first 

In a December 1980 newsletter to his constituents, he provided an 
unprecedented insight into how Israel — despite the budgetary re- 
straints under which the U.S. government labors — is able to get ever- 
increasing aid. Early that year he had started his own quest for 
increased aid. He reported that he persuaded Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance to come to his Capitol Hill office to talk it over. There he 
threatened Vance with a fight for the increase on the House floor if the 
administration opposed it in committee. Shortly thereafter, he said 
Vance sent word that the administration would recommend an in- 
crease — $200 million extra in military aid — although not as much as 
Solarz desired. 

His next goal was to convince the Foreign Affairs Committee to 
increase the administration's levels. Solarz felt an increase approved 
by the committee could be maintained on the House floor. The first step 
was a private talk with Lee H. Hamilton, chairman of the subcommit- 
tee on Europe and the Middle East, the panel that would first deal with 
the request. Tall, thoughtful, scholarly and cautious, Hamilton prides 
himself on staying on the same "wavelength" as the majority — whether 
in committee or on the floor. Never abrasive, he usually works out 
differences ahead of time and avoids open wrangles. Representing a 
rural Indiana district with no significant Jewish population, he is 
troubled by Israel's military adventures but rarely voices criticism in 
public. He guards his role as a conciliator. 

Solarz found Hamilton amenable: "He agreed to support our 
proposal to increase the amount of [military assistance] ... by another 
$200 million." That would bring the total increase to $400 million. Even 
more important, Hamilton agreed to support a move to relieve Israel of 
its obligation to repay any of the $785 million in economic aid. The 
administration had wanted Israel to pay back one-third of the amount. 

"As we anticipated," Solarz reported, "with the support of Con- 
gressman Hamilton, our proposal sailed through both his subcommit- 
tee and the full committee and was never challenged on the floor when 
the foreign aid bill came up for consideration." Democrat Frank 
Church of Idaho, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee, and Jacob Javits, senior Republican — both strongly pro- 
Israeli — guided proposals at the same level smoothly through their 
chamber. 

Solarz summed up: "Israel, as a result, will soon be receiving a 
grand total of $660 million more in military and economic aid than it 
received from the U.S. government last year." He reflected upon the 
magnitude of the achievement: 



70 They Dare to Speak Out 

Through a combination of persistence and persuasion, we were able to provide 
Israel with an increase in military-economic aid in one year alone which is the 
equivalent of almost three years of contributions by the national UJA [United 
Jewish Appeal]. 

In his newsletter Solarz said that he sought membership on the 
Foreign Affairs Committee "because I wanted to be in a position to be 
helpful to Israel." He explained that, while "hundreds of members of 
Congress, Republicans as well as Democrats" support Israel, "it is the 
members of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House, and the 
Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate, who are really in a position 
to make a difference where it counts — in the area of foreign aid, upon 
which Israel is now so dependent." 

Solarz's zeal was unabated in September 1984 when, as a member 
of the House-Senate conference on Export Administration Act amend- 
ments, he demanded in a public meeting to know the legislation's impli- 
cations for Israel. He asked Congressman Howard Wolpe, "Is there 
anything that the Israelis want from us, or could conceivably want 
from us that they weren't able to get?" Even when Wolpe responded 
with a clear "no," Solarz pressed, "Have you spoken to the [Israeli] 
embassy?" Wolpe responded, "I personally have not," but he admitted, 
"my office has." Then Solarz tried again, "You are giving me an abso- 
lute assurance that they [the Israelis] have no reservation at all about 
this?" Finally convinced that Israel was content with the legislation, 
Solarz relaxed, "If they have no problem with it, then there is no 
reason for us to." 

A veteran Ohio Congressman observes: 

When Solarz and others press for more money for Israel, nobody wants to say 
"No." You don't need many examples of intimidation for politicians to realize 
what the potential is. The Jewish lobby is terrific. Anything it wants, it gets. 
Jews are educated, often have a lot of money, and vote on the basis of a single 
issue — Israel. They are unique in that respect. For example, anti-abortion 
supporters are numerous but not that well educated, and don't have that much 
money. The Jewish lobbyists have it all, and they are political activists on top 
of it. 

This Congressman divides his colleagues into four groups: 

For the first group, it's rah, rah, give Israel anything it wants. The second 
group includes those with some misgivings, but they don't dare step out of line; 
they don't say anything. In the third group are Congressmen who have deep 
misgivings but who won't do more than try quietly to slow down the aid to 
Israel. Lee Hamilton is an example. The fourth group consists of those who 
openly question U.S. policy in the Middle East and challenge what Israel is 



Stilling the Still, Small Voices 71 

doing. Since Findley and McCloskey left, this group really doesn't exist any- 
more. 

He puts himself in the third group: "I may vote against the bill 
authorizing foreign aid this year for the first time. If I do, I will not state 
my reason." 

Solarz has never wavered in his commitment to Israel. Another 
Congressman, although bringing much the same level of commitment 
when he first joined the committee, underwent a change. 

"Bleeding a Little Inside" 

Democratic Congressman Mervyn M. Dymally, former lieutenant- 
governor of California, came to Washington in 1980 with perfect cre- 
dentials as a supporter of Israel. He says, "When you look at black 
America, I rank myself second only to Bayard Rustin in supporting 
Israel over the past twenty years." Short, handsome and articulate, 
Dymally was the first black American to go to Israel after both the 1967 
and 1973 wars. 

In his successful campaign for lieutenant-governor, he spoke up 
for Israel in all the statewide Democratic canvasses. He co-founded the 
Black Americans in Support of Israel Committee, organized pro-Israeli 
advertising in California newspapers and helped to rally other black 
officials to the cause. In Congress, he became a dependable vote for 
Israeli interests as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. 

Nevertheless, in 1982 the pro-Israeli community withdrew its 
financial support, and the following year the AIPAC organization in 
California marked him for defeat and began seeking a credible oppo- 
nent to run against him in 1984. Explaining this sudden turn of events, 
Dymally cites two "black marks" against his pro-Israeli record in Con- 
gress. First, he "occasionally asked challenging questions about aid to 
Israel in committee"; although his questions were mild and not fre- 
quent, he stood out because no one else was even that daring. Sec- 
ond — far more damning in the eyes of AIPAC — he met twice with PLO 
leader Yasser Arafat. 

Both meetings were unplanned. The first encounter took place in 
1981 during a visit to Abu Dhabi, where Dymally had stopped to meet 
the local minister of planning while on his way back from a foreign 
policy conference in southern India. The minister told him he had just 
met with Arafat and asked Dymally if he would like to see him. Dy- 
mally recalls, "I was too chicken to say 'no,' but I thought I was safe in 
doing it. I figured Arafat would not bother to see an obscure freshman 
Congressman, especially on such short notice." 



72 They Dare to Speak Out 

To his surprise, Arafat invited him to an immediate appointment. 
This caused near panic on the part of Dymally's escort, an employee of 
the U.S. embassy, who was taking Dymally on his round of appoint- 
ments in the ambassador's car, a vehicle bedecked with a U.S. flag on 
the front fender. Sensitive to the U.S. ban on contact between adminis- 
tration personnel and PLO officials, the flustered escort removed the 
flag, excused himself and then directed the driver to deliver Dymally to 
the Arafat appointment. "He was really in a sweat," Dymally recalls. 

After a brief session with Arafat, he found a reporter for the Arab 
News Service waiting outside. Dymally told him Arafat expressed his 
desire for a dialogue with the United States. That night Peter Jennings 
reported to a nationwide American audience over ABC evening news 
from London that Dymally had become the first Congressman to meet 
Arafat since Ronald Reagan became president. 

The news caused an uproar in the Jewish community, with many 
Jews doubting Dymally's statement that the meeting was unplanned. 
Stella Epstein, a Jewish member of Dymally's Congressional staff, quit 
in protest. 

Dymally met the controversial PLO leader again in 1982 in a simi- 
larly coincidental way. He had gone to Lebanon with his colleagues, 
Democrats Mary Rose Oakar of Ohio, Nick Rahall of West Virginia 
and David E. Bonoir of Michigan, and Republican Paul N. "Pete" 
McCloskey to meet with Lebanese leaders, visit refugee camps and 
view the effects of the Israeli invasion. 

Dymally was shocked by what he saw: "There's no way you can 
visit those [Palestinian] refugee camps without bleeding a little inside." 
After arrival they accepted an invitation to meet with Arafat, who was 
then under siege in Beirut. 

His trouble with the Jewish community grew even worse. Dymally 
was wrongly accused of voting in 1981 for the sale of AWACS intelli- 
gence-gathering aircraft to Saudi Arabia. He actually voted the way the 
Israeli lobby wanted him to vote, against the sale. Moreover, to make 
his position explicit, during the House debate he stated his opposition 
in two separate speeches. He made the second speech, written for him 
by one of his supporters, Max Mont of the Jewish Labor Committee, 
Dymally explains, "because Mont complained that the first was not 
strong enough." 

Still, the message did not get through or by this time was conve- 
niently forgotten. Carmen Warshaw, long prominent in Jewish affairs 
and Democratic Party politics in California— and a financial supporter 
of his campaigns — accosted Dymally at a public dinner and said, "I 
want my money back." Dymally responded, "What did I do, Carmen?" 
She answered, "You voted for AWACS." 



Stilling the Still, Small Voices 73 

Dymally finds membership on the Foreign Affairs subcommittee 
on the Middle East a "no win" situation. He has alienated people on 
both sides. While one staff member quit in protest when he met Arafat, 
another, Peg McCormick, quit in protest when he voted for a large aid 
package that included money to build warplanes in Israel. 

For a time Dymally stopped complaining and raising questions 
about Israel in committee. Asked why by the Wall Street Journal he 
cited the lobby's role in my own loss in 1982 to Democrat Richard J. 
Durbin. He told the Journal reporter, "There is no question the Find- 
ley-Durbin race was intimidating." 

Dymally found intimidation elsewhere as well. Whenever he com- 
plains, he says, he receives a prompt visit from an AIPAC lobbyist, 
usually accompanied by a Dymally constituent. He met one day with a 
group of Jewish constituents, "all of them old friends," and told them 
that, despite his grumbling, in the end he always voted for aid to Israel. 
He said: "Not once, I told them, have I ever strayed from the course." 
One of his constituents spoke up and said, "That's not quite right. 
Once you abstained." "They are that good," marveled Dymally. "The 
man was right." 

"I Hear You" 

After coming to Congress, Dymally waited two years before he 
complained publicly about aid to Israel. He first voiced his concern on 
a wintry day in 1983 in a Capitol Hill hearing room so crowded only 
those with sharp elbows could get inside the door. The newly-formed 
House subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the 98th Con- 
gress was meeting to hear testimony on how much economic aid should 
go to Israel. Those attending learned why such aid flows smoothly 
through Congress — and usually is increased en route. 

Sitting at the witness table was Nicholas Veliotes, at that time the 
assistant secretary of state for Mideast and South Asia Affairs. The 
tall, dark-haired career diplomat of Greek ancestry had previously 
served in Israel and Jordan and was on Capitol Hill that day to explain 
why the Reagan Administration wanted Congress to approve $785 mil- 
lion for economic support of Israel as part of a $2.5 billion aid package 
for the coming fiscal year. The totals were exactly the same as those 
requested the year before, but the administration had decided, in a 
proposal helpful to the U.S. budget, to require that Israel pay back one- 
third of the amount it received for economic purposes. 

Taking part in the discussion were seven Democrats and one Re- 
publican, freshman Congressman Ed Zschau of California. 

The news media gave the event full coverage, with floodlights 



74 They Dare to Speak Out 

adding both heat and glare to the packed room. The lights weren't the 
only source of heat. For two sweltering hours Veliotes was roasted. 
Five of the Congressmen took turns pelting him with statements and 
questions which, in essence, castigated the administration for attempt- 
ing to cut Israeli aid slightly from the amount approved the previous 
year. Only Dymally sided with the administration. 

The nature, intensity and imbalance of the grilling might have led a 
stranger to assume that Veliotes was being examined — not by U.S. 
Congressmen — but by a committee of the Israeli parliament. 

In two turns at questioning, Democrat Tom Lantos of California, a 
white-haired refugee from Hungary, sternly lectured Veliotes for being 
unresponsive to the new threats to Israel posed by the placement of 
new Soviet missiles in Syria as well as the expansion of Soviet arms 
sales to Libya. Lantos belittled as "skyhook policy" the insistence by 
the administration that all Israeli forces be removed from Lebanon. 

Those who had followed Lantos' 1982 campaign for re-election 
were not surprised at his line of questioning. At fund-raising events 
Lantos hammered at the theme, "Israel needs a voice in Congress." He 
offered himself as that voice. In that subcommittee hearing "the voice" 
was tuning up. 

A number of freshmen Democrats pursued similar questioning. 
Lawrence J. Smith of Florida saw Israeli military operations in Leba- 
non as a "substantial gain" toward "total peace" and wanted more 
money for Israel because aid dollars had been "eroded" by inflation. 

Mel Levine, another Californian, chimed in, noting Israel's "loss" 
in revenue when it yielded control of the Sinai oilfields to Egypt in 
compliance with the Camp David agreement. Robert Torricelli of New 
Jersey suspected "coercion" because the administration did not in- 
crease its request for Israel. 

Committee veteran Solarz reinforced the theme by recalling that 
over the last few years Congress had annually "adjusted upward" the 
level or "rearranged the terms" of aid in order to be "more helpful to 
Israel." 

Only Dymally complained that aid to Israel was too high. "How 
can the United States afford to give so much money in view of our 
economic crisis ... to a country that has rejected the President's peace 
initiatives and stepped up its settlements in the occupied territories?" 
he demanded. 

Ed Zschau, a freshman Republican from California, provided the 
only other break from the pro-Israel questioning: "Do you think there 
should be conditions [on aid to Israel] that might hasten the objectives 
of the peace process?" Getting no response, he pressed on: "Given that 
we are giving aid in order to achieve progress in peace in the area, 



Stilling the Still, Small Voices 75 

wouldn't it make sense to associate with the aid some modest condi- 
tions like a halt in the settlements policy?" 

Veliotes gave only cautious responses to the challenges. When 
Zschau pressed for a direct answer, Veliotes answered simply, "I hear 
you." Whatever his private sentiments, he had no authority to encour- 
age the conditions Zschau suggested. 

Dymally spoke up again a month later when the Middle East sub- 
committee acted on the legislation to authorize aid to Israel and several 
other Middle East countries. Dymally offered an amendment increas- 
ing military aid to Egypt, half of it to be a loan and the other half a 
grant. He had logic behind his amendment: it would establish "parity" 
in the way the United States treated Israel and Egypt. Both were 
parties to the Camp David accords and considered friendly to the 
United States; and, Dymally argued, because Egypt's economic prob- 
lems were more severe than Israel's, Egypt should receive U.S. 
generosity at least at the same level as that extended to Israel. 

His amendment was defeated. Congressman Lantos spoke against 
it, citing "budgetary reasons." Only Dymally voted "yes." Its rejection 
came moments after the subcommittee had passed without opposition 
an amendment to increase military "forgiven direct credits" to Israel — 
a euphemism for outright grants — by $200 million, plus a hefty $65 
million increase in economic aid. This time, the subcommittee was 
unmoved by "budgetary reasons," despite the increase in the federal 
budget deficit the amendment would cause. Only Dymally had the 
virtue of consistency that day: he voted in favor of both amendments. 

During the same session the subcommittee voted to place legisla- 
tive strings on the sale of jet fighters to Jordan. Before getting the 
aircraft, King Hussein would first be required to begin negotiations 
with Israel. This restriction reflected the expressed sentiments of the 
House of Representatives, as 170 of its members by then had signed a 
public letter to that effect. Although this public rebuke would undercut 
President Reagan's private efforts to win Hussein's cooperation, 
Robert Pelletreau, who as deputy assistant secretary of state was pre- 
sent to speak for the administration, sat silently in the crowded hearing 
room as the subcommittee adopted the restriction. Pelletreau's silence 
demonstrated the administration's unwillingness to confront the lobby. 

"The Administration Can't Call the Tune" 

Although administration officials often blame Congress for aid in- 
creases to Israel, they should save some of the blame for themselves. A 
month after Dymally' s amendment was defeated in subcommittee — 
and Pelletreau's unbecoming silence — the full committee on Foreign 



76 They Dare to Speak Out 

Affairs took up the same bill. This time the administration witness, 
Alvin Drischler, also a deputy assistant secretary of state, managed to 
land on both sides of the same question, destroying whatever influence 
his presence might have had. 

Under consideration was an amendment offered by Congressman 
Joel Pritchard of Washington to rescind the $265 million additional 
grant aid approved for Israel by the subcommittee and to bring the total 
amount down to the level originally requested by the administration. 
Asked for comment, Drischler told the committee, "We support the 
administration's request." That is, he supported the Pritchard amend- 
ment, a position that was not surprising. However, Drischler quickly 
added: "But we do not oppose the add-on." 

The committee room rocked with laughter when Chairman 
Clement J. Zablocki complained: "We're confused." Clearly, adminis- 
tration resolve, if it ever existed, had vanished. Pritchard was left 
fighting for the administration amendment without administration sup- 
port. He warned that the administration would lose leverage in dealing 
with Israel if Congress approved the increase, but he added candidly: 
"There has always been the feeling that in Congress Israel has enough 
support to checkmate any administration initiative." 

Democratic Congressman George Crockett of Michigan warned 
that the increase would "free additional capital for [Israeli Prime Minis- 
ter] Begin to continue building settlements." But Kansas Republican 
Congressman Larry Winn countered by stating that increasing the 
grant money would "help" Israel meet its debt service obligation to the 
United States, which in 1983 would top $1 billion. Winn, in effect, was 
arguing that the United States should give Israel money to repay its 
debt to the United States. That sort of "logic" prevailed. The Pritchard 
amendment was defeated, 18 to 5. A lobbyist for the U.S. Agency for 
International Development later admitted that no fight was made for 
the Pritchard amendment because "the votes just aren't there." 

Pritchard, witnessing Israel's influence on Congress, puts it differ- 
ently: "The administration can't call the tune of American foreign 
policy." 

"I Do Not Feel As Free" 

Dymally's occasional independence in speaking and voting on 
Middle East questions predictably brought complaints from Israel's 
activists in his home district, and, although they did not succeed in 
finding a credible candidate to oppose him in 1984, he sees no likeli- 
hood that the breach will be closed. He says membership on the 
Foreign Affairs Committee is a "no win" situation. 

"I must confess to you that I do not feel as free to criticize Israel as 



Stilling the Still, Small Voices 77 

I do to criticize Trinidad, the island on which I was born," Dymally 
declares. Noting that Trinidad was one of the islands supporting the 
U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983, he says his own strong opposition to 
the invasion did not cause the islanders to turn against him. "Sure, 
some of Trinidad's leaders were unhappy with me. But they are not 
boycotting my campaign for re-election. In fact, people from that area 
are putting on a fundraiser in New York for me. They don't see me as 
anti-black, anti-Grenada, anti-West Indies. They just disagree with me 
on the invasion, but they don't fall out." 

He contrasts this reaction with that of his Jewish critics in Califor- 
nia. "What is tragic is that so many Jewish people misconstrue criti- 
cism of Israel as anti- Jewish or anti-Semitic." He speaks admiringly of 
the open criticism of Israeli policy that often occurs within Israel itself: 
"It is easier to criticize Israel in the Knesset [the Israeli parliament] 
than it is in the U.S. Congress, here in this land of free speech." 

Dymally notes that 10 of the 37 members of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee are Jewish and finds it "so stacked there is no chance" for 
constructive dialogue." He names Republican Congressman Ed 
Zschau of California as the only member of the Subcommittee on 
Europe and the Middle East who "even shadow boxes." No one on the 
subcommittee, he says, is in there "punching." 

Dymally believes the political scene in the United States would be 
improved "if citizens of Arab ancestry became more effective lobbyists 
themselves and became convinced of the need to give money to their 
cause." One of their problems, he says, is their lack of understanding 
of how to present their interests on Capitol Hill. "Foreign ethnics don't 
understand the importance of lobbying. Nor do they seem to have a 
sense of political philanthropy." Peter Spieller, a former student aide in 
his Congressional office, told him, "The word is out [in the Jewish 
community] that you have sold out for Arab money." Dymally chuck- 
les. "I told him I wished the Arab Americans would give me some 
money." He says they have not helped, despite his need to pay some of 
his campaign debts from his 1980 campaign. Prior to that year, Dymally 
had been able to count on several thousand dollars in campaign contri- 
butions each time from Jewish sources. After he met Arafat and began 
to raise questions about Israeli policies, this money "dried up." In the 
1982 campaign he says a Jewish friend bought two $100 tickets to a 
dinner. "That," he said, "was the extent of Jewish financial support that 
year." 

Dymally's Committee on Foreign Affairs is easily dominated by 
the Israeli lobby partly because most Congressmen consider assign- 
ment there a political liability. With most Americans wanting foreign 
aid cut back, if not eliminated altogether, Congressmen representing 
politically marginal districts take a gamble when they support foreign 



78 They Dare to Speak Out 

aid and a still bigger gamble if they are assigned to the committee that 
handles it. 

Donald J. Pease, a senior Democrat from Ohio, formerly a member 
of the Foreign Affairs Committee, explains why Congressmen with a 
special interest in Israel have no difficulty getting assigned to the com- 
mittee: "It is one of the least sought after committees. If you ask for it, 
you are sure to get it. One year Democrats had to hunt for recruits just 
to fill their seats. The committee is looked on as a liability by most 
Democrats. It is an asset only to members with large Jewish con- 
stituencies." Republicans feel the same way. 

Fourteen Freshmen Save the Day 

Under the watchful eye of Israel's lobby, Congressmen will go to 
extreme measures to help move legislation providing aid to Israel. Just 
before Congress adjourned in December 1983, a group of freshmen 
Democrats helped the cause by taking the extraordinary step of chang- 
ing their votes in the printed record of proceedings, a step Congress- 
men usually shun because it makes them look indecisive. This day, 
however, under heavy pressure from pro-Israel constituents, the first- 
term members buckled and agreed to switch in order to pass catch-all 
legislation known as a Continuing Resolution. The resolution provided 
funds for programs Congress had failed to authorize in the normal 
fashion, among them aid to Israel. Passage would prevent any interrup- 
tion in this aid. 

For once, both the House Democratic leadership and AIPAC were 
caught napping. Usually in complete control of all legislative activities 
which relate to Israel, AIPAC failed to detect the brewing rebellion. 
Concern over the budget deficit and controversial provisions in the bill 
for Central America led these freshman Democrats to oppose their own 
leadership. Unable to offer amendments, they quietly agreed among 
themselves to oppose the whole package. 

When the roll was called the big electric board over the Speaker's 
desk showed defeat — the resolution was rejected, 206 to 203. Twenty- 
four first-term Democrats had deserted the leadership and voted no. 
Voting no did not mean they opposed Israeli aid. Some of them, con- 
cerned over the federal deficit, viewed it as a demand to the leadership 
to schedule a bill raising taxes. For others, it was simply a protest. But 
for Israel it was serious. 

"The Jewish community went crazy," a Capitol Hill veteran re- 
calls. AIPAC's professionals went to work. Placing calls from their 
offices just four blocks away, they activated key people in the districts 
of a selected list of the errant freshmen. They arranged for "quality 
calls" to individuals who had played a major role in the recent Congres- 



Stilling the Still, Small Voices 79 

sional election. Each was to place an urgent call to his or her Congress- 
man, insist on getting through personally and use this message: 

Approval of the continuing resolution is very important. Without it, Israel will 
suffer. I am not criticizing your vote against it the first time. I am sure you had 
reasons. However, I have learned that the same question will come up for vote 
again, probably tomorrow. I speak for many of your friends and supporters in 
asking that you change your vote when the question comes up again. 

Each person was instructed to report to AIPAC after making the 
calls. The calls were accordingly made and reported. 

The House of Representatives took up the question at noon. It was 
the same language, word for word, which the House had rejected two 
days before. Silvio Conte, senior Republican on the Appropriations 
Committee, knowing the pressure that had been applied, during the 
debate challenged the freshmen Democrats to "stick to their guns" as 
"men of courage." Republican leader Bob Michel chided those unable 
to "take the heat from on high." 

Some of the heat came, of course, from the embarrassed Demo- 
cratic leadership, but AIPAC was the institution that brought about 
changes in votes. On critical issues, Congressmen respond to pressures 
from home, and, in such circumstances, House leaders have little 
leverage. To Republicans Conte and Michel, the main issue was the 
need for budgetary restraint. They argued that the measure should be 
rejected for that reason. During the debate, no one mentioned that 
day — or any other day — the influence of the Israeli lobby. 

The urgent telephone messages from home carried the day. When 
the roll was called, 14 of the freshmen — a bit sheepishly — changed 
their votes. They were: C. Robin Britt of North Carolina, Jim Cooper 
of Tennessee, Richard J. Durbin of Illinois, Edward F. Feighan of Ohio, 
Sander M. Levin of Michigan, Frank McCloskey of Indiana, Bruce A. 
Morrison of Connecticut, James R. "Jim" Olin and Norman Sisisky of 
Virginia, Timothy J. Penny of Minnesota, Harry M. Reid of Nevada, 
Bill Richardson of New Mexico, John M. Spratt, Jr. of South Carolina 
and Harley O. Staggers, Jr., of West Virginia. 

To give the freshmen an excuse they could use in explaining their 
embarrassing shift, the leadership promised to bring up a tax bill. 
Everyone knew it was just a ploy: the tax bill had no chance to become 
law. But the excuse was helpful, and the resolution was approved, 224 
to 189. The flow of aid to Israel continued without interruption. 



Subsidizing Foreign Competition 

The final vote on the Continuing Resolution authorized a remark- 
able new form of aid to Israel. It included an amendment crafted by 



80 They Dare to Speak Out 

AIPAC and sponsored by ardently pro-Israeli Congressmen Clarence 
Long of Maryland and Jack Kemp of New York that permitted $250 
million of the military grant aid to be spent in Israel on the development 
of a new Israeli fighter aircraft, the Lavi. The new fighter would com- 
pete for international sales with the Northrop F-20 and the General 
Dynamics F-16 — both specifically designed for export. The amend- 
ment authorized privileged treatment Uncle Sam had never before ex- 
tended to a foreign competitor. It was extraordinary for another 
reason: it set aside a U.S. law that requires that all foreign aid procure- 
ment funds be spent in the United States. 

During debate of the bill, Democrat Nick J. Rahall of West Vir- 
ginia was the only Congressman who objected. He saw the provision as 
threatening U.S. jobs at a time of high unemployment: 

Approximately 6,000 jobs would be lost as a direct result of taking the $250 
million out of the U.S. economy and allowing Israel to spend it on defense 
articles and services which can just as easily be purchased here in the United 
States. 

Americans are being stripped of their tax dollars to build up foreign industry. 
They should not have to sacrifice their jobs as well. 

That day, Rahall was unable to offer an amendment to strike or change 
this provision because of restrictions the House had established before 
it began debate. All that he, or any other member, could do was to vote 
for or against the entire Long-Kemp amendment which included con- 
troversial provisions for El Salvador and international banks, as well as 
aid to Israel. The amendment was approved 262 to 150. Unlike 
Rahall's, most of the 150 negative votes reflected opposition to other 
features of the amendment, not to the $250 million subsidy to Israel's 
aircraft industry. 

The following May, during the consideration of the bill appropriat- 
ing funds for foreign aid, Rahall offered an amendment to eliminate the 
$250 million, but it was defeated 379 to 40. Despite the amendment's 
obvious appeal to constituents connected with the U.S. aircraft indus- 
try, fewer than 10 percent of House members voted for it. It was the 
first roll call vote on an amendment dealing exclusively with aid to 
Israel in more than four years, and the margin of defeat provided a 
measure of AIPAC power. 

After the vote, AIPAC organized protests against the 40 legislators 
who had supported the amendment. Rahall recalls that AIPAC carried 
out a campaign "berating those brave 40 Congressmen." He adds, 
"Almost all of those who voted with me have told me they are still 
catching hell from their Jewish constituency. They are still moaning 
about the beating they are taking." 



Stilling the Still, Small Voices 81 

The "brave" Congressmen got little thanks. TWo ethnic groups, 
the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee and the National 
Association of Arab Americans, congratulated Rahall on his initiative 
and urged their members to send letters of congratulation to each of the 
39 who supported his amendment. The results were meager. As the 
author, Rahall could expect to receive more supportive mail than the 
rest. He received "less than 10 letters" and speculates that the other 39 
got still fewer. 

"Don't Look to Congress to Act" 

The reluctance of Congressmen to speak of Israel in critical vein 
was apparent in 1983 when the House gave President Reagan permis- 
sion under the War Powers Act to keep U.S. Marines in Lebanon for 18 
months. The vote took place a few days before the tragic truck- 
bombing killed over 240 Marines in Beirut. At the time the House 
acted, several Marines had already died. A number of Congressmen 
warned of more trouble ahead, opposing Reagan's request and strongly 
urging withdrawal of the U.S. military force. Five others took the other 
side, mentioning the importance of the Marine presence to the security 
of Israel's northern border. 

In all, 91 Congressmen spoke, but they were silent on the military 
actions Israel had carried out in Lebanon during the previous year — its 
unrestricted bombing of Beirut, forcing the evacuation of the PLO 
fighters and then failing to provide security in the Palestine camps 
where the massacre occurred. These events had altered the Lebanese 
scene so radically that President Reagan felt impelled to return the 
Marines to Beirut. In other words, it was Israel's actions which made 
necessary the Marines' presence, yet none of these critical events was 
mentioned among the thousands of words expressed during the lengthy 
discussion. 

A veteran Congressman, with the advantage of hindsight, ex- 
plained it directly. Just after the terrorist attack which killed U.S. 
Marines who were asleep in their Beirut compound, Congressman Lee 
Hamilton was asked if Congress might soon initiate action on its own to 
get the Marines out of Lebanon. The query was posed by William 
Quandt, a Middle East specialist who had served in the Carter White 
House, at the close of a private discussion on Capitol Hill involving a 
small group of senior Congressmen. Hamilton, a close student of both 
the Congress and the Middle East, responded, "Don't look to Congress 
to act. All we know is how to increase aid to Israel." 

The next year, discussions leading to the decisions on Israeli aid 
by Hamilton's subcommittee were less a public spectacle and Hamil- 



82 They Dare to Speak Out 

ton himself became less directly involved. In late February 1984 he 
was not consulted on aid levels, even privately, until the "Jewish 
caucus" led by freshman Democrat Larry Smith of Florida had worked 
out the details. Others in the caucus, all Democrats, were Mel Levine 
and Tom Lantos of California and Robert Torricelli of New Jersey. 
Torricelli, of Italian ancestry, represents one of the nation's most heav- 
ily Jewish districts. His colleagues often refer to him teasingly as "a 
non- Jewish Jew." 

The group's four votes could always prevail in the ten-member 
subcommittee, since the other six members never voted against a pro- 
Israeli motion, and only Democrat Mervyn M. Dymally and Repub- 
lican Ed Zschau even raised questions. Other Jewish Democrats on the 
full committee — Howard L. Berman of California, Ted Weiss and 
Gary L. Ackerman of New York, Sam Gejdenson of Connecticut, 
Howard Wolpe of Michigan and Stephen J. Solarz of New York — 
accepted the decisions of the "Jewish caucus." This established Smith 
as almost the de facto leader of the 29 Jews in the House, a remarkable 
role for a freshman. Asked to explain how a freshman could reach such 
influence, a Capitol Hill veteran said, "He's always there. He never 
misses a meeting. He never misses a lick." 

Confronted by the caucus on the economic aid level, Hamilton 
agreed to support their recommendations with one modification. He 
insisted that the grant to Israel be increased by only $250 million above 
the administration's request for $850 million, rather than the $350 mil- 
lion increase the caucus wanted. With all of the items settled ahead of 
time, the subcommittee approved the unprecedented provisions for 
Israel without discussion, and then took up questions related to aid for 
other Middle East countries. The panel approved an amendment of- 
fered by Congressman Zschau stating that the funds were provided 
"with the expectation that the recipient countries shall pursue policies 
to enhance the peace process, including giving consideration to all 
peace initiatives by the president and others." By the time the amend- 
ment reached the full committee, AIPAC, without consulting Zschau, 
demonstrated its control over such things by arranging to have the 
language tied to the Camp David Accords rather than the Reagan rec- 
ommendations. Written by AIPAC lobbyist Douglas Bloomfield, the 
substitute language was accepted on a voice vote. 

In either form the amendment was innocuous, but that could not 
be said of two other amendments drafted by the lobby and passed 
overwhelmingly by the subcommittee. The first amendment, accepted 
without opposition, would prohibit all communications between the 
PLO and the U.S. government, even through third parties, until the 
PLO recognizes Israel. It was intended to bar the sort of informal 



Stilling the Still, Small Voices 83 

contact with the Palestinian leadership maintained by both the Carter 
and Reagan administration. The other amendment, approved 7 to 2, 
would prohibit the sale of any advanced aircraft or weapons to Jordan 
until that country becomes "publicly committed" to recognizing Israel. 
When King Hussein of Jordan later criticized Israeli lobby influence in 
Washington in early 1984, he cited both of these amendments. 

Meanwhile, Democratic Congressman Howard Berman of Califor- 
nia secured hearings on a bill that would add an unprecedented new 
dimension to U.S. aid to Israel. Introduced in June 1984, it proposed 
granting $20 million to finance Israel's own foreign aid projects in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America. It would openly authorize activities similar 
to those that have been covertly financed by the CIA for 20 years (see 
chapter five). 

Democrat Larry Smith of Florida applauded Berman's bill: "I 
think it will enhance the image of the U.S. in the Third World." Repub- 
lican Larry Winn of Kansas gave it bipartisan support but noted that 
the initial $20 million would be "only a drop in the bucket; we're going 
to have to look further down the road at a lot more money." Although 
the bill remained in committee through the 1984 session, its supporters 
believe this type of aid to Israel will eventually be approved. 

Clearly, the road Winn mentioned will slope upward. Aid to Is- 
rael — despite U.S. budget problems and Israel's defiant behavior to- 
ward the United States in its use of U.S.-supplied weapons and its 
construction of settlements on occupied territory — is still rising with no 
peak in sight. 



Chapter 3 



The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 



Just off the second-floor corridor connecting the central part of the 
U.S. Capitol building with the Senate wing is the restored old Senate 
chamber where visitors can look around and imagine the room echoing 
with great debates of the past. Action there first gave the Senate its 
reputation as the "world's greatest deliberative body" where no topic 
was too controversial for open debate. 

In most respects, that reputation is deserved and honored. In fact, 
all five former Senators— John C. Calhoun, Daniel Webster, Henry 
Clay, Robert LaFollette and Robert Taft— who are pictured in the or- 
nate reception room near the large chamber now used by the Senate, 
were distinguished by their independence and courage, not their con- 
formity. 

Today, on Middle East issues at least, independence and courage 
are almost unknown, and the Senate deliberates not at all. This 
phenomenon was the topic of discussion during a breakfast meeting in 
1982 between Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan and Senator Claiborne 
Pell of Rhode Island, the senior Democrat on the Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee. Pell explained with candor his own record of consist- 
ent support for Israel and his failure to recognize Arab interests when 
he told the Jordanian leader, "I can be honest with you, but I can't be 
fair." Pell's record is typical of his colleagues. 

Since the establishment of modern Israel in 1948, only a handful of 
Senators have said or done anything in opposition to the policies of the 
government of Israel. Those who break ranks find themselves in 
difficulty. The trouble can arise from a speech, an amendment, a vote, 
a published statement, or a combination of these. It may take the form 
of a challenge in the next primary or general election. Or the trouble 
may not surface until later — after service in the Senate has ended. Such 
was the destiny of a Senator from Illinois. 

84 



The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 85 
"Adlai, You Are Right, But— 99 

The cover of the October 1982 edition of the monthly magazine 
Jewish Chicago featured a portrait of Adlai E. Stevenson III, Demo- 
cratic candidate for governor of Illinois. In the background, over the 
right shoulder of a smiling Stevenson, an Arab, rifle slung over his 
shoulder, glared ominously through a kaffiyeh that covered his head 
and most of his face. The headline announcing the issue's feature arti- 
cle read, "Looking at Adlai Through Jewish Eyes." 

The illustration and article were part of an anti-Stevenson cam- 
paign conducted by some of the quarter-million people in Chicago's 
Jewish community who wanted Stevenson to fail in his challenge to 
Governor James R. Thompson, Jr. 

Thompson, a Republican, was attempting a feat sometimes tried 
but never before accomplished in Illinois history: election to a third 
term as governor. Normally, a Republican in Illinois can expect only 
minimal Jewish support at the polls. 

A crucial part of the anti-Stevenson campaign was a caricature of 
his Middle East record while he was a member of the United States 
Senate. Stevenson was presented as an enemy of Israel and an ally of 
the PLO. 

Stevenson was attempting a political comeback after serving ten 
years in the Senate, where he had quickly established himself as an 
independent. During the oil shortage of the mid-1970s he alarmed cor- 
porate interests by suggesting the establishment of a government cor- 
poration to handle the marketing of all crude oil. He warned of the 
"seeds of destruction" inherent in nuclear proliferation and called for 
international safeguards to restrain other nations from using nuclear 
technology to manufacture weapons. Concerned about the country's 
weakening position in the international marketplace, he called for gov- 
ernment-directed national economic strategies to meet the challenge of 
foreign competition. 

Stevenson lacks the flamboyant extroverted character of many 
politicians. Time magazine described him as "a reflective man who 
seems a bit out of place in the political arena." Effective in committee, 
where most legislation is hammered out, he did not feel comfortable 
lining up votes. "I'm not a back slapper or logroller," he said. "I don't 
feel effective running about buttonholing Senators." 

Chicago Daily News columnist Mike Royko wrote of Stevenson's 
lack of charisma in a tone of affectionate teasing: 

The most dangerous element in politics is charisma. It makes people get glassy- 
eyed and jump and scream and clap without a thought in their heads. Adlai 
Stevenson never does that. He makes people drowsy. His hair is thinning. He 



86 They Dare to Speak Out 

has all the oratorical fire of an algebra teacher. His clothes look like something 
he bought from the coroner's office. When he feels good, he looks like he has a 
virus. We need more politicians who make our blood run tepid. 

Royko could have added that Stevenson also has none of the self- 
righteousness often found on Capitol Hill. Although a "blue-blood," as 
close to aristocracy as an American can be, he displayed little interest 
in the cocktail circuit or the show business of politics. On a Congres- 
sional tour of China in 1975 he didn't seem to mind when the other 
three Senators received lace-curtained limousines and he and his wife, 
Nancy, were assigned a less showy sedan. 

During his second Senate term, he became disillusioned with the 
Carter administration. He saw it as "embarrassingly weak" and more 
concerned with retaining its power than with exercising it effectively. 
In 1979, he announced he would not seek re-election to the Senate, but 
he mentioned a new interest: the presidency. He might run for the 
White House the next year. "I'm going to talk about ideas and see if an 
idea can still triumph, or even make a dent," he said. It didn't. Steven- 
son ultimately decided not to run. With Senator Edward Kennedy in 
the race, he felt he would get little media attention. By the time Ken- 
nedy pulled out Stevenson concluded it was too late to get organized. 

After a year's breather, in 1981 he announced his interest in run- 
ning for the governorship of Illinois. This time he followed through. 

The make-up of his campaign organization, the character of his 
campaign, and the support he had received in the past in Jewish neigh- 
borhoods provided little hint of trouble ahead from pro-Israeli quar- 
ters. 

Several of the most important members of his campaign team were 
Jewish: Philip Klutznick, president emeritus of B'nai B'rith and an 
organizer of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organiza- 
tions, who agreed to organize Stevenson's main campaign dinner; Mil- 
ton Fisher, prominent attorney and chairman of his finance committee; 
Rick Jasculca, a public relations executive who became Stevenson's 
fulltime press secretary. 

Stevenson chose Grace Mary Stern as his running mate for the 
position of lieutenant governor. Her husband was prominent in 
Chicago Jewish affairs. 

Stevenson himself had received several honors from Jewish 
groups in preceeding years. He had been selected by the Chicago Jew- 
ish community as 1974 Israel Bond "Man of the Year," commended by 
the American Jewish Committee for his legislative work against the 
Arab boycott of Israel in 1977, and honored by the government of 
Israel — which established the Adlai E. Stevenson HI Chair at the Weiz- 



The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 87 

mann Institute of Science in Rehovot. Stevenson had every reason to 
expect that organized Illinois Jewry would overlook his occasional 
mild position critical of Israeli policy. 

But trouble developed. A segment of the Jewish community 
quietly launched an attack that would cost him heavily. Stevenson's 
detractors were determined to defeat him in the governor's race and 
thus discourage a future Stevenson bid for the presidency. Their basic 
tool was a document provided by the AIPAC in Washington. It was 
presented as a summary of Stevenson's Senate actions on Middle East 
issues — though it made no mention of his almost unblemished record of 
support for Israel and the tributes the Jewish community had presented 
to him in testimony of this support. Like most AIPAC documents, it 
would win no prizes for balance and objectivity. 

For example, AIPAC pulled from a 21-page report Stevenson pre- 
pared after a 1976 trip to the Middle East just this lonely phrase: 
"There is no organization other than the PLO with a broadly recog- 
nized claim to represent the Palestinians." This was a simple statement 
of fact. But the writer of the Jewish Chicago article, citing the AIPAC 
"summary," asserted that these words had helped to give Stevenson "a 
reputation as one of the harshest critics of both Israel policy and of 
U.S. support for the Jewish state." Stevenson's assessment of the 
PLO's standing in the Palestinian community was interpreted as an 
assault on Israel. 

In fact, the full paragraph in the Stevenson report from which 
AIPAC took its brief excerpt is studied and reasonable: 

The Palestinians are by general agreement the nub of the problem. Although 
badly divided, they have steadily increased in numbers, economic and military 
strength, and seriousness of purpose. They cannot be left out of any Middle 
East settlement. Their lack of unity is reflected in the lack of unity within the 
top ranks of the PLO, but there is no organization other than the PLO with a 
broadly recognized claim to represent the Palestinians. 

The Stevenson report was critical of certain Israeli policies but 
hardly hostile to Israel. "The PLO," he wrote, "may be distrusted, 
disowned and despised, but it is a reality, if for no other reason than 
that it has no rival organization among Palestinians." 

Stevenson went on to issue a challenge to the political leaders of 
America: 

A new order of statesmanship is required from both the Executive and the 
Legislative Branches. For too long Congress has muddled or gone along with- 
out any real understanding of Middle Eastern politics. Neither the United 



88 They Dare to Speak Out 

States, nor Israel, nor any of the Arab states will be served by continued 
ignorance or the expediencies of election year politics. 

None of this positive comment found its way into the AIPAC report or 
into the Jewish Chicago article or into any of the anti-Stevenson litera- 
ture which was distributed within the Jewish community during the 
1982 campaign. 

The anti-Stevenson activists noted with alarm that in 1980 Steven- 
son had sponsored an amendment to reduce aid to Israel and the year 
before had supported a similar amendment offered by Senator Mark O. 
Hatfield, Republican of Oregon. The Hatfield amendment proposed to 
cut by 10 per cent the amount of funds available to Israel for military 
credits. 

Stevenson's amendment had focused on Israeli settlements in oc- 
cupied territories, which President Carter and earlier administrations 
characterized as both illegal and an obstacle to peace but did nothing to 
discourage beyond occasional expressions of regret. Stevenson pro- 
posed withholding $150 million in aid until Israel halted both the build- 
ing and planning of additional settlements. The amendment did not cut 
funds; it simply withheld a fraction of the $2.18 billion total aid au- 
thorized for Israel that year. In speaking for the amendment, Stevenson 
noted that the outlay for Israel amounted to 43 percent of all U.S. funds 
allocated for such purposes worldwide: 

This preference for Israel diverts funds from the support of human life and vital 
American interests elsewhere in an interdependent and unstable world. ... If it 
could produce stability in the Middle East or enhance Israel's security, it could 
be justified. But it reflects continued U.S. acquiescence in an Israeli policy 
which threatens more Middle East instability, more Israeli insecurity, and a 
continued decline of U.S. authority in the world. Our support for Israel is not 
the issue here. Israel's support for the ideals of peace and justice which gave it 
birth are at issue. It is, I submit, for the Israel government to recognize again 
that Israel's interests are in harmony with our own and, for that to happen, it is 
important that we do not undermine the voices for peace in Israel or justify 
those, like Mr. Begin, who claim U.S. assistance from the Congress can be 
taken for granted. 

The amendment, like Hatfield's, was overwhelmingly defeated. 

After the vote on his amendment, Stevenson recalls, he received 
apologetic comments. "Several Senators came up and said, 'Adlai, you 
are right, but you understand why I had to vote against you. Maybe 
next time.'" Stevenson did understand why: lobby intimidation pro- 
duced the negative votes. He found intimidation at work on another 
front too, the news media. He offered the amendment, he explained, 



The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 89 

"because I thought the public was entitled to a debate on this critical 
issue," but news services gave it no attention. 

That's another aspect of this problem. It's not only the intimidation of the 
American politician, it's also the intimidation of some American journalists. If 
it's not the journalists, then it's the editors and perhaps more so the publishers. 

Anti-Stevenson campaigners also found it expedient to portray 
him as a supporter of Arab economic blackmail, despite his widely 
hailed legislative record to the contrary. Stevenson was actually the 
principal author of the 1977 legislation to prohibit American firms from 
cooperating with the Arab boycott of Israel. But in the smear campaign 
conducted against him in his gubernatorial bid his legislative history 
was rewritten. He was actually accused of trying to undermine the 
anti-boycott effort. 

In fact, Stevenson, in a lonely and frustrating effort, saved the 
legislation from disaster. For this achievement, he received a plaque 
and praise from the American Jewish Committee. The chairman of the 
National Jewish Community Relations Council, Theodore R. Mann, 
wrote to Stevenson, expressing the organization's "deep appreciation 
for your invaluable contribution to the adoption of that landmark legis- 
lation." He added that the legislation "not only reassures the American 
Jewish community as to the commitment of America to fairness and 
nondiscrimination in international trade but, more fundamentally, 
stands as a reaffirmation of our nation's profound regard for principle 
and morality." 

Jewish Chicago, making no mention of Stevenson's success in the 
anti-boycott effort or the unstinting praise he received from Jewish 
leaders, reported that he encountered "major conflicts" with "the 
American Jewish leadership" over the boycott legislation. 

A flyer distributed by an unidentified "Informed Citizens Against 
Stevenson Committee," made the same charge. Captioned, "The Truth 
About Adlai Stevenson," it used half-truths to brand Stevenson as anti- 
Israel during his Senate years and concluded: "It is vitally important 
that Jewish voters be fully informed about Stevenson's record. Still 
dazzled by the Stevenson name, many Jews are totally unaware of his 
antagonism to Jewish interests." The "committee" provided no names 
or addresses of sponsoring individuals. Shirley Friedman, a free-lance 
writer in Chicago, later identified the flyer as her own. The message on 
the flyer concluded: 

"Don't forget: It is well-known that Stevenson considers the gov- 
ernor's chair as a stepping-stone to the presidency. Spread the word — 
Let the truth be told!" 



90 They Dare to Speak Out 

The word was indeed spread in the Chicago Jewish community 
throughout the summer and fall of 1982. The political editor of the 
Chicago Sun-Times reported in June that some activists for Thompson 
had been "working quietly for months to assemble a group to mobilize 
Jewish voters" against Stevenson. 

The result of their efforts was "The Coalition for the Re-election of 
Jim Thompson" which included Jewish Democrats who had not backed 
Thompson previously. When Republican Senator Rudy Boschwitz of 
Minnesota, a strong supporter of Israel, came to Chicago in October to 
address a breakfast gathering sponsored by the Coalition, he declared 
that, as Senator, Stevenson was "a very steadfast foe of aid to Israel." 

"Smear and Innuendo" 

A major problem was the unprinted but widely whispered charge 
of anti-Semitism against Stevenson— a man, who, like his father, had 
spent his life championing civil rights for all Americans. "I learned 
after election day there was that intimation throughout the campaign," 
recalls Stevenson. 

Phil Klutznick's daughter, Mrs. Bettylu Saltzman, who worked on 
Stevenson's campaign staff, remembers, "There was plenty of stuff 
going around about him being anti-Semitic. It got worse and worse. It 
was a much more difficult problem than anyone imagined." 

Stevenson's running-mate, Grace Mary Stern, recalls: "There was 
a very vigorous [anti-Stevenson] telephone campaign in the Jewish 
community." She says leaflets charging Stevenson with being anti- 
Israel were distributed widely at local Jewish temples, and adds there 
was much discussion of the anti-Semitism accusation: "There was a 
very vigorous campaign, man to man, friend to friend, locker room to 
locker room. We never really came to grips with the problem." 

Campaign fund raising suffered accordingly. The Jewish commu- 
nity had supported Stevenson strongly in both of his campaigns for the 
Senate. After his remarks in the last years of his Senate career, some of 
the Jewish support dried up. "Many of my most generous Jewish con- 
tributors stayed with me, but the organization types, the professionals 
did not," Stevenson recalls. He believes the withdrawal of organized 
Jewish support also cut into funds from out-of-state he otherwise 
would have received. In the end, Thompson was able to outspend 
Stevenson by better than two to one. 

Fed up by early September with unfounded charges of anti- 
Semitism, Stevenson finally responded, charging that a "subterranean 
campaign of smear and innuendo" was being waged by supporters of 



The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 91 

Thompson. His press secretary, Rick Jasculca, complained that the 
material distributed by the Coalition for the Re-election of Jim Thomp- 
son "tries to give the impression that Adlai is unquestionably anti- 
Israel." Thompson's political director, Philip O'Connor, denied there 
was a smear campaign and disavowed the Friedman flyer. 

Thompson himself said of Stevenson, "I don't think he is an anti- 
Semite, [but he is] no particular friend of Israel." The Chicago Sun- 
Times published an editorial rebuke for this remark: "That's like 
saying, no, I don't think Stevenson beats his wife, but she did have a 
black eye last week." The editorial continued: 

Far more important, the statement is not true; Stevenson as a Senator may 
have occasionally departed from positions advocated by the Israeli govern- 
ment, but out of well-reasoned motives and a genuine desire to secure a lasting 
peace for the area. Thompson's coy phrasing was a reprehensible appeal to the 
voter who measures a candidate's worth by a single, rubbery standard. 

The only Jews who tried to counter the attack were those close to 
Stevenson. Philip Klutznick, prominent in Jewish affairs and chairman 
of the Stevenson Dinner Committee, said, "It is beneath the dignity of 
the Jewish community to introduce these issues into a gubernatorial 
campaign." Stevenson campaign treasurer Milton Fisher said: "Adlai's 
views are probably consistent with 40 percent of the Knesset [Israeli 
parliament]." 

Stevenson was ultimately defeated in the closest gubernatorial 
election in the state's history. The margin was 5,074 votes — one- 
seventh of one percent of the total 3.5 million votes cast. 

The election was marred by a series of mysterious irregularities 
which Time magazine described as "so improbable, so coincidental, so 
questionable that it could have happened only in Wonderland, or the 
Windy City." On election night ballot boxes from fifteen Chicago pre- 
cincts inexplicably disappeared, and others turned up in the homes or 
cars of poll workers. Stevenson asked for a recount — past recounts had 
resulted in shifts of 5,000 to 7,000 votes — but the Illinois Supreme 
Court, by a 4-to-3 vote, denied his petition. Judge Seymour Simon, a 
Democrat, joined the three Republicans on the court in voting against 
Stevenson's request. 

A post-election editorial in a suburban Chicago newspaper ac- 
knowledged the impact of the concerted smear campaign on the elec- 
tion outcome: 

An intense last-minute effort among Chicago-area Jews to thwart Adlai Steven- 
son's attempt to unseat Illinois Gov. James Thompson in last Tuesday's elec- 
tion may have succeeded. The weekend before the election many Chicago and 



92 They Dare to Speak Out 

suburban rabbis spoke out against Stevenson and there were thousands of 
pamphlets and leaflets distributed in Jewish areas ... $ all attacking the former 
Senator. 

After describing the attack, the editorial concluded, 

The concentrated anti-Stevenson campaign, particularly since it went largely 
unanswered, almost surely cost him thousands of votes among the 248,000 
Chicago-area Jews— 266,000 throughout the state— who traditionally have 
leaned in his direction politically. 

Campaign manager Joseph Novak agrees: "If that effort hadn't 
happened, Stevenson would be governor today." In the predominantly 
Jewish suburban Chicago precincts of Highland Park and Lake County 
"We just got killed, just absolutely devastated." Press secretary Rick 
Jasculca adds, "What bothers me is that hardly any rabbis, or Jewish 
leaders beyond Phil [Klutznick] were willing to speak up, and say this 
is nonsense to call Adlai anti-Israel." 

Thomas A. Dine, executive director of the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee, gloated, "The memory of Adlai Stevenson's hostil- 
ity toward Israel during his Senate tenure lost him the Jewish vote in 
Illinois — and that cost him the gubernatorial election." 

Stevenson too believes the effort to discredit him among Jews 
played a major role in his defeat: "In a race that close, it was more than 
enough to make the difference." 

Asked about the impact of the Israeli lobby on the U.S. political 
scene, he responded without hesitation: 

There is an intimidating, activist minority of American Jews that supports the 
decisions of the Israeli government, right or wrong. They do so very vocally 
and very aggressively in ways that intimidate others so that it's their voice — 
even though it's a minority — that is heard and felt in American politics. But it 
still is much louder in the United States than in Israel. In other words, you have 
a much stronger, more vocal dissent in Israel than within the Jewish commu- 
nity in the United States. The prime minister of Israel has far more influence 
over American foreign policy in the Middle East than over the policies of his 
own government generally. 

The former Senator reports a profound change within the Jewish 
community in recent years: 

The old passionate commitment of Jewish leaders to civil liberties, social wel- 
fare, in short, to liberalism has to a large extent dissipated. The issue now is 
much more Israel itself. If given a choice between the traditional liberal com- 
mitment and the imagined Israeli commitment, they'll opt now for the Israeli 
commitment. 



The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 93 

Reflecting on his career and the price he has paid for challenging 
Israeli policies, Stevenson concluded: 

I will have no hesitation about continuing. I wish I had started earlier and been 
more effective. I really don't understand the worth of public office if you can't 
serve the public. It's better to lose. It's better not to serve than to be mortgaged 
or compromised. 

Stevenson followed the tradition of a colleague, a famous Senator 
from Arkansas who eloquently criticized Israeli policy and American 
foreign policy over a period of many years. 



The Dissenter 

"When all of us are dead, the only one they'll remember is Bill 
Fblbright." The tribute by Idaho Senator Frank Church, a fellow De- 
mocrat, was amply justified. As much as any man of his time, J. Wil- 
liam Fulbright shaped this nation's attitudes on the proper exercise of 
its power in a world made acutely dangerous by nuclear weapons. 
Dissent was a hallmark of his career, but it was dissent with distinction. 
The fact was, Fblbright was usually right. 

Fulbright first gained national attention by condemning the "swin- 
ish blight" of McCarthyism. In 1954 while many Americans cheered 
the crusade of the Wisconsin Senator's Permanent Investigations Sub- 
committee, Fblbright cast the lone vote against a measure to continue 
the subcommittee's funding. Because of this vote he was accused of 
being "a Communist, a fellow traveler, an atheist, [and] a man beneath 
contempt." 

Fblbright opposed U.S. intervention in Cuba in 1961 and in the 
Dominican Republic four years later, and was ahead of his time in 
calling for detente with the Soviet Union and a diplomatic opening with 
China. When he proposed a different system for selecting presidents, 
Harry Thiman was offended and called him "that over-educated Ox- 
ford s.o.b." Twenty-five years later, in 1974, the New York Times rec- 
ognized him as "the most outspoken critic of American foreign policy 
of this generation." 

His deepest and most abiding interest is the advancement of inter- 
national understanding through education, and thousands of young 
people have broadened their vision through the scholarships that bear 
his name. But Fblbright also became well known for his outspoken 
opposition to the Vietnam War as "an endless, futile war . . * , debilitat- 
ing and indecent" — a stand which put him at odds with a former col- 
league and close friend, President Lyndon B. Johnson. President 



94 They Dare to Speak Out 

Johnson believed that America was embarked on a noble mission in 
Southeast Asia against an international Communist conspiracy. Ful- 
bright put no stock in the conspiracy theory, feared the war might 
broaden into a showdown with China, and saw it as an exercise in "the 
arrogance of power. " 

In 1963 Fulbright chaired an investigation that brought to public 
attention the exceptional tax treatment of contributions to Israel and 
aroused the ire of the Jewish community. The investigation was 
managed by Walter Pincus, a journalist Fulbright hired after reading a 
Pincus study of lobbying. Pincus recalls that Fulbright gave him a free 
hand, letting him choose the ten prime lobbying activities to be ex- 
amined and backing him throughout the controversial investigation. 
One of the groups chosen by Pincus, himself Jewish, was the Jewish 
Telegraph Agency — at that time a principal instrument of the Israeli 
lobby. Both Fulbright and Pincus were accused of trying to destroy the 
Jewish Telegraph Agency and of being anti-Semitic. 

Pincus remembers, "Several Senators urged that the inquiry into 
the Jewish operation be dropped. Senators Hubert Humphrey and 
Bourke Hickenlooper [senior Republican on the Foreign Relations 
Committee] were among them. Fulbright refused.'* 

The Fulbright hearings also exposed the massive funding illegally 
channelled into the American Zionist Council by Israel. More than five 
million dollars had been secretly poured into the Council for spending 
on public relations firms and pro-Israel propaganda before Fulbright' s 
committee closed down the operation. 

Despite his concern over the pro-Israeli lobby, Fulbright took the 
exceptional step of recommending that the United States guarantee 
Israeli's borders. In a major address in 1970 he proposed an American- 
Israeli treaty under which the United States would commit itself to 
intervene militarily if necessary to "guarantee the territory and inde- 
pendence of Israel" within the lands it held before the 1967 war. The 
treaty, he said, should be a supplement to a peace settlement arranged 
by the United Nations. The purpose of his proposal was to destroy the 
arguments of those who maintained that Israel needed the captured 
territory for its security. 

Fulbright saw Israeli withdrawal from the Arab lands it occupied 
in the 1967 war as the key to peace: Israel could not occupy Arab 
territory and have peace too. He said Israeli policy in establishing 
settlements on the territories "has been characterized by lack of flexi- 
bility and foresight." Discounting early threats by some Arab leaders to 
destroy the state of Israel, Fulbright noted that both President Nasser 
of the United Arab Republic and King Hussein of Jordan had in effect 



The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 95 

repudiated such Draconian threats, "but the Israelis seem not to have 
noticed the disavowals." 

During the 1970s Fulbright repeatedly took exception to the con- 
tention that the Middle East crisis was a test of American resolve 
against Soviet interventionism. In 1971, he accused Israel of "Commu- 
nist-baiting humbuggery" and argued that continuing Middle East ten- 
sion, in fact, only benefited Soviet interests. 

Appearing on CBS television's "Face the Nation" in 1973, Ful- 
bright declared that the Senate was "subservient" to Israeli policies 
which were inimical to American interests. He said the United States 
bears "a very great share of the responsibility" for the continuation of 
Middle East violence. "It's quite obvious [that] without the all-out 
support by the United States in money and weapons and so on, the 
Israelis couldn't do what they've been doing." 

Fulbright said the United States failed to pressure Israel for a 
negotiated settlement, because 

The great majority of the Senate of the United States — somewhere around 80 
percent — are completely in support of Israel, anything Israel wants. This has 
been demonstrated time and time again, and this has made it difficult for our 
government. 

The Senator claimed that "Israel controls the Senate" and warned, 
"We should be more concerned about the United States' interests." Six 
weeks after his "Face the Nation" appearance, Fulbright again ex- 
pressed alarm over Israeli occupation of Arab territories. He charged 
that the U.S. had given Israel "unlimited support for unlimited expan- 
sion." 

His criticism of Israeli policy caused stirrings back home. Jews 
who had supported him in the past became restless. After years of easy 
election victories trouble loomed for Fulbright in 1974. Encouraged, in 
part, by the growing Jewish disenchantment with Fulbright, on the eve 
of the deadline for filing petitions of candidacy in the Democratic pri- 
mary Governor Dale Bumpers surprised the political world by becom- 
ing a challenger for Fulbright's Senate seat. Fulbright hadn't expected 
Bumpers to run, but recognized immediately that the popular young 
governor posed a serious challenge: "He had lots of hair [in contrast to 
Fulbright], he looked good on television and he'd never done anything 
to offend anyone." 

There were other factors. Walter Pincus, who later became a 
Washington Post reporter, believed Fulbright's decision to take a golf- 
ing holiday in Bermuda just before the primary deadline may have 
helped to convince Bumpers that Fulbright would not work hard for the 



96 They Dare to Speak Out 

nomination. It was also the year of Watergate — a bad year for incum- 
bents. In his campaign, Bumpers pointed with alarm to the "mess in 
Washington" and called for a change. The New York Times reported 
that he "skillfully exploited an old feeling that Mr. Rilbright . . . spent 
all his time dining with Henry Kissinger and fretting over the Middle 
East." 

The attitude of Jewish voters, both inside Arkansas and beyond, 
was also a significant factor. "I don't think Bumpers would have run 
without that encouragement," says Rilbright. Following the election, a 
national Jewish organization actually claimed credit for the young gov- 
ernor's stunning upset victory. Rilbright has a copy of a memorandum 
circulated in May 1974 to the national board of directors of B'nai 
B'rith. Marked "confidential," the memo from Secretary-General Her- 
man Edelsberg, announced that ". . . all of the indications suggest that 
our actions in support of Governor Bumpers will result in the ousting of 
Mr. Rilbright from his key position in the Senate." Edelsberg later 
rejected the memorandum as "phoney." 

Since his defeat, Rilbright has continued to speak out, decrying 
Israeli stubbornness and warning of the Israeli lobby. In a speech just 
before the end of his Senate term, Rilbright warned, "Endlessly press- 
ing the United States for money and arms — and invariably getting all 
and more than she asks — Israel makes bad use of a good friend." His 
central concern was that the Middle East conflict might flare into nu- 
clear war. He warned somberly that "Israel's supporters in the United 
States . . • by underwriting intransigence, are encouraging a course 
which must lead toward her destruction — and just possibly ours as 
well." 

Pondering the future from his office three blocks north of the 
White House, Rilbright sees little hope that Capitol Hill will effectively 
challenge the Israeli lobby: 

It's suicide for politicians to oppose them. The only possibility would be some- 
one like Eisenhower who already feels secure. Eisenhower had already made 
his reputation. He was already a great man in the eyes of the country, and he 
wasn't afraid of anybody. He said what he believed. 

Then he adds a somewhat more optimistic note: "I believe a presi- 
dent could do this. He wouldn't have to be named Eisenhower." Ril- 
bright cites a missed opportunity: 

I went to Jerry Ford after he took office in 1975. 1 was out of office then. I had 
been to the Middle East and visited with some of the leading figures. I came 
back and told the president, 'Look, I think these [Arab] leaders are willing to 
accept Israel, but the Israelis have got to go back to the 1967 borders. The 
problem can be solved if you are willing to take a position on it. 



The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 97 

Fulbright predicted that the American people would back Ford if 
he demanded that Israel cooperate. He reminded him that Eisenhower 
was re-elected by a large margin immediately after he forced Israel to 
withdraw after invading Egypt: 

Taking a stand against Israel didn't hurt Eisenhower. He carried New York 
with its big Jewish population. 

I told Ford I didn't think he would be defeated if he put it the right way. He 
should say Israel had to go back to the 1967 borders; if it didn't, no more arms 
or money. That's just the way Eisenhower did it. And Israel would have to 
cooperate. And politically, in the coming campaign, I told him he should say he 
was for Israel, but he was for America first. 

Ford, Fulbright recalls, listened courteously but was non- 
committal: "Of course he didn't take my advice." 

Yet the determination in the face of such disappointment echoes 
through one of his last statements as a U.S. Senator: 

History casts no doubt at all on the ability of human beings to deal rationally 
with their problems, but the greatest doubt on their will to do so. The signals of 
the past are thus clouded and ambiguous, suggesting hope but not confidence in 
the triumph of reason. With nothing to lose in any event, it seems well worth a 
try. 

Warning Against "Absolutism" 

James G. Abourezk of South Dakota came to the Senate in 1973 
after serving two years in the House of Representatives. The son of 
Lebanese immigrants — the first person of Arab ancestry elected to the 
Senate — he spoke up for Arab interests and quickly became a center of 
controversy. 

Soon after he took office, Abourezk accepted an invitation to 
speak at Yeshiva University in New York, but anxious school officials 
called almost immediately to tell him of rising student protests against 
his appearance. A few days later, the chairman of the dinner committee 
asked Abourezk to make a public statement calling for face-to-face 
negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, assuring Abourezk 
that this proposal, identical to the one being made by Israel's prime 
minister, Golda Meir, would ease student objections and end the pro- 
test. Although Abourezk favored such negotiations, he refused to 
make the requested statement. He explained, "I do not wish to be in 
the position of placating agitators." Rabbi Israel Miller, vice-president 
of the school, came to Washington to urge Abourezk to reconsider. 
When Abourezk again refused, the dinner chairman telephoned again, 
this time to report that students were beginning to picket. Sensing that 



98 They Dare to Speak Out 

school officials wanted the event cancelled, Abourezk offered to with- 
draw from the obligation. His offer was hastily accepted. 

Soon after, Abourezk was announced as the principal speaker at a 
rally to be held in Rochester, New York, to raise money for victims of 
the Lebanese civil war. The rally's organizing committee was im- 
mediately showered with telephoned bomb threats. In all, 23 calls 
warned that the building would be blown up if Abourezk appeared on 
the program. With the help of the FBI, local police swept the building 
for bombs and, finding none, opened it for the program. A capacity 
crowd, unaware of the threats, heard the event proceed without inci- 
dent. 

After making a tour of Arab states in December 1973, Abourezk 
sympathized with Arab refugees in a speech at the National Press Club 
in Washington. Covering his speech for the AIPAC newsletter, Near 
East Report, Wolf Blitzer wrote, "If [Abourezk's] position were to 
prevail, Israel's life would be jeopardized." Blitzer's report was sent to 
Jews who had contributed to Abourezk's campaign, accompanied by a 
letter in which I. L. Kenen, AIPAC director, warned that Abourezk 
was "going to great lengths" to "undermine American friendship for 
Israel." The mailing, Abourezk recalls, began an "adversary relation- 
ship" with AIPAC. He adds, "I doubt that I would have spent so much 
time on the Middle East had it not been for that particular unfair 
personal attack." (In 1980, after retiring from the Senate, Abourezk 
founded the American- Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, which 
now has 20,000 members and whose purpose, he says, "is to provide a 
countervailing force to the Israeli lobby.") 

On one occasion in the Senate, Abourezk turned lobby pressure to 
his advantage. Wishing to be appointed in 1974 to fill a vacancy on the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, he warned David Brody, lobbyist for the 
B'nai B'rith's Anti-Defamation League, that if he did not secure the 
appointment he would seek a seat on the Foreign Relations Committee. 
He recalls, with a chuckle, "This warning had the desired effect. The 
last thing Brody wanted was to see me on Foreign Relations where aid 
to Israel is decided. Thanks to the help of the lobby I received the 
appointment to Judiciary, even though James Allen, a Senator with 
more seniority, also wanted the position." The appointment enabled 
Abourezk to chair hearings in 1977 on the legality of Israel's occupa- 
tion of the West Bank and Gaza. "They were the first — and last hear- 
ings — on this subject," Abourezk recalls. "And not one of my 
colleagues attended. I was there alone." 

In 1975, Abourezk invited the head of the PLO's Beirut office, 
Shafiq al-Hout, to lunch in the Senate and learned that PLO-related 
secrets are hard to keep. On Abourezk's assurance that the event 
would be kept entirely private, eleven other Senators, including Abra- 



The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 99 

ham Ribicoff of Connecticut, who is Jewish, attended and heard al- 
Hout relate the PLO side of Middle East issues. Within an hour after 
the event was concluded, Spencer Rich of the Washington Post tele- 
phoned Abourezk for comment. He had already learned the identity of 
all Senators who attended. The next day Israel's leading English lan- 
guage daily newspaper, the Jerusalem Post, reported that Ribicoff and 
the others had had lunch with "murderer" al-Hout. 

A major storm erupted in 1977 when Abourezk agreed on short 
notice to fill in for Vice-President Walter Mondale as the principal 
speaker at the annual Jefferson- Jackson Day dinner sponsored in Den- 
ver by the Colorado Democratic Party. Jewish leaders protested his 
appearance, and John Mrozek, a labor leader in Denver, attacked 
Abourezk as "pro-Arab and anti-Israel." Betty Crist, a member of the 
dinner committee, moved that the invitation be withdrawn. When the 
Crist motion was narrowly rejected, the committee tried to find a pro- 
Israeli speaker to debate Abourezk, with the intention of cancelling the 
event if a debate could not be arranged. This gave the proceedings a 
comic twist, as Abourezk at no point had intended to mention the 
Middle East in his remarks. Unable to find someone to debate their 
guest, the committee reconsidered and let the invitation to Abourezk 
stand in its original form. 

Arriving at the Denver airport, Abourezk told reporters, "As a 
United States Senator, I have sworn to uphold the government of the 
United States, but I never dreamed that I would be required to swear 
allegiance to any other government." In his remarks to the dinner 
audience of 700, he warned of the "extraordinary influence of the Zion- 
ist lobby." He said the United States "is likely to become, if it has not 
already, a captive of its client state." 

He said, "The point of the controversy surrounding this dinner has 
been my refusal to take an absolutist position for Israel. There is ex- 
treme danger to all of us in this kind of absolutism. It implies that only 
one position — that of being unquestionably pro-Israel — is the only po- 
sition." 

The Rocky Mountain News reported that his speech received a 
standing ovation, "although there were pockets of people who sat on 
their hands." The Denver newspaper editorialized, "James Abourezk 
is not a fanatic screaming for the blood of Israel. Colorado Democratic 
leaders should be proud to have him as their speaker. He is better than 
they deserve." 

"Sins of Omission" 

The Israeli lobby's long string of Capitol Hill victories has been 
broken only twice during the past twenty-five years. Both setbacks 



100 They Dare to Speak Out 

occurred in the Senate and involved military sales to Saudi Arabia. In 
1978 the Senate approved the sale of F-15 fighter planes by a vote of 54 
to 44, and in 1981 the sale of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control 
System) intelligence-gathering planes and special equipment for the 
F-15s by a vote of 52 to 48. Curiously, both controversies entangled the 
American Israel Public Affairs Committee in the politics of the state of 
Maine. 

This involvement began on the Senate floor one afternoon in the 
spring of 1978 when Senator Edward "Ted" Kennedy received a whis- 
pered message which brought an angry flush to his face. AIPAC had 
forsaken a Senate Democrat with a consistently pro-Israeli record. 
Senator William Hathaway of Maine, who had, without exception, cast 
his vote in behalf of Israel's interests, was being "dropped" by the 
lobby in favor of William S. Cohen, his Republican challenger. Ken- 
nedy strode to the adjoining cloakroom and reached for a telephone. 

Kennedy demanded an explanation from Morris J. Amitay, then 
executive director of AIPAC. Flustered, Amitay denied that AIPAC 
had taken a position against Hathaway. The organization, he insisted, 
provides information on candidates but makes no endorsements. 
Pressed by Kennedy, Amitay promised to issue a letter to Hathaway 
complimenting him on his support of Israel. 

The letter was sent, but the damage had already been done. 
Though Amitay was technically correct — AIPAC does not formally 
endorse candidates for the House or Senate — the lobby has effective 
ways to show its colors, raise money and influence votes. In the Maine 
race, it was making calls for Cohen and against Hathaway. The shift, so 
astounding and unsettling to Kennedy, arose from a single "failing" on 
Hathaway's part. It was a sin of omission, but a cardinal sin 
nonetheless. 

Over the years, Hathaway had sometimes refused to sign letters 
and resolutions which AIPAC sponsored. The resolutions were usually 
statements of opinion by the Senate — called "sense of the Senate" 
resolutions — and had no legislative effect. The letters were directed 
to the president or a cabinet officer, urging him to support Israel. In 
refusing to sign, Hathaway did not single out AIPAC projects; he often 
rejected such requests from other interest groups as well, preferring to 
write his own letters and introduce his own resolutions. Nor did he 
always refuse AIPAC. Sometimes, as a favor, he would set aside his 
usual reservations and sign. 

Hathaway cooperated in 1975 when AIPAC sponsored its famous 
"spirit of 76" letter. It bore Hathaway's name and those of 75 of his 
colleagues and carried this message to President Gerald R. Ford: "We 
urge that you reiterate our nation's long-standing commitment to Is- 



The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 101 

rael's security by a policy of continued military supplies, and diplo- 
matic and economic support." At another moment, this expression 
would cause no ripples. Since the administration of John F. Kennedy, 
the U.S. government had been following a policy of "continued military 
supplies." But when this letter was made public in January 1975, it 
shook the executive branch as have few Senate letters in history. 

Ford, dissatisfied with Israeli behavior, had just issued a statement 
calling for a "reappraisal" of U.S. policies in the Middle East. His 
statement did not mention Israel by name as the offending party, but 
his message was clear: Ford wanted better cooperation in reaching a 
compromise with Arab interests, and "reappraisal" meant suspension 
of U.S. aid until Israel improved its behavior. It was a historic pro- 
posal, the first time since Eisenhower that a United States president 
even hinted publicly that he might suspend aid to Israel. 

Israel's response came, not from its own capital, but from the 
United States Senate. Instead of relying on a direct protest to the 
White House, Jerusalem activated its lobby in the United States, 
which, in turn, signed up as supporters of Israel's position more than 
three-fourths of the members of the United States Senate. 

A more devastating — and intimidating — response could scarcely 
be conceived. The seventy-six signatures effectively told Ford he could 
not carry out his threatened "reappraisal." Israel's loyalists in the Sen- 
ate — Democrats and Republicans alike — were sufficient in number to 
reject any legislative proposal hostile to Israel that Ford might make, 
and perhaps even enact a pro-Israeli piece of legislation over a presi- 
dential veto. 

The letter was a demonstration of impressive clout. Crafted and 
circulated by AIPAC, it had been endorsed overnight by a majority of 
the Senate membership. Several Senators who at first had said "No" 
quickly changed their positions. Senator John Culver admitted can- 
didly, "The pressure was too great. I caved." So did President Ford. He 
backed down and never again challenged the lobby. 

This wasn't the only time Hathaway answered AIPAC's call to 
oppose the White House on a major issue. Three years later, Ford's 
successor, Jimmy Carter, fought a similar battle with the Israeli lobby. 
At issue this time was a resolution to disapprove President Carter's 
proposal to sell F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia. The White House needed 
the support of only one chamber to defeat the resolution. White House 
strategists felt that the House of Representatives would overwhelm- 
ingly vote to defeat the sale, so they decided to put all their resources 
into the Senate. 

Lobbying on both sides was highly visible and aggressive. Freder- 
ick Dutton, chief lobbyist for Saudi Arabia, orchestrated the pro-sale 



102 They Dare to Speak Out 

forces on Capitol Hill. The Washington Post reported, "Almost every 
morning these days, the black limousines pull up to Washington's 
Madison Hotel to collect their Saudi Arabian passengers. Their des- 
tination, very often, is Capitol Hill, where the battle of the F-15s un- 
folds." 

The Israeli lobby pulled out all the stops. It coordinated a nation- 
wide public relations campaign which revived, as never before, 
memories of the genocidal Nazi campaign against European Jews dur- 
ing World War II. In the wake of the highly publicized television series, 
"Holocaust," Capitol Hill was flooded with complimentary copies of 
the novel on which the TV series was based. The books were accom- 
panied by a letter from AIPAC saying, "This chilling account of the 
extermination of six million Jews underscores Israel's concerns during 
the current negotiations for security without reliance on outside 
guarantees." Concerning the book distribution, AIPAC's Aaron Rosen- 
baum told the Washington Post: "We think, frankly, that it will affect a 
few votes here and there, and simplify lobbying." 

Senator Wendell Anderson of Minnesota at first agreed to support 
the proposed sale. He told an administration official: "Sure, I'll go for 
it. It sounds reasonable." But a few days before the vote he called 
back: "I can't vote for it. I'm up for election, and my Jewish co- 
chairman refuses to go forward if I vote for the F-15s." Furthermore, 
he said, a Jewish group had met with him and showed him that 70 
percent of the contributions to the Democratic Senatorial Campaign 
Committee the previous year came from Jewish sources. 

The pressure was sustained and heavy. Major personalities in the 
Jewish community warned the fighter aircraft would constitute a seri- 
ous threat to Israel. Nevertheless a prominent Jewish Senator, Abra- 
ham Ribicoff of Connecticut, lined up with Carter. This was a hard 
blow to Amitay, who had previously worked on Ribicoff 's staff. Earlier 
in the year Ribicoff, while keeping his own counsel on the Saudi arms 
question, took the uncharacteristic step of criticizing sharply Israeli 
policies as well as the tactics of AIPAC. In an interview with the Wall 
Street Journal, Ribicoff described Israel's retention of occupied terri- 
tory as "wrong" and unworthy of U.S. support. He said AIPAC does "a 
great disservice to the U.S., to Israel and to the Jewish community." 
He did not seek re-election in 1980. 

The Senate approved the sale, 52 to 48, but in the process Carter 
was so bruised that he never again forced a showdown vote in Con- 
gress over Middle East policy. 

Hathaway was one of the forty-four who stuck with AIPAC, but 
this was not sufficient when election time rolled around. AIPAC 
wanted a Senator whose signature — and vote — it could always count 



The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 103 

on. Searching for unswerving loyalty, the lobby switched to Cohen. Its 
decision came at the very time Hathaway was resisting pressures on 
the Saudi issue. The staff at the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Com- 
mittee was outraged. One of them declared to a visitor: "AIPAC de- 
mands 100 percent. If a fine Senator like Hathaway fails to cooperate 
just once, they are ready to trade in his career." A staff member of a 
Senate committee declared: "To please AIPAC, you have to be more 
pure than Ivory soap — 99.44 percent purity is not good enough." Lack- 
ing the purity AIPAC demanded, Hathaway was defeated in 1978. 

Caught in the AWACS Dilemma 

William S. Cohen was elected to the Senate but soon found himself 
in a storm similar to the one Hathaway, his predecessor, had encoun- 
tered. Once again a proposal to sell military equipment to Saudi Arabia 
raised concerns among pro-Israeli forces about a Senator from Maine. 
It occurred soon after Ronald Reagan's inauguration, when the new 
president decided to approve the same request that the Carter adminis- 
tration had put off the year before. Saudi Arabia would be allowed to 
purchase its own AWACS planes, along with extra equipment to give 
Saudi F-15 fighters greater range and firepower. Israeli officials op- 
posed the sale, because, they said, this technology would give Saudi 
Arabia the capacity to monitor Israeli air force operations. 

As in 1978, the Senate became the main battleground, but the 
White House was slow to organize. Convinced that Jimmy Carter the 
year before had taken on too many diverse issues at once, the Reagan 
forces decided to concentrate on tax and budget questions in the early 
months of the new administration. This left a vacuum in the foreign 
policy realm which AIPAC filled skillfully. New director Thomas A. 
Dine orchestrated a bipartisan counter-attack against arms transfers to 
Saudi Arabia. Even before Reagan sent the AWACS proposal to 
Capitol Hill for consideration, the Associated Press reported that the 
Israeli lobby had lined up "veto-strength majorities." 

AIPAC's campaign against AWACS began in the House of Repre- 
sentatives through a public letter attacking the sale sponsored by Re- 
publican Norman Lent in New York and Democrat Clarence Long of 
Maryland. Ultimately, in October, the House rejected the proposed 
sale by a vote of 301 to 111, but the real battleground was the Senate. 
Earlier in the year, before the Senate took up the question, Senator 
Bob Packwood of Oregon, always a dependable supporter of Israel, 
announced that fifty-four Senators, a majority, had signed a request that 
Reagan drop the idea. Needing time to persuade the Senators to 
change, the White House put off the showdown. By September, fifty 



104 They Dare to Speak Out 

Senators had signed a resolution to veto the sale and six more promised 
to sign if needed. Once more, the White House had no choice but to 
delay. 

This time the Saudis were testing their relationship with the new 
president and left more of the lobbying to the White House than was 
true in 1978. Their case relied heavily on personal efforts of Republican 
Senate leader Howard Baker, Senator John Tower, chairman of the 
Armed Services Committee, and Senator Charles Percy, chairman of 
the Foreign Relations Committee. Lobbyist Frederick Dutton was in- 
structed to keep in the background, though David Sadd, executive 
director of the National Association of Arab Americans, helped organ- 
ize the support of U.S. industries with a stake in the sale. 

Meanwhile, Dine's team roamed the Senate corridors while 
AIPAC's grassroots contacts brought direct pressure from con- 
stituents. The Post reported that "AIPAC's fountain of research mate- 
rials reaches a readership estimated at 200,000 people." Senator John 
Glenn of Ohio, said: "I've been getting calls from every Jewish organi- 
zation in the country. They didn't want to talk about the issues. The big 
push was to get me to sign this letter and resolution." Glenn did not 
sign, largely because he hoped to broker a deal with the White House. 

Syndicated columnist Carl T. Rowan wrote "there is strong evi- 
dence" that the AWACS struggle increased "public resentment against 
the 'Jewish lobby/" 

The issue was portrayed by some as a choice between President 
Reagan and Prime Minister Begin. Bumper stickers appeared around 
Washington which read, "Reagan or Begin?" When the Senate finally 
voted, Cohen, although announced in opposition, switched and pro- 
vided one of the critical votes supporting the AWACS sale. He ex- 
plained his reversal by declaring that Israel would have been branded 
the scapegoat for failure of the Middle East peace process if the pro- 
posal were defeated. 

Aside from this "sin," one of "commission" in the eyes of AIPAC, 
his behavior was exemplary. Never once did he stray from the fold, and 
in 1984 AIPAC did not challenge his bid for re-election. 

Standing Up for Civility 

One of the most popular members of the Senate, Charles "Mac" 
Mathias of Maryland is something of a maverick — a role probably nec- 
essary for his political survival. He is a Republican in a state where 
Democrats outnumber Republicans by three to one. 

During the Nixon administration especially, he frequently dis- 
sented from the Republican party line. His opposition to the war in 



The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 105 

Vietnam and his staunch advocacy of civil rights and welfare initiatives 
earned him a place on the Nixon administration's "enemies list" of 
political opponents. In a December 1971 speech, before the Watergate 
break-in at Democratic headquarters that led to Nixon's downfall, and 
while the country was angrily divided by domestic tensions and the war 
in Vietnam, Mathias advised Nixon to work to "bind the nation's 
wounds." He urged the president to "take the high road" in the 1972 
campaign and to disavow a campaign strategy "which now seems des- 
tined, unnecessarily, to polarize the country even more." In the same 
message Mathias criticized Nixon's advisers for "divisive exploitation 
of the so-called social issues [through] ... the use of hard-line rhetoric 
on crime, civil rights, civil liberties and student unrest." Mathias was 
alarmed at what he saw as the Republican drift to the right. 

In 1975 and 1976 he even considered running for president as an 
independent "third force" candidate in an effort to forge a "coalition of 
the center." The late Clarence Mitchell, director of the Washington 
office of the NAACP, said: "He's always arrived at his position in a 
reasoned way." In fact, early in his career he marked himself as a 
progressive and a champion of civil rights, and his constituency takes 
his liberalism on social issues in stride. A resident of Frederick, 
Mathias's home town, told the Washington Post, "Why, a lot of people 
around here think he's too liberal. But they seem to vote for him. The 
thing is, he's decent. He's got class." 

He also has flashes of daring. In the spring of 1981, he wrote an 
article in the quarterly Foreign Affairs that he knew would put him in 
hot water with some of his Jewish constituents, criticizing the role 
played by ethnic lobbies — particularly the Israeli lobby — in the forma- 
tion of U.S. foreign policy. The controversial article upset Maryland's 
influential Jewish community, which had consistently supported 
Mathias's campaigns for office. Mathias had voted to sell fighter planes 
to the Saudis in 1978 and his vote helped President Reagan get Senate 
clearance for the AWACS sale in 1981. 

The same year the controversial article appeared, just after voters 
elected him to his third term in the Senate, Mathias took another step 
which appeared so politically inexpedient that many people assumed 
he had decided to retire from Congress in 1986. At the urging of 
Senators Howard Baker and Charles Percy, who wanted another mod- 
erate Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, Mathias gave 
up a senior position on the Appropriations Committee in order to take 
the foreign policy committee assignment. 

His committee decision shook the leadership of Baltimore, the 
largest city in the state and a competitor for federal grant assistance. 
As the Baltimore Sun noted in an article critical of the move, "Had he 



106 They Dare to Speak Out 

remained on the Appropriations Committee, Mr. Mathias almost cer- 
tainly would have become chairman of the subcommittee that holds 
the purse strings for the Department of Housing and Urban De- 
velopment, an agency of great importance to the "renaissance 9 of Balti- 
more." 

Contrary to the assumptions of Maryland political observers, 
Mathias was not planning to retire. Although he left a committee im- 
portant to his constituents, the Senator welcomed the opportunity to 
help shape the issues that come before the Foreign Relations Commit- 
tee. He was exhibiting a political philosophy admired by former 
Senator Mike Mansfield, who once called Mathias "the conscience of 
the Senate," and by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who 
recognized Mathias as "one of the few statesmen I met in Washington." 

These qualities led Mathias to write his controversial Foreign Af- 
fairs article calling for "the re-introduction of civility" into the discus- 
sion of "ethnic advocacy" in Congress. He acknowledged that ethnic 
groups have the right to lobby for legislation, but he warned, "The 
affirmation of a right, and of the dangers of suppressing it, does not . . . 
assure that the right will be exercised responsibly and for the general 



Mathias cited the Israeli lobby as the most powerful ethnic pres- 
sure group, noting that it differs from others in that it focuses on vital 
national security interests and exerts "more constant pressure." Other 
lobbying groups "show up in a crisis and then disappear" and tend to 
deal with domestic matters. Mathias continued: 

With the exception of the Eisenhower administration, which virtually com- 
pelled Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai after the 1956 war, American presi- 
dents, and to an even greater degree Senators and Representatives, have been 
subjected to recurrent pressures from what has come to be known as the Israel 
lobby. 

He added an indictment of his colleagues: "For the most part they have 
been responsive [to pro-Israeli lobbying pressure], and for reasons not 
always related either to personal conviction or careful reflection on the 
national interest." 

Mathias illustrated his concern by reviewing the "spectacular" 
success of AIPAC in 1975 when it promoted the "spirit of 76" letter: 
"Seventy-six of us promptly affixed our signatures although no hear- 
ings had been held, no debate conducted, nor had the administration 
been invited to present its views." 

The Maryland Republican felt the independence of Congress was 
compromised by the intimidating effect of AIPAC's lobbying. He 
wrote that "Congressional conviction" in favor of Israel "has been 



The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 107 

immeasurably reinforced by the knowledge that political sanctions will 
be applied to any who fail to deliver" on votes to support high levels of 
economic and military aid to Israel. 

Although he signed the 1975 AIPAC letter to President Ford, 
Mathias resisted AIPAC's 1978 lobbying against the Carter adminis- 
tration's proposal to sell 60 F-15 fighter planes to Saudi Arabia. In the 
Senate debate before the vote he said that both Israel and Saudi Arabia 
were important friends of the United States and that "both need our 
support." 

Despite this attempt to balance American interests with Israel and 
the Saudi Arabia, Mathias said an "emotional, judgmental atmosphere" 
surrounded the arms sale issue. He quoted from a letter written to a 
Jewish newspaper in New York condemning his vote: 

Mr. Mathias values the importance of oil over the well-being of Jews and the 
state of Israel. . . . The Jewish people cannot be fooled by such a person, no 
matter what he said, because his act proved who he was. 

Yet Mathias had already responded to such criticism in his Foreign 
Affairs article: 

Resistance to the pressures of a particular group in itself signals neither a 
sellout nor even a lack of sympathy with a foreign country or cause, but rather 
a sincere conviction about the national interest of the United States. 

He appealed to both the president and the Congress to "help to reduce 
the fractiousness and strengthen our sense of common American pur- 
pose." The president's national constituency afford him a unique op- 
portunity to work toward this end, but Congress, "although more 
vulnerable to group pressures," must also be active, he wrote. 

Mathias asserted that it is not enough simply to follow public 
opinion: "An elected representative has other duties as well — to formu- 
late and explain to the best of his or her ability the general interest, and 
to be prepared to accept the political consequences of having done so." 
He warned that ethnic advocacy tends to excessiveness and can thwart 
the higher good of national interests. 

The Baltimore Jewish Times reported that Jewish leaders faced "a 
delicate dilemma" as they considered how to respond to the article: 

Basically, they're damned if they do and damned if they don't. If they keep a 
low profile and do not challenge Mathias's assertions, they feel they will be 
shirking their duty and giving in. Yet if they "go after" the Senator, they will be 
falling into a trap by proving his point about excessive pressure. 

Some Jews decided to take the latter course. Arnold Blumberg, a 
history professor at Towson State University, charged that Mathias "is 
in the mainstream of a tradition which urged Americans to pursue trade 



108 They Dare to Speak Out 

with Japan and Nazi Germany right up to the moment when scrap 
metal rained on the heads of American GIs from German and Japanese 
planes." A prominent Jewish community official charged that the arti- 
cle was "malicious" and expressed hurt that Mathias had the "poison in 
him to express these views." Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal, a 
Democrat from New York and a senior member of the House Foreign 
Affairs committee, charged that Mathias was "standing on the 
threshold of bigotry" and denying "to the ethnic lobbies alone the right 
to participate in shaping the American concensus on foreign policy." 
Other critics expressed the fear that the article would encourage anti- 
Semitism. 

A spokesperson for the Maryland Jewish War Veterans organiza- 
tion said Mathias had "sold" himself "to the cause of the Saudis," while 
a letter to the Baltimore Sun chided, "I wish that [Mathias] had had the 
integrity to express those views one year prior to his re-election rather 
than one year after." 

One critic, identified as "a former lobbyist," told the Jewish Times 
of Baltimore, 

Mathias is a bright, well-respected legislator who's been effective on Soviet 
Jewry, but when it comes to Israel he was always the last to come on board. He 
was always reluctant, and was pressured by Jewish groups, and he resented the 
pressure. He sees himself as a statesman above the fray. Now he obviously 
feels he's in a position to say what he really believes. 

The Jewish Community Relations Council in San Francisco 
criticized Mathias in its August 3, 1981, "Backgrounder" issue for rais- 
ing the issue of "dual loyalty" within the "Jewish lobby." Mathias 
dismissed the charge as a false issue. In Maryland, the article was 
denounced by some rabbis, though Rabbi Jacob Angus of Baltimore 
publicly defended Mathias. 

Two journalist friends, Frank Mankiewicz and William Safire, 
warned Mathias at the time that his article would "cause trouble." Two 
years later Mankiewicz assessed the Senator's future and said he felt 
the article had created serious problems. 

Ethnic lobbying still worries Mathias. Pondering each word over a 
cup of tea one afternoon in the fall of 1983, he told me, 

Ethnic ties enrich American life, but it must be understood they can't become 
so important that they obscure the primary duty to be an American citizen. 
Sometimes the very volume of this kind of activity can amount to an excessive 
zeal. 

Some of his critics had not read his article, Mathias recalls with a 
smile. "In a way, they were saying, I haven't read it, but it's outrag- 
eous." At breakfasts sponsored by Jewish groups, Mathias was regu- 



The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 109 

larly challenged. "When this happened, I would ask how many had 
actually read my article. In a crowd of 200, maybe two hands would be 
raised." 

Did the article close off communication with Jewish constituents? 
"I can't say it closed off access, but I have noticed that invitations have 
fallen off in the past two years." Mathias did not seek a fourth term 
in the Senate. He told a friend that controversy in the Jewish community 
was a factor in his decision. 

$3.1 Million from Pro-Israel Sources 

Boy wonder of industry, self-made millionaire, tireless Republican 
campaigner for progressive causes, Charles H. Percy was a bright pros- 
pect for the presidency for a time in the late sixties. He skyrocketed to 
prominence during his first term in the Senate, which began in 1967 
after he won an upset victory over Paul Douglas, the popular but aging 
liberal Democrat. 

In his first election 60 percent of Jewish votes — Illinois has the 
nation's fourth largest Jewish population — went to Douglas. But in the 
next six years Percy supported aid for Israel, urged the Soviet Union to 
permit emigration of Jews, criticized PLO terrorism, and supported 
social causes so forcefully that Jews rallied strongly to his side when he 
ran for re-election. In 1972 Percy accomplished something never before 
achieved by carrying every county in the state and, even more remark- 
able for an Illinois Protestant Republican, received 70 percent of the 
Jewish vote. 

His honeymoon with Jews was interrupted in 1975 when he returned 
from a trip to the Middle East to declare, "Israel and its leadership, for 
whom I have a high regard, cannot count on the United States in the 
future just to write a blank check." He said Israel had missed some 
opportunities to negotiate and he described PLO leader Yasser Arafat 
as "more moderate, relatively speaking, than other extremists such as 
George Habash." He ui^ged Israel to talk to the PLO if the organization 
would renounce terrorism and recognize Israel's right to exist behind 
secure defensible borders, noting that David Ben Gurion, Israel's first 
prime minister, had said that Israel must be willing to swap real estate 
for peace. 

A week later Percy received this memorandum from his staff: "We 
have received 2,200 telegrams and 4,000 letters in response to your 
Mideast statements. . . . [They] run 95 percent against. As you might 
imagine, the majority of hostile mail comes from the Jewish community 
in Chicago. They threaten to withhold their votes and support for any 
future endeavors." 



1 10 They Dare to Speak Out 

That same year Percy offended pro-Israel activists when he did not 
sign the famous "spirit of 76" letter through which seventy-six of his 
Senate colleagues effectively blocked President Gerald R. Ford's in- 
tended "reappraisal" of Middle East policy. This brought another flood 
of protest mail. 

Despite these rumblings, the pro-Israel activists did not mount a 
serious campaign against Percy in 1978. With the Senator's unprece- 
dented 1972 sweep of the state fresh in mind, they did not seek out a 
credible opponent either in the primary or the general election. In fact, 
when the Democratic nomination went largely by default to an un- 
known lawyer, Alex Seith, Jews took little interest. Even Percy's vote 
to approve the sale of F-15 planes to Saudi Arabia during the campaign 
year caused him no serious problem at that time. 

In fact, only about one hundred Chicago Jews, few of them promi- 
nent, openly supported Seith. Seith's scheduler, who is Jewish, called 
every synagogue and every Jewish men's and women's organization in 
the state, but only one agreed to let the candidate speak. His campaign 
manager, Gary Ratner, concludes, "It was a ghetto mentality. Most 
Jews felt there was no way Percy would lose, so why get him mad at 
us." Of the $1 million Seith spent, less than $20,000 came from Jews. 
Encouraged by Philip Klutznick, a prominent Chicago Jewish leader, 
Illinois Jews contributed several times that amount to Percy. Of 70 
Jewish leaders asked to sign an advertisement supporting the Senator, 
65 gave their approval. On election day, Jewish support figured heavily 
in Percy's victory. He received only 53 percent of the statewide total 
but an impressive 61 percent of the Jewish vote. 

The 1984 campaign was dramatically different. Pro-Israel forces 
targeted him for defeat early and never let up. Percy upset Jews by 
voting to support the Reagan administration sale of AWACS radar 
planes to Saudi Arabia (a sale also supported by the Carter administra- 
tion). These developments provided new ammunition for the attack 
already underway against Percy. Percy's decision was made after staff 
members who had visited Israel said they had been told by an Israeli 
military official that the strategic military balance would not be af- 
fected, but that they did not want the symbolism of the United States 
doing business with Saudi Arabia. 

Early in 1984, AIPAC decided to mobilize the full national re- 
sources of the pro-Israel campaign against Percy. In the March pri- 
mary, it encouraged the candidacy of Congressman Tom Corcoran, 
Percy's challenger for the nomination. One of Corcoran's chief advis- 
ers and fundraisers was Morris Amitay, former executive director of 
AIPAC. Corcoran's high-decibel attacks portrayed the Senator as anti- 
Israel. His fund-raising appeals to Jews cited Percy as "Israel's worst 



The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 1 1 1 

adversary in Congress." A full-page newspaper advertisement, spon- 
sored by the Corcoran campaign, featured a picture of Arafat and 
headlined, "Chuck Percy says this man is a moderate." A letter to 
Jewish voters defending Percy and signed by fifty-eight leading Illinois 
Jews made almost no impact. 

Although Percy overcame the primary challenge, Corcoran's at- 
tacks damaged his position with Jewish voters and provided a strong 
base for AIPAC's continuing assault. Thomas A. Dine, executive di- 
rector of AIPAC, set the tone early in the summer by attacking Percy's 
record at a campaign workshop in Chicago. AIPAC encouraged fund- 
raising for Paul Simon and mobilized its political resources heavily 
against Percy. It assigned several student interns fulltime to the task of 
anti-Percy research and brought more than one hundred university 
students from out-of-state to campaign for Simon. 

Midway in the campaign, AIPAC took a devious step to make 
Percy look bad. The key votes selected by AIPAC and used to rate all 
Senators showed Percy supporting Israel 89 percent of the time during 
his career. This put him only a few points below Simon's 99 percent 
rating in the House of Representatives and was hardly the contrast 
AIPAC wanted to cite in its anti-Percy campaign. The lobby solved the 
problem by changing its own rulebook in the middle of the game. It 
added to the selected list a number of obscure votes Percy had cast in 
the subcommittee and letters and resolutions that Percy had not signed. 
The expanded list dropped the Senator's rating to only 51 percent, a 
mark useful to Simon when he addressed Jewish audiences. 

While most financial support from pro-Israel activists came to 
Simon from individuals, political action committees figured heavily. By 
mid-August these committees had contributed $145,870 to Simon, 
more than to any other Senate candidate. By election day, the total had 
risen to $235,000, with fifty-five committees participating. 

In addition, a California Jewish activist, Michael Goland, using a 
loophole in federal law, spent $1.6 million for billboard, radio and 
television advertising which urged Illinoisans to "dump Percy" and 
called him a "chameleon." 

Percy undertook vigorous countermeasures. Former Senator 
Jacob Javits of New York, one of the nation's most prominent and 
respected Jews, and Senator Rudy Boschwitz, chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee subcommittee concerning the Middle 
East, made personal appearances for Percy in Chicago, and one hun- 
dred Illinois Jews led by former Attorney General Edward H. Levi 
sponsored a full-page advertisement which declared that Percy "has 
delivered for Illinois, delivered for America and delivered for Israel." 
The advertisement, in an unstated reference to Goland's attacks, 



1 12 They Dare to Speak Out 

warned, "Don't let our U.S. Senate race be bought by a Californian." 

Except for charging in one news conference that Simon pro- 
claimed that he had a 100 percent voting record for the pro-Israel 
lobby, Percy tried to avoid the Israel- Jewish controversy in the cam- 
paign. 

These precautions proved futile, as did his strong legislative en- 
deavors. His initiatives as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee brought Israel $425 million more in grant aid than Reagan 
had requested in 1983 and $325 million more in 1984, but these suc- 
cesses for Israel seemed to make no difference. A poll taken a month 
before the election showed a large majority of Jews supporting Simon. 
The Percy campaign found no way to stem the tide. 

When the votes were counted, Percy had lost statewide by 89,000 
votes. One exit poll indicated that Percy won 35 percent of the Jewish 
vote. In the same balloting Illinois Jews cast only 30 percent of their 
votes for the re-election of President Ronald Reagan, despite their 
unhappiness with the chief executive's views on the separation of 
church and state, abortion, and other social issues — not to mention his 
insistence on selling AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia. 

In an election decided by so few votes, any major influence could 
be cited as crucial. Although broadly supportive of Reagan's program, 
Percy was remembered by many voters mainly as a moderate, progres- 
sive, Republican. Some conservative Republicans rejoiced at his de- 
feat. The "new right," symbolized by the National Conservative 
Political Action Committee, withheld its support from Percy and early 
in the campaign indicated its preference for Simon, despite the latter's 
extremely liberal record in Congress. 

Yet the Middle East controversy alone may have been sufficient to 
cost Percy his Senate seat. Thousands of Jews who had voted for Percy 
in 1978 left him for the Democratic candidate six years later. And these 
votes fled to Simon mainly because Israel's lobby worked effectively 
throughout the campaign year to portray the Senator as basically anti- 
Israel. Percy's long record of support for Israel's needs amounted to a 
repudiation of the accusation, but too few Jews spoke up publicly in his 
defense. The Senator found that once a candidate is labeled anti-Israel 
the poison sinks so swiftly and deeply it is almost impossible to re- 
move. 

The Middle East figured heavily in campaign financing as well as 
voting. Simon's outlay for the year was $5.3 million and Percy's about 
$6 million. With Goland spending $1.6 million in his own independent 
attack on Percy, total expenditures in behalf of the Simon candidacy 
came to $6.9 million. 



The Deliberative Body Fails to Deliberate 1 13 

Forty percent — $3.1 million — came from Jews disgruntled over 
Percy's position on Arab-Israel relations. Indeed, Simon was promised 
half this sum before he became a candidate. While he was still ponder- 
ing whether to vacate his safe seat in the House of Representatives in 
order to make the race, he was assured $1.5 million from Jewish 
sources. The promise came from Robert Schrayer, Chicago area busi- 
nessman and leader in the Jewish community, whose daughter, 
Elizabeth, was helping to organize anti-Percy forces in her job as as- 
sistant director of political affairs for AIPAC. 

Reviewing the impact of the Middle East controversy on his de- 
feat, Percy says, "Did it make the difference? I don't know. But this I 
believe: I believe Paul Simon would not have run had he not been 
assured by Bob Schrayer that he would receive the $1.5 million." 
Simon acknowledges, "This assurance was a factor in my decision." 

AIPAC's Dine told a Canadian audience: "All the Jews in America, 
from coast to coast, gathered to oust Percy. And American politi- 
cians — those who hold public positions now, and those who aspire — 
got the message." 



Chapter 4 



The Lobby and the Oval Office 



On a Sunday afternoon, just a few days before the presidential election 
in 1960, John F. Kennedy, the Democratic candidate, parked his car in 
front of the residence at 4615 W Street, just off Foxhall Road in a 
fashionable section of Washington. He was alone, unencumbered by 
the Secret Service officers soon to be a part of his life. 

He wanted to get away from campaign pressures and have a chat 
with Charles Bartlett, a journalist and a close friend of many years. 
Their friendship had remained firm since they became acquainted in 
Florida immediately after World War II, and it was Bartlett who first 
introduced Kennedy to his future bride, Jacqueline Bouvier. 

The night before, Kennedy had gone to dinner with a small group 
of wealthy and prominent Jews in New York. An episode of the eve- 
ning troubled him deeply. Describing it to Bartlett as an "amazing 
experience," he said one of those at the dinner party — he did not iden- 
tify him by name — told him he knew his campaign was in financial 
difficulty and, speaking for the group, offered "to help and help 
significantly" if Kennedy as president "would allow them to set the 
course of Middle East policy over the next four years." It was an 
astounding proposition. 

Kennedy told Bartlett he reacted less as a presidential candidate 
than as a citizen. "He said he felt insulted," Bartlett recalls, "that 
anybody would make that offer, particularly to a man who even had a 
slim chance to be president. He said if he ever did get to be president 
he would push for a law that would subsidize presidential campaigns 
out of the U.S. Treasury. He added that whatever the cost of this 
subsidy, it would insulate presidential candidates in the future from this 
kind of pressure and save the country a lot of grief in the long run." 

Just what Kennedy said in response to the proposition, Barlett did 
not know. "Knowing his style, he probably made a general comment 
and changed the subject." 

114 



The Lobby and the Oval Office 1 15 

After learning of the event from Bartlett, I talked with one of the 
people attending the dinner, Myer Feldman, a Washington attorney 
who worked closely in the Kennedy campaign in 1960 and later became 
assistant to the president with special responsibilities for liaison with 
the Jewish community. I hoped he could supply further details. As a 
freshman Congressman in 1961-62, 1 had had several friendly encoun- 
ters with Feldman over wheat sales to the Soviet Union. 

He recalled the gathering which, he said, was held at the apart- 
ment of Abraham Feinberg, chairman of the American Bank and Trust 
Company in New York and influential in national Jewish affairs and the 
Democratic Party. Those attending, Feldman recalled, were "ambigu- 
ous about Kennedy." They weren't sure "which way he would go" on 
Middle East policy and therefore not sure they would support him. The 
candidate was "peppered with tough and embarrassing questions." 
Asked for his opinion about moving the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel 
Aviv to Jerusalem, Kennedy had replied, "Not under present circum- 
stances." He said Kennedy answered all questions directly and made a 
good impression on his hosts. Feldman said he was unaware of the 
proposition that "insulted" the future president. 

It was not the first time Middle East politics intruded forcibly into 
presidential campaigns. Bartlett says that when he related the episode 
to Roger L. Stevens, head of the John F. Kennedy Center for the 
Performing Arts in Washington, D.C., Stevens responded, "That's 
very interesting, because exactly the same thing happened to Adlai 
[former U.N. Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson] in Los Angeles in 
1956." Stevenson was then the Democratic candidate for president, 
opposing the re-election of Dwight D. Eisenhower. 

Ethnic group pressure is an ever-present part of U.S. partisan 
politics, and because the president of the United States is the executor 
of all foreign policy, and the formulator of most of it, pressures natu- 
rally center on the people who hold or seek the presidency. When the 
pressure is from friends of Israel, presidents — and presidential candi- 
dates — often yield. 

Lobby pressure on the White House is applied at several different 
levels. The most direct — person-to-person — varies greatly, depending 
on the inclinations of the person who is president at the time. 

Some of those applying pressure are close personal friends whose 
influence is limited to just one presidency, an example being Harry S. 
Truman's close friendship with Ed Jacobson, his former haberdashery 
partner and an ardent Zionist. Mr. and Mrs. Arthur Krim, Jewish lead- 
ers from New York, maintained a close relationship with Lyndon B. 
Johnson. A White House official of the period recalls: "Arthur Krim 
stayed at the LB J Ranch during crucial moments before the 1967 war 
and his wife, Mathilde, was a guest in the White House during the 



1 16 They Dare to Speak Out 

war." White House logs show that Mrs. Krim talked frequently by 
telephone with Johnson. 

Other Jewish leaders maintain a relationship from one administra- 
tion to another. Abraham Feinberg of New York, who hosted the dinner 
for Kennedy in October 1960, kept close White House ties over a 
period of years. He was a frequent visitor at the White House during 
the Johnson years, and as late as 1984, during the pre-convention presi- 
dential campaigning, brought the leading Democratic contenders, Wal- 
ter Mondale and Gary Hart, together for a private discussion at his 
New York apartment. Philip Klutznick of Chicago, former president of 
B'nai B'rith, kept close relations throughout the Truman, Eisenhower, 
Kennedy, Johnson and Carter administrations. 

Sometimes Israeli diplomats have a personal relationship which 
gives them direct access to the president. Ephraim Evron, then deputy 
chief in the Israeli embassy and a friend since Senate days, sometimes 
talked privately with Johnson in the Oval Office. 

The second level of pressure comes through officials close to the 
president— his adviser on relations with the Jewish community or 
others among his top aides. President Kennedy told a friend, with a 
chuckle, that he learned that when he was away from Washington, 
Myer Feldman, his adviser on Jewish matters, would occasionally in- 
vite Jewish leaders to the White House for a discussion in the Cabinet 
Room. 

The third level for pressing the presidency is within the top levels 
of the departments — the State Department, Defense Department and 
National Security Council — where Israeli officials and groups of U.S. 
citizens who are pro-Israeli activists frequently call to present their 
agendas to cabinet officers or their chief deputies (see chapter five). 

"The Votes Are Against You" 

Zionists began pressing their case early in the administration of 
Harry S. Truman and intensified their efforts in 1947 when Truman 
initially expressed opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state in 
Palestine. Jewish leaders bought newspaper advertising designed to 
transform public shame and outrage over the Holocaust into popular 
support for the idea of a Jewish national homeland. Both Houses of 
Congress passed resolutions urging presidential support. 

When Thiman continued to resist and publicly urged citizens to 
avoid inflaming "the passions of the inhabitants of Palestine," a group 
of New Jersey Jews wired: "Your policy on Palestine . . . has cost you 
our support in 1948." With election day approaching, it was a reminder 
of the grim political facts of life. Two-thirds of American Jews lived in 



The Lobby and the Oval Office 1 17 

New York, Pennsylvania and Illinois, and these states would cast 1 10 
electoral votes in the presidential voting. Considered the underdog in 
the upcoming election despite his incumbency, Truman knew he must 
have those votes to win. 

With a proclamation announcing the new state of Israel expected 
soon, Truman assembled his Middle East ambassadors to get their 
views. Their spokesman, ambassador to Egypt Pinkerton "Pinky" 
T\ick, advised against immediate recognition. He told Truman the deci- 
sion should be delayed long enough to carry out the consultation with 
Arab states that Truman's predecessor, Franklin D. Roosevelt, had 
promised the king of Saudi Arabia. 

Thiman replied, "Mr, TUck, you may be right, but the votes are 
against you." In deciding to recognize Israel immediately, Truman re- 
jected not just Tack's advice but that of all his military and diplomatic 
advisers. He chose instead the recommendation of his close friend and 
former associate in the haberdashery trade, Ed Jacobson. In fact, pro- 
Israeli partisans today generally view Truman's immediate recognition 
of Israel as a prime example of effective lobbying through a "key 
contact" rather than the usual pressure tactics. Jacobson's pro-Zionist 
view was shared by Thiman's political advisers, particularly Clark Clif- 
ford. 

Secretary of State George C. Marshall opposed the decision so 
strongly that he bluntly told Thiman soon after his recognition an- 
nouncement that if the election were held the next day he would not 
vote for him. Sentiments were of course much different in Israel. Dur- 
ing a 1949 White House visit, the chief rabbi of Israel told the presi- 
dent, "God put you in your mother's womb so you would be the 
instrument to bring about the rebirth of Israel after 2000 years." 

In partisan political terms, Thiman's decision paid off. On election 
day he received 75 percent of the Jewish vote nationally, which helped 
him win a razor-thin upset victory — and a permanent place of honor on 
the face of Israeli postage stamps, as well as in the hearts of Zionists. 

"Dismayed by 'Partisan Considerations 9 " 

Presidential behavior toward the state of Israel took a turn in the 
opposite direction when Truman's successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
assumed office. He resisted pressures from the Israeli lobby and on 
three occasions forced Israel to abandon major policies to which it was 
publicly and strongly committed. 

In September 1953, he ordered a cancellation of all aid — 
amounting to $26 million — until Israel stopped work on a diversion 
canal being constructed on the Jordan River in violation of the 1949 



1 18 They Dare to Speak Out 

ceasefire agreements, a project which would help assure Israeli control 
of water resources which were important to all nations in the region. It 
was the first time a president actually cut off all aid to Israel. He also 
instructed the Treasury Department to draft an order removing the tax- 
deductible status of contributions made to the United Jewish Appeal 
and other organizations raising funds for Israel in the U.S. 

Predictably, Eisenhower's decision kicked up a major storm. Dr. 
Israel Goldstein told an audience of 20,000 celebrating Jerusalem's 
3,000th birthday at New York's Madison Square Garden: "Peace will 
not be helped by withholding aid as an instrument of unwarranted 
duress." New York members of Congress joined the bandwagon. 
Senator Robert Wagner called the decision "cruel and intemperate," 
and Congressman Emanuel Celler denounced it as a "snap judgment." 
All major Jewish organizations condemned the action. 

Eisenhower stood firm in withholding aid, and less than two 
months later Israel announced it was ceasing work on the river diver- 
sion project. The president had won a first round, the confrontation 
was postponed, aid to Israel was resumed, and the order ending the 
privileged tax status enjoyed by Zionist groups was not issued. 

Eisenhower faced the lobby again in October 1956, just days be- 
fore his re-election as president. Israel had negotiated a secret deal 
with Britain and France under which the three nations would coordi- 
nate a military attack on the Nasser regime in Egypt, which had just 
taken over the Suez Canal. Israel would strike across the Sinai Desert 
and move against the canal, while British and French forces, after an 
air bombardment, would invade from the north. 

The allied governments assumed that the United States would not 
interfere; France and Britain believed that Eisenhower would avoid a 
public showdown with his wartime allies. Israel, with the U.S. presi- 
dential election just days away, counted on partisan pressures from its 
American lobby to keep candidate Eisenhower on the sidelines. All 
miscalculated. 

When Israel's invasion of Egypt began on October 29, Eisenhower 
immediately cancelled all aid to Israel. He permitted only the delivery 
of food already in transit, stopping all other forms of assistance, both 
economic and military. These measures created such pressure that 
Israel halted its attack. The British and French, also under heavy U.S. 
pressure, abandoned their invasion from the north. 

Despite partisan assaults on his Middle East policy, the president 
was, of course, easily re-elected. In fact, more American Jews voted 
for Eisenhower in 1956 (40 percent) than those who had supported him 
in 1952 (36 percent). 

But Eisenhower's problems with Israel were far from over. Even 



The Lobby and the Oval Office 1 1 9 

after the invasion was halted, Israel decided to keep occupying forces 
in the Egyptian-administered Gaza Strip, as well as the strategic village 
of Sharm el-Sheik at the access to the Gulf of Aqaba. Despite protests 
by the United States and six resolutions by the United Nations, Israel 
refused to withdraw. As weeks passed, lobby pressure against 
Eisenhower's position received support from Eleanor Roosevelt, for- 
mer President Truman, and leaders of both parties in the Senate, 
Democrat Lyndon Johnson of Texas and Republican William 
Knowland of California. 

Informed that the United States might support U.N. sanctions 
against Israel, Knowland threatened to resign as a member of the U.N. 
delegation and warned Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, "This 
will mean a parting of the ways." Dulles was firm: "I think you should 
study this. We cannot have all our policies made in Jerusalem." Dulles 
told Henry Luce, owner of Time, Inc. and a supporter of Israel's 
position, "I am aware how almost impossible it is in this country to 
carry out a foreign policy not approved by the Jews. [But] I am going to 
try to have one. This does not mean I am anti-Jewish, but I believe in 
what George Washington said in his farewell address, that an emotional 
attachment to another country should not interfere." 

Eisenhower considered the issue vital. He summoned the biparti- 
san leadership of Congress to the White House to request their sup- 
port. Unwilling to tangle with pro-Israeli activists, the group refused. 
That night the president wrote in his diary: "As I reflected on the 
pettiness of the discussion of the morning, I found it somewhat dismay- 
ing that partisan considerations should enter so much into life-or- 
death, peace-or-war decisions." 

A determined president took his case to the American people in a 
televised address in the spring of 1957: 

Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of the 
United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its own with- 
drawal? If we agreed that armed attack can properly achieve the purposes of 
the assailant, then I fear we will have turned back the clock of international 
order. 

Letters and telegrams poured into the White House, but almost all 
of the communications came from Jews, 90 percent supporting Israel's 
position. Dulles complained, "It is impossible to hold the line because 
we get no support from the Protestant elements in the country. All we 
get is a battering from the Jews." 

Eisenhower persisted, declaring that the United States would sup- 
port a U.N. resolution imposing sanctions if Israel did not withdraw 
from all of the Sinai peninsula and from Gaza and threatening to take 



120 They Dare to Speak Out 

away the tax privilege enjoyed by donors to Israeli causes. Faced with 
that prospect, Israel finally capitulated and withdrew from the oc- 
cupied territory. 



"Armed Shipments Are . . . Ready to Go" 

Israel fared better at the hands of the next occupants of the White 
House. Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson began to 
help Israel in its military activities, not hold it back. 

Although there is no evidence to suggest that Kennedy accepted 
the dinner party propositions— to exchange control of Middle East pol- 
icy for campaign contributions — he fared well on election day in 1960, 
receiving 82 percent of the Jewish vote, topping even Harry Ihiman's 
75 percent, and, as president, he made a decision vital to Israel's 
military plans. He approved for the first time the U.S. sale of weapons 
to Israel. 

But Israel's military fortunes received a still greater boost with the 
arrival in the Oval Office of President Lyndon B. Johnson. Johnson's 
sympathy for the underdog — in his view, Israel — made him responsive 
to the demands of Israel and its lobby in the United States. Friends of 
Israel with special influence included Arthur Goldberg, U.S. ambassa- 
dor to the United Nations, Philip Klutznick of Chicago, and three New 
Yorkers, Abraham Feinberg and Arthur and Mathilde Krim. The latter 
often worked through the Rostow brothers, Walt Rostow, Johnson's 
national security adviser, and Eugene Rostow, assistant secretary of 
state for political affairs. 

In a September 1966 letter to Feinberg, Klutznick called for an im- 
proved relationship between Johnson and the American Jewish com- 
munity. He did not want Jewish differences with Johnson over the 
Vietnam war and aid to private schools, for example, to complicate 
American support for Israel. He called on Feinberg to help establish a 
"sense of participation." The elements of a deal were present. At the 
time, Johnson desperately wanted public support for the war in South- 
east Asia, and the Jewish leaders wanted assurance that the U.S. would 
stand by Israel in a crisis. 

Aid levels were increased, clearances issued for almost any mili- 
tary item, and extensive credit extended. 

Lobby pressure may not have been needed to persuade Johnson to 
support Israel, but the pressure came nevertheless. Harold Saunders, a 
member of the National Security Council staff and later Carter's assist- 
ant secretary of state for the Near East and South Asia, recalls the 
avalanche of telegrams and letters that urged President Johnson to 



The Lobby and the Oval Office 121 

stand behind Israel when Egypt's President Nasser closed the Strait of 
Tiran in May 1967: "I had 150,000 telegrams and letters from the Jew- 
ish community in boxes in my office. I do not exaggerate. There were 
150,000 pieces of paper sitting there. They all said the same thing. And 
Johnson decreed that every one of them should be answered." 

In early June, on the day that Israel attacked Egypt, the president 
received this urgent message from Rostow: "Arthur Krim reports that 
many armed shipments are packed and ready to go to Israel, but are 
being held up. He thinks it would be most helpful if these could be 
released." 

Israel was at war, and this time the president of the United States 
would cause no problems. Aid would go forward without interruption, 
and calls for sanctions against Israel in the United Nations would face 
adamant U.S. opposition. The United States would actively support 
Israel's military endeavors. Powerful new ties with Israel would lead 
the president of the United States to cover up the facts concerning one 
of the most astonishing disasters in the history of the United States 
Navy, the Israeli attack on the USS Liberty (see chapter five), 

Saunders recalls that after the Arab-Israeli war, pro-Israeli inter- 
ests blanketed the White House with the basic demand that Israel not 
be forced to withdraw from territory it occupied until the Arab states 
agreed to a "just and lasting peace" with Israel. Under this demand, 
Israel could use occupied Arab territory as a bargaining "chip" in seek- 
ing Arab recognition, an option that President Eisenhower refused to 
permit Israel to use after the Suez crisis in 1957. 

Saunders adds, "This Israeli demand was accepted by President 
Johnson without discussion in the National Security Council or other 
policy institutions. It has had a profound impact on the course of 
events in the Middle East since that time." According to another high 
official of that period, the policy was adopted because the lobby suc- 
ceeded in "pervading the very atmosphere of the White House." 

Nixon's Order Ignored 

Although Johnson's successor, Richard M. Nixon, came to office 
with little Jewish help, he supported Israel so heavily in his first term as 
president that in 1972 re-election campaign Israel's ambassador to 
Washington, Yitzhak Rabin, openly campaigned for him. Nixon won 
35 percent of the Jewish vote in 1972, up 20 points from four years 
before. 

In 1973 he came powerfully to Israel's defense when Arab states 
tried to recover territory seized in 1967 by the Israelis. During the 



122 They Dare to Speak Out 

conflict, the weapons and supplies Nixon ordered airlifted to Israel 
proved to be Israel's lifeline. His decision to order forces on a high 
state of alert worldwide may have kept the Soviet Union from under- 
taking a larger role. 

Privately, Nixon criticized Israel for failing to cooperate in a com- 
prehensive settlement of issues with its Arab neighbors. On several 
occasions, he ordered Henry Kissinger, national security adviser and 
later secretary of state, to suspend aid to Israel until it became more 
cooperative. Three days before he resigned the presidency, Nixon in- 
structed Kissinger to disapprove an Israeli request for "long-term mili- 
tary assistance." Kissinger writes in his memoirs: "He would cut off all 
military deliveries to Israel until it agreed to a comprehensive peace. 
He regretted not having done so earlier; he would make up for it now. 
His successor would thank him for it. I should prepare the necessary 
papers." Kissinger adds that Nixon did not return to the subject. Al- 
though "the relevant papers were prepared," according to Kissinger, 
they were "never signed." Nor did Kissinger see fit to carry out the 
orders. (In July 1984, Nixon verified the Kissinger account, saying it 
was accurate and adding that he "still believes that aid to Israel should 
be tied to cooperation in a comprehensive settlement.") 

Assuming the presidency in 1975, Ford took no action on the cut- 
off papers prepared for Nixon, but confronted Rabin, who by then had 
become the Israeli prime minister, over the same comprehensive peace 
settlement issue. In an effort to elicit greater Israeli cooperation, Ford 
announced in 1975 that he would "reassess" U.S. policy in the Middle 
East (see chapter three). Under lobby-organized pressure from the 
Senate, Ford dropped the reassessment, but this retreat did not win 
him votes when he sought a full term as president the next year. In 
1976, 68 percent of the Jewish vote went to Democrat Jimmy Carter. 

Uncritical Support Is No Favor to Israel 

During the period between Carter's election in 1976 and his inau- 
guration in January 1977, the Israeli lobby played a role in his decision 
on who would manage foreign policy. Carter decided to nominate as 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, a man of decency and fairness and 
possessing the right impulses on Middle East policy, but in doing so he 
passed over George W. Ball, a man who had all these same important 
qualities but who also possessed the experience, personal force and 
worldwide prestige Carter would need in upcoming crises in the Middle 
East and elsewhere. 

When I visited him at his Princeton, N.J., residence during the 
summer of 1983 — seeking background facts on this period — Ball was 



The Lobby and the Oval Office 123 

well into writing his fourth major book. I found him at the end of a 
narrow corridor lined with cartoons and photographs of the political 
past, in a large high-ceilinged room bustling with the activity of a city 
newsroom just before presstime. Once a private art gallery, it is now 
filled with computers, papers, books and busy people. 

At the center of it all, pecking away at a word processor keyboard 
and surrounded by papers stacked high on a U-shaped table sat the 
former deputy secretary of state under two presidents, former U.S. am- 
bassador to the United Nations, and former executive with one of 
Manhattan's largest investment banking firms. At 73, he was still busy 
trying to bring order out of a world in disarray. The Manchester Guar- 
dian characterized him as "an idealist facing chaos with dignity." 

I was armed with questions. What price had Ball paid for speaking 
out on Middle East issues? Had it hurt his law practice, spoiled his 
chances to serve in higher office? Ball took time to talk, but he was 
busy. He had just addressed the cadets at West Point and was midway 
in preparing an editorial piece for the Washington Post in which he 
would warn the Reagan administration of immense pitfalls ahead in its 
Lebanese policy. He was one of my heroes, especially for his courage 
on Vietnam policy, and I admired his brilliance as a writer. Eloquent 
and witty, he reminded me more of his colleague in the Johnson admin- 
istration, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk, but their views on 
Vietnam were sharply at odds, 

"I'll be with you in a minute," Ball said, glancing up from the 
keyboard. He gave the computer keys a few more whacks, stood up, 
whipped out a diskette and told his assistant, Lee Hurford, "Print it 
all." His six-foot two-inch frame exuded confidence and power. Mak- 
ing his way through the array of books and papers, he explained, "I'm 
addicted to this machine. I would never go back to a typewriter. I quit 
commuting to Manhattan," he added, gesturing down the corridor, 
"because I can slip down here evenings if I have some ideas to put 
down." 

Put them down he has. Over the years many diplomats have firmly 
criticized Israeli policies, but most have confined their advice to pri- 
vate circles. Those who have spoken out publicly usually have done so 
in muted tones. Close friends doubt that Ball has any muted tones. He 
has never pulled any punches. But while on government assignments 
Ball dutifully kept his advice private. 

Ball has paid a price for such candor on Israeli policy. He was one 
of only three people considered for appointment as secretary of state 
under President Carter, and except for his outspoken views on Middle 
East affairs, his nomination would have seemed inevitable. 

His political and professional credentials were immaculate. A 



124 They Dare to Speak Out 

lifelong Democrat, he twice campaigned vigorously for Adlai E. 
Stevenson for president. In 1959 he became a supporter of John F. 
Kennedy's presidential ambitions. His diplomatic experience and pres- 
tige were diverse and unmatched. He had served as number two man in 
the State Department under Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon 
Johnson. In those assignments he dealt intimately with the Cuban mis- 
sile crisis and most other major issues in foreign policy for six years. 
He took the job as ambassador to the U.N., a job he did not want, 
because, in his words, "L.B.J, had surrounded me." 

Ball challenged military policies forcefully within administration 
circles. On a proposed policy question Johnson would frequently go 
around the cabinet room for advice, then say, "Now let's hear what 
Ball has to say against it." 

Ball consistently argued against the buildup in Vietnam. The 
Washington Post described him as "the consistent dove in a hawkish 
administration." Journalist Walter Lippman, a close friend, urged him 
to resign in protest: "Feeling as you do, you should resign and make 
your opposition public." Ball declined, believing it important that criti- 
cism of the war be heard directly from within the administration, 
though Johnson usually rejected his advice. 

Ball was one of America's best-known and most admired diplo- 
mats, but he probably spiked his prospects of becoming Carter's secre- 
tary of state when he wrote an article entitled "The Coming Crisis in 
Israeli-American Relations" for the Winter 1975/76 issue of Foreign 
Affairs quarterly. It provoked a storm of protest from the Jewish com- 
munity. 

In the article, Ball cited President Eisenhower's demand that Is- 
rael withdraw from the Sinai as "the last time the United States ever 
took, and persisted in, forceful action against the strong wishes of an 
Israeli government." He saw the event as as watershed. "American 
Jewish leaders thereafter set out to build one of Washington's most 
effective lobbies, which now works in close cooperation with the Is- 
raeli embassy." 

He lamented the routine leakage of classified information: 
Not only do Israel's American supporters have powerful influence with many 
members of the Congress, but practically no actions touching Israel's interests 
can be taken, or even discussed, within the executive branch without it being 
quickly known to the Israeli government. 

He bemoaned Israel's rejection of U.S. advice at a time when Israel's 
dependence on U.S. aid had "reached the point of totality." 

Yet he was not surprised that Israel pursued an independent 
course: 



The Lobby and the Oval Office 125 

Israelis have been so long conditioned to expect that Americans will support 
their country, no matter how often it disregards American advice and protests 
and America's own interests. 

Despite such sharp criticism, candidate Carter for a time con- 
sidered Ball his principal foreign policy adviser and selected him as one 
of three finalists for secretary of state when, as the president-elect, he 
took up the process of selecting his cabinet. The other two finalists 
were Paul Warnke, former assistant secretary of defense and, of 
course, Cyrus Vance. 

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser, wrote in 
his book Power and Principle that Ball was his preference for secre- 
tary of state during the period preceding election day although he later 
shifted to Vance. Asked for his views during the postelection process 
at Plains, Georgia, Brzezinski told Carter that Ball would be "a strong 
conceptualizer but probably a poor organizer, an assertive individual 
but probably somewhat handicapped by his controversial position on 
the Middle East." He said Ball's appointment as secretary of state 
would be received "extremely well in Western Europe and Japan, 
probably somewhat less so in the developing countries, and negatively 
in Israel." 

A number of Jewish leaders urged Carter not to name Ball to any 
significant role in his administration. The characteristic which made 
Ball unacceptable to the Israeli lobby was his candor; he wasn't afraid 
to speak up and criticize Israeli policy. Carter dropped Ball from con- 
sideration. 

With Carter's cabinet selection process completed, Ball continued 
to speak out. Early in 1977 he wrote another article in Foreign Affairs, 
"How to Save Israel in Spite of Herself," urging the new administra- 
tion to take the lead in formulating a comprehensive settlement that 
would be fair to the Palestinians as well as Israel. For a time Carter 
moved in this direction, even trying to communicate with the Palestine 
Liberation Organization through Saudi Arabia. When this approach 
floundered, Carter shifted his focus on attempting to reach a settlement 
between Egypt and Israel at Camp David, where Ball believes Carter 
was double-crossed by Begin. "I talked with Carter just before Camp 
David. We had a long dinner together. He told me he was going to try to 
get a full settlement on Middle East issues, and he seemed to under- 
stand the significance of the Palestinian issue. On this I have no doubt, 
and I think he desperately wanted to settle it." After Camp David, 
Israel frustrated Carter's goals, continuing to build settlements in oc- 
cupied territory and blocking progress toward autonomy for Palestin- 
ians in the West Bank. 



126 They Dare to Speak Out 

Although not a part of the Carter Administration, Ball continued 
to be an all-time favorite on television interview shows. One of these 
appearances led to a public exchange with a Jewish leader. On a panel 
interview in late 1977 Ball said he felt the Jewish community in the 
United States had put United States interests "rather secondary in 
many cases." 

To Morris B. Abram, Manhattan lawyer and former president of 
the American Jewish Committee, these were fighting words. Enlisted 
the year before in support of the effort to make Ball the secretary of 
state, Abram wrote him a public letter, published in the Washington 
Post, charging that these comments established Ball "as one who is 
willing to accept and spread age-old calumnies about Jews." 

Responding in the Washington Post, Ball denied that he was sug- 
gesting that "even the most ardent Zionist consciously choose Israel 
over America." He explained, "I suggest rather that the effect of their 
uncritical encouragement of Israel's most excessive actions is not 
wholly consistent with the United States' interests." His correspon- 
dence with Abram was published in the Washington Post. Ball con- 
cluded, 

When leading members of the American Jewish community give [Israel's] 
government uncritical and unqualified approbation and encouragement for 
whatever it chooses to do, while striving so far as possible to overwhelm any 
criticism of its actions in Congress and in the public media, they are, in my 
view, doing neither themselves nor the United States a favor. 

During the Reagan administration, Ball became one of the few 
Democrats trying to take his party back to the Middle East morality of 
Eisenhower. Of Reagan, he said, 

He did not demand, as he should have done under the law, that we would exact 
the penalties provided unless the Israelis stopped murdering civilians with the 
weapons we had provided them solely for self-defense. Instead he bought them 
off by committing our own Marines to maintain order while we persuaded the 
PLO leaders to leave rather than face martyrdom. 

Ball did not let his business career, any more than his public 
career, soften his public expressions. He admitted that his plain talk 
about the Middle East "certainly hasn't helped" his business career: 

I'm sure that my partners at Lehman Brothers had to absorb a certain amount 
of punishment. But they were tolerant and understanding people. I never felt I 
lost anything very much by speaking out. I'm politically untouchable, but I am 
sure certain groups would rather shoot me than deal with me. 

While never shot at for his views, his encounters with the Israeli 
lobby were numerous and began early in his career. He recalls the day, 



The Lobby and the Oval Office \T1 

during the 1952 presidential race, when a pro-Israel emissary visited 
Adlai Stevenson's presidential campaign headquarters in Springfield, 
Illinois. The emissary told Ball that his friends had gathered a "lot of 
money" but wanted to "discuss the Israeli question" before turning it 
over. Ball says Stevenson met with the group — "He met with any 
group" — but he "never made any of the promises expected." 

In more recent presidential campaigns, Ball experienced lobby 
pressure of a different kind. In early 1979, impressed with the early 
pronouncements of John B. Anderson, Ball announced that he planned 
to vote for the maverick Republican who was running for president as 
an independent. Upon hearing the news, an elated Anderson called 
Ball and promised to visit him at Princeton "soon." Anderson changed 
his mind. He never came. Convinced by his campaign staff that he had 
to cultivate the pro-Israeli community if he hoped to make progress as 
a candidate, Anderson made a ritual visit to Israel. He issued state- 
ments fully supporting Israel. He shunned Ball. 

The elder statesman had a similar experience in 1983. After testify- 
ing to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee one morning, Ball was 
approached by Senator John Glenn, who was already testing the presi- 
dential waters. Glenn invited Ball to call because he wanted his advice 
on foreign policy issues. After trying unsuccessfully to get calls 
through, Ball wrote him. He stated his willingness to help Glenn set up 
a panel of scholars and former diplomats who could help the candidate 
with ideas, statements and speeches during the hectic days of cam- 
paigning. Ball had done the same thing for Adlai Stevenson in 1956. 
Several weeks later a letter arrived from Glenn stating that he would 
take up the suggestions with his campaign staff. That was the end of 
Ball's relationship with Glenn. 

Despite the intimidating factors that led candidates Carter, Ander- 
son and Glenn to avoid his help, Ball feels the lobby is overrated in the 
power it can deliver. While it controls many votes in strategically im- 
portant states and provides generous financial support to candidates, 
he contends these are not the principal factors of influence. 

Ball believes the lobby's instrument of greatest power is its will- 
ingness to make broad use of the charge of anti-Semitism: "They've got 
one great thing going for them. Most people are terribly concerned not 
to be accused of being anti-Semitic, and the lobby so often equates 
criticism of Israel with anti-Semitism. They keep pounding away at 
that theme, and people are deterred from speaking out." 

In Ball's view, many Americans feel a "sense of guilt" over the 
extermination of Jews by Nazi Germany. The result of this guilt is that 
the fear of being called anti-Semitic is "much more effective in silenc- 
ing candidates and public officials than threats about campaign money 
or votes." 



128 They Dare to Speak Out 
He Was Not Consistent 

Although proceeding without the services of George Ball, Jimmy 
Carter, for a fleeting moment, gave every indication of being a presi- 
dent who would stand up to Israel and pursue policies based on U.S. 
interests in the Middle East. He came to the presidency determined to 
be fair to Arab interests, as well as Israel, and once in office even 
advocated a homeland with secure borders for the Palestinians (see 
introduction). 

While this endeavor soon faded, Carter made great strides in 
foreign policy elsewhere. In addition to organizing the Camp David 
Accords, his administration marked the consummation of the treaty 
with Panama, normalization of diplomatic relations with China, a major 
reform in international trade policy, and the initial agreement with the 
Soviet Union on strategic arms limitation, But in overall Middle East 
policy he lacked consistent purpose and commitment. 

Carter was dismayed when Jews in the United States remained 
disgruntled with his administration despite his major role in achieving a 
long-sought Israeli goal, the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. A 
senior diplomat whose career stretches back over twenty years, re- 
members the pressures Jewish groups brought to bear following the 
joint U.S.-Soviet communiqu6 of October 1977. Carter was trying to 
revive the Geneva conference on the Middle East in order to get a 
comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. The American 
Jewish community strongly objected. The diplomat recalls, "I remem- 
ber I really had my hands full meeting with protesting Jewish groups. I 
figured up one day, totaling just the people the groups said they repre- 
sented, that I must have met with representatives of half the entire U.S. 
Jewish community." 

The groups came well briefed. All, he says, used the same theme: 

What a terrible unpatriotic act it was to invite the Russians back into the 
Middle East; it was anti-Israel, almost anti-Semitic. I would spend part of my 
time meeting Jewish groups on Capitol Hill in the offices of Senators and 
Congressmen. 

Other times I would meet with groups of 20 to 40 in my conference room at 
State Department. Meanwhile Secretary of State Vance would be meeting with 
other groups, and the President with still others. 

The pressure was too much. Carter yielded to lobby pressures and 
quickly dropped the proposal. Carter also learned, like Ford before 
him, that yielding to the lobby on relations with Israel did not pay 
dividends on election day. Many Jews deserted him when he sought re- 
election in 1980. 



The Lobby and the Oval Office 129 
"They Wouldn't Give Him a Dime* 9 

The same year, the pressures of pro-Israeli activists became deci- 
sive in the fortunes of a renegade Texas Democrat who turned Repub- 
lican because he wanted to succeed Jimmy Carter as president. 

In October 1979, John Connally, who had been Democratic gover- 
nor of Texas, came to Washington to give the first major foreign policy 
speech of his campaign for the presidency. The field of Republican 
aspirants to the White House was already crowded. Although Ronald 
Reagan had not yet formally entered the race, seven other Republicans 
had announced their candidacy. 

Connally's campaign theme was "leadership for America,'* and 
television advertisements showed him the "candidate of the forgotten 
American who goes to church on Sunday." This American, Connally 
believed, was looking for leadership. His speech to the Washington 
Press Club contained a section outlining a plan to resolve the Arab- 
Israeli conflict. It was part of a campaign strategy designed to present 
the former governor of Texas and secretary of the treasury as a deci- 
sive leader capable of talking man to man with powerful foreigners. He 
had served in several cabinet positions under President Nixon. From 
this wide-ranging political experience, he should have known the sen- 
sitivity of the Arab-Israeli question. 

Several Middle East peace plans had been advanced by sitting 
presidents, but the plan Connally outlined in his speech was the most 
ambitious ever presented by a candidate for the office. He argued that 
the Carter initiative at Camp David had stalled because of failed diplo- 
matic leadership and that it was time for the United States to pursue a 
new Middle East policy, one "based not on individual Arab or Israeli 
interests, but on American interests." 

American interests demanded peace and stability in the region, 
Connally said, and this could best be achieved by a program whereby 
the Israelis withdrew from occupied Arab territories in return for Arab 
acceptance of Israeli sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Arabs 
would be obligated to "renounce forever all hostile actions toward 
Jews and give up the use of oil supply and prices to force political 
change." This would ensure an uninterrupted supply of Middle Eastern 
oil, which, Connally said, "is and will continue to be the lifeblood of 
Western civilization for decades to come." The United States would 
guarantee the stability of the region by greatly expanding its military 
presence there. 

Connally became the first prominent presidential candidate to de- 
clare his support for Palestinian self-determination. He said the Pales- 
tinians should have the option of establishing an independent state on 



130 They Dare to Speak Out 

the West Bank and Gaza or an autonomous area within Jordan. Pales- 
tinian leaders willing to work for a compromise peace settlement with 
Israel should be welcomed to discussions, he added, but "those ex- 
tremists who refuse to cooperate and continue to indulge in terrorism 
should be treated as international outlaws by the international commu- 
nity." 

Connally also suggested that future American aid be conditioned 
on Israeli willingness to adopt a more reasonable policy on the West 
Bank. Noting the strain imposed upon the Israeli economy by the need 
for constant military preparedness, he said, "Without billions of dollars 
in American economic and military aid, Israel simply could not sur- 
vive. Yet it is only candid to say that support for this level of aid, in the 
absence of greater willingness by Israeli leadership to compromise with 
their neighbors, is eroding." He criticized the Begin government's 
"policy of creeping annexation of the West Bank," quoting a group of 
American Jewish leaders who earlier in the year had denounced Israeli 
policy on the West Bank as "morally unacceptable and perilous for the 
democratic character of the Jewish state." 

Connally knew his speech would stir controversy, and indeed the 
criticism came quick and hard. Rabbi Alexander Schindler, president 
of the Union of American Hebrew Congregations, said Connally's call 
for withdrawal from the territories "is a formula for Israel's liq- 
uidation." The Washington Star quoted unnamed Israeli officials in 
Washington as calling his plan "a total surrender to blackmail by Arab 
oil-producing countries." Henry Siegman, executive director of the 
American Jewish Congress, said Connally's criticism of the Camp 
David peace process "gives encouragement to the Arab confrontation 
states who urge a violent solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is 
disappointing, although perhaps not surprising, that Mr. Connally 
should emerge as the candidate of the oil interests." Connally's cam- 
paign manager later accused the Israeli embassy of orchestrating the 
attack. 

Few news commentators praised his speech. Christian Science 
Monitor columnist Joseph C. Harsch found Connally's peace plan re- 
markable for its candor. Harsch wrote that Connally "broke with and, 
indeed, defined the pro-Israel lobby." He "said things about Israel 
which no prominent American politician has dared to say for a long 
time, with the exception of Senator J. William Fulbright." Agreeing 
that the peace plan was really nothing new, Harsch pointed out that it 
"comes out of the book of official American foreign policy as stated 
since the 1967 war." What was unusual, Harsch wrote, was that this 
policy should be articulated by a candidate for president: 



The Lobby and the Oval Office 131 

The immediate question is whether Mr. Connally can demonstrate that it is 
possible to take the official government position on Middle East policy and still 
survive in the present political climate. 

Writing in the Nation, Arthur Samuelson called Connally' s plan 
"both wrong and dangerous," but went on to say that "Connally's 
candor is praiseworthy": 

For all too long, public debate over the Middle East has been characterized by 
a marked dishonesty on the part of aspirants for public office. Rather than put 
forward how they plan to break the impasse in American-Israeli relations that 
has remained constant since 1967, they fall over one another in praise of 
Israel's virtues. 

The Washington Post called Connally's speech "a telling measure 
of how American debate on this central issue is developing": 

No previous candidate for a major party's presidential nomination has staked 
out a position so opposed to the traditional line. Mr. Connally offers no defer- 
ence to the 'Jewish lobby,' attacking the current Israeli government's policies 
head on. 

Within a few days of the speech, however, less friendly voices 
were heard. A Jewish Republican running for mayor of Philadelphia 
snubbed Connally by refusing to be photographed with him. Two Jew- 
ish members of Connally's national campaign committee resigned in 
protest. One of them, Rita Hauser, chairman of the Foreign Affairs 
Council of the American Jewish Committee, called the speech "inex- 
cusable" and said it represented "the straight Saudi line." The second, 
attorney Arthur Mason, said he was fearful that Connally's speech 
might stir anti-Semitism. 

The bad news kept coming. The New York Republican Committee 
withdrew its invitation for Connally to speak at its annual Lincoln Day 
dinner, and traditional big givers boycotted a fundraiser in New York 
that was to feature Connally. The Washington Post quoted an unnamed 
source who said the speech had robbed Connally of support which his 
pro-business positions had won among some Jews: "Now they 
wouldn't give him a dime." 

Certainly the Connally candidacy suffered problems unrelated to 
his positions on the Middle East. The campaign experienced organiza- 
tional difficulties, the forceful Texan came across to some as too "hot" 
on the "cool" medium of television, and he was undoubtedly hurt by 
his switch from the Democratic to the Republican party in 1973. 

But Winton Blount, Connally's campaign chairman, believes that 



132 They Dare to Speak Out 

none of these factors equalled the "devastating" effect of the contro- 
versial speech. Connally himself says there is "no question" that the 
speech hurt. Columnist William Safire, an admirer of Connally but also 
a pro-Israeli hard-liner, made a pained assessment of the speech's ef- 
fect on the presidential race: 

Supporters of Israel — along with many others concerned with noisy U.S. 
weakness in the face of Soviet military and Arab economic threats — made a 
reassessment of Ronald Reagan and decided he looked ten years younger. 



Succumbing to Israeli Dictates 

In 1984, it was no contest at all on the Republican side of the 
presidential race, either for the nomination or in respect to policy 
toward Israel. Ronald Reagan had the field to himself and was not 
about to risk a confrontation like the one fatal to the candidacy of John 
Connally four years before. 

In late 1983, certain to be a candidate for re-election, Reagan was 
in a position to deliver, not just promise. He had encountered Israeli 
pressures in opposition to his September 1982 peace plan and his delay 
in delivering fighter aircraft in the wake of Israel's bombing of the Iraq 
nuclear plant. But he had avoided a major showdown with Israel, and, 
beginning in 1983, Reagan went all-out for the Jewish vote, pandering 
to the Israeli lobby while trying to keep the Middle East crisis on hold 
until after the election. 

Polls showed the need for repair work. In 1980 Reagan had re- 
ceived 40 percent of the Jewish vote — the largest ever by a Repub- 
lican—but half of this support had since drifted away. In April 1983 
Albert A. Spiegel, a longtime Reagan supporter, had quit as a special 
adviser to Reagan on Jewish affairs. Spiegel was upset over a news- 
paper story which said Reagan intended to press his Middle East peace 
plan despite Jewish opposition and felt he could be re-elected without 
Jewish votes. 

In December Reagan launched a broad bid for Jewish support. The 
first action was upgrading the position of White House liaison with the 
Jewish community, but his changes on the policy front were even more 
significant. After meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir 
in December 1983, Reagan announced a dramatic increase in the level 
of aid. Instead of the old formula, under which Israel was required to 
pay back some of the funds advanced, the administration requested 
that in the future all aid be in the form of a grant. In addition, in a 
gesture to Israel's sagging industry, he agreed that $250 million in U.S. 
aid funds could be spent in Israel to help finance the manufacture of a 



The Lobby and the Oval Office 133 

new Israeli warplane. United States aircraft firms were dismayed, be- 
cause they receive no similar government aid. (See chapter two.) 

Reagan proposed a new higher level of "strategic cooperation*' in 
the military field and a free trade relationship which would make Israel 
the only nation with tariff-free access to both the European community 
and the United States. 

All of this won applause from the Israeli lobby. Near East Report, 
the AIPAC newsletter, declared editorially: "[Reagan] has earned the 
gratitude of all supporters of a strong U.S.-Israel relationship." 

In March, Reagan made further concessions to the lobby. He re- 
fused to intercede with Israel at the request of King Hussein of Jordan, 
whom he had been pressing to join the peace process. Aiming both to 
strengthen Yasser Arafat against more radical elements within the 
Palestine Liberation Organization, and to improve his own influence 
over the Palestinian cause, Hussein asked the president for help. He 
wanted Reagan to press Israel to permit Palestinians living on the West 
Bank and Gaza to attend the upcoming session of the Palestine Na- 
tional Council. In another message, Hussein asked the United States to 
support a U.N. resolution declaring illegal the settlements Israel has 
built in Arab territory it occupies, a position maintained for years by 
previous presidents. Reagan rejected both requests. Hussein told a 
reporter for the New York Times that "the United States is succumbing 
to Israeli dictates," and he saw no hope for future improvement. 

The leading contenders for the Democratic nomination, like 
Reagan, never missed an opportunity to pledge allegiance to Israel. 



"Conscience of the Democrats" 

The 1984 presidential contest often focused on the competition 
between former Vice-President Walter Mondale and Senator Gary 
Hart on the question of who was more loyal to Israel. Mondale accused 
Hart of being weak in supporting the removal of the U.S. embassy from 
Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Hart accused Mondale of trying to "intimidate 
and coerce Israel into taking unacceptable risks" while he was vice- 
president under President Carter. 

Actually, Mondale was the principal pro-Israel force within the 
Carter Administration. During the 1980 campaign he responded to 
lobby pressure by helping to engineer a diplomatic maneuver that 
proved costly to the United States. When Donald McHenry, the U.S. 
ambassador to the United Nations, cast a vote March 1 rebuking Israel 
publicly for its settlements policy — the first such rebuke of an Israeli 
action since the Eisenhower administration— Jewish circles were furi- 



134 They Dare to Speak Out 

ous, and so was Mondale. McHenry's vote supported a resolution 
which offended the pro-Israel lobby on two points: it was critical of 
Israeli settlements on the West Bank, and it referred to East Jerusalem 
as "occupied territory." 

Mondale organized an immediate counterattack within White 
House circles. He persuaded Carter that the State Department had 
wrongly advised him. Late in the evening of the controversial vote the 
White House announced a "failure in communications" between Wash- 
ington and New York. It explained that McHenry had misunderstood 
his instructions and should have abstained. Three days later, Secretary 
of State Cyrus Vance personally took the blame for the "failure." Few 
believed him. 

Both the nation and the Carter-Mondale ticket would have been 
better off if Carter had ignored Mondale's demand for a vote reversal. 
For Carter the episode was an unrelieved diplomatic disaster. Arabs 
were outraged at what they viewed as a shameless withdrawal in the 
face of Jewish pressure. American Jews, urged to action by Israeli 
Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, doubted the honesty of the explanation 
and felt betrayed. Sharon told Jews in New York, "I do not like to 
interfere with internal United States affairs, but the question of Israeli 
security is a question for Jews anywhere in the world." To the world, 
the administration appeared out of control. 

Senator Edward Kennedy was the main beneficiary of Carter's 
embarrassment. Calling the U.N. vote a "betrayal" of Israel, he won 
the Massachusetts primary 2-to-l over Carter and also carried New 
York and Connecticut, where earlier polls had shown Carter ahead. In 
New York, Jews voted 4-to-l for Kennedy. A member of the Israeli 
parliament said: "The American Jewish community showed itself to 
have the leverage to swing a vote over the issue of whether the presi- 
dent is good to Israel." 

Mondale's measures did not placate the Jewish vote. In November 
Carter-Mondale became the first Democratic presidential ticket that 
failed to win a majority of the Jewish votes cast, exit polls showing it 
receiving, at the most, 47 percent. 

After losing on the Carter ticket to Reagan-Bush, Mondale de- 
voted himself full-time to campaigning for the presidency, with uncrit- 
ical support of Israel becoming a principal plank in his platform. Early 
in the campaign, he dismissed the idea that Saudi Arabia would "be- 
come a strong assertive force for moderation" and urged the pre- 
positioning of high-technology U.S. military equipment in the custody 
of Israeli "technicians, an arrangement that would eliminate any possi- 
bility that the equipment could be used for purposes independent of 
Israeli wishes." 



The Lobby and the Oval Office 135 

Later, Mondale and his campaign team carefully avoided any rela- 
tionship with Arab interests, or even Arab American interests. In June 
1984, this zeal led Thomas Rosenberg, Mondale's finance director in 
Illinois, to return five $1,000 checks to Chicagoans of Arab ancestry 
who had presented them as campaign donations. He explained that 
some of the comments they had made in a personal meeting with Mon- 
dale amounted to "an anti-Israeli, anti-Semitic diatribe," but one of the 
five, Albert Joseph, a lifelong Democrat and owner of Hunter Publish- 
ing company, denied the accusation, recalling, "We passed 45 minutes 
with [Mondale] in the utmost friendliness and respect." 

Joseph said that when the checks were returned he was informed 
by Joseph Gomez, at the time a member of the Mondale finance com- 
mittee in Illinois, that Mondale's organization had decided to "take no 
more money from Arab Americans in the future." The Chicago pub- 
lisher said he felt "insulted, betrayed and shocked." He told a reporter 
that Mondale was "disenfranchising a whole group of Americans." 
Upset by the decision to return the funds, Gomez, a Chicago banker 
and Hispanic leader, withdrew from the Mondale campaign. Gomez 
said the Mondale campaign decision confirmed his view that "people of 
Arab ancestry are the most persecuted group in America today." 

Candidate Gary Hart's record of support for Israel was as unblem- 
ished as Mondale's, and his campaign organization displayed a similar 
indifference to Arab American sensibilities. Upon learning that the 
First American Bank in Washington — where he had done personal 
banking for years — had been purchased by a group of Middle East 
investors in 1982, Hart immediately closed out a campaign loan of 
$700,000 and severed all ties with the bank. His special counsel ex- 
plained, "We didn't know it was an Arab bank. We got [Hart] out of it 
as soon as we knew." Hart's competitor for the nomination, Jesse 
Jackson, denounced the act as a "serious act of racism." 

As a Senator, Hart voted for every pro-Israeli measure, opposed 
every initiative intended to provide arms to Arab states, and put his 
signature on every major letter and resolution helpful to the Israeli 
cause. When a few colleagues, like Senator John Glenn, condemned 
Israel's raid on the Iraqi nuclear installation, he deplored the condem- 
nation. 

Senators Ernest Hollings of South Carolina and Alan Cranston of 
California and former Florida governor Reuben Askew — early drop- 
outs in the Democratic competition — were similarly uncritical in their 
support of Israel. So was Senator John Glenn of Ohio, who had been 
expected by many observers to take a middle road position on Mideast 
policy. In the past he had criticized Israeli military actions, supported 
the sale of F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia, and even suggested talks with 



136 They Dare to Speak Out 

the PLO: "I don't think we should reject talking with the PLO. . . . 
PLO terrorism is not unique in that area." 

Bitten by the presidential bug, Glenn shifted ground in 1983, effec- 
tively ruling out such talks and excusing his vote for F-15 sale on the 
grounds that Saudi Arabia would otherwise have bought planes from 
France with "no strings attached." 

In a speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New York, Glenn 
went much further, saying that the United States should recognize 
Jerusalem as the official capital of Israel once the terms of Camp David 
are completed or if negotiations break down completely. He charac- 
terized the PLO as "little more than a gang of thugs" and said the 
biggest obstacle to peace in the Middle East was Arab refusal to accept 
the legitimacy of Israel. 

Although the speech did not allay Jewish suspicion, it cost him the 
support of citizens who felt the next president must respond to Arab as 
well as Israeli concerns. One of Glenn's closest colleagues, an Ohio 
Congressman, reacted with alarm and distress: "Glenn caved in, and 
he didn't have to do it. I was so demoralized by that statement I 
delayed making some calls to labor people in his behalf." The speech 
caused a veteran diplomat of the Johnson administration, former Am- 
bassador Lucius Battle, to refuse to serve as a Glenn foreign policy 
adviser. 

Only two candidates spoke up for a balanced policy in the Middle 
East: black civil rights activist Jesse L. Jackson and George 
McGovern, the 1972 Democratic presidential nominee. McGovera 
called for the creation of an independent Palestinian state and criticized 
Israeli military and settlement actions. His proposals were even more 
precise than those that brought John Connally's campaign to an end 
four years before. 

In a speech at a Massachusetts synagogue in February, McGovern 
asked, "Is it not both bad politics and bad ethics to brand as anti-Israel 
an American politician who is willing to apply the same critical stan- 
dards to Israeli policies that are applied to United States policies?" 
McGovern said that even though during his 22 years in Congress he 
had voted "100 percent" for measures providing economic and military 
aid to Israel, he nevertheless opposed Israel's invasion of Lebanon: "I 
don't think one sovereign nation has the right to invade another." 

Neither McGovera nor Jackson had a serious prospect for nomi- 
nation. In different ways, each presented himself in the role of "party 
conscience." The "Super TUesday" primaries in March eliminated 
McGovern, and only Jackson's conscience remained in the campaign. 

Jackson became controversial with U.S. Jews four years before 
his presidential bid when he carried his human rights activism abroad 



The Lobby and the Oval Office 1 37 

to Lebanon and there met PLO leader Yasser Arafat. Until then the 
former disciple of the Reverend Martin Luther King had worked 
mainly for black rights through his organization, People United to Save 
Humanity (PUSH), a Chicago-based group that received substantial 
Jewish financial support. In Lebanon, he came face-to-face with the 
misery of Palestinians, describing them as "the niggers of the Middle 
East." 

Early in 1983, Jackson began traveling the country as a "non- 
candidate" but already drumming up interest in a "rainbow coalition" 
of interest groups. At a time when prospective candidates often try to 
blur controversial statements made in the past, Jackson reiterated his 
recommendation that the United States open a dialogue with the Pales- 
tine Liberation Organization. In a statement over New York television 
he said the United States can best help Israel by supporting the crea- 
tion of a Palestinian homeland. Until that happens, he said, Palestin- 
ians will engage in "more acts of terrorism, more acts of desperation." 
He urged direct U.S. talks with the PLO to get the peace process 
moving, but he said our diplomats cannot even discuss this option, 
because "intimidation is so great" in the United States. These state- 
ments put him at odds with most Jewish leaders. 

By the time he became a candidate in October 1983, Washington 
Post editorial editor Meg Greenfield called Jackson one of the nation's 
two greatest political orators (sharing the honor with President 
Reagan). He immediately enlivened the political scene by flying to 
Syria where he negotiated the release of a U.S. Navy pilot held captive 
there. He proclaimed, "The temperature has been lowered somewhat 
between Syria and America. The cycle of pain has been broken." 

In the critical primaries beginning in March, he received impres- 
sive support in Illinois, New York and Pennsylvania, as well as south- 
ern states. In televised debates with Mondale and Hart, Jackson called 
for compassion in dealing with all people in the Middle East and re- 
jected the "terrorist" labels so often attached to all Palestinians. While 
Mondale and Hart rejected Jackson's plea for a comprehensive Middle 
East peace involving a Palestinian homeland in the West Bank, the 
exchange was moderate in terms and expression, the first time that 
Palestinian rights had been discussed with civility in a presidential 
campaign. 

Jackson found himself on the defensive when a reporter disclosed 
that in private conversation he had referred to Jews as "Hymies" and 
New York as "Hymietown," a slip that led many to charge him with 
being anti-Semitic. He was encumbered by the endorsement of contro- 
versial black leader Louis Farrakhan, who called Judaism a "dirty reli- 
gion" and Hitler a "wickedly great man." Inspired by attacks from 



138 They Dare to Speak Out 

Jewish leaders, the press never let up in pressing him concerning alle- 
gations of anti-Semitism and his relationship with Farrakhan. Even in 
his press conference in Cuba, where his endeavors brought the release 
of several U.S. citizens, the anti-Semitic theme dominated the ques- 
tioning. In advance of the Democratic convention, the American Jew- 
ish Committee organized a campaign to keep Jackson from attaining 
prominence in the campaign of the expected nominee, Walter Mon- 
dale. 

Despite these problems, he rallied support broadly enough to re- 
main a major factor through the convention. 

While no one expected Jackson to be on the presidential ticket, he 
emerged a winner even before the convention. He proved that a black 
man could be a credible candidate for the nation's highest office, even 
while supporting positions strongly opposed by the Israeli lobby. In 
doing so, he lifted the self-esteem of two ethnic groups often abused or 
neglected in U.S. society: blacks and Arab Americans. 

The winner of the presidential sweepstakes, Ronald Reagan, was 
left to wonder if his heroic endeavors for Israel had paid off at the polls. 
He received 31 percent of the Jewish vote, down from the 40 percent 
he received in 1980. 



Chapter 5 



Penetrating the Defenses at Defense — and 
State 



The Pentagon, that enormous, sprawling building on the banks of the 
Potomac, houses most of the Department of Defense's central head- 
quarters. It is the top command for the forces and measures which 
provide Americans with security in a troubled world. Across the 
Potomac is the Department of State, a massive eight-story building on 
Washington's Foggy Bottom, the nerve center of our nation's 
worldwide diplomatic network. These buildings are channels through 
which flow each day thousands of messages dealing with the nation's 
top secrets. No one can enter either building without special 
identification or advance clearance. Armed guards seem to be 
everywhere, and in late 1983 concrete emplacements were added and 
heavy trucks strategically parked to provide extra buffers if a fanatic 
should launch an attack. These buildings are fortresses where the na- 
tion's most precious secrets are carefully guarded by the most ad- 
vanced technology. 

But how secure are the secrets? 

"The leaks to Israel are fantastic. If I have something I want the 
secretary of state to know but don't want Israel to know, I must wait 
till I have a chance to see him personally." 

This declaration comes from an ambassador still on active duty in 
a top assignment, reviewing his long career in numerous posts in the 
Middle East. Although hardly a household name in the United States, 
his is one of America's best-known abroad. Interviewed in the State 
Department, he speaks deliberately, choosing his words carefully. 

"It is a fact of life that everyone in authority is reluctant to put 
anything on paper that concerns Israel if it is to be withheld from 
Israel's knowledge," says the veteran. "Nor do such people even feel 
free to speak in a crowded room of such things." 

139 



140 They Dare to Speak Out 

The diplomat offers an example from his own experience. "I re- 
ceived a call from a friend of mine in the Jewish community who 
wanted to warn me, as a friend, that all details of a lengthy document 
on Middle East policy that I had just dispatched overseas were 'out.' " 
The document was classified "top secret," the diplomat recalls. "I 
didn't believe what he said, so my friend read me every word of it over 
the phone." 

His comments will upset pro-Israel activists, many of whom con- 
tend that both the State Department and Defense Departments are 
dominated by anti-Israeli "Arabists." Such domination, if it ever existed, 
occurs no longer. In the view of my diplomat source, leaks to pro- 
Israeli activists are not only pervasive throughout the two departments 
but "are intimidating and very harmful to our national interest." He 
says that because of "the ever-present Xerox machine" diplomats pro- 
ceed on the assumption that even messages they send by the most 
secure means will be copied and passed on to eager hands. "We just 
don't dare put sensitive items on paper." A factor making the pervasive 
insecurity even greater is the knowledge that leaks of secrets to Israel, 
even when noticed — which is rare — are never investigated. 

Whatever intelligence the Israelis want, whether political or tech- 
nical, they obtain promptly and without cost at the source. Officials 
who normally would work vigilantly to protect our national interest by 
identifying leaks and bringing charges against the offenders are de- 
moralized. In fact, they are disinclined even to question Israel's tactics 
for fear this activity will cause the Israeli lobby to mark them as 
trouble-makers and take measures to nullify their efforts, or even harm 
their careers. 

The lobby's intelligence network, having numerous volunteer 
"friendlies" to tap, reaches all parts of the executive branch where 
matters concerning Israel are handled. Awareness of this seepage 
keeps officials — whatever rung of the ladder they occupy — from mak- 
ing or even proposing decisions that are in the U.S. interest. 

If, for example, an official should state opposition to an Israeli 
request during a private interdepartmental meeting — or worse still, 
put it in an intraoffice memorandum — he or she must assume that this 
information will soon reach the Israeli embassy, either directly or 
through AIPAC. Soon after, the official should expect to be mentioned 
by name critically when the Israeli ambassador visits the secretary of 
state or other prominent U.S. official. 

The penetration is all the more remarkable because much of it is 
carried out by U.S. citizens in behalf of a foreign government. The 
practical effect is to give Israel its own network of sources through 
which it is able to learn almost anything it wishes about decisions or 



Penetrating the Defenses at Defense— and State 141 

resources of the U.S. government. When making procurement de- 
mands, Israel can display better knowledge of Defense Department 
inventories than the Pentagon itself. 



Israel Finds the Ammunition— in Hawaii! 

In its 1973 Yom Kippur war against Egypt and Syria, Israel sus- 
tained heavy losses in weapons of all kinds, especially tanks. It looked 
to the United States for the quickest possible resupply. Henry Kiss- 
inger was their avenue. Richard Nixon was entangled in the Watergate 
controversy and soon to leave the presidency, but under his authority 
the government agreed to deliver substantial quantities of tanks to 
Israel. 

Tanks were to be taken from the inventory of U.S. military units 
on active duty, reserve units, even straight off production lines. Noth- 
ing was held back in the effort to bring Israeli forces back to desired 
strength as quickly as possible. 

Israel wanted only the latest-model tanks equipped with 105 mil- 
limeter guns. But a sufficient number could not be found even by 
stripping U.S. forces. The Pentagon met the problem by filling part of 
the order with an earlier model fitted with 90-millimeter guns. When 
these arrived, the Israelis grumbled about having to take "second-hand 
junk." Then they discovered they had no ammunition of the right size 
and sent an urgent appeal for a supply of 90-millimeter rounds. 

The Pentagon made a search and found none. Thomas Pianka, an 
officer then serving at the Pentagon with the International Security 
Agency, recalls: "We made an honest effort to find the ammunition. We 
checked everywhere. We checked through all the services — Army, 
Navy, Marines. We couldn't find any 90-millimeter ammunition at all." 
Pianka says the Pentagon sent Israel the bad news: "In so many words, 
we said: 'Sorry, we don't have any of the ammunition you need. We've 
combed all depots and warehouses, and we simply have none.' " 

A few days later the Israelis came back with a surprising message: 
"Yes, you do. There are 15,000 rounds in the Marine Corps supply 
depot in Hawaii." Pianka recalls, "We looked in Hawaii and, sure 
enough, there they were. The Israelis had found a U.S. supply of 90- 
millimeter ammunition we couldn't find ourselves." 

Richard Helms, director of the CIA during the 1967 Arab-Israel 
war, recalls an occasion when an Israeli arms request had been filled 
with the wrong items. Israeli officials resubmitted the request complete 
with all the supposedly top-secret code numbers and a note to Helms 
that said the Pentagon perhaps had not understood exactly which items 
were needed "It was a way for them to show me that they knew 



142 They Dare to Speak Out 

exactly what they wanted," Helms says. Helms believes that during 
this period no important secret was kept from Israel. 

Not only are the Israelis adept at getting the information they 
want — they are masters at the weapons procurement game. Les Janka, 
a former deputy assistant secretary of defense who is a specialist in 
Middle East policy, recalls Israeli persistence: 

They would never take no for an answer. They never gave up. These emissaries 
of a foreign government always had a shopping list of wanted military items, 
some of them high technology that no other nation possessed, some of it secret 
devices that gave the United States an edge over any adversary. Such items 
were not for sale, not even to the nations with whom we have our closest, most 
formal military alliance — like those linked to us through the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. 

Yet Janka learned that military sales to Israel were not bound by 
the guidelines and limitations which govern U.S. arms supply policy 
elsewhere. He says, "Sales to Israel were different. Very different." 

Janka has vivid memories of a military liaison officer from the 
Israeli embassy who called at the Defense Department and requested 
approval to purchase a military item which was on the prohibited list 
because of its highly secret advanced technology: "He came to me, and 
I gave him the official Pentagon reply. I said, Tm sorry, sir, but the 
answer is no. We will not release that technology.' " 

The Israeli officer took pains to observe the bureaucratic cour- 
tesies and not antagonize lower officials who might devise ways to 
block the sale. He said, "Thank you very much, if that's your official 
position. We understand that you are not in a position to do what we 
want done. Please don't feel bad, but we're going over your head." 
And that of course meant he was going to Janka' s superiors in the 
office of the secretary of defense, or perhaps even to the White 
House. 

Asked if he could remember an instance in which Israel failed to 
get what it wanted from the Pentagon, Janka pauses to reflect, then 
answers, "No, not in the long run." 

Janka has high respect for the efficiency of Israeli procurement 
officers: 

You have to understand that the Israelis operate in the Pentagon very profes- 
sionally, and in an omnipresent way. They have enough of their people who 
understand our system well, and they have made friends at all levels, from top 
to bottom. They just interact with the system in a constant, continuous way 
that keeps the pressure on. 

The Carter White House tried to establish a policy of restraint. 
Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's assistant for national security, remem- 



Penetrating the Defenses at Defense— and State 143 

bers in an interview Defense Secretary Harold Brown's efforts to hold 
the line on technology transfer. "He was very tough with Israel on its 
requests for weapons and weapons systems. He often turned them 
down." But that was not the final word. For example, Brzezinski cites 
as the most notable example Brown's refusal to sell Israel the contro- 
versial antipersonnel weapon known as the cluster bomb. Despite 
written agreements restricting the use of these bombs, Israel used them 
twice against populated areas in Lebanon, causing death and injury to 
civilians. Brown responded by refusing to sell the deadly replace- 
ments. But even on that request, Israel eventually prevailed. President 
Reagan reversed the Carter administration policy, and cluster bombs 
were returned to the approved list. 

Others who have occupied high positions in the executive branch 
were willing to speak candidly, but, unlike Janka, they did so with the 
understanding that their names would not be published. As one ex- 
plains, "My career is not over. At least, I don't want it to be. Quoting 
me by name would bring it to an end." With the promise of anonymity, 
he and others gave details on the astounding process through which the 
Israeli lobby is able to penetrate the defenses at the Defense Depart- 
ment — and elsewhere. 

Sometimes the act is simple theft. One official says, "Israelis were 
caught in the Pentagon with unauthorized documents, sometimes 
scooping up the contents of 'in boxes' on desk tops." He recalls that 
because of such activity a number of Israeli officials were told to leave 
the country. No formal charges of espionage have ever been filed, and 
Israel covered each such exit with an excuse such as family illness or 
some other personal reason: "Our government never made a public 
issue of it." He adds, "There is a much higher level of espionage by 
Israel against our government than has ever been publicly admitted." 

The official recalls one day receiving a list of military equipment 
Israel wanted to purchase. Noting that "the Pentagon is Israel's 4 stop- 
and-shop,' " he took it for granted that the Israelis had obtained clear- 
ances. So he followed usual procedure by circulating it to various 
Pentagon offices for routine review and evaluation: 

One office instantly returned the list to me with a note: 'One of these items is so 
highly classified you have ho right to know that it even exists.' I was instructed 
to destroy all copies of the request and all references to the particular code 
numbers. I didn't know what it was. It was some kind of electronic jamming 
equipment, top secret. Somehow the Israelis knew about it and acquired its 
precise specifications, cost and top secret code number. This meant they had 
penetrated our research and development labs, our most sensitive facilities. 

Despite that somber revelation, no official effort was launched to 
discover who had revealed the sensitive information. 



144 They Dare to Speak Out 
"They Always Get What They Want" 

Israel's agents are close students of the U.S. system and work it to 
their advantage. Besides obtaining secret information by clandestine 
operations they apply open pressure on executive branch offices thor- 
oughly and effectively. A weapons expert explains their technique: 

If promised an answer on a weapons request in 30 days, they show up on the 
31st day and announce: 'We made this request. It hasn't been approved. Why 
not? We've waited 30 days.' With most foreign governments, you can finesse a 
problem. You can leave it in the box on the desk. With Israel, you can't leave 
anything in the box. 

He says the embassy knows exactly when things are scheduled for 
action: 

It stays on top of things as does no other embassy in town. They know your 
agenda, what was on your schedule yesterday, and what's on it today and 
tomorrow. They know what you have been doing and saying. They know the 
law and regulations backwards and forwards. They know when the deadlines 
are. 

He admires the resourcefulness of the Israelis in applying pres- 
sure: 

They may leak to Israeli newspapers details of their difficulty in getting an 
approval. A reporter will come in to State or Defense and ask a series of 
questions so detailed they could be motivated only by Israeli officials. Some- 
times the pressure will come, not from reporters, but from AIPAC. 

If things are really hung up, it isn't long before letters or calls start coming from 
Capitol Hill. They'll ask, 'Why is the Pentagon not approving this item?' Usu- 
ally, the letter is from the Congressman in whose district the item is manufac- 
tured. He will argue that the requested item is essential to Israel's security. He 
probably will also ask, 'Who is this bad guy in the Pentagon — or State — who is 
blocking this approval? I want his name. Congress would like to know.* 

The American defense expert pauses to emphasize his point: "No 
bureaucrat, no military officer likes to be singled out by anybody from 
Congress and required to explain his professional duty." 

He recalls an episode involving President Carter's secretary of 
defense, Harold Brown: 

I remember once Israel requested an item on the prohibited list. Before I 
answered, I checked with Secretary Brown and he said, 'No, absolutely no. 
We're not going to give in to the bastards on this one.' So I said no. 

Lo and behold, a few days later I got a call from Brown. He said, "The Israelis 
are raising hell. I got a call from [Senator Henry] 'Scoop' Jackson, asking why 
we aren't cooperating with Israel. It isn't worth it. Let it go." 



Penetrating the Defenses at Defense— and State 145 

When Jimmy Carter became president, the Israelis were trying to 
get large quantities of the AIM 9-L, the most advanced U.S. air-to-air 
missile. The Pentagon kept saying, "No, no, no. It isn't yet deployed to 
U.S. troops. The production rate is not enough to supply even U.S. 
needs. It is much too sensitive to risk being lost." Yet, early in his 
administration, Carter overruled the Pentagon, and Israel got the mis- 
siles. 

A former administration official recalls a remarkable example of 
Israeli ingenuity: 

Israel requested an item of technology, a machine for producing bullets. It was 
a big piece of machinery, weighed a lot, and it was exclusive. We didn't want 
other countries to have it, not even Israel. We knew if we said 'no, 1 the Israelis 
would go over our heads and somehow get approval. So, we kept saying we 
were studying the request. Then, to our astonishment, we discovered that the 
Israelis had already bought the machinery and had it in a warehouse in New 
York. 

The Israelis did not have a license to ship the equipment, but they 
had nonetheless been able to make the purchase. When they were 
confronted by the Defense official, they said, "We slipped up. We were 
sure you'd say 'yes,' so we went ahead and bought it. And if you say 
no, here's the bill for storage, and here's what it will cost to ship it back 
to the factory." Soon after, the official recalled, someone in the State 
Department called and said, "Aw, give it to them," adding an earthy 
expletive. 

This sense of futility sometimes reaches all the way to the top. 
Unrestricted supplies to Israel were especially debilitating in the 1974- 
77 period when U.S. military services were trying to recover from the 
1973 Arab-Israeli war. In that conflict the United States stripped its 
own army and air forces in order to supply Israel. 

During this period of U.S. shortage, Israel kept bringing in its 
shopping lists. The official recalls that the Pentagon would insist, "No, 
we can't provide what you want now. Come back in a year or so." In 
almost every one of those cases, he said, the Pentagon position was 
overruled by a political decision out of the White House. This de- 
moralized the professionals in the Pentagon but, still worse, handi- 
capped national security: "Defense Department decisions made 
according to the highest professional standards went by the board in 
order to satisfy Israeli requests," 

"Exchanges" That Work Only in One Direction 

The Israelis are particularly adept at exploiting sympathetic 
officials, as a former Pentagon officer explains: 



146 They Dare to Speak Out 

We have people sympathizing with Israel in about every office in the Pentagon. 
A lot of military personnel have been in Israel, and some served there, making 
friends and, of course, a number of Israeli personnel study in U.S. military 
schools. 

The guts, the energy, the skill of the Israelis are much admired in the Pentagon. 
Israelis are very good at passing back to us their performance records using our 
equipment. Throughout our military schools are always a large number of 
Israeli students. They develop great professional rapport with our people. 

For years, the United States and Israel have exchanged military 
personnel. On paper, it works both ways. In practice, Israel is the 
major beneficiary. The process is more one of national character than 
anything clandestine. Israeli officers generally speak English, so it's no 
problem for them to come to America and quickly establish rapport 
with U.S. officers. On the other hand, hardly any U.S. officers speak 
Hebrew. 

Language disparity is not the only problem. One of equal gravity is 
the American laxity in enforcing its security regulations. Many Israeli 
officers spend a year in a sensitive area — one of the U.S. training 
commands, or a research and development laboratory. At the start they 
are told they cannot enter certain restricted areas. Then, little by little, 
the rules are relaxed. A former Defense Department official explains: 

The young Israeli speaks good English. He is likeable. You know how Ameri- 
cans are: they take him in, and he's their buddy. First thing you know, the 
restrictions are forgotten, and the Israeli officers are admitted to everything in 
our laboratories, our training facilities, our operational bases. 

The former official quickly adds that rules are seldom relaxed at 
the other end: 

This means that the officer training exchange is really a one-way street. Israel 
does not permit our officers, whether they speak Hebrew or not, to serve in 
sensitive military facilities in Israel. Many areas are totally off limits. They are 
very strict about that. Our officers cannot be present even when U.S.-suppiied 
equipment and weapons are being delivered for the first time. 

U.S. officers on exchange programs in Israel are, more often than not, given a 
desk in an office down the hall, and assigned just enough to do to keep them 
busy and prevent them from being too frustrated. Without knowledge of He- 
brew, they have almost no way to know what is going on. 

Camaraderie is also an element. Many employees in the executive 
branch, Jewish and non- Jewish, feel that the United States and Israel 
are somehow "in this together" and therefore cooperate without limit. 
Many also believe that Israel is a strategic asset and that weapons and 
other technology provided to Israel serve U.S. purposes. These feel- 



Penetrating the Defenses at Defense— and State 147 

ings sometimes cause official restrictions on sharing of information to 
be modified or conveniently forgotten. As one Defense official puts it, 
the rules get "placed deeper and deeper into the file": 

A sensitive document is picked up by an Israeli officer while his friend, a 
Defense Department official, deliberately looks the other way. Nothing is said. 
Nothing is written. And the U.S. official probably does not feel he has done 
anything wrong. Meanwhile the Israelis ask for more and more. 

Despite such openhanded generosity, Israel does not hesitate to 
try to get classified information by espionage, a process that the United 
States years ago tried unsuccessfully to halt. 



Moss ad's Role in the Network 

On one occasion — and only one — an employee of the U.S. govern- 
ment was punished for leaking classified information to Israel, and that 
was thirty years ago. In 1954, Fred Waller, a career foreign service 
officer in charge of the Israel- Jordan desk at the State Department, 
read in a classified document that a friend on the staff of the Israeli 
embassy — under suspicion for espionage — was being recommended by 
the FBI for expulsion from the United States. 

Waller told associates that he considered the charges "unjustified" 
and, according to allegations, tipped off his friend at the Israeli em- 
bassy. For this, Waller was first marked for dismissal but later per- 
mitted simply to retire. "They wanted to throw him out without a 
nickel," states Don Bergus, who succeeded Waller in the State Depart- 
ment assignment. During those years of "McCarthyism," Bergus re- 
calls, "the FBI was recommending that a lot of people be declared 
persona non grata. They were so happy with themselves in doing this. 
They knew damned well their recommendations wouldn't be acted 
upon." 

Bergus recalls that Israel got a lot of information without espio- 
nage activity: "A lot of the information was volunteered. The apples 
were put on the table, and I don't blame Israel for taking them." 

The investigation of Waller occurred during the high point of our 
government's concern over Israeli intelligence activities in the United 
States. Because the Eisenhower administration was trying to withhold 
weapons from Israel, as well as other states in the Middle East, a major 
attempt was made to bring leaks of classified information under con- 
trol. A veteran diplomat recalls the crisis: "Employees in State and 
Defense were being suborned and bribed on a wide scale, and our 
government went to Israel and demanded that it stop." 

After high-level negotiations following the Waller affair, the 



148 They Dare to Speak Out 

United States and Israel entered into an unwritten agreement to share a 
larger volume of classified information and at the same time to restrict 
sharply the clandestine operations each conducted in the other's terri- 
tory. The diplomat explains that it was supposed to be a two-way 
street: "The deal provided that we would get more from them too, and 
it was hoped the arrangement would end the thievery and payoff of 
U.S. employees." 

The understanding with Israel did not end the problem, however, 
as the Israelis were not content to let the U.S. decide what classified 
information it would receive. Israel did not live up to the terms of the 
agreement and continued to engage broadly in espionage activities 
throughout the United States. 

This was still true more than twenty years after the Waller episode, 
during the tenure of Atlanta mayor Andrew Young as U.S. ambassador 
to the United Nations during the Carter administration. Young recalls, 
"I operated on the assumption that the Israelis would learn just about 
everything instantly. I just always assumed that everything was 
monitored, and that there was a pretty formal network." 

Young resigned as ambassador in August 1979 after it was revealed 
that he had met with Zuhdi Terzi, the PLO's UN observer, in violation 
of the U.S. pledge to Israel not to talk to the PLO. Press reports on 
Young's episode said Israeli intelligence learned of the meeting and that 
Israeli officials then leaked the information to the press, precipitating 
the diplomatic wrangle which led to Young's resignation. 

Israel denied that its agents had learned of the Young-Terzi meet- 
ing. The press counselor at the Israeli embassy went so far as to tell 
the Washington Star, "We do not conduct any kind of intelligence 
activities in the United States." This denial must have been amusing to 
U.S. intelligence experts, one of whom talked with Newsweek maga- 
zine about Mossad's activities here: "They have penetrations all 
through the U.S. government. They do better than the KGB," said the 
expert, whom the magazine did not identify. 

The Newsweek article continued: 

With the help of American Jews in and out of government, Mossad looks for 
any softening in U.S. support and tries to get any technical intelligence the 
administration is unwilling to give to Israel. 

'Mossad can go to any distinguished American Jew and ask for his help, 1 says a 
former CIA agent. The appeal is a simple one: 'When the call went out and no 
one heeded it, the Holocaust resulted.' 

The U.S. tolerates Mossad's operations on American soil partly because of 
reluctance to anger the American Jewish community. 



Penetrating the Defenses at Defense— and State 149 

Another reason cited: Mossad is often a valuable source of information 
for U.S. intelligence. 

Penetration by Israel continued at such a high level that a senior 
State Department official who has held the highest career positions 
related to the Middle East confides, "I urged several times that the U.S. 
quit trying to keep secrets from Israel. Let them have everything. They 
always get what they want anyway. When we try to keep secrets, it 
always backfires." 

An analysis prepared by the CIA in 1979, 25 years after the U.S.- 
Israeli espionage agreement, gives no hint that Mossad had in any way 
restricted its operations within the United States. According to the 48- 
page secret document, entitled, Israel: Foreign Intelligence and Se- 
curity Services, the United States continues to be a focus of Mossad 
operations: 

In carrying out its mission to collect positive intelligence, the principal function 
of Mossad is to conduct agent operations against the Arab nations and their 
official representatives and installations throughout the world, particularly in 
Western Europe and the United States. . . . 

Objectives in Western countries are equally important (as in the U.S.S.R. and 
East Europe) to the Israeli intelligence service. Mossad collects intelligence 
regarding Western, Vatican and UN policies toward the Near East; promotes 
arms deals for the benefit of the IDF; and acquires data for silencing anti-Israel 
factions in the West, [emphasis added] 

Under "methods of operation," the CIA booklet describes the way 
in which Mossad makes use of domestic pro-Israeli groups. It states 
that "Mossad over the years has enjoyed some rapport with highly- 
placed persons and government offices in every country of importance 
to Israel." It adds, "Within Jewish communities in almost every coun- 
try of the world, there are Zionists and other sympathizers, who render 
strong support to the Israeli intelligence effort." It explains, 

Such contacts are carefully nurtured and serve as channels for information, 
deception material, propaganda and other purposes. . . . Mossad activities are 
generally conducted through Israeli official and semiofficial establishments; 
deep cover enterprises in the form of firms and organizations, some especially 
created for, or adaptable to, a specific objective, and penetrations effected 
within non-Zionist national and international Jewish organizations. . . . 

Official organizations used for cover are: Israeli Purchasing Missions and Is- 
raeli Government Tourist, El Al and Zim offices. Israeli construction firms, 
industrial groups and international trade organizations also provide nonofficial 
cover. Individuals working under deep or illegal cover are normally charged 



150 They Dare to Speak Out 

with penetrating objectives that require a long-range, more subtle approach, or 
with activities in which the Israeli government can never admit complicity. . . . 

The Israeli intelligence service depends heavily on the various Jewish com- 
munities and organizations abroad for recruiting agents and eliciting general 
information. The aggressively ideological nature of Zionism, which emphasizes 
that all Jews belong to Israel and must return to Israel, had had its drawbacks 
in enlisting support for intelligence operations, however, since there is con- 
siderable opposition to Zionism among Jews throughout the world. 

Aware of this fact, Israeli intelligence representatives usually operate dis- 
creetly within Jewish communities and are under instructions to handle their 
missions with utmost tact to avoid embarrassment to Israel. They also attempt 
to penetrate anti-Zionist elements in order to neutralize the opposition. 

The theft of scientific data is a major objective of Mossad opera- 
tions, which is often attempted by trying to recruit local agents: 

In addition to the large-scale acquisition of published scientific papers and 
technical journals from all over the world through overt channels, the Israelis 
devote a considerable portion of their covert operations to obtaining scientific 
and technical intelligence. This had included attempts to penetrate certain 
classified defense projects in the United States and other Western nations. 

The Israeli security authorities (in Israel) also seek evidence of illicit love 
affairs which can be used as leverage to enlist cooperation. In one instance, 
Shin Beth (the domestic Israeli intelligence agency) tried to penetrate the U.S. 
Consulate General in Jerusalem through a clerical employee who was having 
an affair with a Jerusalem girl. They rigged a fake abortion case against the 
employee in an unsuccessful effort to recruit him. Before this attempt at black- 
mail, they had tried to get the Israeli girl to elicit information from her boy- 
friend. 

Israel's espionage activities, according to the CIA, even included 
"crude efforts to recruit Marine guards [at the United States Embassy 
at Tel Aviv] for monetary reward." It reports that a hidden microphone 
"planted by the Israelis" was found in the office of the U.S. ambassador 
in 1954, and two years later telephone taps were found connected to 
two telephones in the residence of the United States military attache. 
Retired diplomat Don Bergus recalls the episode: "Our ambassador, 
Ed Lawson, reported the bug in a telegram to Washington that went 
something like this: 'Department must assume that all conversations in 
my office as well as texts of my telegrams over the last six months are 
known to the Israelis.' Ed had dictated all telegrams to his secretary." 

During the Iranian hostage crisis in 1980, columnist Jack Anderson 
quoted "U.S. intelligence reports," actually supplied by the Israeli em- 
bassy, by way of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, that 



Penetrating the Defenses at Defense— and State 151 

the PLO had mined the embassy to frustrate any rescue attempt by the 
United States. The intelligence reports proved to be bogus. 

Asked about the present activities of Mossad in the United States, 
a senior official in the Department of State, is candid: 

We have to assume that they have wire taps all over town. In my work I 
frequently pick up highly-sensitive information coming back to me in conversa- 
tions with people who have no right to have these secrets. I will ask, 4 I wonder 
who has the wiretaps out to pick that up,* and usually the answer is, ( I don't 
know, but it sure isn't us.' 

The same official says he never gives any highly sensitive information 
over his office phone. "You have to respect their ingenuity. The Mos- 
sad people know how to get into a system." 



"No One Needs Trouble Like That" 

Leaks of classified information remain a major problem for policy- 
makers. An official whose identity I promised to withhold says that 
during the Carter administration his colleagues feared even to speak up 
even in small private meetings. When Israeli requests were turned 
down at interagency meetings attended at most by fifteen people — all 
of whom knew the discussions were to be considered top secret — 
within hours "the Israeli military attach^, the political officer, or the 
ambassador— or all of them at once — were lodging protests. They 
knew exactly who said what, even though nothing had been put on 
paper." He adds, "No one needs trouble like that." 

He says David McGiffert, assistant secretary of defense for in- 
ternational security affairs, was often subjected to pressure. Fre- 
quently the Israeli embassy would demand copies of documents that 
were still in the draft stage and had not reached his desk. 

To counteract these kinds of leaks some officials have taken their 
own precautions. 

Although no charges are ever brought against those suspected of 
leaking information to Israel, they are sometimes bypassed when 
classified documents are handed out. The word is forwarded discreetly 
to drop their names from the distribution list. One such official served 
during both the Carter and Reagan administrations and remains today 
in a sensitive foreign policy position. When he occupied a senior posi- 
tion in the Carter administration, his superiors were instructed to 
"clear nothing" in the way of classified documents related to the Mid- 
dle East through his office and used extreme caution when discussing 
such matters in his presence. One of his colleagues says, admiringly, 



152 They Dare to Speak Out 

"He is brilliant. He belongs in government, but he has a blind spot 
where Israel is concerned." 

To strike back at government officials considered to be unsym- 
pathetic to Israeli needs the pro-Israel lobby singles them out for per- 
sonal attack and even the wrecking of their careers. In January 1977 a 
broad-scale purge was attempted immediately after the inauguration of 
President Carter. The perpetrator was Senator Richard Stone of 
Florida, a Democrat, a passionate supporter of Israel. When he was 
newly installed as chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on the Middle 
East, he brought along with him a "hit list" on a call at the White 
House. In his view fifteen officials were not sufficiently supportive of 
Israel and its weapons needs, and he wanted them transferred to posi- 
tions where their views would create no problems for Israel. Marked 
for removal were William Quandt, Brzezinski's assistant for Middle 
East matters, and Les Janka, who had served on the National Security 
Council under Ford. The others were career military officers, most of 
them colonels. Stone's demands were rejected by Brzezinski and, ac- 
cording to a senior White House official, "after pressing reasonably 
hard for several days," the Senator gave up. Although unsuccessful, his 
demands caused a stir. One officer says, "I find it very ironic that a U.S. 
Senator goes to a U.S. President's National Security Adviser and tells 
him to fire Americans for insufficient loyalty to another country." 

Leaks Disrupt American Foreign Policy 

Four times in recent years, major leaks of information to Israel 
caused serious setbacks in our relations with Israel's neighbors. The 
first destroyed an arrangement with Jordan that had been serving U.S. 
security interests successfully for years. 

Under a long-standing secret agreement, Jordan's King Hussein 
received secret financial support from the CIA. It was a carry-over of a 
normal support system developed by the British. Under it, moderate 
leaders like Hussein received payments in exchange for helpful ser- 
vices which enabled them to maintain their political base without hav- 
ing to account to anyone locally. 

Early in the Carter administration, a White House review was 
ordered of all covert operations, including, of course, the CIA pay- 
ments in the Middle East. Nineteen people attended the review meet- 
ing in early February 1977, and one of the senior officials who attended 
recalls: "I feared at the time that leaks were certain to occur." A few 
days later, the Washington Post headlined a story, "CIA Paid Millions 
to Jordan's King Hussein." Written by Bob Woodward, the article said 
that over a period of twenty years the CIA had made "secret annual 



Penetrating the Defenses at Defense— and State 153 

payments totaling millions of dollars" to Hussein. It said the payment 
in 1976 was $750,000, and the disclosure provoked wide international 
controversy. 

When he read Woodward's Washington Post article, Senator 
James G. Abourezk of South Dakota called in Harold Saunders, then an 
official of the National Security Council, and received confirmation 
that Israel, as well as Jordan, was receiving secret payments from the 
CIA. Abourezk recalls that Saunders estimated that during the same 
period that Hussein received about $10 million, over $70 million went 
to Israel. The payments helped Israel support its own burgeoning 
foreign aid program in Africa, payments which Abourezk believes still 
continue. Hussein used the funds to maintain a strong relationship with 
the Bedouin tribes of his desert kingdom. 

After confirming the information, Abourezk called Woodward and 
asked if he was aware of the CIA aid to Israel when he wrote about the 
payments to Jordan. Abourezk recalls, "Woodward admitted knowl- 
edge of the payments to Israel but said he thought the circumstances 
were different and that was why he did not write about them." 
Abourezk recalls being so outraged at this explanation and Wood- 
ward's "selective" coverage of the news that he shouted over the 
phone, "It seems to me that sort of judgment is better left up to the 
readers of the Post." 

Abourezk tried unsuccessfully for several months to interest 
Washington journalists in the news that Israel too received CIA pay- 
ments. Months later, after the furor over Jordan had died down, Jack 
Anderson mentioned the payments to Israel in his syndicated column. 
There was no public outcry. 

The CIA arrangement with Jordan was viewed by Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Adviser, as "very valuable" to 
the United States. But as a result of the publicity, he recalls, the ar- 
rangement had to be cancelled, Hussein was embarrassed, and the 
United States suffered a setback in its relations with the Arab world. 

The next leak so embarrassed U.S.-Saudi relations that a career 
intelligence officer was ordered out of Saudi Arabia. After the fall of 
the Shah of Iran in 1979, there was speculation that the Saudi regime 
also might fall. The CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia reported this 
information to Washington in a secret cable, citing it as only a rumor, 
not a forecast. On the basis of this and other reports and analysis in 
Washington, the CIA produced a paper given restricted circulation in 
the official policy community. That paper discussed the stability of the 
Saudi regime. A report was leaked to news services, which errone- 
ously stated that the CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia predicted the fall 
of the Saudi government within six months. 



154 They Dare to Speak Out 

John C. West, former governor of South Carolina, was the U.S. 
ambassador to Saudi Arabia at the time. West recalls the CIA story: 
"Of course, there was no such prediction that the Saudi government 
would fall, but that's the way it was printed." The episode caused deep 
resentment in the Saudi capital and the station chief was asked to 
leave. 

West had other problems with leaks. On another occasion, this 
time in 1980, a government employee's leak of secret information de- 
stroyed a sensitive mission to Saudi Arabia and, in West's opinion, led 
to a costly confrontation between the president and the Senate. The 
leak came from a secret White House meeting where West and a small 
group of high officials decided several Saudi requests to buy military 
equipment. "The arms package was of very, very great concern to the 
Saudis," West recalls: 

It was essential that they, as serious customers, not be embarrassed. As we 
went over the items, I said, 'Whatever we do, we must not say 'no' to the 
Saudis on any of these. It's very important that we avoid a flat turn down.' 

The group agreed to approve four of the requests, but found the 
other two highly controversial. The Saudis wanted to buy high- 
technology AWACS intelligence-gathering aircraft and special bomb 
racks for F-15 fighter planes they already owned. These sales would 
cause an uproar in neighboring Israel, and the Carter administration 
did not want to offend either government. 

West worked out solutions to both problems. "Let's do this," he 
advised the group: 

The bomb racks haven't yet been adopted as a part of the U.S. system. There 
are still some bugs that need to be worked out. Let's explain that we won't 
make a decision until we decide the bomb racks are right and meet our own 
requirements. Given that explanation, the Saudis will go along. 

On the AWACS dilemma, West predicted the Saudis would with- 
draw their request to buy the planes if the United States would resume 
a practice initiated during the tense period following the fall of the Shah 
of Iran. At that time, he says, "The U.S. met Saudi intelligence needs 
by operating AWACS planes from Saudi bases and supplying to the 
Saudi government the information accumulated on these flights." West 
told the group, "I will explain to the Saudis that the U.S. can't deliver 
the new planes until 1985, and by then the technology will probably be 
outdated." 

West's recommendations were accepted. The Saudis would be 
permitted to buy the four non-controversial items, and the other two 
requests would be set aside in a way that would cause no offense. West 



Penetrating the Defenses at Defense— and State 155 

says, "I was instructed to explain the decisions personally when I 
returned to Saudi Arabia." 

But once again, sensitive information was leaked in a twisted 
form. West recalls, 

The very day I left for Saudi Arabia, the New York Times published a story 
headlined: 'Carter Is Said to Refuse Saudi Request for Arms.' Other news 
services reported that at a high level meeting the White House decided to turn 
down the Saudi request, and after debating several days how to break the 
news, instructed West simply to tell them 'no.' 

I knew nothing of the leak until I landed in Saudi Arabia ready to meet Saudi 
officials in appointments already scheduled. The news story hit me in the face 
when I got off the plane. It was terrible. 

The Times story delivered the blunt negative answer that West had 
warned must be avoided at all cost. "It destroyed all chance of success 
in my diplomatic mission." 

West does not know how the newspapers got the damaging report. 
Only a few had attended the meeting in the White House, but notes 
were taken, memos prepared. He speculates that the story, with delib- 
erate inaccuracies, was leaked by "someone determined to worsen 
relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia." 

A few months later, the Carter administration resumed AWACS 
operations based in Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, embarrassed by the 
earlier headlines, Saudi officials decided to insist on buying their own 
AWACS planes and launched a public relations campaign in the United 
States that culminated in a costly, bruising showdown two years later 
in the U.S. Senate. Without the leak, West feels, the Saudis would have 
accepted the Carter administration decision and the AWACS con- 
troversy would never have surfaced. If so, the U.S. taxpayers might 
have been spared an extra $1.2 billion in aid to Israel — the price Is- 
rael's lobby demanded as compensation when it lost the AWACS vote 
in the Senate. 

West recalls that leaks to Israel were so frequent that he imposed 
strict rules on communications: 

I would never put anything in any cable that was critical of Israel. Still, because 
of the grapevine, there was never any secret from the government of Israel. 
The Israelis knew everything, usually by the time it got to Washington. I can 
say that without qualification. 

West adds that if he wanted to communicate any information that was 
in any way critical of Israel, he felt more confident using an open 
telephone line than a top-secret cable. 

West's problems with the lobby did not end with his departure 



156 They Dare to Speak Out 

from diplomatic service. Before leaving his post in 1981, in an inter- 
view in Jeddah, he told a reporter the "most difficult question" he 
encountered during his work as ambassador was trying to explain why 
talks between the U.S. and the PLO were not permitted. 

This mild comment caused trouble when West returned to private 
life. His appointment as distinguished professor of Middle East studies 
at the University of South Carolina brought a strong protest from a 
group of South Carolina Jews led by State Senator Hyman Rubin. "The 
group charged bias," West recalls, "and the protest so disturbed the 
university administration that public announcement of my appointment 
was delayed for more than a year." When he learned of the protest, 
West asked Rubin to arrange a meeting with his group. The result was a 
candid two-hour discussion between twenty critics and the ambassa- 
dor-turned-professor. In its wake, West says, "The controversy sub- 
sided," and he assumed his post. 

In 1983 the Israeli embassy itself directly arranged a news leak 
which effectively blocked U.S. support for a Jordanian rapid deploy- 
ment force, though it concealed its own role. The White House was 
privately considering a proposal under which the U.S. would help Jor- 
dan establish an airborne unit able to provide swift help if nearby Arab 
states were threatened. A White House official explains, 

When the Bahrainis asked for help during the Iranian crisis, Jordan wanted to 
help but had no way to get there. The Jordanian force idea is sound. Arabs 
need to be able to defend their own territory. Instead of having an American 
rapid deployment force going to the Persian Gulf, it would be better for Arabs 
to do the job themselves. Better to have Muslims defending Muslim territory 
than American boys. 

L. Dean Brown, former ambassador to Jordan, says the proposal 
would have been a "godsend" to the small countries of the gulf. "What 
Jordan needed were C-130 transport planes in order to move light 
weapons by air." 

At first, Israel raised no objection. Told of the plan while he was 
still Israel's ambassador to the United States, Moshe Arens simply 
listened. A White House official close to the project recalls, "We told 
Arens that we were going to have Israeli interests in mind, but we were 
going ahead. We would proceed in a way that would not harm Israel." 

The non-committal Israeli reaction was mistaken as a green light, 
and, after getting clearance from the intelligence committees of Con- 
gress, the Reagan administration proceeded with secret negotiations. 

After Arens left to become Israel's defense minister, the proposal 
ran into trouble. Briefed on the progress of the project by Secretary of 
State Shultz, Meir Rosenne, Israel's new ambassador, suddenly raised 



Penetrating the Defenses at Defense— and State 157 

objections. The Israeli embassy tipped off a reporter for an Israeli radio 
station about the issue, suggesting he go to Congressman Clarence 
Long, chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee that han- 
dles aid to Israel, and "he will tell you the whole story." Long 
cooperated, Israeli radio broke the story, and with controversy swirling 
in Israel, AIPAC joined the fray with its own salvos* 

A White House official recalls the effect. "Once this became 
public," he says, "King Hussein of Jordan backed away too. He didn't 
want to be seen as a tool of the Americans." The official says his 
colleagues at the White House were convinced that the whole thing 
was a carefully engineered leak by the Israeli embassy. It was delayed 
only until Arens left Washington. "It was a carom shot, bounced 
through Doc Long and Israeli radio in such a way that it would not be 
traced back to the embassy." Former U.S. Ambassador Brown de- 
scribes the leak by the Israelis as "purposeful." 

"The State Department Leaks Like a Sieve" 

A leak got Talcott Seelye, ambassador to Syria, in hot water in 
1981 when he sent a classified cable from Syria to the State Department 
protesting a resolution just introduced in the House of Representatives 
by Stephen Solarz, a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. Solarz 
represents a New York district in which Jews of Syrian origin are 
numerous, and his resolution criticized Syria for not permitting more 
Jews to leave that country. 

In the cable Seelye warned that approval of the resolution would 
make Syria less cooperative, not more. Seelye explains, "My cable 
said that if Solarz is sincere and serious about getting the Jews out of 
Syria, he will not go ahead with this resolution; on the other hand, if he 
merely wants to make points with the voters, he should do something 
else." The cable was leaked to Solarz, who called Secretary of State 
Vance and demanded: "Look, you've got to get Seelye out of there." 
Vance was furious over the leak. 

Seelye kept his job, but the State Department did little to defeat 
the resolution. When the resolution was taken up in the House, only 
one no vote was heard. 

The employee guilty of leaking the cable to Solarz worked under 
Ed Sanders, Carter's official liaison with the Jewish community, who 
then had an office in the State Department as well as the White House. 
No punishment was imposed; the employee was simply transferred to a 
different job. 

The leak confirmed the fears of diplomats who had strongly op- 
posed locating a Jewish liaison office in the State Department. One 



158 They Dare to Speak Out 

diplomat of the period describes Sanders as "a very decent human 
being, and he was there to do his job at the request of the president. At 
the same time, some of the stuff we were doing should not get out of 
the building to anybody." 

Harold Saunders, a scholarly career Middle East specialist who 
occasionally got in hot water by noting Arab concerns, was then assist- 
ant secretary of state and voiced his feelings to Vance: "How would 
you like having somebody from U.S. Steel sitting in our Economic 
Bureau's tariff office?" Vance too opposed the arrangement, but San- 
ders's State Department office was not closed for months. 

Seelye pinpoints a very mundane reason for the wave of leaks: the 
prevalence of copying machines. He says that as ambassador to Syria 
he operated on the assumption that the Israelis would learn everything 
he sent to Washington. He says, "The trouble with our system of 
classification is that even when we limit distribution, say, to just twenty 
copies for the whole government, one of the offices on the list will 
make a dozen extra copies for their own use, and so on. It's hard to 
control." 

Veterans in government lay the blame for much of the leaking on 
political appointees holding important positions in the State Depart- 
ment and not on career diplomats. In the early months of the Reagan 
Administration, National Security Adviser Richard Allen was viewed 
as highly sympathetic to Israeli interests and, in fact, as the de facto 
clearance officer, encouraging the placement of personnel acceptable 
to the state of Israel in key positions. After Allen's departure from 
government, a senior officer of the State Department recalls, "No one 
was needed to replace him, as people with pro-Israeli interests — we 
call them mail carriers — are spotted in every important office." 

A senior diplomat, now on leave, says: "The leaks are almost 
never traced to professional foreign service officers. In my experience, 
leaks are normally by staff members brought in by political appointees, 
and every administration brings in a lot of them. They seem to be all 
over the place." He says these "loose-tongued amateurs" are promi- 
nent on the seventh floor, where offices of senior State Department 
officials are located, and on the staff for policy planning, as well as in 
the White House. This gives them ready access to sensitive material. 
"Unfortunately," he adds, "they do not have the same idea of discipline 
and sense of loyalty as the professionals." 

Some leaks originate from a few members of Congress and their 
staff. A former Defense Department official recalls, 

There were individuals on Capitol Hill that the Pentagon viewed as conduits to 
Israel. No question about it. A number of times we would get requests from 



Penetrating the Defenses at Defense— and State 159 

Congressmen or Senators for intelligence materials. We knew damn well that 
these materials were not for their own edification. The information would be 
passed to Israel. 

For example, we would get a letter from a Congressman, stating he had heard 
the Pentagon had done a study on the military balance between Israel and its 
Arab neighbors. He would like to have a copy of it. We would respond, *We 
can't give you a copy, but we can give you an oral briefing.' The usual answer 
is, 4 Sorry, we are not interested in an oral briefing.' 

The Case of Stephen Bryen 

In the opinion of all these sources, Israeli penetration of State and 
Defense has reached an all-time high during the Reagan administration. 
In 1984 people known to have intimate links with Israel were employed 
in offices throughout the bureaucracy and particularly in the Defense 
Department, where top-secret weapons technology and other sensitive 
matters are routinely handled. 

The bureaucracy is headed by Fred Ikle, undersecretary of de- 
fense for international security. The three personalities of greatest im- 
portance in his area are Richard Perle, Ikle's assistant for international 
security policy; Stephen Bryen, Perle's principal deputy, whose as- 
signed speciality was technology transfer; and Noel Koch, principal 
deputy to Richard Armitage, assistant secretary for international se- 
curity affairs. Koch was formerly employed by the Zionist Organiza- 
tion of America. Perle previously served on the staff of Democratic 
Senator Henry Jackson of Washington, one of Israel's most ardent 
boosters, and had the reputation of being a conduit of information to the 
Israeli government. Stephen Bryen came to the administration under 
the darkest cloud of all. 

Bryen's office is represented on the inter-agency unit, known as the 
National Disclosure Policy Commission, which approves technology 
transfers related to weapons systems. The commission includes repre- 
sentatives of State, National Security Council and the intelligence ser- 
vices, as well as Defense. Bryen was publicly accused in 1978 of 
offering a top-secret document on Saudi air bases to a group of visiting 
Israeli officials. 

The accusation arose from an incident reported by Michael Saba, 
a journalist and former employee of the National Association of Arab 
Americans. Saba, who readily agreed to a lie detector test by the FBI, 
said he overheard Bryen make the offer while having breakfast in a 
Washington restaurant. At the time, Bryen was on the staff of the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A senior career diplomat ex- 
presses the problem State Department officials encountered during that 



160 They Dare to Speak Out 

period: "Whenever Bryen was in the room we always had to use ex- 
treme caution." During the controversy, Bryen was suspended from 
the committee staff but later reinstated. He later left the committee 
position and became executive director of the Jewish Institute for Na- 
tional Security Affairs (JINSA), an organization founded — according 
to The Jewish Week — to "convince people that the security of Israel 
and the United States is interlinked." When Bryen moved to a position 
in the Defense Department, his wife, Shoshona, replaced him at 
JINSA. 

After nine months the investigating attorneys recommended that a 
grand jury be empanelled to consider the evidence against Bryen. Ac- 
cording to the Justice Department, other witnesses testified to Bryen's 
Israeli contacts. Indeed, a Justice Department memorandum dated 
January 26, 1979, discussed "unresolved questions thus far, which sug- 
gest that Bryen is (a) gathering classified informations for the Israelis, 
(b) acting as their unregistered agent and (c) lying about it. . . ." The 
Justice Department studied the complaint for two years. Although it 
found that Bryen had an "unusually close relationship with Israel," it 
made no charges and in late 1979 closed the file. Early in 1981 Bryen 
was hired as Richard Perle's chief deputy in the Pentagon. He remains 
in this highly responsible position today. 

Perle himself was also the subject of an Israel-related controversy. 
An FBI summary of a 1970 wiretap recorded Perle discussing classified 
information with someone at the Israeli embassy. He came under fire in 
1983 when newspapers reported he received substantial payments to 
represent the interests of an Israeli weapons company. Perle denied 
conflict of interest, insisting that, although he received payment for 
these services after he had assumed his position in the Defense Depart- 
ment, he was between government jobs when he worked for the Israeli 
firm. 

Because of these controversies both Perle and Bryen were given 
assignments in the Reagan administration which — it was expected — 
would keep them isolated from issues relating to Israel. But, observes a 
State Department official, it has not worked out that way. Sensitive 
questions of technology transfer which affect Israeli interests are often 
settled in the offices of Perle and Bryen. 

Despite the investigation, Bryen holds one of the highest possible 
security classifications at the Department of Defense. It is a top secret/ 
code word classification, which gives him access to documents and 
data anywhere in the government, almost without limit. A high official 
in the Department of State explains the significance of his access: 
"With this classification, Bryen can keep up to date not only on what 



Penetrating the Defenses at Defense— and State 161 

the United States has in the way of technology, but on what we hope to 
have in the future as the result of secret research and development." 



'77/ Take Care of the Congress" 

Admiral Thomas Moorer recalls a dramatic example of Israeli 
lobby power from his days as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At 
the time of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war Mordecai Gur, the defense at- 
tach6 at the Israeli embassy who later became commander-in-chief of 
Israeli forces, came to Moorer demanding that the U.S. provide Israel 
with aircraft equipped with a high technology air-to-surface anti-tank 
missile called the Maverick. At the time, the U.S. had only one squad- 
ron so equipped. Moorer recalls telling Gur: 

I can't let you have those aircraft. We have just one squadron. Besides, we've 
been testifying before the Congress convincing them we need this equipment. 
If we gave you our only squadron, Congress would raise hell with us. 

Moorer looks at me with a steady piercing gaze that must have 
kept a generation of ensigns trembling in their boots: "And do you 
know what he said? Gur told me, 'You get us the airplanes; I'll take 
care of the Congress.'" Moorer pauses, then adds, "And he did." 
America's only squadron equipped with Mavericks went to Israel. 

Moorer, speaking in his office in Washington as a senior counselor 
at the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, says he strongly opposed the transfer but was overruled by 
"political expediency at the presidential level." He notes President 
Richard Nixon was then in the throes of Watergate. "But," he adds, 

I've never seen a President— I don't care who he is — stand up to them [the 
Israelis]. It just boggles your mind. 

They always get what they want. The Israelis know what is going on all the 
time. I got to the point where I wasn't writing anything down. 

If the American people understood what a grip those people have got on our 
government, they would rise up in arms. Our citizens don't have any idea what 
goes on. 

On another occasion, fear of lobby pressure caused a fundamental 
decision on further military sales to Israel to be deliberately pigeon- 
holed. It involved the general consensus of professionals in the 
Pentagon that Israel had enough military power for any need as of 1975. 
By then it had reached a level of regional superiority that was over- 
whelming. In December 1976 the Middle East Arms Transfer Panel 
wrote a report to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, concluding 



162 They Dare to Speak Out 

that no additional arms sales to Israel were necessary. However, Rums- 
feld did not send the report to the State Department. It was the closing 
days of the Ford administration, and its transmission as an official 
document and subsequent leakage would have given the Democrats a 
partisan edge with the Israeli lobby. 

Jewish groups in the United States are often pressed into service 
to soften up the secretary of state and other officials, especially in 
advance of a visit to the United States by the Israeli prime minister. A 
senior Defense official explains, "Israel would always have a long 
shopping list for the prime minister to take up. We would decide which 
items were worth making into an issue and which were not. We would 
try to work things out in advance." There was the constant threat that 
the prime minister might take an arms issue straight to the president, 
and the tendency was to clear the agenda of everything possible. "We 
might decide that we don't want this chicken shit electronic black box 
to be an issue between the president and prime minister, we would 
approve it in advance." 

On one such occasion, Ed Sanders, President Carter's adviser on 
Jewish affairs, brought a complaint to the National Security Council 
offices: "I'm getting a lot of flack from Jewish Congressmen on the 
ALQ 95-J. What is this thing? And why are we being so nasty about it? 
Shouldn't we let Israel have it? The president is getting a lot of abuse 
because the Pentagon won't turn it loose." It was a high technology 
radar jamming device, and soon it was approved for shipment to Israel. 

In advance of Carter's decision to provide a high technology mis- 
sile to Israel, a procession of Jewish groups came, one after another, to 
say: 

Please explain to us why the Pentagon is refusing to sell AIM 9-L missiles to 
Israel? Don't you know what this means? This missile is necessary so the 
Israelis will be able to shoot down the counterpart missile on the Mig 21 which 
carries the Eight Ball 935. 

A former high-ranking official in security affairs cites the in- 
timidating effect of this procession on career specialists: 

When you have to explain your position day after day, week after week to 
American Jewish groups — firet, say, from Kansas City, then Chicago, then East 
Overshoe — you see what you are up against. These are people from different 
parts of the country, but they come in with the very same information, the same 
set of questions, the same criticism. 

They know what you have done even in private meetings. They will say, 'Mr. 
Smith, we understand that in interagency meetings, you frequently take a hard 
line against technology transfers to Israel. We'd like you to explain yourself.' 



Penetrating the Defenses at Defense— and State 163 

They keep you on the defensive. They treat you as if you are the long pole in 
the anti-Israeli tent no matter how modest the position you have taken. 

Jewish groups in turn press Capitol Hill into action: 

We'll get letters from Congressmen: 4 We need an explanation. We're hearing 
from constituents that Israel's security is threatened by the refusal of the 
Pentagon to release the AIM 9-L missile. Please, Mr. Secretary, can you give 
me your rationale for the refusal?' 

The certainty of such lobby pressure can be costly to taxpayers. In 
one instance it kept the U.S. from trying to recover U.S.-supplied arms 
which Israel captured from Lebanon. During Israel's invasion of Leba- 
non in 1982, its forces overran and captured tons of equipment of all 
sorts, including weapons supplied by the United States to the govern- 
ment forces in that country. Knowledge of this came to light in an 
unusual way a year later. 

During a visit to Lebanon, the Reverend George Crossley, of Del- 
tona, Florida, was shown cases of U.S.-made M-16 rifles which Israeli 
officials said were captured from Palestinian forces. Crossley noted 
they carried a Saudi insignia and wrote down the serial numbers. Saudi 
Arabia, of course, had no forces involved in the fighting in Lebanon, 
and the clergyman jumped to the conclusion that rifles the U.S. had 
sold to Saudi Arabia were turned over to PLO forces in Lebanon, then 
captured by the Israelis. If true, this would have been a violation of a 
U.S. law which prohibits transfer of U.S.-supplied weapons to another 
country without permission. 

Crossley wrote to his Congressman, Bill Chappell, Jr., who asked 
the State Department to explain. A check of records showed the U.S. 
had never sold M-16 rifles to the Saudis, who prefer a German make. 
The rifles in question were provided directly to forces of the Lebanese 
government. 

The episode got public attention at a time when the U.S. govern- 
ment, at great expense, was once again equipping Lebanese forces. A 
White House official, reading accounts of the Crossley affair, asked the 
desk officer at the Pentagon why the U.S. didn't demand that the Is- 
raelis give back these rifles and all other equipment they had taken 
from the Lebanese army. The Pentagon had an accurate list of what the 
U.S. had supplied. Surely, he argued, the Israeli government could be 
forced to cooperate, and this would ease U.S. costs substantially. 

The desk officer exploded: "Are you kidding? No way in hell! Who 
needs that? I answer maybe one hundred letters a month for the secre- 
tary of defense in reply to Congressmen who bitch and complain about 
our mistreatment of Israel. Do you think that I want to increase my 



164 They Dare to Speak Out 

work load answering more shitty letters? Do you think I am going to 
recommend action that will increase the flow of problem letters to my 
boss? Be serious." 

Every official of prominence in the State and Defense Depart- 
ments proceeds on the assumption — and certainty — that at least once a 
week he will have to deal with a group from the Jewish community. 
One of them summarizes, 

One has to keep in mind the constant character of this pressure. The public 
affairs staff of the Near East Bureau in the State Department figures it will 
spend about 75 percent of its time dealing with Jewish groups. Hundreds of 
such groups get appointments in the executive branch each year. 

In acting to influence U.S. policy in the Middle East, the Israeli 
lobby has the field virtually to itself. Other interest groups and indi- 
viduals who might provide some measure of counterbalancing pres- 
sure have only begun to get organized. 

Americans of Arab ancestry, for example, remain divided. A dip- 
lomat who formerly served in a high position in the State Department 
gives this example: 

When a group concerned about U.S. bias favoring Israel would come in for an 
appointment, more often than not those in the group start arguing among 
themselves. One person will object to a heavy focus on Palestinian problems. 
Another will want Lebanon's problems to be central to the discussion. I would 
just sit back and listen. They had not worked out in advance what they wanted 
to say. 

Les Janka had similar experiences. In a commentary at a gathering 
sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute, he recalled visits by 
groups sympathetic to Arab problems: 

Their complaints tended to be fairly general. They would say, 'We want the 
U.S. to be more even-handed, more balanced,' or 'We want you to be more 
interested in the Palestinians.' Nothing specific. In contrast the Jewish groups 
come in with a very specific list of demands. 

On all kinds of foreign policy issues the American people just don't make their 
voices heard. Jewish groups are the exceptions. They are prepared, superbly 
briefed. They have their act together. It is hard for bureaucrats not to respond. 



Chapter 6 



The Assault on "Assault 



99 



Although Israel's lobby seems able at will to penetrate our nation's 
strongest defenses in order to gain the secret information it wishes, 
when the lobby's objective is keeping such information secret, our 
defenses suddenly become impenetrable. 

After seventeen years, James M. Ennes Jr., a retired officer of the 
U.S. Navy, is still having difficulty prying loose documents which shed 
light on the worst peacetime disaster in the history of our Navy. In this 
quest, he has encountered resistance by the Department of Defense, 
the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, the American Israel 
Public Affairs Committee, the book publishing industry, the news 
media, and the Israeli Foreign Ministry. The resistance, seemingly 
coordinated on an international scale, is especially perplexing because 
Ennes' goal is public awareness of an episode of heroism and tragedy 
at sea which is without precedent in American history. 

As the result of a program of concealment supported by succes- 
sive governments in both Israel and the United States, hardly anyone 
remembers the miraculous survival of the USS Liberty after a devastat- 
ing assault by Israeli forces on June 8, 1967, left 34 sailors dead, 171 
iiyured, and the damaged ship adrift with no power, rudder or means of 
communication. 

The sustained courage of Captain William L. McGonagle and his 
crew in these desperate circumstances earned the Liberty a place of 
honor in the annals of the U.S. Navy. But, despite energetic endeavors, 
including those of Ennes, McGonagle's officer of the deck that day, the 
entries remain dim and obscure. Ennes's stirring book-length account of 
the attack, Assault on the Liberty, itself continues to be under heavy 
assault five years after publication. 

The episode and its aftermath were so incredible that Admiral 
Thomas L. Moorer, who became chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff a 

165 



166 They Dare to Speak Out 

month after the attack, observes, "If it was written as fiction, nobody 
would believe it." 

Certain facts are clear. The attack was no accident. The Liberty 
was assaulted in broad daylight by Israeli forces who knew the ship's 
identity. The Liberty, an intelligence-gathering ship, had no combat 
capability and carried only light machine guns for defense. A steady 
breeze made its U.S. flag easily visible. The assault occurred over a 
period of nearly two hours — first by air, then torpedo boat. The ferocity 
of the attacks left no doubt: the Israeli forces wanted the ship and its 
crew destroyed. 

The public, however, was kept in the dark. Even before the Ameri- 
can public learned of the attack, U.S. government officials began to 
promote an account satisfactory to Israel. The American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee worked through Congressmen to keep the story 
under control. The President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, 
ordered and led a cover-up so thorough that sixteen years after he left 
office, the episode was still largely unknown to the public — and the 
men who suffered and died have gone largely unhonored. 

The day of the attack began in routine fashion, with the ship first 
proceeding slowly in an easterly direction in the eastern Mediterra- 
nean, later following the contour of the coastline westerly about fifteen 
miles off the Sinai Peninsula. On the mainland, Israeli forces were 
winning smashing victories in the third Arab-Israeli war in nineteen 
years. Israeli Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin, announcing that the Israelis 
had taken the entire Sinai and broken the blockade on the Strait of 
Tiran, declared: "The Egyptians are defeated." On the eastern front 
the Israelis had overcome Jordanian forces and captured most of the 
West Bank. 

At 6 a.m. an airplane, identified by the Liberty crew as an Israeli 
Noratlas, circled the ship slowly and departed. This procedure was 
repeated periodically over an eight-hour period. At 9 a.m. a jet ap- 
peared at a distance, then left. At 10 a.m., two rocket-armed jets 
circled the ship three times. They were close enough for their pilots to 
be observed through binoculars. The planes were unmarked. An hour 
later the Israeli Noraltas returned, flying not more than 200 feet di- 
rectly above the Liberty and clearly marked with the Star of David. 
The ship's crew members and the pilot waved at each other. This plane 
returned every few minutes until 1 p.m. By then, the ship had changed 
course and was proceeding almost due west. 

At 2:00 p.m. all hell broke loose. Three Mirage fighter planes 
headed straight for the Liberty, their rockets taking out the forward 
machine guns and wrecking the ship's antennae. The Mirages were 



The Assault on "Assault" 167 

joined by Mystdre fighters, which dropped napalm on the bridge and 
deck and repeatedly strafed the ship. The attack continued for over 20 
minutes. In all, the ship sustained 821 holes in her sides and decks. Of 
these, more than 100 were rocket size. 

As the aircraft departed, three torpedo boats took over the attack, 
firing five torpedoes, one of which tore a 40-foot hole in the hull, killing 
25 sailors. The ship was in flames, dead in the water, listing precari- 
ously, and taking water. The crew was ordered to prepare to abandon 
ship. As life-rafts were lowered into the water, the torpedo boats 
moved closer and shot them to pieces. One boat concentrated 
machine-gun fire on rafts still on deck as crew members there tried to 
extinguish the napalm fires. Petty Officer Charles Rowley declares, 
"They didn't want anyone to live." 

At 3:15 p.m. the last shot was fired, leaving the vessel a combina- 
tion morgue and hospital. The ship had no engines, no power, no rud- 
der. Fearing further attack, Captain McGonagle, despite severe leg 
injuries, stayed at the bridge. An Israeli helicopter, its open bay door 
showing troops in battle gear and a machine gun mounted in an open 
doorway, passed close to the deck, then left. Other aircraft came and 
went during the next hour. 

Although U.S. air support never arrived, within fifteen minutes of 
the first attack and more than an hour before the assault ended, fighter 
planes from the USS Saratoga were in the air ready for a rescue 
mission under orders "to destroy or drive off any attackers." The car- 
rier was only 30 minutes away, and, with a squadron of fighter planes 
on deck ready for a routine operation, it was prepared to respond 
almost instantly. 

But the rescue never occurred. Without approval by Washington, 
the planes could not take aggressive action, even to rescue a U.S. ship 
confirmed to be under attack. Admiral Donald Engen, then captain of 
the America, the second U.S. carrier in the vicinity, later explained: 
"President Johnson had very strict control. Even though we knew the 
Liberty was under attack, I couldn't just go and order a rescue." The 
planes were hardly in the air when the voice of Secretary of Defense 
Robert S. McNamara was heard over Sixth Fleet radios: "Tell the Sixth 
Fleet to get those aircraft back immediately." They were to have no 
part in destroying or driving off the attackers. 

Shortly after 3 p.m., nearly an hour after the Liberty's plea 
was first heard, the White House gave momentary approval to a rescue 
mission and planes from both carriers were launched. At almost pre- 
cisely the same instant, the Israeli government informed the U.S. naval 
attache in Tel Aviv that its forces had "erroneously attacked a U.S. 



168 They Dare to Speak Out 

ship" after mistaking it for an Egyptian vessel, and offered "abject 
apologies." With apology in hand, Johnson once again ordered U.S. 
aircraft back to their carriers. 

When the second launch occurred, there were no Israeli forces to 
"destroy or drive away." Ahead for the Liberty and its ravaged crew 
were 15 hours of lonely struggle to keep the wounded alive and the 
vessel afloat. Not until dawn of the next day would the Liberty see a 
U.S. plane or ship. The only friendly visit was from a small Soviet 
warship. Its offer of help was declined, but the Soviets said they would 
stand by in case need should arise. 

The next morning two U.S. destroyers arrived with medical and 
repair assistance. Soon the wounded were transferred to the carrier 
hospital by helicopter. The battered ship then proceeded to Malta, 
where a Navy court of inquiry was to be held. The inquiry itself was 
destined to be a part of an elaborate program to keep the public from 
knowing what really had happened. 

In fact, the cover-up began almost at the precise moment that the 
Israeli assault ended. The apology from Israeli officials reached the 
White House moments after the last gun fired at the Liberty. President 
Johnson accepted and publicized the condolences of Israeli Prime 
Minister Levi Eshkol, even though information readily available 
showed the Israeli account to be false. The CIA had learned a day 
before the attack that the Israelis planned to sink the ship. 
Congressional comments largely echoed the president's interpretation 
of the assault, and the nation was caught up in euphoria over Israel's 
stunning victories over the Arabs. The casualties on the Liberty got 
scant attention. Smith Hempstone, foreign correspondent for the 
Washington Star, wrote from Tel Aviv, "In a week since the Israeli 
attack on the USS Liberty not one single Israeli of the type which this 
correspondent encounters many times daily — cab drivers, censors, 
bartenders, soldiers — has bothered to express sorrow for the deaths of 
these Americans." 

The Pentagon staved off reporters' inquiries with the promise of a 
"comprehensive statement" once the official inquiry, conducted by Ad- 
miral Isaac Kidd, was finished. Kidd gave explicit orders to the crew: 
"Answer no questions. If somehow you are backed into a corner, then 
you may say that it was an accident and that Israel has apologized. You 
may say nothing else." Crew members were assured they could talk 
freely to reporters once the summary of the court of inquiry was made 
public. This was later modified; they were then ordered not to provide 
information beyond the precise words of the published summary. 

The court was still taking testimony when a charge that the attack 
had been deliberate appeared in the U.S. press. An Associated Press 



The Assault on "Assault" 169 

story filed from Malta reported that "senior crewmen" on the ship were 
convinced the Israelis knew the ship was American before they at- 
tacked. "We were flying the Stars and Stripes and it's absolutely im- 
possible that they shouldn't know who we were," a crew member said. 
The Navy disputed the story, saying the U.S. "thoroughly accepted the 
Israeli apology." 

Testimony completed, Admiral Kidd handcuffed himself to a huge 
box of records and flew to Washington to be examined by the Chief of 
Naval Operations, Admiral McDonald, as well as by Congressional 
leaders before the long-awaited summary statement was issued. When 
finally released, it was far from comprehensive. It made no attempt to 
fix blame, focusing almost entirely on the actions of the crew. 

The censored summary did not reveal that the ship had been under 
close aerial surveillance by Israel for hours before the attack and that 
during the preceding 24 hours Israel had repeatedly warned U.S. au- 
thorities to move the Liberty. It contained nothing to dispute the notion 
of mistaken identity. The Navy reported erroneously that the attack 
lasted only 6 minutes instead of 70 minutes and asserted falsely that all 
firing stopped when the torpedo boats came close enough to identify 
the U.S. flag. The Navy made no mention of napalm or of life-rafts 
being shot up. It even suppressed records of the strong breeze which 
made the ship's U.S. flag plainly visible. 

The report did make one painful revelation: Before the attack the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff had ordered the Liberty to move further from the 
coast, but the message "was misrouted, delayed and not received until 
after the attack." 

Several newspapers criticized the Pentagon's summary. The New 
York Times said it "leaves a good many questions unanswered." The 
Washington Star used the word "cover-up," called the summary an 
"affront" and demanded a deeper and wider probe. Senator J. William 
Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee, after a 
closed briefing by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, called the episode 
"very embarrassing." The Star concluded: "Whatever the meaning of 
this, embarrassment is no excuse for disingenuousness." 

In early July, the Associated Press quoted Micha Limor, identified 
as an Israeli reservist who had served on one of the torpedo boats, as 
saying that Israeli sailors noticed three numbers as they circled the 
Liberty but insisted the numbers meant nothing to them. 

Lieutenant James M. Ennes, Jr., a cypher officer recovering in a 
hospital from shrapnel wounds, was incredulous when he read the 
Limor story. He had been officer of the deck. He knew the ship's 
name appeared in large letters on the stern and the hull number on the 
bow. He knew also that a breeze made the Stars and Stripes easily 



170 They Dare to Speak Out 

visible during the day. He had ordered a new 5-by-8 foot flag displayed 
early on the day of the attack. By the time the torpedo boats arrived, 
the original flag had been shot down but an even larger 7-by-13 foot flag 
was mounted in plain view from a yardarm. He knew that the attack- 
ers, whether by air or surface, could not avoid knowing it was a U.S. 
ship. Above all else, he knew that Liberty's intercept operators had 
heard the Israeli reconnaissance pilots correctly reporting to Israeli 
headquarters that the ship was American. 

Disturbed by the Limor story and the exchange of public messages 
concerning the assault, Ennes determined to unravel the story. During 
the four months he was behidden at Portsmouth, Virginia, he 
collected information from his shipmates. Later, while stationed in 
Germany, he recorded the recollections of other crew members. 
Transferred to Washington, D.C., he secured government reports 
under the Freedom of Information Act and also obtained the full Court 
of Inquiry report, which was finally, after nine years, declassified in 
1976 from being top secret. 

The result was Ennes's book, Assault on the Liberty, published in 
1980, two years after he retired from the Navy. Ennes discovered 
"shallowness" in the court's questioning, its failure to "follow up on 
evidence that the attack was planned in advance" — including evidence 
that radio interceptions from two stations heard an Israeli pilot identify 
the ship as American. He said the court, ignoring the ship's log, which 
recorded a steady breeze blowing and confirming testimony from crew- 
men, concluded erroneously that attackers may not have been able to 
identify the flag's nationality, because the flag, according to the court, 
"hung limp at the mast on a windless day." 

Concerning Israeli motives for the attack, Ennes wrote that Israeli 
officials may have decided to destroy the ship because they feared its 
sensitive listening devices would detect Israeli plans to invade Syria's 
Golan Heights. (Israel invaded Syria the day after the Liberty attack, 
despite Israel's earlier acceptance of a ceasefire with its Arab foes.) 

Ennes learned that crewmen sensed a cover-up even while the 
court was taking testimony at Malta. He identified George Golden, the 
Liberty's engineering officer and acting commanding officer, as the 
source of the Associated Press story charging that the attack was delib- 
erate. Golden, who is Jewish, was so outraged at the prohibition 
against talking with reporters that he ignored it — risking his future 
career in the Navy to rescue a vestige of his country's honor. 

The American embassy at Tel Aviv relayed to Washington the 
only fully detailed Israeli account of the attack — the Israeli court of 
inquiry report known as "Israeli Preliminary Inquiry 1/67." The em- 



The Assault on "Assault" 171 

bassy message also contained the recommendation that, at the request 
of the Israeli government, it not be released to the American people. 
Ennes believes this is probably because both governments knew the 
mistaken identity excuse was too transparent to believe. 

Another request for secrecy was delivered by hand to Eugene 
Rostow, undersecretary of state for political affairs. It paralleled the 
message from the embassy at Tel Aviv imploring the Department of 
State to keep the Israeli court of inquiry secret because "the circum- 
stances of the attack [if the version outlined in the file is to be believed] 
strip the Israeli Navy naked." Although Ennes saw that message in an 
official file in 1977, by 1984 it had vanished from all known official files. 
Ennes believes Israeli officials decided to make the Israeli Navy the 
scapegoat in the controversy. With the blame piled on its Navy, the 
orphan service that has the least clout in Israel's military hierarchy, 
Israel then asked the U.S. to keep the humiliation quiet. United States 
officials agreed not to release the text of the Israeli report. 

Legal Adviser's Report Becomes Top Secret 

During this same period — the weeks immediately following the 
assault on the Liberty, an assessment of the "Israeli Preliminary In- 
quiry 1/67" was prepared by Carl F. Salans, legal adviser to the secre- 
tary of state. It was prepared for the consideration of Eugene Rostow. 
The report, kept top secret until 1983 and apparently given only cur- 
sory examination by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, examines the 
credibility of the Israeli study and reveals as has no other single docu- 
ment the real attitude of the U.S. government toward the Israeli attack 
on the USS Liberty. It was a document too explosive to release. 

Item by item, Salans demonstrated that the Israeli excuse could 
not be believed. Preparing the report immediately after the attack, he 
relied mainly on the limited information in Admiral Isaac Kidd's court 
of inquiry file. He never heard Ennes, Golden, nor any of the principal 
witnesses. He found enough there to discredit the Israeli document 
thoroughly. The items Salans examined were the speed and direction of 
the Liberty, aircraft surveillance, identification by Israeli aircraft, 
identification by torpedo boats, flag and identification markings, and 
time sequence of attacks. In each instance, eyewitness testimony or 
known facts disputed the Israeli claims of innocent error. 

For example, the Israeli report contended that the Liberty was 
traveling at a speed of 28 to 30 knots, hence behaving suspiciously. Its 
actual speed was five knots. Israeli reconnaissance aircraft claimed to 
have carried out only two overflight missions, at 6:00 and 9:00 a.m. 



172 They Dare to Speak Out 

Aircraft actually overflew the Liberty eight times, the first at 5:15 a.m. 
and the last at 12:45 p.m. 

The Israeli report charged that the Liberty, after refusing to iden- 
tify itself, opened fire. Captain McGonagle testified that the only sig- 
nals by the torpedo boats came from a distance of 2,000 yards when the 
attack run was already launched and torpedoes on their way. The 
blinker signals could not be read because of intermittent smoke and 
flames. Not seeing them, the Liberty could not reply. Immediately 
thereafter it was hit by a torpedo and 25 sailors died instantly. 

The Israeli report contended that the Liberty did not display a flag 
or identifying marks. Five crewmen testified that they saw the naval 
ensign flying the entire morning and until the attack. When the flag was 
shot away during the air attack, another larger flag was hoisted before 
the torpedo onslaught began. Hull markings were clear and freshly 
painted. The Israelis tried to shift responsibility by asserting that the 
attack originated through reports that the coastal area was being 
shelled from the sea. Salans said it should be clear to any trained 
observer that the small guns aboard the Liberty were incapable of 
shore bombardment. 

The Salans report was forwarded September 21, 1967, to Under 
Secretary of State Rostow. This means that high officials of the admin- 
istration knew the falsity of Israeli claims about the Liberty soon after 
the assault itself. 

With a document in hand so thoroughly refuting the Israeli claims, 
the next logical step obviously would be its presentation to the Israeli 
government for comment, followed by publication of the findings. 

Instead, it was stamped "top secret" and hidden from public view, 
as well as the attention of other officials of our government and its 
military services, along with the still-hidden Israeli report. Dean Rusk, 
secretary of state at the time, says that he has "no current recollection" 
of seeing the Salans report. He adds, however, that he "was never 
satisfied with the Israeli purported explanation of the USS Liberty 
affair." 

The cover-up of the Salans report and other aspects of the episode 
soon had agonizing implications for United States security. 

If the Navy had been candid about the Liberty episode even within 
its own ranks, the nation might have been spared the subsequent 
humiliation of an ordeal that began five months later when North Ko- 
rean forces killed a U.S. sailor and captured the USS Pueblo and its 
entire crew. The agony ended when the crew was released after experi- 
encing a year of captivity under brutal conditions. 

Pueblo commander Lloyd M. Bucher later concluded that if he 



The Assault on "Assault" 173 

had been armed with facts of the disaster in the Mediterranean, he 
might have prevented the Pueblo episode. 

In the late summer of 1967, still ashore but preparing to take 
command of the ill-fated ship, Bucher learned of the Liberty's misfor- 
tune. Headed for hostile waters near North Korea, he believed his 
mission would profit from the experience and asked for details. Bucher 
recalls how his request was brushed aside: "I asked my superiors about 
the disaster and was told it was all just a big mistake, that there was 
nothing we could learn from it." When he later read the Ennes book, 
Bucher discovered that the Liberty crew had encountered many of the 
same problems his ship faced just before its capture. Both ships had 
inadequate means for destroying secret documents and equipment, 
and, in a crisis, even the ship itself. Both had serious shortcomings in 
control procedures. Bucher blames "incompetency at the top" and 
"lack of response to desperate calls for assistance during the attack." 
He speaks bitterly of the Pueblo's ordeal: 

We had a man killed and 14 wounded. Then a year of pretty damned severe 
brutality which could have been prevented had I been told what happened to 
the Liberty. It's only because that damned incident was covered up as thoroughly 
as it was. 

The cover-up of the attack on the Liberty had other, more personal 
consequences. On recommendation of the Navy Department, Wil- 
liam L. McGonagle, captain of the Liberty, was approved by President 
Johnson for the nation's highest award, the Congressional Medal of 
Honor. According to Ennes, the captain "defied bullets, shrapnel and 
napalm" during the attack and, despite injuries, stayed on the bridge 
throughout the night. Under his leadership, the 82 crewmen who had 
survived death and injury had kept the ship afloat despite a 40-foot hole 
in the side and managed to bring the crippled vessel to safe harbor. 

McGonagle was an authentic hero, but he was not to get the award 
with the customary style, honor, ceremony and publicity. It would not 
be presented personally by the president, nor would the event be at the 
White House. The Navy Department got instructions to arrange the 
ceremony elsewhere. The president would not take part. It was up to 
the Navy to find a suitable place. Admiral Thomas L. Moorer, who had 
become chief of naval operations shortly before the order arrived, 
was upset. It was the only Congressional Medal in his experience not 
presented at the White House. He protested to the Secretary of De- 
fense Robert S. McNamara, but the order stood. From the two houses 
of the legislature for which the medal is named came not a voice of 
protest. 



174 They Dare to Speak Out 

The admiral would have been even more upset had he known at 
the time that the White House delayed approving the medal until it was 
cleared by Israel. Ennes quoted a naval officer as saying: "The govern- 
ment is pretty jumpy about Israel. The State Department even asked 
the Israeli ambassador if his government had any objection to 
McGonagle getting the medal. 'Certainly not,' Israel said." The text of 
the accompanying citation gave no offense: it did not mention Israel. 

The secretary of the Navy presented the medal in a small, quiet 
ceremony at the Navy Yard in Washington. Admiral Moorer said later 
he was not surprised at the extraordinary arrangements. "They had 
been trying to hush it up all the way through." Moorer added, "The 
way they did things I'm surprised they didn't just hand it to him under 
the 14th Street Bridge." 

Even tombstone inscriptions at the Arlington National Cemetery 
perpetuated the cover-up. As with McGonagle's citation, Israel was 
not mentioned. For fifteen years the marker over the graves of six 
Liberty crewmen read simply, "died in the Eastern Mediterranean." No 
mention of the ship, the circumstances, or Israel. Visitors might con- 
clude they died of natural causes. Finally, survivors of the ship banded 
together into the USS Liberty Veterans Association and launched a 
protest that produced a modest improvement. The cover-up was lifted 
ever so slightly in 1982 when the cemetery marker was changed to 
read, "Killed USS Liberty." The dedication event at gravesite was as 
quiet as the McGonagle ceremony years before. The only civilian 
official of the U.S. government attending, Senator Larry Pressler, 
promised further investigation of the Liberty episode but two years 
later had done nothing. 

The national cover-up even dictated the phrasing of letters of con- 
dolence to the survivors of those killed in the assault. In such circum- 
stances, next of kin normally receive a letter from the president setting 
forth the facts of the tragedy and expressing profound feelings over the 
hardship, sacrifice and bravery involved in the death. In fact, letters by 
the hundreds were then being sent to next of kin as the toll in Vietnam 
mounted. 

To senior White House officials, however, death by Israeli fire was 
different from death at the hands of the Vietcong. A few days after the 
assault on the Liberty, the senior official in charge of President John- 
son's liaison with the Jewish community, Harry McPherson, received 
this message from White House aide James Cross: 

Thirty-one [sic] Navy personnel were killed aboard the USS Liberty as the 
result of the accidental [sic] attack by Israeli forces. The attached condolence 
letters, which have been prepared using basic formats approved for Vietnam 
war casualties, strike me as inappropriate in this case. 

Due to the very sensitive nature of the whole Arab-Israeli situation and the 



The Assault on "Assault" 175 

circumstances under which these people died, I would ask that you review 
these drafts and provide me with nine or ten different responses which will 
adequately deal with this special situation. 

The "special situation" led McPherson to agree that many of the 
usual paragraphs of condolence were "inappropriate." He suggested 
phrases that de-emphasized combat, ignored the Israeli role and even 
the sacrifice involved. 

Responding to the "very sensitive nature" of relations with Israel, 
the president's staff set aside time-honored traditions in recognizing 
those killed in combat. McPherson suggested that the letters express 
the president's gratitude for the "contribution to the cause of peace" 
made by the victims and state that Johnson had tried to avert the 
Israeli- Arab war. 

While Washington engaged in this strange program of coverup, 
Liberty crewmen could remember with satisfaction a moment of per- 
sonal pride, however brief. On the afternoon of June 10, 1967, as the 
battered ship and its crew prepared to part company with the USS 
America for their journey to Malta and the court of inquiry, carrier 
Captain Donald Engen ordered a memorial service for those who had 
died during the assault. Held on the deck of the America where more 
than 2,000 sailors were gathered, the service was an emotional mo- 
ment. Afterwards, as the ships parted, Engen called for three cheers 
for the Liberty crew. Petty Officer Jeffery Carpenter, weakened from 
loss of blood, occupied a stretcher on the Liberty's main deck. Crew- 
man Stan White lifted one end of the stretcher so Carpenter could see 
as well as hear the tribute being paid by the carrier. "Such cheers!" 
Engen told me. "Boy, you could hear the cheers echo back and forth 
across the water. It was a very moving thing." 

It was the only "moving thing" that would be officially bestowed in 
tribute to the heroic crew. 

"This Is Pure Murder" 

Books have perpetuated myths about the Liberty. Yitzhak Rabin, 
military commander of Israeli forces at the time, declared in his 
memoirs published in 1979 that the Liberty was mistaken for an Egyp- 
tian ship: "I must admit I had mixed feelings about the news [that it was 
actually a U.S. ship] — profound regret at having attacked our friends 
and a tremendous sense of relief [that the ship was not Soviet]." He 
wrote that Israel, while compensating victims of the assault, refused to 
pay for the damage to the ship "since we did not consider ourselves 
responsible for the train of errors." 

Lyndon Johnson's own memoirs, Vantage Point, continued the 
fiction that the ship had been "attacked in error." Although his signa- 



176 They Dare to Speak Out 

ture had appeared on letters of condolence to 34 next of kin, his 
memoirs reported the death toll at only ten. He cited 100 wounded; the 
actual count was 171. He added, "This heartbreaking episode grieved 
the Israelis deeply, as it did us." 

Johnson wrote of the message he had sent on the hotline to Mos- 
cow in which he assured the Soviets that carrier aircraft were on their 
way to the scene and that "investigation was the sole purpose of these 
flights." He did not pretend that protection and rescue of the ship and 
its crew were among his objectives, nor did he record that the carrier 
aircraft were never permitted to proceed to the Liberty even for "inves- 
tigation." The commander-in-chief devoted only sixteen lines to one of 
the worst peacetime naval disasters in history. 

Moshe Dayan, identified in a CIA report as the officer who person- 
ally ordered the attack, made no mention of the Liberty in his lengthy 
autobiography. According to the CIA document, Dayan had issued the 
order over the protests of another Israeli general who said, "This is 
pure murder." 

The cover-up also dogged Ennes in the marketing of his book. 
Despite high praise in reviews, book orders routinely got "lost," 
wholesale listings disappeared mysteriously, and the Israeli lobby 
launched a far-flung campaign to discredit the text. The naval base in 
San Diego returned a supply of books when a chaplain filed a com- 
plaint. Military writer George Wilson told Ennes that when the Wash- 
ington Post printed a review, "It seemed that every phone in the 
building had someone calling to complain about our mention of the 
book." 

The Atlanta Journal called Ennes's Assault on the Liberty a "dis- 
quieting story of Navy bungling, government cover-up and Israeli du- 
plicity that is well worth reading." The Columbus Dispatch called it 
"an inquest of cover-up in the area of international political intrigue." 
Journalist Seymour Hersh praised it as "an insider's book by an honest 
participant," and the prestigious Naval Institute at Annapolis called it 
"probably the most important naval book of the year." 

Israel took swift measures to warn U.S. readers to ignore the 
reviews. The Israeli Foreign Office charged, "Ennes allows his very 
evident rancor and subjectivity to override objective analysis," and 
that his "conclusions fly in the face of logic and military facts." These 
charges, Ennes later said, were "adopted by the Anti-Defamation 
League of B'nai B'rith for distribution to Israeli supporters throughout 
the United States." A caller to the American Israel Public Affairs Com- 
mittee was told that the book was "a put-up job, all lies and financed by 
the National Association of Arab Americans." Ennes said the "emo- 
tional rhetoric" caused "serious damage to sales and a marked reluc- 
tance of media executives to allow discussion of this story." 



The Assault on "Assault" 111 

As the result of radio talk shows and lecture platforms on which 
Ennes appeared, he heard from people "all over the country" who had 
been frustrated in efforts to buy his book. Several retail book stores, 
seeking to order the book from the publisher, Random House, were 
given false information — they were told the book did not exist, or that 
it had not been published, or that it was out of print, or that it was 
withdrawn to avoid a law suit. 

Talk show host Ray Taliaferro caused a stir one Sunday night in 
1980 when he announced over San Francisco radio station KGO that he 
would interview Ennes the following Sunday. Over 500 protest letters 
poured into the station, but the program went on as scheduled. Public 
response was overwhelming, as listener calls continued to stream in for 
a full hour after the two-hour show with Ennes had ended. Two phone 
calls arrived threatening Taliaferro's life — one on a supposedly private 
line. 

At the invitation of Paul Backus, editor of the Journal of Elec- 
tronic Defense, Ennes wrote a guest editorial in 1981 on the implica- 
tions of the Liberty incident, stating that friendly nations sometimes 
feel compelled to take hostile actions. In the case of the Liberty, he 
added, 

Because the friendly nation ... is the nation of Israel, and because the nation 
of Israel is widely, passionately and expensively supported in the United 
States, and perhaps also because a proper inquiry would reveal a humiliating 
failure of command, control and communications, an adequate investigation 
... has yet to be politically palatable. 

Backus was stunned when the owners of the magazine, an organi- 
zation of military and defense-related executives known as the Associ- 
ation of Old Crows, ordered him not to publish the Ennes editorial. 
Association spokesman Gus Slayton wrote to Backus that the article 
was "excellent" but said "it would not be appropriate to publish it now 
in view of the heightened tension in the Middle East." Backus, a retired 
Navy officer, resigned: "I want nothing more to do with organizations 
which would further suppress the information." The Ennes piece was 
later given prominent play in a rival magazine, Defense Electronics, 
which later found it a popular reprint at $3 a copy. 

As Ennes lectured at universities in the midwest and west in 1981 
and 1982, he encountered protests in different form. Although most 
reaction was highly favorable, hecklers called him a liar and an anti- 
Semite and protested to administrators against his appearance on cam- 
pus. Posters announcing his lectures were routinely ripped down. 
Wording identical with that used by the Israeli Foreign Office and B'nai 
B'rith in attacks on the book appeared in flyers distributed by local 
"Jewish Student Unions" as Ennes spoke to college audiences. 



178 They Dare to Speak Out 

Criticism of the Ennes book seemed to be coordinated on a na- 
tional—even international— scale. After National Public Radio read 
the full text of the book over its book-reading network, alert local 
Anti-Defamation League spokesmen demanded and received the 
opportunity for a 10-minute rebuttal at the end of the series. The rebut- 
tal in Seattle was almost identical with a document attacking the book 
issued by the Israeli Foreign Office in Jerusalem. Both rebuttals 
matched verbatim a letter criticizing Ennes that had appeared in the 
Jacksonville (Florida) Times-Union. 

Ennes's misfortunes took an ironic turn in June 1982 when ABC's 
Nightline cancelled the broadcast of a segment it had prepared on the 
15-year reunion of the Liberty crew. The show was pre-empted by 
crisis coverage of Israel's invasion of Lebanon, which had begun the 
day before. In early 1983, Nightline rescheduled the segment, but 
once again Israel intruded; this time an interview with its new U.S. 
ambassador, Moshe Arens, took the allotted time. Meanwhile, the 
edited tape and 15 reels of unedited film had disappeared from the 
studio library. (Ennes's book may have cost the former captain of the ill- 
fated Pueblo an appearance on ABC's "Good Morning America" tele- 
vision show in 1980. Bucher had been invited to New York for a post- 
captivity interview. Suddenly the interview was withdrawn. A studio 
official told Bucher only that he had heard there were problems "up- 
stairs," but then he asked Bucher, "Did you have a book review pub- 
lished recently in the Washington Post?" He had indeed, a review 
which heaped praise on the Ennes book). 

Later in 1983, the Jewish War Veterans organization protested 
when the Veterans of Foreign Wars quoted Ennes to support its call for 
"proper honors" for those killed on the Liberty and again when 
James R. Currieo, national commander of the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars, referred to the "murderous Israeli attack." Currieo excited Jew- 
ish wrath even more when he published in the VFW magazine a letter 
to President Reagan inviting the White House to send a representative 
to the cemetery to help honor the men who died. There was no reply. 

Four years after publication of Assault on the Liberty, Ennes is 
still receiving a steady flow of mail and telephone calls about the 
episode. Elected by his shipmates as their official historian, he became 
editor of The USS Liberty Newsletter. Meanwhile, not wishing to be 
fettered to an endless struggle of conscience, he is writing another 
book on an unrelated subject and trying to leave the Liberty matter 
behind. He finds it cannot be left behind. The book continues to gener- 
ate a swirl of controversy that will not go away. 

Another retired officer, Admiral Thomas L. Moorer, applauds En- 
nes's activities and still wants an investigation. He scoffs at the mis- 



The Assault on "Assault" 179 

taken identity theory, and says he hopes Congress will investigate and 
if it does not, he favors reopening the Navy's court of inquiry. He adds, 
"I would like to see it done, but I doubt seriously that it will be al- 
lowed." 

Asked why the Johnson administration ordered the cover-up, 
Moorer is blunt: "The clampdown was not actually for security reasons 
but for domestic political reasons. I don't think there is any question 
about it. What other reasons could there have been? President Johnson 
was worried about the reaction of Jewish voters." 

Moorer says the attack was "absolutely deliberate" and adds, 
"The American people would be goddam mad if they knew what goes 
on." 



"Like Sending a Weather Report" 

The publication in September 1990 of Victor Ostrovsky's By Way of 
Deception is certain to broaden awareness of what goes on in the realm of 
Israeli perfidy. 

The shocking exposfi, written by a former Israeli spy, reports that the 
Mossad, Israel's intelligence agency, failed to relay to the United States early 
data about the 1983 suicide bombing that killed 241 U.S. marines asleep in a 
barracks at the Beirut airport 

An informant had told the Mossad that a large truck was being fitted by 
Shi'ite Muslims with spaces that could hold bombs of exceptional size. Local 
agents concluded that the marine barracks was among the most likely targets, 
but, according to Ostrovsky, the Mossad chief in Tel Aviv made a conscious 
decision not to warn the U.S. government, declaring: "We're not there to 
protect Americans." Accordingly, only a routine notice went to the CIA, 
which, Ostrovsky writes, "was like sending a weather report." 

In equally foolish acts, the government of Israel requested and a New York 
judge ordered that the book be banned in the United States. The New York Post 
headlined: "Israelis muzzle spy author." The New York Times summed up the 
book's allegation: the Mossad failed to warn the CIA because it wanted "to 
poison American relations with Arab countries." 

When the ban was overturned by a higher court the next day, the book 
enjoyed a second round of nationwide publicity. Overnight it was a bestseller. 



Chapter 7 



Challenges to Academic Freedom 



The Israeli lobby pays special attention to the crucial role played by 
American colleges and universities in disseminating information and 
molding opinion on the Middle East. Lobby organizations are con- 
cerned not only with academic programs dealing with the Middle East 
but also with the editorial policies of student newspapers and with the 
appearance on campus of speakers critical of Israel. In all three of 
these areas of legitimate lobby interest and activity, as in its dealings on 
Capitol Hill, pro-Israeli organizations and activists frequently employ 
smear tactics, harassment and intimidation to inhibit the free exchange 
of ideas and views. 

As government, academic and public awareness of the Middle 
East increased following the 1973 OPEC oil price hike, such organiza- 
tions as the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and the Ameri- 
can Jewish Committee developed specific programs and policies for 
countering criticism of Israel on college campuses. 

Making It "Hot Enough" on Campus 

In 1979 AIPAC established its Political Leadership Development 
Program, which trains student activists on how to increase pro-Israeli 
influence on campus. Coordinator Jonathan Kessler recently reported 
that in just four years "AIPAC's program has affiliated over 5,000 stu- 
dents on 350 campuses in all 50 states": 

They are systematically monitoring and comprehensively responding to anti- 
Israeli groups on campus. They are involved in pro-Israel legislative efforts, in 
electoral campaign politics as well. 

However self-serving and perhaps exaggerated such statements 
may be, AIPAC works closely with the B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundation 

180 



Challenges to Academic Freedom 181 

on campuses. When Kessler is introduced to campus audiences, it is as 
one who has "trained literally thousands of students." His campus 
contacts send him tapes or notes from talks that are considered to be 
"pro-Palestinian" or "anti-Israeli" and alert him to upcoming speaking 
engagements. Kessler keeps the notes on file and when he hears that a 
particular speaker is coming to a campus, he sends summaries of the 
speaker's usual points and arguments, his question-answer style, and 
potentially damaging quotes — or purported quotes — from other talks. 
Kessler specializes in concocting questions with which the speaker will 
have difficulty and in warning the campus organizers away from ques- 
tions the speaker answers well. 

If the student union or academic senate controls what groups may 
be allowed to reserve halls, Kessler works to get friends of Israel into 
those bodies. If the control is with the administration, speakers are 
accused of advocating violence, either by "quoting" earlier speeches or 
by characterizing them as pro-PLO. AIPAC students also argue that 
certain forums, such as memorial lectures should not be "politicized." 
While this may not always bar the speaker, Kessler advises that "if you 
make it hot enough" for the administrators, future events will be dis- 
couraged and even turned down rather than scheduled. 

Kessler's students receive training— through role-playing and 
"propaganda response exercises" — in how to counter anti-Israel argu- 
ments. These exercises simulate confrontations at pro- and anti-Israel 
information tables and public forums. 

Once a solid AIPAC contingent is formed, it takes part in student 
conferences and tries to forge coalitions with other student groups. 
AIPAC then has pro-Israeli resolutions passed in these bodies and can 
run pro-Israel advertisements signed by the (liberal) Americans for 
Democratic Action and (conservative) Young Americans for Freedom, 
for example, rather than just by AIPAC. The workshop handout says: 
"Use coalitions effectively, Tty finding non-Jewish individuals and 
groups to sign letters to the editor, for it is far more effective and 
credible." 

In 1983 AIPAC distributed to students and faculty around the 
country a ten-page questionnaire on political activism on their cam- 
puses. Its instructions include: "Please name any individual faculty 
who assist anti-Israel groups. How is this assistance offered? What are 
the propaganda themes . . . ?" The survey results form the body of the 
AIPAC College Guide: Exposing the Anti-Israel Campaign on Campus, 
published in April 1984. 

While AIPAC claims to respect the right of all to free speech, 
number eight on its list of 10 suggested "modes of response" to pro- 
Palestinian events or speakers on campus reads: "Attempt to prevent." 



182 They Dare to Speak Out 

Number 10 on the same list reads "Creative packaging." Edward Said, 
a professor of comparative literature at Columbia University who fre- 
quently speaks on campuses in support of the Palestinian cause, de- 
scribed a case of "creative packaging" at the University of Washington 
where he spoke in early 1983: 

They stood at the door of the auditorium and distributed a blue leaflet which 
seemed like a program but it was in fact a denunciation of me as a 'terrorist.* 
There were quotations from the PLO, and things that I had said were mixed in 
with things they claimed the PLO had said about murdering Jews. The idea was 
to intimidate me and to intimidate the audience from attending. 

Said reports another experience at the University of Florida, 
where the group protesting Said's talk was led by a professor of phi- 
losophy: 

They tried to disrupt the meeting and [the professor] finally had to be taken out 
by the police. It was one of the ugliest things, not just heckling but interrupting 
and standing up and shouting. It's pure fascism, outright hooliganism. 

Another episode involving Said occurred at THnity College in 
Hartford, Connecticut. In the fall of 1982 Said spoke, at the invitation 
of the college's Department of Religion, on the subject of Palestine and 
its significance to Christians and Muslims as well as Jews. As the day 
of the talk approached, the department began to get letters of protest 
from prominent members of the Hartford Jewish community and from 
Jewish faculty members. Said, said the protesters, was pro-Palestinian 
and had made "anti-Israel" statements. One writer asked the orga- 
nizers of the talk: "How could you do this, given the fact that there are 
two Holocaust survivors on the faculty?" 

After Said spoke, more letters of protest arrived at the religion 
department, and a move was made to deny the department a new $1 
million chair in Jewish Studies. The uproar died down after several 
months, but the protests had their effect. Asked whether the depart- 
ment would feel free, given the reaction of the Jewish community, to 
invite Edward Said again, a department spokesperson responded, "No, 
I don't think we would." 

The AIPAC College Guide also includes profiles of 100 U.S. cam- 
puses and the anti-Israel campaign "unprecedented in scope and mag- 
nitude" which supposedly pervades them. Anti-Semitism is also cited 
as a major influence on some campuses. For example, Colorado State 
University's campus newspaper, the Collegian, is said to have printed 
anti-Semitic letters to the editor; but only a letter which "sought to 
draw attention to the * Jewish lobby and the true extent of its influence 
over the U.S. media' " is cited as evidence. 



Challenges to Academic Freedom 1 83 

An example of how the lobby works on campus came in the spring 
of 1982 when the American Indian Law Students Association (AILSA) 
at Harvard Law School hosted a conference on the rights of indigenous 
peoples in domestic and international law. They invited Deena Abu 
Lughod, an American of Palestinian origin who worked as a researcher 
at the PLO mission to the United Nations, to participate in the confer- 
ence. The Harvard Jewish Law Students Association (HJLSA), which 
according to one source has an active membership of only about 
twenty, first asked AILSA to remove Abu-Lughod from the program. 

When this failed, the Jewish group protested vehemently to the 
dean of the law school and also asked the dean of students to consider 
withdrawing all funding for the conference. The latter refused, saying 
she was "not in the business of censoring student conferences." But 
the dean of the law school, who was slated to give the opening address 
at the conference, backed out. Several members of the Indian Law 
Students Association and the director of the Harvard Foundation 
(which co-sponsored the conference), received telephoned death 
threats. One came from callers who identified themselves as Jewish 
Harvard students. Told of these, a member of the HJLSA said, "We 
were contacted by the JDL [Jewish Defense League], but we didn't 
want to have anything to do with any disruption of the conference." 

The conference took place as scheduled, but one organizer recalls: 

The atmosphere was incredibly tense. We were really very concerned about 
Deena' s physical safety and about our own physical safety. We had seven 
policemen there. We had many, many marshals and very elaborate security. We 
had searches at the door, and we confiscated weapons, knives — not pocket 
knives — but butcher knives. We also had dogs sniff the room for explosives. 
The point is that the event did occur, but in a very threatening atmosphere. 

The following spring, a group of Third World student organiza- 
tions at Harvard invited the director of the PLO Information Office in 
Washington, Hassan Abdul-Rahman, to speak on the theme "Palestine: 
Road to Peace in the Middle East." Again the Harvard Jewish Law 
Students Association organized a demonstration, but this time the pro- 
testers packed the hall and actively disrupted the meeting. "It was just 
an absolute madhouse inside," recalls one student who was present. 
"Abdul-Rahman spoke for probably an hour and a half to virtually 
constant taunting, jeering, insults, screams, shouts, cursing." 

According to the Harvard Law Record, a representative of the 
Harvard Arab Students Society "struggled" simply to relate a bio- 
graphical sketch of the speaker and to provide an introduction to his 
talk. "It was an extremely intimidating atmosphere," recalls the stu- 
dent: 



184 They Dare to Speak Out 

We just barely kept the lid on things. I think the fact that these events occurred 
is a testimony to our perseverence, not to the lack of intimidation. Because the 
intimidation is really very overt and very strong. 

In both cases the protesters used material provided by the Anti- 
Defamation League of B'nai B'rith. 

In still another incident at Harvard, a member of the Harvard law 
faculty who had visited the Israeli-occupied West Bank on a tour orga- 
nized by North American Friends of Palestinian Universities gave a 
talk on campus after his return. Prior to the talk, a group of students 
from the Harvard Jewish Law Students Association came to the pro- 
fessor's office. They told him that they just wanted to make sure that 
he knew "all the facts" before giving his talk, and if he wasn't going to 
give a "balanced" picture, they intended to picket his address. 

Recently asked if he altered his talk in any way as a response to 
the visit by the students, the professor said, "No, but that's because I 
knew what was going on whether or not they came to my office. I knew 
they were going to be there and I knew what the situation was." He 
added that "the presence of a highly charged group of Jewish law 
students" changed the nature of his talk "from one that was more 
directed at what was actually going on for the Palestinians into one that 
was more abstract and about the relationship between power and 
knowledge here and there and in a lot of other places." After the talk, 
the representatives of the HJLSA sent the professor a letter saying 
they were "very satisfied with the balanced nature" of his presentation. 
"Which made me think," he said, "it had been a little too balanced." 

He said the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was "an issue about which 
we've never had a successful, open discussion at this school." The 
professor said that, while he didn't feel intimidated, "I felt that I was 
operating in a place in which there were limits on what I could say." 

AIPAC is not the only pro-Israel organization to keep files on 
speakers. The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith keeps its own 
files. Noam Chomsky, world renowned professor of linguistics at MIT 
and author of two books on the Middle East, was leaked a copy of his 
ADL file, containing about a hundred pages of material. Says 
Chomsky: "Virtually every talk I give is monitored and reports of their 
alleged contents (sometimes ludicrously, even comically distorted) are 
sent on to the [Anti-Defamation] League, to be incorporated in my 
file." 

Says Chomsky: 

When I give a talk at a university or elsewhere, it is common for a group to 
distribute literature, invariably unsigned, containing a collection of attacks on 
me spiced with "quotes" (generally fabricated) from what I am alleged to have 
said here and there. 



Challenges to Academic Freedom 1 85 

I have no doubt that the source is the ADL, and often the people distributing 
the unsigned literature acknowledge the fact. These practices are vicious and 
serve to intimidate many people. They are of course not illegal. If the ADL 
chooses to behave in this fashion, it has a right to do so; but this should also be 
exposed. 

Student publications are also monitored. When the monthly 
Berkeley Graduate, a magazine of news and opinion intended for 
graduate students at the University of California at Berkeley, published 
in its April 1982 issue several articles critical of Israeli Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin and his government's policies, the office of the maga- 
zine began to receive anonymous phone calls, generally expressing in 
crude terms the callers' opinion of the magazine. One caller suggested 
that the editor, James Schamus, "take the next train to Auschwitz." 
According to Schamus, these calls continued for several weeks. 

The campus Jewish Student Board circulated a petition protesting 
the content of the April issue and characterized the Graduate as anti- 
Semitic — until it discovered that editor James Schamus was himself 
Jewish. Schamus met with Jewish Student Board members and agreed 
to furnish space in the following issue of the magazine for a 4,000-word 
rebuttal, but they were not satisfied. 

The following week, members of the Jewish Student Board in- 
troduced a bill in the Graduate Assembly expressing "regret" at the 
content of the April issue and stipulating that if an oversight committee 
were not formed "to review each issue's content before it goes to 
press," steps would be taken to eliminate the Graduate. The assembly 
voted down the resolution but agreed to revive a moribund editorial 
oversight committee to set editorial policy. Opponents of the bill, in- 
cluding editors of several campus publications, defended the right of 
the Graduate to print "without prior censorship." 

The next day, the Student Senate narrowly defeated a bill that 
would have expressed "dissatisfaction" with the Graduate magazine. 
An earlier draft of the bill, amended by the Senate, would have asked 
the Senate to "condemn" the publication. An editorial in The Daily 
Californian, the university's main student newspaper, said that such 
"meaningless censures" came not out of intelligent consideration of an 
issue, but out of "irrational urgings to punish the progenitor of an idea 
with which one disagrees." 

The May issue of the Graduate did contain a response to 
Schamus's original article. The author concluded his piece by calling 
the April issue of the Graduate "simple, unvarnished anti-Semitism in 
both meaning and intent." 

Later in May, Schamus left for a two-month vacation. While he 
was gone, the Graduate Assembly leadership decided by administra- 



186 They Dare to Speak Out 

tive fiat to cut the amount of student funds allocated to the Graduate by 
55 percent and to change the accounting rules in such a way that the 
magazine could no longer survive. Schamus resigned, along with his 
editorial and advertising staffs. In an interview with the San Francisco 
Examiner, Schamus said that the series on Begin "directly precipitated 
our silencing." He told the Daily Calif ornian: "This whole situation 
was a plan by student government censors to get rid of the magazine 
and create a new one in its own image next year." The chairman of the 
Graduate Assembly denied any conspiracy. "The Israel issue had abso- 
lutely nothing to do with it," he said. He acknowledged, however, that 
the controversy over the issue "brought up the question of content in 
the Graduate" The Graduate is today little more them a calendar of 
events that comes out four or five times a yean 

Student Editor Under Fire 

Another student newspaper editor who learned to think twice be- 
fore criticizing Israel is John D'Anna, editor of the Arizona Daily Wild- 
cat at the University of Arizona in TUcson during the 1982-83 academic 
year. In February of 1983, 22-year-old D'Anna wrote an editorial en- 
titled "Butcher of Beirut Is Also a War Criminal," in which he decried 
the fact that former Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon was per- 
mitted to remain a member of the Israeli Cabinet after being found 
"indirectly responsible" for the massacre of Palestinian civilians at the 
Sabra and Shatila camps in Lebanon. If Nazi war criminal Klaus Bar- 
bie, the infamous "butcher of Lyon" was to be tried for his crimes 
against humanity, asked D'Anna, "shouldn't those responsible for the 
Beirut massacre be tried for theirs?" 

D'Anna was shocked at the reaction to his editorial: 

My grandparents were the only John D' Annas listed in the phone book, and 
they were harassed with late night phone calls. I personally got a couple of the 

type 'If we ever catch you alone ' There were threats on my life. I also got 

hate mail. Some of the letters were so vitriolic it makes me shudder. 

There followed a series of letters to the newspaper accusing 
D'Anna of "irresponsible polemic," "fanning hatred" and "inciting vio- 
lence." The director of the local B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundation wrote 
that D' Anna's editorial "merely inflames passions, draws conclusions 
on half-truths and misleads." 

The uproar prompted D'Anna to write an apology in a subsequent 
issue. He said that while he stood by his beliefs, "I just wish I had 
expressed those beliefs differently." He agreed with some of his critics 
that it was a bad editorial and that he could have made the same points 
"without arousing passions and without polemic." 



Challenges to Academic Freedom 187 

Nevertheless, the day after D' Anna's apology appeared, members 
of twenty local Jewish groups wrote to the university president de- 
manding that the Wildcat editor resign or be fired for his "anti-Semitic" 
and "anti-Israel" editorial. If he was not fired by noon the following 
Monday, said the letter, the group would tell Wildcat advertisers that 
the newspaper was "spreading hatred," in the hope that the advertisers 
would cancel their ads. The group's spokesman was Edward Tennen, 
head of the local Jewish Defense League, a group founded by Meir 
Kahane, who advocates the forcible expulsion of Arabs from Israel. 
The JDL is shunned by AIPAC and other Jewish groups. 

When the deadline passed without D'Anna' s removal, the group 
calling for a boycott, having dubbed itself "United Zionist Institu- 
tions," distributed a letter to local businesses and ad agencies urging 
them to stop supporting the Wildcat's "anti-Semitic editor" and his 
"consciously orchestrated bigotry." Calling D'Anna "an accomplice to 
PLO aims," the letter asked the advertisers to "search your con- 
sciences and do what you know must be done." D'Anna noted that the 
group's acronym was UZI, the name of the standard issue Israeli ma- 
chine gun. 

Meanwhile, about twenty-five members of local Jewish groups, 
mostly from the campus Hillel organization, attended a meeting of the 
university's Board of Publications during which they confronted 
D'Anna with their complaints. As the former editor recalls it: 

I was on the hot seat for about two hours. And I tried to deal with all their 
questions and they kept demanding that steps be taken. I asked them what 
steps, and they said they wanted a review board. And I said That's fine, you 
can review anything you want after it comes out in the paper/ and they said 
'No, we want to review it before it comes out in the paper,' and I said that was 
totally unacceptable. 

In the end the boycott effort was ineffective, as only two busi- 
nesses cancelled their advertising. Moreover, D'Anna received firm 
support from the newspaper staff and from the head of the university's 
journalism department, himself Jewish. Yet the former editor recalls 
that the campaign against him had an impact: "It was effective to a 
certain extent. I was gun-shy and it was quite a while before I touched 
any international issue." 



"It Seemed to Be Politics" 

The Hartford Seminary in Hartford, Connecticut, has the oldest 
Islamic studies program in the United States. Beginning in the early 
1970s, the president of the seminary began to receive complaints from 
members of the Hartford Jewish community that the program was anti- 



188 They Dare to Speak Out 

Jewish. One person said the program was in fact an "al-Fatah support 
group." More recently, Willem A. Bijlefeld, director of the seminary's 
Center for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, was 
asked by the local daily Hartford Courant to write a piece about PLO 
leader Yasser Arafat. On New Year's Eve, 1983, the day following 
publication of his article, Bijelfeld received a phone call from a man 
who identified himself only as Jewish. The caller said that the seminary 
had a long tradition of "anti- Jewish propaganda" and accused Bijlefeld 
of supporting "the killing of Jews and the destruction of Israel." He 
then expressed his joy at the "extremely painful death" of NBC news 
anchorwoman Jessica Savitch, killed in an automobile accident, which 
he said was a "manifestation of divine justice" since she had "lied" 
about the number of Lebanese forced out of their homes during the 
1982 Israeli invasion. The caller said that he was fully confident that 
this kind of punishment awaited "any enemy of Israel." Said Bijlefeld, 
"The implications for me were clear." 

Ostracism is another weapon of the lobby. Eqbal Ahmad is an 
American scholar of Pakistani origin who holds two Ph.D. degrees 
from Princeton University, one in political science and one in Islamic 
studies. He is also a fellow at Washington's Institute for Policy Studies. 
Ahmad has written widely on the Middle East and has had a number of 
articles published on the op-ed page of the New York Times. Ahmad 
says that as a critic of Israeli policies and a supporter of the rights of 
the Palestinians, he has been ostracized by the academic community: 

It is not only the material punishments that people encounter, but the extraordi- 
nary environment of conformity that is imposed upon you and the price in 
isolation that individuals have to pay for not conforming on this issue. 

Ahmad joined the faculty of Cornell University in 1965. "I was a 
young assistant professor, generally liked by my colleagues," recalls 
Ahmad. "And they continued to be very warm and civil to me despite 
the fact that many of them were conservative people and I had already 
become fairly prominent in the anti- Vietnam war movement." 

After the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967, Ahmad made a speech at 
Cornell criticizing Israel's conquest and retention of Arab territory and 
also signed petitions supporting the right of the Palestinians to self- 
determination. Throughout his two remaining years at Cornell, says 
Ahmad, no more than four of the entire faculty spoke to him. "I would 
often sit at the lunch table in the faculty lounge, which is generally very 
crowded, and I would have a table for six to myself." Ahmad says that 
of the four who remained his friends, three were Jewish: 

The issue is not one of Jew versus gentile. There is a silent covenant within the 
academic community concerning Israel. The interesting thing is that the num- 



Challenges to Academic Freedom 1 89 

ber of prominent Jews who have broken the covenant is much larger than the 
number of gentiles. 

In 1983, Ahmad's name appeared in the B'nai B'rith publication 
Pro-Arab Propaganda in America: Vehicles and Voices. "This they are 
doing to somebody who has not to date received any form of support 
from an Arab government or an Arab organization," says Ahmad. 
Ahmad says that about a quarter of his income comes from speaking 
engagements, mainly university endowed lectures. Since the publica- 
tion of the B'nai B'rith "enemies list," his speaking invitations have 
dropped by about 50 percent. "These invitations come from my reputa- 
tion as an objective, independent scholar," says Ahmad. "By putting 
me under the rubric of propagandist they have put into question my 
position as an objective scholar." 

Since Ahmad left Cornell in 1969 he has not been able to obtain a 
regular teaching appointment. He has been a visiting professor at one 
college or another every year. Towards the end of his 1982-83 term at 
Rutgers University College in Newark, New Jersey, he was considered 
for a regular appointment, but at the last minute it fell through. Says 
Ahmad, 

I have been told privately that it was because Zionist professors objected to my 
appointment. The dean was told that I would not get the vote of the faculty 
because accusations had been made that I was anti-Semitic and had created an 
anti-Semitic atmosphere on the campus while I was teaching there. All this was 
told to me in private; I have nothing in writing. . . . 

S. C. Whittaker, former chairman of the Political Science Depart- 
ment at Rutgers University College and the man who originally hired 
Ahmad as a visiting professor, was away when the question of a full 
professorship for Ahmad came up. "When I got back," said Whittaker, 
"I was told that he'd been a great smash as a teacher and that his 
enrollments were terrific. But when the proposal to have him stay on 
permanently came up, it was shot down, and it seemed to be politics." 



Arab Funding Too Hot to Handle 

In 1977, three of America's most prestigious small colleges, 
Swarthmore, Haverford and Bryn Mawr, proposed to seek funds from 
a private Arab foundation for a joint Middle East studies program. The 
three "sister schools," located in the affluent "mainline" suburbs of 
Philadelphia, already shared a Russian studies program. 

The idea for the joint program originated in conversations between 
college officials and Swarthmore alumnus Willis Armstrong, a former 
assistant secretary of state who had recently become secretary- 



190 They Dare to Speak Out 

treasurer of the Triad Foundation. The Washington-based foundation 
had been established by wealthy Saudi entrepreneur Adnan Khashoggi 
to finance, in his words, "programs with long-range goals for building 
bridges of understanding between countries." Khashoggi is a flamboy- 
ant multimillionaire who made his fortune by serving as a middleman 
to foreign companies, including several major defense contractors, 
seeking business in Saudi Arabia. 

The three-year $590,000 program worked out by Armstrong and 
the colleges was exemplary by everyone's account. The plan would 
provide foreign student scholarships to needy Arab students, expand 
the colleges' collections of books and periodicals dealing with the Mid- 
dle East and strengthen existing Middle East-related courses. In addi- 
tion, about one-fourth of the grant would be used to finance a rotating 
professorship. The visiting professors would teach courses on the Mid- 
dle East and its relation to disciplines including anthropology, art his- 
tory, economics, history, political science and religion. 

"It was as innocuous and rich as a proposal could be," recalled 
Swarthmore Vice-President Kendall Landis five years later. Haverford 
President Stephen Cary had described it at the time as "promising in 
terms of academic enrichment." The program would serve to "raise the 
consciousness of students about the Middle East situation," com- 
mented Haverford' s associate director of development, John Gilbert. 

Perhaps the most enthusiastic supporter of the plan was Bryn 
Mawr President Harris Wofford. A former Peace Corps director, Wof- 
ford was known for his long interest in promoting international under- 
standing. He called the Middle East studies proposal "a good prospect 
for something we badly want." 

The grant proposal included a guarantee of absolute academic 
freedom. "This was to be done in accordance with the highest 
academic standards," explained Armstrong. "The colleges would 
choose the visiting professors, they'd buy the books and they'd pick 
out the students to whom to give scholarships." 

Moreover, the rotating professorship meant that no one professor 
would be around long enough to develop roots. "We really bent over 
backwards to be completely fair," said Landis. "Jewish professors 
would be employed as well as others." 

"There was never any pressure from Triad in any discussions we 
had with them," said Haverford's Cary, "nor any indication from them 
that it couldn't be a study that would include Israel. So I never had any 
criticism of the Triad Foundation people at all." 

The agreement with Triad was all but concluded by the three col- 
leges. All that remained was to present the grant proposal formally to 



Challenges to Academic Freedom 1 9 1 

the IHad Foundation which, Armstrong assured the college officials, 
would accept it and write out the check. 

Some, however, like Ira Silverman of the American Jewish Com- 
mittee, saw dangers in the plan. Silverman had received a telephone 
call from Swarthmore political science professor James Kurth alerting 
the AJC to the grant proposal. In a confidential memorandum he pre- 
pared for the AJC's National Committee on Arab Influence in the 
United States, Silverman wrote: 

Professor Kurth, who is not Jewish, believed that the proposed program should 
be of concern to the AJC inasmuch as it would not only expand study of the 
contemporary Arab world but would explicitly seek to bring the Arab political 
message to those campuses. 

Professor Kurth brought these facts to our attention and asked for AJC help in 
blocking the implementation of the program. We discussed the matter and 
agreed that it would make most sense to try to kill the program through quiet, 
behind-the-scenes talks with college officials, before 'going public'; and that 
protests against the program need not be based solely or particularly on Jewish 
opposition to Arab influence. Instead, we thought it should be possible to 
generate concern about the program based on its sponsorship by Khashoggi 
and its evident public relations aims, not appropriate for colleges of the stature 
of these three schools. 

Silverman went right to work orchestrating a campaign to discredit 
Khashoggi and Triad: 

I immediately sent Professor Kurth a folder of information on Khashoggi, the 
THad Corporation and Thad Foundation which was compiled by the AJC 
TVends Analysis Division. 

I also notified the AJC Philadelphia chapter of these developments so that they 
could be in touch with Professor Kurth to assist in getting some local Philadel- 
phia Jewish community leaders, alumni of the schools or otherwise associated 
with them, to raise questions about the proposed grant." 

The effect of the AJC's efforts to "kill the program" was stunning. 
Using material provided by Silverman, the Swarthmore student news- 
paper, The Phoenix, published an article which falsely stated that 
Khashoggi was "under indictment by a federal grand jury" in connec- 
tion with certain payments to Lockheed. Asked later about the role this 
article played in the controversy, James Piatt, who had edited the 
student newspaper, said: "The Phoenix got things out there publicly, at 
least for students and certain alums who probably hadn't heard about it 
beforehand, to make their phone calls and be upset and so forth." 
Where had he gotten his information? He refused to say. "I'd prefer to 



192 They Dare to Speak Out 

talk to the people first just to make sure they have no problem with 
that. At the time, it was to remain confidential." 

Before the Phoenix article appeared, Swarthmore President Theo- 
dore Friend called a meeting of department representatives to obtain 
the concurrence of faculty on the tentative grant proposal. Some of the 
faculty were reported to have objected to the plan. On the evening after 
the Phoenix article appeared, a petition was circulated in the college 
dining hall calling Khashoggi a "munitions monger" and referring to 
"kickbacks" in the Middle East. The petition, which called on the 
administration to drop the proposal, was signed by 230 students and 
faculty. Almost at the same time, the Philadelphia Jewish Federation 
had a letter on the president's desk. 

"Speaking from memory," says one observer close to the Swarth- 
more scene, "it all happened in about eighteen and a half minutes. It 
was like the Great Fear sweeping across France during the French 
Revolution." 

On November 3, 1977, articles appeared in The Philadelphia In- 
quirer and in another Philadelphia paper, The Evening Bulletin. The 
latter was headlined: "Colleges Hesitate in Scandal." By November 
4, the student newspaper published jointly by Bryn Mawr and Haver- 
ford had also published an article detailing both the grant proposal and 
Khashoggi's background. The same issue included an editorial entitled 
"SayNotoTHad." 

The Jewish Community Relations Council, the American Jewish 
Committee and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith also issued 
a joint statement: "It is altogether appropriate that the schools should 
seriously question the wisdom of accepting any grant from such a 
tainted source and one which is dominated by a figure like Adnan 
Khashoggi." 

Finally, the Washington office of the AJC put Professor Kurth in 
touch with Congressman James Scheuer, who is Jewish and a Swarth- 
more alumnus. According to Armstrong, Scheuer called President 
Friend and requested the telephone numbers of the members of the 
college's Board of Managers "so he could call them at once and get 
them to put a stop to this outrageous thing." 

Various groups tried to enlist faculty intervention. Harrison 
Wright, a professor of history at Swarthmore, recalled later that there 
were "memos to the whole faculty and to the department chairmen by 
different groups. It was a fairly short but quite sharp exchange of 
different points of view." 

The first of the three colleges to publicly withdraw from the joint 
effort was Haverford. In a prepared statement, Haverford President 
Cary said the college was "grateful to TKad for its willingness to con- 



Challenges to Academic Freedom 1 93 

sider an application," but "because of Haverford's Quaker background 
it has decided it shouldn't apply for funds derived so directly from arms 
traffic which it deplores." 

Swarthmore's withdrawal followed immediately. President Friend 
announced the college's decision in these words: 

At a time of rigorous financial planning and examination of curriculum, our 
lack of a significant existing base in Middle Eastern studies at Swarthmore does 
not in our view warrant what at present could only be a temporary experiment. 

Peter Cohan, a leader of student protest against the Triad grant, 
complained later to a Phoenix reporter that the statement "did not 
establish principles, but spoke only to the immediate situation." In the 
same Phoenix article, Swarthmore Vice-President Landis pointed out 
that the decision on the Triad grant was made "amid a whirlwind of 
protest which arose from 'more than just Khashoggi.'" According to 
Landis, "There were other concerns within the protest." 

In a letter to the Phoenix, Ben Rockefeller, another student, 
agreed with Landis: 

Jewish students are not disturbed about the Rockefellers' business conduct 
because they aren't truly contesting anybody's business conduct: the alleged 
concern about Mr. Khashoggi's professional character is a ruse to conceal an 
anti-Arab prejudice. 

Only Bryn Mawr continued to pursue the grant. "I think the ques- 
tion of judging the source of money is not a simplistic one," said Presi- 
dent Wofford. Wofford defended the college's decision in an article 
published in the Bryn Mawr/Haverford student newspaper, The News, 
which was on record as opposing the grant: 

No one at Bryn Mawr has suggested that Mr. Khashoggi's record is irrelevant 
or that we don't care about it. We explored that record in the three-college 
discussions last summer and circulated information we found. If there is new 
information we should consider it carefully. But instead of simply saying 'No' 
to Triad, as The News proposes, I think we should examine all the facts and 
together think about the issues raised. 

In deciding our next steps, we need to guard against prejudice, against misin- 
formation, and against the politics of purely personal psychic satisfaction. 
Wouldn't it be prejudice to accept a donation from Lockheed, for example, 
which was found guilty of improper practices, while refusing it from Triad, 
whose donor (contrary to the Swarthmore Phoenix's allegation) has not been 
indicted let alone convicted of anything? 

The Philadelphia Inquirer supported Bryn Mawr's position. In an 
editorial entitled ". . . But Money Has No Smell," the newspaper said it 
did not believe it necessary that Haverford, Swarthmore and Bryn 



194 They Dare to Speak Out 

Mawr "look with revulsion" at the source of the $590,000 grant. "We 
believe they would do well to follow the counsel of the celebrated 
American philosopher, Woody Allen, and take the money and run." 
Like Wofford, the newspaper pointed out that "quite a few sources of 
donations to higher education would not bear close scrutiny." 

The American Jewish Committee memo notes with satisfaction 
that, though Bryn Mawr pursued the grant proposal, it did so "on a 
substantially reduced scale." 

In fact, Bryn Mawr's request for funds ultimately went unan- 
swered. Khashoggi had been badly burned. He gave up the foundation 
and with it the offer to the three colleges. 

Reflecting on the controversy and on Bryn Mawr's decision to 
stay with the proposal, Wofford said: "We were in a relatively strong 
position because that same year we had started a program of inviting 
people who wanted to contribute to Bryn Mawr's Judaic Studies pro- 
gram to donate Israel bonds." The Jewish community was pleased by 
this. "In fact," said Wofford, "I was awarded the Eleanor Roosevelt 
award of the Israel Bonds Organization." Asked how he felt about the 
withdrawal of the other colleges, Wofford said, 

We felt sort of run out on by both of them. In the first place they publicly 
withdrew without any real consultation. And secondly, it was something we 
had thought through and it seemed an unfair flap at a potential donor. 

In a letter to President Friend, Willis Armstrong said: 

Swarthmore seems to me to have taken leave of its principles and to have 
yielded all too quickly to partisan and xenophobic pressure from a group 
skilled in the manipulation of public opinion. I am at a loss to think how the 
United States can promote peace in the Middle East unless we can gain Arab 
confidence in our understanding and objectivity. For a Quaker institution to 
turn its back on an opportunity to contribute to this understanding is pro- 
foundly depressing. 

Haverford President Cary, like Swarthmore's President Friend, 
denies that his decision to withdraw from the grant proposal was in- 
fluenced by pressures from the Jewish community. Said Cary: 

I did have some letters from some of our Jewish alumnae who thought that we 
should have no part of such a thing. But that had nothing to do with my 
decision. 

Haverford's provost at the time, Tom D' Andrea, assesses the impor- 
tance of Jewish opposition differently: 

One of the big issues, of course, had to do with very strong opposition from 
Jewish organizations. I think a lot of it had to do with Arab influence and the 



Challenges to Academic Freedom 195 

whole Middle East situation. But then, of course, you get into really serious 
questions about academic freedom. The freedom of expression. Well, one way 
you can avoid that is to find another peg to hang the protest on and the arms 
one is a little cleaner given the Quaker factor. 

In concluding his memo describing the success of the American 
Jewish Committee's efforts to foil the Middle East studies program at 
the three colleges, Ira Silverman wrote: 

Our participation was not widely known on the campuses and not reported in 
the public press, as we wished. This is a good case history of how we can be 
effective in working with colleges to limit Arab influence on campuses — 
although in view of the schools' Quaker background and Khashoggi's cloudy 
reputation as an arms merchant, its happy ending is not likely to be replicated 
easily in other cases. 

Swarthmore, Haverford and Bryn Mawr have done little since the 
1977-78 events to improve their offerings in a field that has become too 
hot for many colleges to handle. 

Another college about a hundred miles away showed more cour- 
age, although it too nearly faltered. 



Returning Solicited Gifts 

Georgetown University's Center for Contemporary Arab Studies 
(CCAS) was the first academic program in the United States devoted 
exclusively to the study of the modern Arab world. Established in 
1975, the center is a functional part of the Georgetown University 
School of Foreign Service. As such, CCAS not only offers an academic 
program leading to a master's degree in Arab studies but also provides 
opportunities for students with other international interests to learn 
about the 22 political systems and 170 million people in North Africa, 
the Nile valley, the Fertile Crescent, and the Arabian Peninsula. 

Since federal funding for a traditional Middle East center at 
Georgetown had twice been sought and denied, the directors of the 
new center decided early on to seek support from private sources. 
They hoped to obtain about half the needed funds from Arab govern- 
ments. The dean of Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, Peter F. 
Krogh, explained the original plan: "It was our view that we should not 
play favorites among the Arab states and seek support from some but 
not from others. This would then suggest that the academic program 
would also play favorites." 

After obtaining approval for the plan from the university's de- 
velopment office and from Georgetown's president at the time, the 
Reverend R. J. Henle, Dean Krogh visited all the Arab embassies and 



196 They Dare to Speak Out 

missions in Washington. He told them about the center's plans and 
asked for their assistance. "I went to all of them," says Krogh, 
"whether they had diplomatic relations with the United States or not, 
whether they were moderate or radical, whatever their stripe." John 
Ruedy, chairman of the center's program of studies, recalls the fund 
raising philosophy in similar terms: "We were going to be sure that we 
weren't labeled as being in anybody's pocket." 

The first country to contribute was Oman, soon followed by grants 
from United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Then, in May 
1977, Libya committed $750,000, payable over five years, to endow a 
professorial chair in Arab culture. 

The Libyan gift aroused controversy. According to one faculty 
member, there was "considerable consternation" among faculty, stu- 
dents and some administrators and trustees. The protest included a 
letter to the student newspaper, the Georgetown Voice, from columnist 
Art Buchwald. Buchwald calling the gift "blood money from one of the 
most notorious regimes in the world today." But Georgetown's execu- 
tive vice-president for academic affairs, the Reverend Aloysius R Kel- 
ley, told the Washington Post at the time that the Libyan gift 
"contributes to the fulfillment of the main purpose of the center . . . 
which is to increase knowledge of the Arab world in the United 
States." Says Dean Krogh, "Libya was responding to the blanket re- 
quest to all Arab countries to take an interest in our work and to help us 
where they could. It was an endowment. They sent the check; we 
deposited it. They never inquired, never asked for an accounting. They 
didn't even ask for a stewardship report." Center Director Michael 
Hudson stressed in press interviews that no conditions were attached 
to the gift regarding who could occupy the chair or what the chosen 
professor could teach. "We don't mix politics and education," Hudson 
told the Washington Post. 

The next governmental contributors were Jordan, Qatar and Iraq. 
The Iraqi gift of $50,000 came in the spring of 1978. It was an unre- 
stricted contribution which the center subsequently decided to use to 
hire a specialist in Islamic ethics. 

In the meantime, Henle had been replaced as president of 
Georgetown by the Reverend Timothy S. Healy. In July of 1978, Healy 
took the unusual step of returning Iraq's $50,000 gift without advising 
the center of his intentions. The official reason given for the action was 
that another donor had come forward to provide funds for the same 
purpose. In his letter to the director general of Iraq's Center for Re- 
search and Information, Healy wrote: 

I feel obliged in conscience to return to Your Excellency the generous check 
which you have sent us. I hope that in doing this, we can continue our conver- 



Challenges to Academic Freedom 197 

sations and that it will be possible for the university to return to the generosity 
of the Iraqi government in the future and ask for a gift for which full credit can 
be given to the government which gave it. I am sure you will understand the 
delicacy of the university's position in this matter. 

But faculty members at the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies 
said they did not understand "the delicacy of the university's position." 
Arab Studies Director John Ruedy commented at the time: "Acting as 
agents of the university, we solicited money from Iraq. The president 
of this university returned it without ever seeking our approval. His 
intervention into this is really extraordinary." Dean Krogh told the 
press: "This is the first time we've given back a grant as long as I've 
been here," adding that the issue had been "taken out of my hands." 

According to the Washington Stan both supporters and opponents 
of the Iraqi grant agreed that "the decision was politically motivated." 
Ruedy told the Star: "I don't know what other basis there would be for 
refusing the money." CCAS faculty members charged that Father 
Healy's own support for Israel, combined with pressure from pro- 
Israeli members of the university's community and from influential 
Jewish leaders, led him to return the gift. 

John Ruedy recalls the incident: 

The timing was appalling. We were just shocked. We had been arguing with 
[Healy] over that for a couple of months. He said he didn't like it. We knew he 
was distressed about it. But we thought that we had convinced him that he 
must quietly accept the gift because we had asked for it under the mandate 
given to us by his predecessor. 

According to one member of the CCAS faculty, the center's prob- 
lems really began with the arrival of Healy: 

His whole political socialization regarding the Middle East took place within 
the context of New York City [where Healy grew up]. He told us early on that 
if he had been here in our formative days, we wouldn't exist. He was a vulner- 
able instrument for these people and they kept pushing and pushing and push- 
ing. He was under enormous pressure. 

Father Healy refused to comment to the press on his decision to 
return the gift, saying that to do so "would only harm the institution." 
The university's executive vice-president for academic affairs and pro- 
vost, the Reverend Aloysius R Kelley, declined to comment directly on 
whether the university had considered any other use for the general 
purpose grant. 

Despite Healy's return of the Iraqi gift, Georgetown's new Arab 
studies center came under attack. In June 1979 The New Republic, a 
liberal weekly that has become a staunchly pro-Israeli magazine under 



198 They Dare to Speak Out 

owner Martin Peretz, ran an article by Nicholas Lemann on 
Georgetown's Center for Contemporary Arab Studies insinuating that 
the center was "nothing but a propagandist for the Arabs." Wrote 
Lemann, "Unlike the older Middle Eastern studies centers at other 
universities, the Georgetown center makes no attempt to achieve bal- 
ance by studying Israel along with the Arab nations or by hiring Israeli 
scholars." Center Director Michael Hudson and Dean Peter Krogh 
answered this charge in a reply which was prepared but never pub- 
lished: 

Since when was it required, for example, that a center for Chinese studies 
study the Soviet Union and employ Soviet scholars?. . . . The center studies 
the Arabs and it employs scholars recruited through normal University Depart- 
mental and School procedures which provide for appointments without dis- 
crimination of any kind. If this country is not allowed by particular interest 
groups to pursue the study of the Arabs by the same standards applied to the 
study of other major peoples and cultures, this country's knowledge of, and 
international relations with, a significant group of countries is going to be 
deeply, perhaps tragically, flawed. 

The New Republic article added that the Georgetown Center "is 
constantly charged with violating standards of scholarly objectivity" 
but did not say by whom. Author Lemann referred to the center's 
critics, "who, in the cloak-and-dagger spirit, like to remain anony- 
mous." 

Hudson and Krogh, in their unpublished reply, wrote: 

Detective Lemann, to his credit, discovers "an informal network of people" 
operating in the "cloak and dagger spirit" who are busy trying to embarrass the 
center in some way. To his discredit, he associates himself with this undercover 
group by borrowing upon these anonymous accusations in criticizing an open, 
legitimately constituted academic program. A more worthy approach would 
have been to investigate and reveal the composition, operations, and motiva- 
tions of this "informal network." We think the public should be deeply con- 
cerned about an underground group which seeks to undermine the imparting of 
knowledge and understanding about the Arab world; certainly we would be 
interested in any findings Mr. Lemann (or his publisher, Mr. Martin Peretz) 
could provide on this question. 

Despite the return of the Iraqi grant, Georgetown continued to 
receive Arab funds, including grants of $1 million each from Kuwait 
and Oman in the fall of 1980. An article in the Washington Post report- 
ing the Kuwaiti gift quoted Ira Silverman of the American Jewish Com- 
mittee as saying that Georgetown's Arab studies center "has a clearly 
marked pro-Arab, anti-Israel bias in its selection of curriculum mate- 



Challenges to Academic Freedom 199 

rial, its faculty appointments, and speakers." By accepting money from 
"political sponsors of one point of view," said Silverman, Georgetown 
might be "selling something very precious to Americans — the integrity 
of its universities." 

Georgetown officials rejected criticism of the Arab gifts, pointing 
out that if it had pro- Arab scholars in the Arab studies center, it had 
pro-Israel scholars elsewhere on its faculty, particularly in its Center 
for Strategic and International Studies. 

Then, in February 1981 President Healy again returned an Arab 
donation which had been solicited and received by the Arab studies 
center. This time it was the grant from Libya received four years ear- 
lier. Of the $750,000 pledged over five years, $600,000 had been re- 
ceived. Healy personally took a check for that amount, plus about 
$42,000 in interest earned, to the Libyan embassy. Healy said Libya's 
"accent on violence as a normal method of international policy and its 
growing support of terrorism made [keeping the money] . . . incompat- 
ible with everything Georgetown stands for." 

Once again, many doubted the official reason given. As one pro- 
fessor in the Arab studies program put it: "If it was strictly an ethical 
judgment, it certainly was a long time in coming." John Ruedy added: 

If you ask around here, you'll probably find nobody in our center who ap- 
proves of the policies of [Iraqi President] Saddam Hussein. But we have tried 
to maintain cooperative relationships with the government and, to the extent 
that we can, with the Iraqi people. We think that this is our mission. And I feel 
the same way about Libya. I find [Libyan President] Kaddafi very objection- 
able in most instances. This was a gift, as far as I'm concerned, from the 
Libyan people. 

"This whole thing is something out of the blue," Professor Hisham 
Sharabi told the Washington Post. "It's very strange." 

Dean Peter Krogh opposed returning the money but did not make 
an issue of it. He declined to comment to the press, except to say, "We 
never felt any pressure from the Libyan government" on how the 
money was to be spent. But, he observes: "Deans are deans and presi- 
dents are presidents. Presidents do pretty much what they please." 

Ira Silverman of the American Jewish Committee was "delighted 
that Georgetown has made this decision." Moreover, the day after the 
return of the Libyan money, the New York City investment banking 
firm, Bear, Stearns & Co., donated $100,000 to Georgetown. Said 
senior managing partner Alan Greenberg, "We admire them, and this is 
our little way of saying thank you." 

Healy told the Post that in returning the money to Libya, "I was 



200 They Dare to Speak Out 

under absolutely no heat and pressure, but it worried me, I guess Vm 
just kind of slow to move, but I came to a growing realization that what 
Libya is up to is incompatible with Georgetown." 

In an interview with the Washingtonian magazine, however, he 
was more candid. Originally, he had approved the Libyan gift despite 
some misgivings. He told the magazine the Libyan money "had been a 
huge nuisance and had kept him entangled in a verbal version of the 
Arab-Israeli war." Reported the Washingtonian: 

His Jewish friends screamed at him privately, and the American Jewish Com- 
mittee issued a statement publicly condemning the university. Even his ges- 
tures of appeasement and balance — a goodwill trip to Israel, an honorary 
degree for the Israeli ambassador to the United States, refusal of a gift from 
Iraq, wearing a yarmulke at a Jewish service on campus — did little to offset 
Jewish anger over the Libyan money. 

In fact, pressure on Healy had been intense before his return of the 
Libyan grant. One expression of Jewish anger took the form of a visit 
to Healy's office by a delegation of rabbis. Max Kampelman, an in- 
fluential Jewish member of Georgetown University's Board of 
Thistees, also interceded with Healy directly. As a former ambassador 
to the Helsinski Accords, Kampelman was "a major factor," observes 
Dean Krogh. Former ambassador to the United Nations Arthur Gold- 
berg reportedly added his weight to the combined pressure. In addi- 
tion, Healy received, according to John Ruedy, "loads of letters." 
Another Georgetown professor called it "hate mail." 

Indeed, controversy over the Arab studies program largely sub- 
sided after the return of the Libyan grant. As one professor at the 
center put it, "If returning the Libyan money has brought us some 
breathing space and gotten the monkey off our backs, maybe it was 
worth it." But since then Arab governments have been less forthcom- 
ing with contributions. Says Ruedy, "We know that in some cases it has 
specifically to do with a sense of affront. Returning a gift in one donor's 
face is seen as an attack on all of them." 

On the other hand, Georgetown University has now committed 
itself and its own financial resources to Arab studies. In the spring of 
1983, Arab studies was one of nine graduate programs which the uni- 
versity "designated for excellence." "I feel that this may mean we have 
crossed the Rubicon," said Ruedy. 

One reason Georgetown's Arab studies center has been able to 
survive, and even prosper despite the controversy, is that it is affiliated 
with a private university. Says Ruedy, 

You could probably not have an Arab studies program in a public institution. 
You can have a Jewish studies program, of course. In fact, that is politically 



Challenges to Academic Freedom 201 

very advantageous. . . . Georgetown and the Jesuits are as far from depen- 
dency on Jewish support as you could be. 



"That Was the Buzzword, 'Arab' n 

The second U.S. university to create an Arab studies program, 
Villanova University in Pennsylvania, is also Catholic. In 1983, Vil- 
lanova set up the Institute for Contemporary Arab and Islamic Studies. 
The director, Father Kail Ellis, is an Augustinian priest of Lebanese 
origin. Villanova's is a modest program, involving as yet no outside 
funds, which offers certificates in Arab studies to undergraduates ma- 
joring in other fields. The institution also sponsors conferences, lec- 
tures and cultural events. Says Father Ellis: "Our goal is to familiarize 
the students with the history, language, politics and culture of the Arab 
Islamic world." 

Despite the program's modest scope and the absence of Arab 
funding, there was considerable opposition to it from within the univer- 
sity, mainly from the political science department. "The pressure 
wasn't really overt as such," says Ellis. "It was always behind the 
scenes. There are a couple of faculty people who were the most vocal 
against it and they organized the opposition." 

The political science department was originally asked to comment 
on the proposal for establishing the institute. In a minority report at- 
tached to the department's comments, one professor warned about the 
effect of such a program on the Jewish community: 

Villanova exists in a larger community on which it depends for both financial 
and political support. This larger community is made up of Protestants, Catho- 
lics and Jews and very few Muslims. If Villanova creates an Islamic Studies 
Institute, it will have no effect, positive or negative, on its Catholic and Protes- 
tant constituencies. But because this issue has high emotional content, it will in 
my view have strong negative effects on the Jewish community in the Vil- 
lanova area who though relatively few in number are financially and politically 
influential. 

Such an institute might reflect on Villanova University's president in such a 
way as to affect his ability to function on the Holocaust Committee where his 
efforts have provided great credibility for Villanova among the Jewish Commit- 
tee. It is my opinion that the existence of such an institute might dry up 
possible Jewish financial and political support. 

Another professor commented: 

Israel is the single most important United States ally in the Middle East politi- 
cally, it has extensive and close economic and business ties with the U.S., it is 
the cultural and religious homeland of millions of Americans. To exclude the 



202 They Dare to Speak Out 

study of Israel from the proposed program is a mistake and may affect potential 
enrollment. 

Ellis explains: "The idea was to broaden the program from Arab 
studies. That was the buzzword, 'Arab.' " 

Georgetown's John Ruedy was invited to Villanova as a consul- 
tant to participate in the preparations for the Arab studies proposal. 
"The opposition was very interesting," said Ruedy: 

It was the Zionist issue but nobody said it. I could just tell, because I'd been 
there before. The first line of opposition is on academic grounds. But when you 
get around all these and answer all the questions, then they bare their fangs and 
say, 'This is anti-Israel, this is anti-Semitic, and it will be against the interests of 
the university. And we have to relate to Jewish donors and so on." This is 
precisely what happened at Villanova. 

After the institute opened, Father Ellis received a letter from 
American Professors for Peace in the Middle East, a national pro- 
Israeli organization. The executive director, George Cohen, took issue 
with a map that appeared in the brochure. The map, clearly labeled 
"The Arab and Islamic World," shows only the Arab countries of the 
Middle East and Africa in dark green and the non-Arab Islamic coun- 
tries, namely, TUrkey, Afghanistan and Pakistan in light green. Cohen 
noted that the map did not identify Israel. "Is this an error," he asked, 
"or is it intended to make a political statement, excluding Israel?" 

Ellis wrote back that the purpose of the map was to identify the 
Arab and Islamic countries with which the program dealt: 

It was not our intention to make a political statement about Israel or any other 
country, such as Ethiopia, Cyprus, Mali, Chad or even the TUrkmen, Uzbek 
and Tajik Republics of the Soviet Union, all of which are located in the area and 
have substantial Moslem populations but which were excluded from the map. 

Cohen was not satisfied and wrote another letter, saying he did not 
accept Ellis's response and asking him to "present this issue to your 
department before I take it further." 

Cohen did not specify what measures he might employ in "taking it 
further," and Ellis did not respond to his second letter. Meanwhile the 
Institute for Contemporary Arab and Islamic Studies has continued to 
gain acceptance within the Villanova scholarly community. 

Meanwhile, the attacks against the academic community in Middle 
East studies are, in the view of a leading scholar, continuing and "per- 
haps getting even stronger." He adds, "They are not directed just at 
one or two institutions but appear to have a nationwide basis." 



Challenges to Academic Freedom 203 

Think Tank Under Pressure 

Of the many "think tanks" that have sprung up around the country 
in the last two decades, Georgetown University's Center for Strategic 
and International Studies is one of the most prestigious. Established in 
1965, CSIS has grown to comprise a staff of 150, with a budget of $6 
million and a publications list of nearly 200 titles. Among the eminent 
names on the Center's roster are Henry Kissinger, Howard K. Smith, 
Lane Kirkland and John Glenn. CSIS is a non-profit, tax-exempt or- 
ganization which, though known to be conservative in outlook, in- 
cludes both Democrats and Republicans on its advisory board. 

Based in Washington, the center views the provision of expert 
research and analysis to government leaders as one of its most vital 
functions. As part of Georgetown University, CSIS considers itself an 
"integral part of the academic community." Scholarly participation in 
all center activities "insures that the widest and most rigorous thinking 
is brought to bear on issues." 

The center, says its brochure, is "well-equipped to function in a 
true interdisciplinary, nonpartisan fashion." Yet, a report completed in 
1981 by the director of the center's Oil Field Security Studies Project 
was suppressed on the eve of Congressional action on the sale of 
AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia. Supporters of Israel from outside the 
center were opposed to the sale and did not want the contents of the 
report known because they feared it could be used effectively in win- 
ning Congressional approval. Six months later, the author of the of- 
fending study was fired by the center and urged to leave town. 

The victim was Mazher Hameed — a native of Saudi Arabia, a 
graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a specialist 
on international security affairs. Former U.S. ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia James Akins wrote of Hameed in 1983, "I know of no one else 
in this country with his insight, his honesty, his analytical ability and 
his profound knowledge of the Middle East, particularly the Arabian 
Peninsula." Hameed was hired by the center in November of 1980 as a 
research fellow "with responsibilities for research on a project on 
Saudi oil field security." In the letter of appointment, CSIS Executive 
Director Amos Jordan wrote: "This letter also constitutes a formal 
approval of the oil field security project." 

The scope of the project was outlined in a memorandum to Jordan 
prepared a month earlier by Wayne Berman, responsible to Jordan for 
fund raising. That memo stated that the project would focus on the 
political and military analysis of oil field vulnerabilities in the Middle 
East, the likelihood of attacks from various sources, an examination of 
security planning, and technical defense profiles. 



204 They Dare to Speak Out 

Amos Jordan himself brought up with Hameed the need to evalu- 
ate the AWACS/F-15 enhancement package before it became an issue 
on Capitol Hill. 

For the next nine months, Hameed carried out his research and 
wrote a series of drafts of a report on his results. These drafts were 
shown to Amos Jordan, who had become vice chairman of the center, 
and to David Abshire, the chairman, as well as to several experts 
outside the center. The final report was to be published by CSIS. 

Jordan told Hameed after reading one of the earlier drafts that his 
work was "brilliant" and that he wanted to see more work of that 
caliber emerging from the center. Abshire concurred with this view. 
Jordan personally gave copies of one of the earlier drafts to William 
Clark, at that time deputy secretary of state and subsequently Presi- 
dent Reagan's national security advisor. Other Middle East experts 
who praised the report were Anthony Cordesman, international editor 
of the Armed Forces Journal, and William Quandt, director of the 
Energy and National Security Project of the Brookings Institution. 

In August 1981, Abshire and Jordan left together for a trip to 
Tokyo. They took Hameed's final draft with them. Jordan sent back a 
telex praising the study: "On plane I read Hameed's Saudi security 
paper," read the telex, "which is informative and beautifully written." 
The telex went on to suggest that the report should be edited to tone 
down its strong advocacy of the AWACS/F-15 package. "Paper makes 
strong case without overkill," wrote Jordan. "Careful edit to meet 
above point needed before CSIS publishes in house by about 10 or IS 
September. Suggest 300 copies." 

In accordance with these instructions, Hameed met with Jean 
Newsom, a senior editor at the center, and William Taylor, director of 
political and military studies, and the three of them set to work on the 
final editing. At the same time, Newsom initiated talks with McGraw- 
Hill concerning publication of the report. 

Jean Newsom, when asked to confirm that the center had 
negotiated publication of the report with McGraw-Hill, demurred. She 
said in a telephone interview: "We were not negotiating with McGraw- 
Hill, just seeing whether they were interested." But THsh Wilson, a 
research assistant for Hameed at the time, said, "They were talking 
about what the price was. They gave McGraw-Hill an estimate of how 
much they could sell the book for." 

The editing proceeded simultaneously with the negotiations 
through September and into October when, without warning, the cen- 
ter's comptroller, David Wendt, told Hameed that David Abshire had 
called from California where he was vacationing on his way back from 



Challenges to Academic Freedom 205 

Japan. The message from Abshire was that the report was not to be 
released. 

Upset, Hameed pursued the matter with Jordan and others at the 
center: "They told me that many very large contributors to the center 
would be upset if they saw a report that was, as they described it, 
"lacking in objectivity. 1 " Research assistant Paul Sutphin recalls: 

I remember that it came as quite a surprise that suddenly there was going to be 
a problem with the center's putting out the report. Everything fell apart at the 
last moment. Hameed said that suddenly the "powers on high" had decided to 
nix the center's support of the publication. 

Trish Wilson also remembers the incident: "They didn't want him to 
publish it at all, even privately." 

Another of Hameed's research assistants, George Smalley, who 
had been hired at the beginning of October on a salary basis was told 
before the month was out that his status would be changed. "Due to 
budget problems," he was to work on a fee basis and would no longer 
be granted any of the benefits initially agreed upon. These included 
social security, a paid vacation, sick leave, and free tuition at 
Georgetown University after one year. Smalley is convinced there was 
a direct link between the fate of Hameed' s report and the fate of his 
own position with the center. 

At that stage Hameed decided to take the initiative: 

I wanted the report out before the AWACS issue came up in Congress. Because 
this was a document that was relevant to what was being discussed on the Hill 
and I want my work to be looked at. 

Hameed sent copies of the 85-page report to major corporations that 
contributed to the center. He told them: "I understand you people 
would be upset if you saw this report coming out of the center." Until 
that time, says Hameed, he had no relationship with these companies. 
The center had asked him specifically not to go to any of these corpora- 
tions for funding because it had long-standing relationships with most 
of them and didn't want these disturbed. 

"These people," says Hameed, "for the first time heard about me, 
saw the report, got excited and started calling the center to ask what 
was going on. They said that not only was the document interesting, 
not only did it have a unique point of view, but it had something very 
timely to say." Some of these companies, acknowledged Hameed, 
were engaged in the lobbying effort on behalf of the AWACS sale. 
"They found something that they liked very much," he recalls, "and 
they wanted to use it. So I used some influence of that sort to get a 



206 They Dare to Speak Out 

compromise." The compromise was that the center permitted Hameed 
to release the report as a private document. "But they didn't want me 
to indicate my designation at the center. I could just say I was a re- 
search fellow and program director without mentioning the name of the 
project." Naming the project would have given the report additional 
credibility. "They didn't want him to say that it was under the research 
auspices of the center," confirms Paul Sutphin. 

Hameed complied with the request. "For me the primary interest 
was to get the document out and to get it read. What the document had 
to say was more important than these other matters." So Hameed had 
the report printed at his own expense and released it himself. 

The response to the report in government circles was immediate. 
Recalls Hameed: "People at the State Department asked for copies, 
people on the Hill asked for copies, NSC [the National Security Coun- 
cil] asked for copies." After Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was as- 
sassinated the following month, William Clark gave copies of 
Hameed' s report to former Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter to help 
update themselves on the Middle East while en route to Cairo for 
Sadat's funeral. Clark called CSIS Vice-Chairman Amos Jordan 
specifically to tell him about it. Jordan conveyed this information to 
Hameed and assured him that the center's chairman, David Abshire, 
concurred in praising the report. 

On October 28, the U.S. Senate voted 52 to 48 against a resolu- 
tion that would have blocked the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia. Al- 
though the House had passed such a resolution two weeks earlier, a 
majority in both chambers was required to prevent the sale from going 
through. The Senate vote represented a rare defeat for the pro-Israeli 
lobby and one it was not about to forget. 

In November Amos Jordan received a visit from Steve Emerson, 
an aide in former Senator Frank Church's law firm, who had earlier 
assisted Church on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Emerson 
asked Jordan probing questions about the center's activities, some of 
them concerning Hameed's project. He told Jordan he was writing an 
article for The New Republic about the influence of "petro-dollars." 
Emerson said he was interested in Hameed's report and wanted to 
know who had funded it. After the interview, Jordan called Hameed, 
cautioned him that there might be some "turbulence" and advised him 
to "fasten your seatbelt." To Jordan, the interview was "something 
threatening." He later told Hameed: "It was clear that Emerson's ques- 
tions were hostile, and we were concerned that we would be subject to 
some unwarranted charges." 

In early December, Emerson and his associates returned to the 
center and brought with them the draft of the Emerson article for The 



Challenges to Academic Freedom 207 

New Republic. It was part of a series Emerson was writing for the 
magazine on alleged Arab attempts to manipulate U.S. public opinion. 
The suggestion was that policy "think tanks" receiving money from oil 
corporations with Arab business were under obligation to serve the 
political interests of those companies. But the draft fell short of singling 
out CSIS, and center officials continued to feel they could safely 
weather the storm caused by Hameed's report. 

Hameed, exhausted physically and emotionally, left in December 
for a vacation, but only, he said, after receiving assurance from Jordan 
that there was "nothing to worry about." 

"I came back in January," said Hameed, "to learn that these gen- 
tlemen had returned once more to the center with another draft of the 
New Republic article. This time the draft appeared to compromise the 
center in a more specific way." 

Nevertheless, another member of the center's senior staff, Jon 
Vondracek, had been in touch with the publisher of The New Republic, 
Martin Peretz. He told Hameed that he thought the center had enough 
clout to prevent the magazine from doing any harm. 

During the same period, Emerson phoned Hameed's office, asking 
questions about the report and, more specifically, about how Hameed's 
project was funded. When Hameed declined to reveal his sources of 
funding, Emerson threatened to expose an alleged "petro-dollar" con- 
nection at CSIS. Hameed wished him luck. In addition to calling 
Hameed and his staff, Emerson had also contacted several corpora- 
tions trying to find out who had funded the research. 

"What was funny," says Hameed, "was that my project had some 
funding but not from any of the companies you would expect. I felt I 
shouldn't go to companies that had an obvious interest in influencing 
my work. What I had to say didn't need influence from other groups, 
particularly those that were funding it. But beyond that I didn't want 
the appearance of such influence. Having been meticulous about all 
this, I was especially irked to have this problem at the end." 

On February 17, 1982, the first of Steve Emerson's promised 
series of articles appeared in The New Republic. Entitled "The Petro- 
dollar Connection," the article was to be followed, according to the 
magazine, by future articles dealing with "strings-attached donations to 
policy think tanks, universities, and research institutions." 

The very next day, the center found itself under the spotlight from 
another sources. Piatt's Oilgram News, a respected newsletter owned by 
McGraw-Hill, published an article on February 18 about Hameed's 
report, saying the document had been "kept under wraps" by CSIS. 
Entitled "Georgetown Study: Israel Could 'Create' a Saudi Oil Em- 
bargo to Pressure U.S.," the article quoted from the section of the 



208 They Dare to Speak Out 

report which discussed threats to Saudi Arabia from its neighbors. This 
was one of the sections that the CSIS directors were most nervous 
about, because it made the point that since Israel considered Saudi 
Arabia a "confrontation state" in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Israelis 
might make pre-emptive strikes against Saudi military and economic 
assets. 

"The study notes," said the Oilgram article, "that Israel already 
occupies Saudi territory (the islands of Tiran and Sanafir) and that 
since 1976, Israeli aircraft have been making practice bombing runs 
over the Saudi airbase of Tabuk, dropping empty fuel tanks on several 
occasions. In addition, Israel has pointed out that its air force has the 
capability to create an 'oil embargo' of its own by destroying Saudi oil 
installations." 

The editor of Piatt's Oilgram News, Onnik Maraschian, did not 
know who had written the report or that it had been released privately 
months earlier. "All we knew was that there was a report," says 
Maraschian. "It was distributed as a draft, as a CSIS report, and then it 
got pulled back, but we ran it nevertheless because it started as a 
project of CSIS." 

After the Piatt's article appeared, CSIS began to receive phone 
calls from people wanting copies of the study. This created an embar- 
rassing situation for the center. Should they admit that they had sup- 
pressed the report? How could they explain the fact that they had never 
published it? Vice-Chairman Amos Jordan attempted a solution in the 
form of a memorandum to "Concerned Staff" that deserves a prize for 
obfuscation. The memo called the staff's attention to the publication of 
the Piatt's article and suggested they use the following paragraph to 
answer all inquiries: 

The center has not "completed last fair a study entitled 'Saudi Security and the 
Evolving Threat to U.S. Interests.' We have had underway for over a year a 
project on oil field security and research and that study continues. The project 
has produced several research fragments, including a partial draft with the title 
cited, but that does not represent a center study — rather it is only a small piece 
of the problem; and that at an early stage. When the study is completed later 
this year and becomes a CSIS report, it will be made public. 

"They were quite taken aback when they saw that we used the 
story," recalls Maraschian. "Obviously when they commissioned the 
man to do this study they knew what his qualifications were. So why 
did they go with it for a year and then pull it back?" Maraschian had an 
idea: "You see, what they got mad at was the possibility of a pre- 
emptive strike by Israel." 

Interestingly, Hameed was not the only one who thought that Is- 



Challenges to Academic Freedom 209 

rael might make a pre-emptive strike against Saudi Arabia. In the se- 
cret version of a government report entitled "U.S. Assistance to the 
State of Israel," and leaked to the press in June 1983, the CIA is cited 
as warning that in reaction to the modernization of Arab armies, Israel 
might launch "pre-emptive attacks in future crises." In fact, over the 
years Israeli military officials have talked openly about such strikes 
against Saudi Arabia. 

Embarrassed by the Piatt's article and worried about efforts by 
the Israeli lobby to discredit the center, Jordan and Abshire — despite 
their own inclination to support the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia — 
apparently finally decided that Hameed was too great a liability. A 
week later, the center's comptroller, David Wendt, told Hameed he 
would have to pay an additional surcharge on his office space amount- 
ing to $1 ,570 a month. As project director, Hameed was already paying 
24 percent of his project funds to cover office overhead costs and 
another 20 percent to help cover the center's general operations. The 
new charge would come on top of what he was already paying. 

"I grumbled a bit but finally agreed," recalls Hameed. "Then came 
the bombshell. They made it retroactive back 18 months!" Wendt told 
Hameed that, with the new charges, his project was $40,000 in deficit. 
Wendt said he would have to report the deficit and that it was likely that 
Hameed' s project would be terminated. 

The stunned Hameed called John Shaw, a member of the senior 
staff. Shaw confided to Hameed that David Abshire was furious, 
though Shaw wouldn't say why. Committee meetings were held 
throughout that day in order, Hameed believes, to discuss how to deal 
with the "problem." The answer reached, says Hameed, was to offer 
up his head. 

In April Hameed met with Jordan, whom he found uncharacterist- 
ically cold and distant. Jordan said he was concerned about the 
"deficit" and warned that Hameed' s project was in an unsustainable 
financial position. 

A few days later, Jordan sent Hameed a letter stating that the 
project would have to be terminated by the end of the following month. 
Jordan added that he would be happy to review his decision and that 
Hameed might be hired back if he could raise "especially large amounts 
of money." 

After receiving the letter, Hameed met again with Jordan. He still 
hoped there was something he could do to prevent the imminent col- 
lapse of his project. He still saw Jordan as a friend, a man who had 
supported him personally and professionally. He thought that Jordan 
had been given a distorted picture of his project's finances. But Jordan 
was unmoved. He responded to Hameed that the new surcharge had 



210 They Dare to Speak Out 

been decided formally and that the matter was beyond his control. 
Hameed pleaded with Jordan to give him at least three or fou*- ntionths 
in which to wind things up, but to no avail. 

Hameed spoke to other prominent people at the center in a desper- 
ate attempt to save his project. One told him, "Just lie low and once 
this thing blows over, we can probably arrange to have you come 
back." But, recalls Hameed with some bitterness, "Basically, no one 
stood up for me. They all looked the other way. They let it happen. The 
knives were out." 

Then, on March 5, shortly after learning that his job was to be 
terminated, Hameed arrived at his office to find that it had been burgled 
during the night. Someone had managed to penetrate three locked 
doors and had then pried open the file cabinet next to Hameed's desk. 
The burglar had first to enter the office building, which was equipped 
with an electronic surveillance system using card readers. Then he had 
to enter the locked door to the office suite and finally the locked door to 
Hameed's office. There were no signs of forced entry. But the file 
cabinet was bent and the drawer had been wrenched open. Adds Paul 
Sutphin: "This bore no signs of a common burglary. There were other 
valuable things that were not taken." In fact, nothing was taken at all. 
"It was such a lousy job, so obvious," says Trish Wilson, "that we 
concluded it was there to scare us." 

The next day Hameed found that the post office box he used for 
some of his correspondence had been broken open. A few days later, 
the mailbox at his home was broken open. "Other weird things started 
to happen as well," recalls Hameed. "For example, I'd leave for the 
weekend and come back and find things in my house that didn't belong 
there . . . like contact lenses." 

These incidents were particularly frightening to Hameed — and the 
contact lens prank needlessly cruel — because he is blind. 

Hameed left the center at the end of March. In May and June, The 
New Republic published the second and third parts of its series on 
petrodollar influence in the United States. The promised expos6 of 
"strings-attached donations to policy think tanks" was missing from 
the series. 

The last episode in Hameed's relations with CSIS occurred in May 
1982, some weeks after he had left the center. Officers of the center 
contacted a number of Hameed's friends as well as corporate execu- 
tives in an effort to discredit him. In one case, a senior administration 
official's help was sought to encourage Hameed to "leave town." 

Several corporations, after learning that Hameed had been fired, 
cut back their contributions to Georgetown University and made it 
clear that the reason was the treatment accorded Mazher Hameed. 



Challenges to Academic Freedom 2 1 1 

Amos Jordan, asked to comment on Hameed's charges, insisted 
that these various circumstances were coincidental and that Hameed's 
departure related only to his performance. He denied that the center 
responded to lobby pressure: "I went out of my way to protect and 
sponsor Hameed despite the deficits. I am concerned that the center 
not have a reputation for being a Zionist foil. 19 

It was an unsettling, traumatic time for the scholar. In a short 
space of weeks, people from the pro-Israel magazine descended on the 
center — threatening an expose of petrodollar influence, warning about 
the center's tax status under IRS regulations, questioning the funding 
of Hameed's project. Preceding and following these events were the 
center's suppression of the report, the personal harassment of 
Hameed, his associates and his friends — and his dismissal. If the coin- 
cidence of these events was pure happenstance, it was a remarkable 
coming together. 

Recalling what he knew of Hameed's tenure at CSIS, William 
Quandt, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and a personal friend 
of Hameed's said: "The way they terminated his whole relationship 
there was rather strange. He was very shabbily treated, to say the 
least." Les Janka, former special assistant in the White House for 
Middle East affairs, said: "CSIS did not have the courage to put out 
under its own name a paper that made a significant contribution to 
public debate." 



Chapter 8 



Tucson: Case Study in Intimidation 



In November 1980, Sheila Scoville, outreach coordinator at the Uni- 
versity of Arizona's Near Eastern Center, was visited in her office by a 
short, balding man in his late forties. His immediate purpose was to 
borrow a book, but as he left he remarked: "I understand you are 
running a pro- Arab propaganda network." 

The man was Boris Kozolchyk, a law professor at the University 
of Arizona and vice-chair of the Community Relations Committee of 
the TUcson Jewish Community Council. Kozolchyk's remark signalled 
the beginning of a three-year attack against the Near Eastern Center 
that would culminate in the barring of outreach materials from local 
public schools and the resignation of the center's director. The attack, 
orchestrated by local Jewish community leaders, succeeded despite 
the finding of a panel of nationally known Middle East scholars that 
charges of anti-Israel bias in the program were groundless. 

The details of TUcson's long ordeal constitute a noteworthy case 
study of the unrelenting commitment and resourcefulness of pro-Israel 
activists at the community level. 

The Near Eastern Center, devoted to increasing knowledge and 
understanding of the Middle East, is one of only eleven such facilities 
in the United States which receive federal funding. To qualify for fed- 
eral support, each of these centers must devote a portion of its re- 
sources to "outreach" and educational programs for the local 
community. These may take the form of films, public lectures, informa- 
tion and consultation services, seminars for businessmen, or cur- 
riculum development for the public schools. 

Sheila Scoville had been coordinating these outreach activities for 
the University of Arizona for four years when the TUcson Jewish Com^ 
munity Council began making its complaints. With a Ph.D. in Middle 

212 



Tucson: Case Study in Intimidation 2 1 3 

East history from UCLA, she was well qualified for the job and had 
made the Tucson outreach program one of the most active programs in 
the country. Scoville, a petite blond in her late thirties, had also co- 
founded the Middle East Outreach Council, the coordinating body for 
the eleven Middle East outreach programs in the United States. 

In February 1981, Kozolchyk and three other representatives of 
the Tlicson Jewish Community Council (TJCC) contacted William De- 
ver, chairman of the Oriental Studies Department of which the Near 
Eastern Center is a part. They told Dever that in their opinion both 
Scoville and Near Eastern Center Director Ludwig Adamec had an 
"anti-Israeli bias which called into question their objectivity about the 
Middle East." Dever said that the authority for the outreach program 
rested with the federal government, which provided most of the funds. 
He suggested that the group form an official committee and gave them, 
in his own words, "carte blanche" to check out any of the Near Eastern 
Center's outreach materials. He even said that he would "personally 
remove" from the library shelves any materials which the Tlicson Jew- 
ish Community Council found offensive. In a later meeting which 
Adamec attended, the director of the Near Eastern Center responded: 
"We do not have anything inflammatory or propagandistic. You tell me 
which books you find that way. I'll look at them, and if I agree I'll tell 
Sheila to throw them in the wastepaper basket." But Kozolchyk and 
the others rejected this offer. Their aims were more ambitious. 

Following Dever' s advice, the TJCC formed a committee of four 
women who called themselves "concerned teachers." (Only two of 
them were actually teachers, both at the private Tlicson Hebrew 
Academy.) Dever then introduced the group to Sheila Scoville and told 
her to provide them whatever help they required in conducting their 
investigation. 

Among the four women were Carol Karsch, co-chair of the TJCC 
Community Relations Committee and wife of the president of Tlicson's 
largest conservative synagogue. Karsch was to join Kozolchyk as a 
major figure in the attack against the outreach program. The group first 
met with Scoville and "grilled" her, as she recalls it, about her ac- 
tivities. They asked for a copy of her mailing list and for the names of 
teachers who had checked out materials from the library. Then the 
group, permitted to enter the Near Eastern Center after hours, set to 
work collecting and reviewing library materials. By May, the four 
women had prepared a "preliminary report." 

Instead of returning to Dever with their findings, the TJCC com- 
mittee complained directly to the U.S. Department of Education. Carol 
Karsch wrote the letter to Washington, attaching to it the group's 



214 They Dare to Speak Out 

report. The report questioned the use of federal funds to promote 
outreach "in an area so inherently complex and conflictive [sic] as 
Middle East studies." 

The report strongly suggested that the ultimate aim of the TJCC 
was to shut down the outreach program altogether: 

Even if numerous materials were added objectively portraying Israel and her 
interests, coupled with the removal of objectionable and propagandistic mate- 
rial regarding the Arab viewpoint, the problem would still exist. 

It is the outreach function per se (and not the implementation by any specific 
institution) which ought to be addressed. 

The Department of Education replied to the TJCC that it was not 
responsible for the content or scholarly quality of the outreach mate- 
rial, which was the responsibility of the university. 

Accordingly, the TJCC again focused on the university. A delega- 
tion from the council visited the office of university president John 
Schaefer and complained to him of the anti-Israeli bias they perceived 
in the outreach materials. After assuring the group that all such mate- 
rials must conform to university standards, Schaefer referred the mat- 
ter to Dean Paul Rosenblatt of the Liberal Arts College. Rosenblatt 
arranged a meeting on October 5, 1981, between representatives of the 
TJCC and members of the Oriental Studies Department faculty. Sheila 
Scoville was not invited. At that meeting the new head of the Oriental 
Studies Department, Robert Gimello, suggested that the TJCC "docu- 
ment more specifically" its concerns so that his department could pro- 
vide a response. At the same time, Gimello agreed to set up an ad hoc 
committee within the Oriental Studies Department to review the out- 
reach program. 

The TJCC seized this opportunity and, armed with additional li- 
brary materials, set to work on its report. None of those who reviewed 
the materials had any academic credentials in the Middle East field. On 
March 19, 1982, it presented a document of nearly one hundred pages 
to the university. It included reviews of fifteen Near Eastern Center 
publications, eight books, five pamphlets and bibliographies, and two 
teachers' guides. The report objected to one book's reference to Pales- 
tine as "the traditional homeland of the Arabs" and another description 
of the Palestine Liberation Organization as "the only legitimate repre- 
sentative of the Palestinian people." It faulted a map for failing to 
designate Jerusalem as the capital of Israel — even though, of course, 
not even the United States recognizes it as such — and cited "the perva- 
sive theme throughout most materials that Jews are interlopers in an 
area that rightfully belongs to the Arabs." 

Among the twelve appendices to the report was a "memorandum 



Tucson: Case Study in Intimidation 215 

of law" prepared by a Tlicson attorney, Paul Bartlett. He contended 
that the outreach center violated the First Amendment to the Constitu- 
tion as well as eligibility guidelines for federal funds by trying to "elimi- 
nate the Israeli point of view from the spectrum of views presented to 
the public schools and the press regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict." 
The memorandum contended further that the program violated the 
constitutional separation of church and state by showing "a religious 
preference with respect to the Middle East" since it "advances the 
religion of Islam and consciously belittles the connection between the 
Jewish religion and the Middle East." 

The report was co-authored by Boris Kozolchyk and Carol 
Karsch, with the help of four volunteers: a rabbi, an agricultural econo- 
mist who had studied in Israel, and a non-Jewish couple (the husband a 
lawyer and the wife an elementary school teacher). 

Gimello welcomed the report as a "thoughtful, well-intentioned 
community response." The ad hoc committee within Gimello's Orien- 
tal Studies Department was itself ill-equipped to make a scholarly re- 
view of the outreach program, as its five members included a Japanese 
linguist, an Indian rural anthropologist and Gimello himself, an expert 
on Buddhism. Of the five committee members, only two had a Middle 
East background: one a specialist in Arabic literature, and one in Jew- 
ish history. Adamec did not participate in the committee's work be- 
cause he had gone on a six-month sabbatical to Pakistan in January. 
Sheila Scoville was not consulted. 

After receiving the TJCC report in March, the ad hoc committee 
met regularly for two months to review the materials it criticized and to 
try to decide what to do about it. In May, 1982, as the academic year 
drew to a close with the work still unfinished and several members of 
the committee due to leave for the summer, the committee adopted an 
interim response that shocked many: "Pending, and without prejudice 
to, the final resolution of our deliberations, the Near East Center's 
outreach program will suspend its distribution of materials to elemen- 
tary and secondary schools." 

The suspension of the outreach program was an unexpected vic- 
tory for the TJCC, which named Kozolchyk and Karsch "Man and 
Woman of the Year" at its annual awards dinner in June. The four 
volunteers who had helped them were also presented with "Special 
Recognition" awards for their "scholarly and objective analyses." 

But the victory celebration proved to be premature. When Near 
East Center Director Ludwig Adamec returned from Pakistan in mid- 
August, he was incensed at the action of the Oriental Studies Depart- 
ment. He dispatched a memo to all department faculty drawing their 
attention to the TJCC campaign against the outreach program and to 



216 They Dare to Speak Out 

the ad hoc committee's action. The TJCC report, he said, was not 
scholarly and was replete with ad hominem attacks, false issues and 
innuendo. Adamec said the closing of the outreach program was ill- 
advised, premature and done without the committee's consulting ex- 
pert opinion: "It is utterly inappropriate that a committee of scholars 
without expertise in the field" judge the matter. 

Adamec's annoyance increased when he saw the headlines in an 
early September issue of the student newspaper: "Interim Report: De- 
partment Drops Anti-Israel Materials." In a statement to the editor of 
the student newspaper, Adamec wrote: 

Our center does not contain any "anti-Israeli" materials; it contains books and 
other items which discuss the Middle East, including Israel. . . . Our books 
have been selected on the basis of expert recommendation and it would not be 
feasible to proceed in a manner different from, let's say, the university library, 
which does not endorse the material contained on its shelves. 

Naturally, we want to enjoy the friendship and support of all segments of the 
community in Arizona and therefore we give serious consideration to the con- 
cerns of all. I do not think there is any need to make sensational copy about an 
issue which has now been resolved. 

But the issue was far from resolved. With strong encouragement 
from Adamec, Gimello prepared a memo reversing the suspension of 
the Outreach Center and containing the ad hoc committee's "Final 
Response" to the TJCC report. After acknowledging the right of com- 
munity groups to comment on and criticize the university's outreach 
program, the memo stated that the members of the Department of 
Oriental Studies reserved to themselves the final authority to evaluate 
the academic merit of any of their programs. The memo took "strong 
exception" to TJCC personal criticism of Sheila Scoville and Ludwig 
Adamec and, in particular, "the attribution to them of certain political 
biases": 

It happens that both scholars deny the accusations in question, but more im- 
portant than the truth or falsity of the accusations is the fact that they are 
irrelevant and out of order. Members of our department are entitled to what- 
ever political views they may choose to hold. . . . The university in any free and 
open society is by design an arena of dispute and contention, and it does not 
cease to be such an arena when it engages in community outreach. • . . For all 
of these reasons, we have resolved not to close our outreach program. Neither 
will we discard any of the books we use in that program, or keep them under 
lock and key, or burn them. 

The memo stressed the need to offer the community a variety of 
opinions on the Middle East, "a variety with which any citizen must be 
familiar before he can responsibly, intelligently and freely formulate his 



Tucson: Case Study in Intimidation 217 

own opinions," The ad hoc committee found, however, "in the whole 
array of the program's holdings, no general pattern of political dis- 
crimination and no evidence that political palatability, to any group, 
has ever been used as a criterion in the selection of materials/ 9 

The TJCC had contended that the materials used in the outreach 
program, while suitable for use within the university, were inappropri- 
ate for use in elementary and secondary schools because younger stu- 
dents lacked the sophistication to understand them. Gimello's memo 
pointed out that the immediate clientele of the Outreach Center was 
not the students but their teachers and that the final decisions as to 
which materials were suitable for their younger charges should be left 
up to the teachers. 

Carol Karsch then launched a personal attack on William Dever, 
Gimello's predecessor as head of the Oriental Studies Department. 
Dever was an archaeologist who had done much digging in Israel. He 
had returned in August from a year's sabbatical in Israel and was 
dependent on Israeli goodwill for much of his archaeological research. 
In late October, three weeks after receiving the department's "Final 
Response," Karsch told Shalom Paul, a visiting Israeli professor about 
to return to Tel Aviv, that Dever was no longer a friend of Israel. 
Karsch told Paul to go back and spread the word so that Dever would 
"never again dig in Israel." Karsch did not realize that Professor Paul 
was a close friend of Dever' s and had no intention of carrying such a 
message back to Israel. Instead, he got word back to Dever of his 
conversation with Karsch before leaving TUcson. 

With this information, Dever sent Mrs. Karsch an angry letter 
saying, in part: 

I have reason to believe that you (and perhaps others) have attempted to 
implicate me in charges of: (1) obstructing the Jewish Community Council's 
"investigation" of this department's outreach program while I was Head; 
(2) threatening to undermine the Judaic Studies Program if you pursued your 
investigation; (3) instigating the reopening of the outreach program when I 
returned from Israel last August; and (4) participating in a deliberate arrange- 
ment to keep Jewish faculty from serving on the department's newly-appointed 
committee to oversee the Near East Center and its outreach program. I have 
also learned from more than one recent, direct source that I have now been 
labeled publicly in the Jewish Community as 'anti-Zionist' and even 'anti- 
Semitic' 

Dever denied all of the charges and said that "far from obstructing 
your investigation, the record will show that I was both candid and 
cooperative — which neither you nor other members of your group 
have been." Noting that his research, professional standing and liveli- 
hood had been jeopardized, Dever told Karsch that he considered the 



218 They Dare to Speak Out 

attack grounds for legal action and signed his letter: "Awaiting your 
response, William Dever." 

There was no response. Instead, Carol Karsch and Boris Kozol- 
chyk sent to the university a scathing "Reply to the Department of 
Oriental Studies' Final Response," calling that document a "smoke- 
screen" and demanding that the department rebut the TJCC charges 
point by point. Once again, the department agreed to accommodate 
the TJCC. From December 10 to December 29, 1982, Middle East area 
faculty drafted a 330-page "Extended and Detailed Response to the 
TUcson Jewish Community Council's Report on Middle East Outreach 
at the University of Arizona." The document was presented to the new 
university president, Henry Koffler, who had succeeded Schaefer in 
September. 

Outside Experts Get Sidetracked 

President Koffler was new to TUcson and was desirous of integrat- 
ing himself with the community. He had addressed a meeting of Had- 
dasah, the women's Zionist organization, within a few months of his 
arrival. Instead of endorsing the Oriental Studies Department's report, 
he decided to bring to Tbscon a panel of Middle East scholars from 
around the country who would investigate the TJCC charges, review 
the outreach materials, and serve as arbiters of the dispute. 

Koffler asked the TJCC and the Oriental Studies Department each 
to present a list of eight scholars. Each side could then veto half of the 
other side's choices. From the final list of eight scholars Koffler 
selected four: Richard Frye of Harvard, Carl Brown of Princeton, Wil- 
liam Brinner of Berkeley and Nahum Glatzer of Boston University. It 
was agreed that the four scholars would meet in TUcson from July 29 to 
August 1, 1983 to examine the charges against the outreach program 
and to decide whether each item of material contested by the TJCC 
was "essentially scholarly or essentially propagandists. " 

In the meantime, Koffler ordered the faculty and staff of the De- 
partment of Oriental Studies not to speak to the press or to take the 
matter outside the university. The TJCC, not content to await the 
decision of the scholars, observed no such discretion. 

First, with the help of the National Jewish Community Relations 
Advisory Council in New York, the TJCC again brought the matter to 
the attention of the U.S. Department of Education in Washington. The 
associate director of the New York organization sent a letter to Edward 
Elmendorf, assistant secretary for post secondary education, repeating 
the TJCC's objections to the outreach program. The TJCC sent a copy 
of its report attacking the program to Elmendorf and to U.S. Represen- 



Tucson: Case Study in Intimidation 219 

tative James McNulty and U.S. Senator Dennis DeConcini, both of 
Arizona. In a letter to the DOE, DeConcini said that if the TJCC's 
charges were correct, "then the federal funding from the Department 
of Education for this type of project should be terminated im- 
mediately." The Senator from Arizona asked in his letter for a complete 
federal investigation of the charges. 

Responding to the two Congressmen, the Department of Educa- 
tion pointed out that it was federal policy to leave the evaluation of 
publications and other academic materials to "normal academic chan- 
nels" and that the impending meeting of the panel of experts "should 
lead to a mutually satisfactory resolution of this matter." 

When Adamec learned of the steps the TJCC had taken, he sent a 
letter to President Koffler in which he suggested that Koffler ask the 
TJCC why it carried its complaint outside the university after agreeing 
to Koffler' s arbitration efforts. Adamec also questioned the motivation 
for the TJCC action "at a time when our application for [renewal of 
federal] funding in national competition is being decided." He sug- 
gested that "our accusers want to hurt our chances of being selected." 

When, despite these efforts, the center received its federal fund- 
ing for the following academic year, Senator DeConcini and Represen- 
tative McNulty wrote jointly to U.S. Secretary of Education Terrence 
Bell complaining that the "funding cycle had been completed" without 
the peer review group's being provided with the TJCC report docu- 
menting "possible propagandizing through the outreach program." 
They appealed to Bell, "as the only official who can temporarily halt 
the funding," to do so and to order the complete investigation that 
DeConcini had earlier requested. 

Secretary Bell responded to the two Congressmen with a letter 
stating that "Federal interference would be unwarranted and illegal." 
Wrote Bell: "Questions of academic freedom as well as of state and 
local control of education also enter in here." Despite his generally firm 
position on the matter, Bell did seek to appease the indignant Congress- 
men by informing them that he would "encourage the university to 
suspend its dissemination of the contested materials pending the out- 
come of the local committee proceedings." 

While the TJCC was enlisting the aid of Congress, Ludwig 
Adamec learned that he was being attacked by Boris Kozolchyk. In a 
letter to university President Koffler, Adamec charged that Kozolchyk 
had made "untrue statements about my background and personal life." 
In particular, he wrote, Kozolchyk had told members of the univer- 
sity's Department of Judaic Studies that Adamec was "a member of the 
German Wehrmacht during World War II." He had also told Professor 
Dever that Adamec had been "arrested as a Nazi." Finally, Kozolchyk 



220 They Dare to Speak Out 

claimed that Adamec had, at a public gathering, characterized Israel as 
a "pirate state." Adamec had in fact been arrested as a teenager by the 
Nazis for trying to escape into Switzerland from his native Austria. 
After a year and a half in jail, he was sent to a concentration camp 
where he remained until the end of the war. In his letter, he simply said 
that all of the charges were ridiculous and wrote: 

I do not know Dr. Kozolchyk and cannot imagine what is the purpose of these 
slanderous remarks other than to make me appear unfit to carry out my duties 
as a professor of Middle East studies and as director of the Near East Center, 
which I have founded and managed since 1975. 

He asked that the university's grievance committee reprimand 
Kozolchyk and require him to desist from his defamatory campaign. 

But Kozolchyk and the TJCC were not to be deterred. Having 
failed to get satisfaction from Washington, they turned their attention 
to the local community and, in particular, the local school district. In 
May 1983, the TJCC delivered a copy of its attack on the outreach 
program to Jack Murrieta, assistant superintendent of the Tlicson 
Unified School District. In addition, the TJCC made fresh allegations 
to Murrieta about a new course that Sheila Scoville had taught during 
the spring semester called "Survey of the Middle East." Without giving 
the university a chance to respond to the charges, Murrieta sent out a 
memorandum to the eight high school teachers and librarians who had 
taken Scoville's course. The memorandum notified the teachers that 
the school district would not offer salary increase credits for the course 
"pending investigation" and would not allow textbooks or teaching aids 
from the course in district classrooms without approval from each 
teacher's supervisor. 

One of those who received a copy of Murrieta' s memorandum was 
Robert Gimello. The head of the Oriental Studies Department was 
angered that the school district should take such an action without 
consulting his department. First of all, the course was new, and had not 
been included in the original TJCC attack of 1982. Moreover, in a 
deliberate attempt not to exacerbate the ongoing controversy, Sheila 
Scoville had avoided the modern period of Middle East history al- 
together, ending her course with the establishment of Israel in 1948. In 
a letter to Murrieta, Gimello defended Scoville and refuted the new 
TJCC allegations: 

There has, in fact, been no discrimination in enrollment; neither the materials 
used in the course nor the manner of their presentation has been propagandistic 
in nature; and we are confident that the course violates no federal guidelines. 
Claims to the contrary are profoundly offensive to us not only because they are 
untrue but also because they would appear to be part of a concerted attempt to 



Tucson: Case Study in Intimidation 221 

interfere with the free dissemination of information and legitimate scholarly 
opinion. 

But Murrieta maintained his "lock-out" of the outreach program. 
The teachers, who had received his memorandum the day after com- 
pleting the final exam for the course, were enraged and a group of them 
took the matter to the Arizona Civil Liberties Union. The ACLU 
agreed with the teachers that the school district action represented "a 
potential violation of academic freedom rights" and consented to repre- 
sent them. ACLU Associate Director Helen Mautner met with 
Murietta and another school district official to discuss the issue. In a 
letter sent later to the president and other members of the school 
board, she said she had had the distinct impression that much of her 
conversation with the school district officials was "full of either delib- 
erate obfuscation on their part or evasiveness." Mautner wrote that she 
was "dismayed" that the district had taken such action after the em- 
ployees had finished the course and with what appeared to be "very 
little attempt to ascertain some facts" or to discuss the matter "with 
both sides of the controversy." The ACLU decided, nevertheless, to 
await the judgment of the blue ribbon panel concerning the charges of 
bias before pressing suit against the district. 

Meanwhile, arrangements for the blue ribbon panel proceeded, 
growing more complex with each letter exchanged between President 
Koffler and the TJCC. The list of items which the TJCC wanted the 
panel to cover incuded: the outreach materials themselves and their 
"networking" among outreach coordinators, the choice of emphasis in 
their presentation and distribution, their effect on children, foreign 
government and oil company sponsorship, the perception of univer- 
sity endorsement, Scoville's workshop for teachers and her new sur- 
vey course, the funding, administration and supervision of the 
outreach program, and the Department of Oriental Studies' defense of 
the program. 

Koffler decided, with the agreement of the TJCC, that the panel 
would deal only with some of the items. The university would then 
carry out a separate investigation of the others. 

On July 15, the University of Arizona controversy finally broke 
into the public domain. Once again, breaking its word of keeping the 
matter private, the TJCC had given copies of its report to the local 
press. Articles appeared simultaneously in the two major TUcson 
dailies, while a local television program carried interviews with Carol 
Karsch of the TJCC, Sylvia Campoy of the TUcson Unified School 
District, and ACLU official Helen Mautner. Meanwhile, the depart- 
ment's response to the now public charges against it remained, as ever, 
under virtual lock and key. Moreover, under orders from President 



222 They Dare to Speak Out 

Koffler not to speak to the press, Gimello, Adamec and Scoville could 
neither answer reporters' questions nor appear on television programs. 

The newspapers quoted liberally from the TJCC report, including 
its contention that "a national effort linking corporate and Arab inter- 
ests was promoting the dissemination of [outreach] materials" and that 
"the vast majority of materials evinced, to varying degrees, an unmis- 
takable bias and inaccuracy." Carol Karsch informed television view- 
ers of the program's "systematic exclusion of materials on Israel" and 
said that the outreach program and Department of Oriental Studies 
were "in the position of being an advocate for one side of a difficult, 
complex political issue." 

The morning the story hit the press, Sheila Scoville received a 
number of phone calls from newspaper and television reporters, all 
wanting the department's side of the controversy. "But I couldn't say 
anything," recalled Scoville later, lamenting the gag rule imposed by 
President Koffler. Robert Gimello felt similarly frustrated and finally 
wrote a long letter to Koffler. He said that one of the several reporters 
whom he had dodged throughout the day had finally managed to reach 
him late at night. "It was clear from what the reporter told me — as it is 
from the article in this morning's Star—that he had in his possession 
documents of TJCC authorship," wrote Gimello. The chairman of the 
Oriental Studies Department had fended off the reporter's questions 
"even to the point of not answering when he asked about whether or 
not we had ever formally replied to the TJCC's report." Wrote 
Gimello: 

I did feel it necessary, however, to make the one brief and entirely unelaborated 
observation that the Department of Oriental Studies does not believe that its 
Middle East Outreach Program reflects the anti-Israeli, pro-Arab bias that has 
been alleged . . . particularly in view of the fact that the reporter had at his 
disposal the whole array of TJCC charges and arguments. 

Gimello said that his department had sought to abide by the 
ground rules relating to the adjudication panel and had refrained from 
public argument with the TJCC. "The TJCC, however, has not done 
the same," he wrote. ". . . This latest press flap seems to me to be only 
the most recent in a series of bad-faith actions." 

Gimello said the situation was developing to the considerable dis- 
advantage of his department. "The charges against us have been made 
public in all their detail and in all their scurrilousness. As a result, I 
suspect that it will be henceforth very difficult for my colleagues and 
myself to refrain from making statements in our own defense." The 
fairness and success of the adjudication process, said Gimello, de- 
pended on "both sides playing by the rules." Gimello then stated that 



Tucson: Case Study in Intimidation 223 

the TJCC's charges were not only "untrue and profoundly offensive" 
but that "they threaten to do us real harm/ 9 He ended his anguished 
letter by suggesting that the mere announcement of the panel proce- 
dure was not enough and that something had to be said in the depart- 
ment's behalf. Gimello told the university president: "I now think we 
stand in need of your support." 

While the "gag order" prevented representatives of the Oriental 
Studies Department from providing some balance to the press cover- 
age, TUcson's two daily papers did find teachers who had taken Sco- 
ville's course and were willing to speak in her defense. One teacher 
said the TJCC charges "smacked of almost an open insult." Another 
said that the suggestion that the teachers were being given propaganda 
that later would be distributed to students "sort of made us out to be a 
bunch of dummies." She said she was "mystified" by the charges. "I 
keep thinking maybe we're talking about completely different pro- 
grams. I haven't seen anything like what they're talking about." De- 
scribing herself as "pro-Israeli," the teacher said that Scoville's course 
had concluded with a short video presentation about the forming of 
Israel which was "very fair, very balanced." 

One of the TJCC's complaints was that maps handed out during 
the course did not include Israel. Said the teacher: "Of course the map 
didn't have Israel on it, because the map was of the Ottoman Empire 
and Israel was not part of the Ottoman Empire." A librarian who had 
been enrolled in the Middle East course commented: "If somebody can 
get to the district and get them to do this without even asking a ques- 
tion, that's what I find frightening." 

With the exception of the article reflecting these comments, how- 
ever, the press coverage of the controversy just two weeks before the 
panel of experts was to meet presented the Near Eastern Center in a 
damaging light. Moreover, the interviews with Carol Karsch made it 
clear that the TJCC had now totally gone back on its promise to abide 
by the decision of the blue ribbon panel. In a statement published in the 
Arizona Star, Karsch said of the committee of scholars: "We absolutely 
have not agreed to a committee, period." 

Gimello was stunned by Karsch's statement. He told reporters: "I 
thought we had the agreement with the president of the council some 
months ago, and if they say there has been no agreement, that comes as 
something of a surprise to me." In fact, Karsch's statement con- 
tradicted assurances given earlier to President Koffler and documented 
in a letter Koffler wrote to Representative McNulty on April 18: "I 
persuaded both the department and the council to agree to the rulings 
of an outside panel of experts," said the letter. 

By July 19, it was clear that the TJCC had managed to persuade 



224 They Dare to Speak Out 

Koffler to redefine the panel's mandate. In a joint statement with TJCC 
President Sol Tobin, Koffler said that the panel was simply one "part of 
a thorough fact-finding process," and would not make a binding deci- 
sion but would merely "advise the university concerning the work of 
the outreach program." 

The four scholars finally met in closed-door sessions from July 29 
to August 1. The panel members heard representatives of the TJCC 
present their charges and then, in a separate hearing, members of the 
Near Eastern Center defended the outreach program. The scholars 
drafted their report and transmitted it to President Koffler. They were 
not allowed to keep copies of it themselves, nor were any copies dis- 
tributed. 

Then came the bombshell: President Koffler refused to release the 
panel's report. Instead he appointed, with the approval of the Tbcson 
Jewish Community Council, a University of Arizona law professor 
named Charles Ares to conduct the "second phase" of the university's 
investigation. The panel's report would not be released, said the presi- 
dent, until the second phase of the review was completed. 

Scoville, Adamec and Gimello, prevented from seeing the panel's 
report which they expected would vindicate them, were now asked to 
cooperate in Ares's wide-ranging investigation of all the TJCC charges 
not covered by the panel. These included the funding, administration 
and supervision of the outreach program; allegations of bias and enroll- 
ment irregularities surrounding Sheila Scoville's Middle East survey 
course; and the question of whether the "Extended Response" of the 
Department of Oriental Studies had been fully endorsed by all depart- 
ment faculty. 

According to Scoville, Ares asked her for copies of her correspon- 
dence as outreach coordinator and for copies of financial reports, in- 
cluding the accounts of the national Middle East Outreach Council of 
which she was treasurer. "He also probed into my personal life and 
moral character," she said, not wishing to elaborate. From Gimello, 
Ares attempted to discover which professors had written each section 
of the Oriental Studies Department's written defense. Gimello refused 
to give Ares the names. But the last straw for Gimello came when Ares 
began asking questions about the Middle East Studies Association, an 
international association of Middle East scholars which has been head- 
quartered at the University of Arizona since 1981. Ares's probings into 
MESA's financing prompted Gimello to set down in a letter his strong 
reservations about the scope of Ares's investigation. Gimello wrote to 
Ares that he could not in good conscience respond to his questions 
about MESA and wished to explain his reasons, since "I suspect that, 



TUcson: Case Study in Intimidation 225 

through no fault of your own, you do not fully appreciate what it is you 
are asking." The letter went on: 

Since the inception of this controversy my colleagues and I have been con- 
vinced that our critics* charges against the outreach program were a pretext, 
merely an opening move in an elaborate effort to control and/or stifle other 
aspects of our Department's and this University's work in Middle East 
Studies. Kozolchyk and company have repeatedly denied this, but, frankly, we 
have not believed them. 

Your questions today about MESA serve only to confirm our disbelief. . . . 
Questions regarding the presence of MESA at the University of Arizona, in- 
cluding questions about its finances, are entirely outside the legitimate scope of 
your investigation and even further afield of the proper interests of the TJCC I 
really cannot participate in or abet any effort by our critics to expand their 
calumny beyond what even they themselves had said were its limits. 

Gimello said that he considered the TJCC request for the inclusion of 
MESA in the investigation to constitute "an absolutely unjustifiable 
attempt both to interfere in university affairs and to abridge academic 
freedom." 

After learning that an attempt had been made to investigate 
MESA, the organization's executive secretary, Michael Bonine, wrote 
a letter to President Koffler which contained even stronger language: 

I am very disturbed at the mere fact that Professor Ares has asked about 
MESA. ... I can only surmise that Professor Ares is asking about MESA due 
to the urging and pressure of his colleague, Dr. Kozolchyk. Certainly, the TJCC 
would not mind damaging the reputation of MESA and its position at the 
University of Arizona. . . . 

The charges of the TJCC are irresponsible and its tactics reprehensible: secret 
tape recordings; vicious slander and innuendos against the director and out- 
reach coordinator; leaks to the press when it serves its purpose; planting of 
"spies" in classes; . . . slander against the previous head of the Department of 
Oriental Studies; . . . and agreeing to an arbitration panel, but then . . . putting 
sufficient pressure on the administration to extend the scope of the inquiry. . . . 

What is most disturbing about the last point is the fact that the TJCC evidently 
has sufficient influence and power not only to dictate the agenda but to change 
the 'rules' as well. 

Adamec cooperated with Ares at first, but balked when the inves- 
tigation was extended to MESA and to Sheila Scoville's private life. 
He wrote to Ares, "It has now become nationally known that the TJCC 
demanded that Dr. Scoville be fired and the Near Eastern Center be 
closed because of its purported anti-Israel bias." He said that having 



226 They Dare to Speak Out 

failed to make the anti-Israel accusations stick, the TJCC was now 
resorting to a "fishing expedition": 

It seems not to have occurred to you or to the administration of this university 
that workshops, classes, conferences, seminars and similar academic en- 
deavors are not subject to political scrutiny. . . . The blue ribbon panel has met, 
and we know we are vindicated. A continuation of this investigation is harass- 
ment and political persecution. 

Meanwhile, the TUcson Unified School District had launched its 
own investigation of the University of Arizona outreach program. 
TUSD Compliance Officer Sylvia Campoy, who had been assigned the 
task, explained to the press: "We have to adhere to Title VI [of the 
Civil Rights Act] — that we will not allow bias or discrimination on the 
basis of race, creed or color." Not waiting for the release of the panel's 
report, the TUSD came out on September 13 with its own findings. Its 
11-page report, backed up by appendices taken verbatim from the 
original TJCC attack, stated: "There appears to be a significant bias in 
the operation of the Near East Center Outreach Program of a deci- 
sively anti-Israel and pro- Arab character." The report charged Sheila 
Scoville with deliberately avoiding the Arab-Israeli conflict by ending 
her Middle East survey course with the year 1948: "The choice of dates 
and texts are [sic] indicative of the tendency of the outreach program's 
intent to exclude information about Israel as compared to the Arab 
countries." 

The report claimed that 

In general, the outreach program appears to constitute unauthorized activities 

within the district which are of a highly political nature The danger posed 

to otherwise harmonious religious or racial relations among teachers, students, 
and even parents is serious and altogether unnecessary. . . . TUSD does not 
tolerate the presentation of biased materials promoting defamation of a culture, 
race, sex or religion in order to rectify the image of another culture, race, sex 
or religion. 

While the panel's findings remained a closely-guarded secret, the 
TUSD report, like the TJCC report which inspired it, was widely 
quoted in the press. The Arizona Daily Star, ran the headline "Teaching 
Tools from UA Near Eastern Center 'Pro-Arab,' TUSD says." The 
article quoted the report's author, Sylvia Campoy, as saying that Sco- 
ville's Middle East survey course was "blatant pro-Arab, subtle anti- 
Israel," and that "the Israeli government apparently was not contacted 
for materials!' (on the period 600 to 1948, before Israel existed). The 
Daily Star reporter did not contact the Oriental Studies Department for 
comment on the TUSD report, mentioning in the 700-word article only 



Tucson: Case Study in Intimidation 227 

that "officials in the Oriental Studies Department have denied charges 
of bias and propaganda." 

Adamec again wrote an angry letter, this time to the editor of the 
Daily Star. "I am astonished that you would print these charges without 
trying to get the 'other side' of the story," he wrote. He asked how a 
course which dealt with a period prior to the foundation of Israel could 
be "biased against Israel." He said the texts used in the course were 
not "oil company or Arab government sources, as implied in your 
article" and that there was nothing "improper" in reimbursing the 
teacher's tuition, a common practice at the university's College of 
Education. Adamec ended his letter with this: 

We realize that at present Middle Eastern studies is a controversial field, and 
that people with emotional attachment to one or another faction in Israel may 
try to influence our activities. As an educational institution we cannot allow 
this to happen. 

These last lines were edited out of the printed version which appeared 
nine days later. 

The Tucson Citizen wrote a more balanced article a few days later 
entitled "Charges of Bias in UA Class Called Groundless." The article 
quoted Gimello as saying he was "astounded" by the TUSD report, 
while former Oriental Studies Department head William Dever pointed 
out that Campoy was not qualified to evaluate the program for any sort 
of bias. Noting the similarities between the TUSD and TJCC reports, 
Dever said: "It is the same groundless charges repeated word for word 
with no hard evidence." 



"No Systematic Pattern of Bias" 

On September 23, after nearly two months of suspense, Koffler 
released the blue ribbon panel's report. The scholars completely vin- 
dicated the outreach program. 

The report found "no systematic pattern of bias" in the outreach 
materials and "no overt policy bias" in their selection, presentation or 
distribution. On the contrary, "the selection of the material generally 
showed skill and good will on the part of the coordinator." The scholars 
said they were convinced that "the outreach activity at the University 
of Arizona does not attempt to advance the interests of any political 
group, state, or states. Nor do we see in the Outreach Library evidence 
of any effort to detract from any political group, state or states." 

As for the use of some foreign government publications and corpo- 
ration-sponsored material in the outreach program, the panel found 



228 They Dare to Speak Out 

that "these materials are appropriate for use with accompanying expla- 
nations" of their nature. In reference to the TJCC's claim that the 
program improperly attempted to rectify the image of Arabs, the panel 
found that "there is nothing intrinsically wrong with this approach or 
activity, nor does the panel find anything sinister in efforts to eliminate 
stereotyping." Charges that books used or statements made in the 
outreach program were "related to the effort . . . of certain Arab states 
to delegitimize Israel in the family of nations" were, in the panel's 
view, "completely groundless." 

The panel refuted virtually every charge that the TJCC had made 
against the outreach program, conceding only that the materials used in 
the workshop "struck us as being generally superficial and uninspired." 
They added, "This was because the outreach library from which the 
selection was made is unfortunately quite limited." The panel, which 
had been asked to look into the supervision and structure of the out- 
reach program, also said that "better supervision of the selection and 
presentation of the outreach materials would enhance the program. 
Responsibility for the program would better rest on a committee than 
on one individual." The panel's report contained specific recommenda- 
tions as to how the outreach program might be restructured so as to 
become a more interdisciplinary program involving more of the faculty. 

Having responded to the issues put before them, the four scholars 
then turned to the general matter of academic freedom. This section of 
the report, some five and a half pages long, was a diplomatically- 
worded denunciation of the tactics of the TJCC. It reads in part: 

The TJCC has exercised its right to question the university and the university 
has responded fully and adequately. The TJCC is entitled to disagree with the 
university position and to make that disagreement known. To insist, however, 
that the case can be closed only after the university takes action in line with the 
TJCC demands is to cross a clearly demarcated line. It is to go beyond the 
legitimate right to question and to be informed, moving into the illegitimate 
demand to control and to censor. 

The TJCC has now reached this line. Pressing its demands further can only be 
seen as an effort to erode university autonomy, as an attack on academic 
freedom. 

We accept that members of the TJCC do not wish to attack academic freedom, 
but in our judgment new challenges will be viewed by the public as harassment. 
And, alas, for all of us — university and community— the public image will be 
correct. 

The panel report then defended outreach coordinator Sheila Sco- 
ville. In another implicit condemnation of the TJCC, the report said 
that Scoville had been allowed to become "the issue." 



Tucson: Case Study in Intimidation 229 

This should not have been permitted to happen, and the damage cannot now be 
easily repaired. An individual possessing the requisite academic credentials 
and acting as an acknowledged member of the university community has had 
her integrity called into question. Not her competence but her integrity. We 
trust all the parties concerned — even if they cannot agree on anything else — 
will accept that this unfortunate situation must be redressed. Academic free- 
dom is meaningless unless it protects the individual whose ideas or whose 
chosen field of activity may be unpopular in certain quarters. 

Ares's report, to the surprise of those who believed that Ares sided 
with the TJCC, supported the findings of the blue ribbon panel. It was 
released the same day as the panel report. First, in Sheila Scoville's 
Middle East survey course, Ares could find "no evidence that a specific 
point of view was advocated or that the instructor sought to shape the 
participants' lesson plans to fit such a point of view." Ares found noth- 
ing wrong with reimbursing teachers for the course and no evidence of 
discrimination in enrollment. Nor did Scoville, as the TJCC had 
charged, seek to "replace the curricular processes of a School Dis- 
trict." Wrote Ares: "On all the evidence available there is no ground to 
believe that there were any irregularities in the way the course was 
arranged or taught." 

Nor did Ares find any irregularities in the funding or sponsorship 
of the outreach program. While some of the center's funding came 
from oil corporations such as Mobil and Exxon, Ares found nothing 
untoward in these general purpose grants. As for the question of 
whether the extended response had been endorsed by all members of 
the Oriental Studies Department, this aspect of Ares's investigation had 
been thwarted by Gimello's refusal to release the names of the authors 
of individual sections of the response. Ares appears to have realized 
himself the impropriety involved. He wrote: 

There seems no room for doubt that the response has the full support of the 
Department Faculty. It has been urged that individual members of the faculty 
be interviewed, presumably to determine whether they agree with every state- 
ment of every book review in it. This seems unreasonable. These are mature 
scholars of natural independence. Without some evidence that the response is 
not approved at least by a substantial majority of the Department, an effort to 
cross question them now would be quite destructive. 

Ares then turned his attention to tapes of Scoville'e classroom 
remarks that had been surreptitiously made by a TJCC "plant" who 
attended her 1982 teachers' workshop. The TJCC had made a partial 
transcript of the tapes which they claimed showed evidence of Sco- 
ville's bias. They were made available to Ares but not to the panel. 
Ares wrote: 



230 They Dare to Speak Out 

I discuss these [cassette tapes] for several reasons. (1) The partial transcript 
has been circulated but was not considered by the panel. (2) A partial transcript 
is necessarily selective and would not permit an impression of the overall tone 
of the proceedings. (3) The tapes were made without the prior consent or 
knowledge of the teacher of the workshop and this implicates academic free- 
dom even in its most minimal dimension. . . . Despite grave misgivings about 
listening to tapes made under such circumstances, I ultimately concluded that 
the harm that would be done to the credibility of the fact-finding process by 
refusing to listen, would be greater than the increased harm to academic free- 
dom, much of which had already been inflicted in any event. 

Therefore, I listened to the tapes and read the partial transcript after advising 
Dr. Scoville that she would also have the opportunity to do the same. She has 
not done so. 

Ares then pronounced his finding: "Listening to the tapes and 
reading the partial transcript does not undermine the panel's finding 
that there was no discernible policy bias." 

Despite the refutation of the TJCC's claims in two separate re- 
ports, President Koffler's cover letter summarizing their findings 
seemed calculated to present the TJCC defeat in the best possible light. 
In the section of his summary entitled "Findings," Koffler leads off as 
follows: "The TUcson Jewish Community Council was justified in its 
concern that the outreach program had not had appropriate supervi- 
sion." In the next sentence, Koffler actually manages to subordinate 
the major and critical finding of the investigations to what was in effect 
a crumb thrown out to the TJCC: "Further, while the selection of the 
material has not been biased, the panel notes that the printed materials 
are generally superficial and uninspired." Koffler ended his cover letter 
with a muffled criticism of the TJCC's attack on Scoville: 

Considerable concern by the [T\icson Jewish Community] Council has been 
expressed about the integrity of the outreach coordinator. The professional 
reputation of individuals who work in sensitive areas is always subject to an 
increased risk of criticism. Hence it is incumbent on any critic to take extra 
care to ensure fairness in rendering judgments which could be both profession- 
ally and personally destructive. I therefore believe it is important that I draw 
special attention to the fact that the panel concluded that no overt policy bias is 
discernible in the selection and distribution of the materials by the Coordinator. 

The panel's report and Ares's findings together represented a clear 
vindication of the Near Eastern center and its outreach program. Of all 
the many and various changes made by the TJCC, only one was sus- 
tained. The program would benefit from restructuring and greater 
supervision. In fact, the Department of Oriental Studies had already 
reached that conclusion in the spring of 1983 and was only awaiting the 



Tucson: Case Study in Intimidation 23 1 

panel's recommendations before implementing its own reforms. Be- 
yond these reforms, Koffler wrote, the university proposed to take no 
further action. 

Interviewed on television after the release of the two reports, 
Gimello and Adamec expressed their belief that they had been vin- 
dicated and that the affair had now been resolved. Carol Karsch also 
claimed victory in her appearance before the cameras: 

Oh, the report far from vindicates the Near Eastern Center. As a matter of fact, 
if you read it carefully, it confirms our concern that it was not managed 
properly. . . . The presentation of the Middle East, including Israel, must be 
accurate; it must be fair; and it must be consistent with our American ideals. 
This has not been the case. It would remain to be seen how the university 
would prepare to deal with this. 

Another spokesman for the TJCC, Mark Kobernic, was quoted on 
a radio news report as saying: "We certainly don't believe that there's 
been any sort of vindication of the program in that it should go on in its 
present form." 

Carol Karsch also wrote a self-congratulatory "analysis" piece for 
the Jewish weekly Arizona Post. Asserting that "a grave issue has 
faced the Tlicson Jewish community for the past two years, she argued 
that 

Our research and that of the Anti-Defamation League and American Jewish 
Committee evaluated the materials on Arab-Israeli conflict as biased, propa- 
gandist^ and having a strong pro-Arab anti-Israel slant. The panel found that 
the materials were not scholarly and characterized them as "superficial and 
uninspired," "lacking in depth," and most importantly, often containing a 
"point of view." 

This was apparently Karsch's interpretation of the panel's statement 
which said: "Although certain passages in the works reviewed might be 
seen as expressing particular points of view, we find no systematic 
pattern of bias in the works." Karsch continued: 

We must not let ourselves get bogged down in a battle of semantics. Whether to 
call pro-Arab materials 'biased' or to say that they demonstrate a "point of 
view," the effect remains the same. 

Then came this startling claim: "The m^jor thrust of Dr. Koffler's re- 
port was the admission of an overriding need for radical changes in the 
program." Karsch concluded by again raising the spectre of a national 
anti-Israel conspiracy: 

Our responsibility in Tlicson is part of a national challenge to counter a power- 
ful, well-financed effort to promote the Arab cause while attempting to under- 



232 They Dare to Speak Out 

mine the legitimacy of Israel. The price of Jewish security has always been 
vigilance. 

Obviously, the battle wasn't over, although by now it had gone on 
for two years. 



"It Came as a Terrible Surprise" 

Despite the findings of Ares and the blue ribbon panel, the admin- 
istration of the TUcson Unified School District met on October 14, 1983, 
and officially adopted the recommendations contained in Sylvia Cam- 
poy's anti-outreach report. Interviewed by telephone after the meet- 
ing, Campoy said: "We have totally disassociated ourselves from the 
outreach program/ 9 She said that teachers would be denied salary 
increment credit not only for Scoville's Middle East survey course but 
also for any future course offered by the outreach program. No mate- 
rials from the outreach program would be permitted in the classrooms. 

At a TUSD school board meeting a few days later, both Robert 
Gimello and William Dever criticized Campoy's report, calling it 
"shoddy, hasty and one-sided." Gimello told the board: "I hope that 
district policies are not decided on because of uncritical submission to 
pressure-group tactics." The school board voted to reinstate salary 
increment credits to the teachers who had taken Sheila Scoville's Mid- 
dle East survey course on the grounds that taking the credits away 
retroactively had been unfair. There was no discussion of future policy, 
however, or of the TUSD administrative decision to ban the outreach 
materials from classrooms. Merrill Grant, district superintendent, 
stood behind the decision and so did the school board. 

Nor were the program's continuing headaches confined to the 
school district. At a faculty senate meeting, also in early October, 
President Koffler said that while no bias had been found in the out- 
reach program, the panel did find cause for the TJCC allegation that the 
program had not been properly supervised. In particular, the panel 
found that the quality of the program had not benefitted from faculty 
participation. For this reason it had been decided to create a board of 
governors to oversee the center's operations. Koffler repeated the 
panel's finding that materials used in the outreach program were 
"superficial and uninspired" and said: "A report which points to defects 
in the quality of the work is scarcely a vindication of the center." 

Adamec was enraged. In a letter to all members of the faculty 
senate, he said he found the accusation that the outreach program had 
not been properly supervised "insulting": 

I am an expert in Middle East studies with fifteen books to my name and thirty 

years of experience in the field Dr. Scoville's outreach activities have been 

praised by officials of the Department of Education as being a "model program 9 



Tucson: Case Study in Intimidation 233 

and it is in good part due to the excellent evaluation of our outreach program 
that we have won funding for ten years in spite of keen national competition. 

Do we need to be supervised, directed, and governed by a board? As long as 
the board is a consultative body I welcome its creation, even though the Near 
Eastern Center is the only center at this University for which such 'guidance' is 
deemed necessary. 

But it soon became clear that the board was to be more than 
"advisory." In a memo from the university's acting dean, it was 
specified that the board would give approval for funding requests and 
expenditures, select and review personnel in the center, "including the 
director," review the quality of the center's programs and, in particular, 
the quality of the outreach materials. It would review and even initiate 
future plans for the center and "oversee and be involved in all policy 
matters affecting the center." 

The board of governors set up to supervise the center had only one 
faculty member from the Middle East area core. Meanwhile, the roster 
of "center faculty" was augmented, in order to increase faculty in- 
volvement, to include professors from the South Asia, Near Eastern 
archaeology, arid lands, anthropology and Judaic studies depart- 
ments — and all were given equal voting power. 

In Adamec's view, these measures deprived the Near Eastern 
Center of the autonomy it had previously enjoyed and were indicative 
of an attempt to nudge him out of his position. On December 5, 1983, 
Adamec sent to the university's acting dean his letter of resignation. 
Announcing that he would leave his position at the end of the fall 1984 
semester, he wrote: "After almost three years of political attacks from 
which we were eventually vindicated, the most urgent task you have 
assigned to your board of governors is yet another review of center 
'personnel,' namely the director and the outreach coordinator." After 
summing up the measures that had been taken, Adamec said, 

There is no need to further detail instances of what may or may not have been 
intentional harassment and discrimination against the center and its personnel. 
My work as center director was a labor of love for which I did not receive any 
compensation; those who want to see someone else in my position will not 
have long to wait. 

Sheila Scoville stated that under the changed circumstances she 
would not work for a new director and so would resign as outreach 
coordinator when Adamec left. It was doubtful whether, with the de- 
parture of Adamec and Scoville, the Near Eastern Center would con- 
tinue to obtain federal funds. Adamec himself predicted its ultimate 
demise: "I have a pretty good idea that a year from now there may not 
be any money for the center," he said. 

And so, the TUcson Jewish community was to have its way. Not 



234 They Dare to Speak Out 

only had it effectively crippled the outreach program by getting its 
materials banned from the classrooms of Arizona's largest school dis- 
trict; it had, with the help of President Koffler, brought about the 
resignation of the two individuals it had targeted from the outset. 

In an interview, William Dever said that when he heard about the 
TUSD decision, 

I realized we'd been had. [The TJCC] has endless time and devotion and 
resources and we don't. We're just a few individuals, acting on our own, taking 

time from our real work to fight this hopeless battle What bothers us is we 

know that is not an isolated case in this community. The local people have been 
forced into admitting this is part of a much larger national campaign and we 
know that other Near Eastern centers have been under pressure. They can say 
4 We did it in TUcson; we can do it to you, too.' 

Robert Gimello commented: "This has been an education in disil- 
lusionment for me. I had been very suspicious of claims that there was 
interference by a pro-Isareli lobby in many areas of our public life. But 
having gone through the last two years, I'm now less suspicious. It 
came as a terrible surprise to me." 

It was no surprise, however, when the TUcson Jewish community 
singled out for recognition several of the people prominent in the 
school district's decision. Six months after Sylvia Campoy issued the 
directive dissociating the school district from the program, she and two 
members of the board, Eva Bacal and Raul Grijalva, were honored by 
the Jewish Community Relations Committees. Bacal, like Superintend- 
ent Merrill Grant, is prominent in the Jewish community. At the dinner 
Campoy was recognized for "leadership in ensuring compliance and 
equal opportunity." Chairing the event was Carol Karsch, who the 
previous year had been cited as TUcson's Jewish "woman of the year" 
for her attack on the same program. 

For Campoy the best was yet to come. A month later, the Jewish 
weekly announced that she would be the guest of the Jewish commu- 
nity in a week-long, expense-paid tour of Israel organized by Karsch 
with the support of the American Jewish Committee and the local 
Jewish Community Foundation. 

It is interesting to note that Karsch and others in the TUcson Jew- 
ish community became "vigilant" only in 1981, six years after the Near 
East Center was founded. That was the same year in which the Ameri- 
can Jewish Committee, whose assistance to the TJCC Karsch ac- 
knowledges, came out with its report entitled "Middle East Centers at 
Selected American Universities." Written by Gary Schiff, project di- 
rector for the "Academy for Educational Development," the report 
asserts that funding by Arab governments or "pro- Arab corporations" 
exercises "at least a subliminal influence" on students and faculty in 



Tucson: Case Study in Intimidation 235 

Middle East centers "as well as on the nature, content, and outcome of 
the programs." 

The Schiff report recommends that universities should exercise 
"close oversight" of outreach programs. For its part, the American 
Jewish Committee stated in a press release that it intended to follow up 
the Schiff report by "continuing to monitor the Middle East centers" 
around the country, by "collecting and evaluating outreach materials in 
cooperation with local community groups, teachers, professors, etc.," 
and by "meeting with university officials to discuss oversight mecha- 
nisms and review procedures in case problems arise." The Schiff re- 
port refers ominously to the "overall attempt to delegitimize the state 
[of Israel] ... as prelude to its destruction." 

Observers of events in Tbcson saw the TJCC campaign as a test 
case in preparation for similar attacks on other Middle East centers in 
the United States. The Schiff report and the cooperation between the 
TJCC and such national organizations as the American Jewish Com- 
mittee and the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith lend credence 
to this hypothesis. Other federally-funded Middle East area studies 
centers are at Harvard, Columbia, UCLA, Berkeley, Princeton and 
New York University (the latter two share a joint program), and at the 
Universities of Texas, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Utah and Washington. 

The success of the Tbcson attack soon served to encourage moves 
against another outreach program. During the summer of 1982, Char- 
lotte Albright, Middle East outreach coordinator at the University of 
Washington in Seattle, was visited by Arthur Abramson of the Ameri- 
can Jewish Committee. Abramson asked Albright for a report on the 
activities of the center over the preceding five years. When she re- 
fused, he said that similar reports had been requested from the Middle 
East Outreach Centers in Tbcson and Los Angeles and reminded Al- 
bright that the Tbcson center had been closed down (this was during 
the four months of the program's suspension). Abramson further 
claimed that Jonathan Friedlander, the coordinator of the center at 
UCLA, had provided him with a requested report. When Albright 
called Friedlander about this, however, he said that no such report had 
been either requested or provided. Confronted with this information, 
Abramson said he had Friedlander' s report in his files and would show 
it to Albright. He never did so. 

After attending a 1984 conference for outreach coordinators, 
Sheila Scoville, her own future clouded by the controversy that had 
swirled around her, was pessimistic: "The other coordinators think 
they can work with these pressure groups. My experience is you sim- 
ply cannot. I fear that in the future outreach programs inevitably will 
take on a political bias and cease to serve educational purposes." 

One striking aspect of the Tbcson controversy was the absence of 



236 They Dare to Speak Out 

public opposition to the TJCC campaign within the Jewish community. 
The comments of one Jewish professor at the university throw some 
light on the reason for the general reluctance of Jews to speak out. 

This professor told Richard Frye, one of the four scholars brought 
to Tlicson to review the TJCC charges, that Karsch and Kozolchyk had 
the Jewish community "almost in a stranglehold" and "anyone who 
speaks against them is speaking against the national organization, the 
policy." The professor said the pressures on him were "terrible." "After 
all," he told Frye, "we get our funds, our grants, from various Jewish 
communities. . . . What I am telling you is branding me a quisling." 

Another Jewish professor at the university, Jerrold Levy, was in- 
terviewed shortly after the school board meeting and asked about the 
lack of protest from the more liberal elements within Hicson's Jewish 
community. He said, "I think everybody's a little frightened." Levy 
had himself sent letters deploring the TJCC attacks to the editors of 
three newspapers, but none was printed. He explained his daring: 

I don't depend on Jewish funds for my academic work or for my livelihood. It's 
the people in the professional classes, doctors, lawyers, who feel intimidated. 
The friends I have within the [Reform] congregation are very, very close to the 
chest on political matters. I know a professional man who is very liberal, but 
now that he's got a well-established business, he's not coming out against the 
TJCC. There are some concerned people who are not saying anything. We're 
up against a very well-organized group of co-religionists here. There's some 
fairly good blackballing going on. 

While Levy said that a lot of people privately disagreed with the 
TJCC, he also gave another reason for the lack of Jewish voices raised 
in protest: misinformation. 

I called two older members of the Jewish community whom I really respect and 
I said, 'What do we do?' And their answer was pretty generally: 'Where there's 
smoke there's fire. They [the TJCC] wouldn't have started this attack if there 
hadn't been something going on.' I asked them what they had read. Well, 
they'd only read the editorials in the [Jewish] Arizona Post. Nothing else. 
There's a lack of awareness, a lack of facts. The Arizona Post has published 
some pretty slanted things. 

Levy said he had tried to reason with both Kozolchyk and Karsch. 
They responded by inviting him to an "educational series" they were 
holding on why Jews should support Israeli Prime Minister Begin. 

It was a series of evening lectures which were strictly brainwashing. And at the 
second one I got up during the discussion and told them the facts that they'd 
got wrong. They had manipulated maps and all kinds of funny things. And they 
disinvited me from the group. It's that simple. This is not a group that's open to 
discussion. 



Tucson: Case Study in Intimidation 237 
Levy describes the general atmosphere of T\icson in similar terms: 

It's an awful lot like the McCarthy period. And I include not only the Near 
Eastern Center [controversy] but the whole line taken on Israel. It's an awful 
lot like Germany in the thirties, too. It's a lot like what we Jews have been 
yelling about, that we want to be free from. And then who starts doing it again? 
It's a very scary business. 



Chapter 9 



Church and State 



Dwight Campbell, the youthful clerk of Shelby County, Illinois, sat 
quietly through the meeting in a Shelbyville restaurant. It was fall 1982, 
the campaign season in Illinois, and during the session I discussed 
foreign policy issues with a group of constituents. Only when the 
gathering had begun to break up did Campbell call me aside to voice his 
deep concern over remarks I had made criticizing Israeli policy in 
Lebanon. 

He identified himself as a Christian and, speaking very personally 
and without hostility, warned me that my approach to the Middle East 
was both wrong from a political standpoint and, more importantly, in 
conflict with God's plan. He concluded with a heartfelt injunction: "I 
would not advocate anything to interfere with the destiny of Israel as 
set forth in the Bible." 

The urgency in his voice was striking. It seemed clear that this 
public official, well-respected in his community, was not compelled to 
support Israel by external pressure. Nor was he motivated by a desire 
for professional or social advancement. As with many evangelical 
Christians, his support came from deep conviction. 

Americans like Dwight Campbell comprise a natural constituency 
for Israel and add enormous strength to the manipulations of the Israeli 
lobby. Democratic Congressman Lee H. Hamilton, chairman of the 
Middle East Subcommittee, hears similar comments when he visits his 
district in rural Indiana. At "town meetings" which Hamilton conducts, 
constituents frequently speak up, beginning by identifying themselves 
as Christians, and then urge that he support Israel's needs completely 
and without reservation. 

Many U.S. Christians, both conservative and mainline, support 
Israel due to shared cultural and political values and in response to the 
horror of the Holocaust. Many convervatives feel, as did the young 

238 



Church and State 239 

official in Shelby ville, that the creation of Israel in 1948 came in 
fulfillment of biblical prophecy, and that the Jewish state will continue 
to play a central role in the divine plan. 

Religious affiliation also tends to influence members of the main- 
stream denominations, particularly Protestant, toward a pro-Israeli 
stance. An exclusive focus on biblical tradition causes many Christians 
to see the Middle East as a reflection of events portrayed in the Bible: 
twentieth century Israelis become biblical Israelites, Palestinians be- 
come Philistines, and so on in a dangerous, though most often uncon- 
scious, chain of historical misassociation. The distinction between 
Jewish settlers on the occupied West Bank and the Hebrew nation 
which conquered the land of Canaan under Moses and Joshua becomes 
obscured. 

Virtually all Christians approach the Middle East with at least a 
subtle affinity to Israel and an inclination to oppose or mistrust any 
suggestion that questions Israeli policy. The lobby has drawn widely 
upon this support in pressing its national programs. More important, 
fresh perspectives which challenge shibboleths and established preju- 
dices regarding the Middle East are often denounced by both the lobby 
and many of its Christian allies as politically extremist, anti-Semitic, or 
even anti-Christian. 

The religious convictions of many Americans have made them 
susceptible to the appeals of the Israeli lobby, with the result that free 
speech concerning the Middle East and U.S. policy in the region is 
frequently restricted before it begins. The combination of religious 
tradition and overt lobby activity tends to confine legitimate discussion 
within artificially narrow bounds. 

Conservative Christians Rally to the Cause 

Fundamentalist and evangelical groups have been active in this 
campaign to narrow the bounds of free speech. Jerry Falwell and Pat 
Robertson proselytize tirelessly for ever-increasing U.S. backing of 
Israel, citing scriptural passages as the basis for their arguments. As 
the membership of conservative Protestant churches and organizations 
has expanded over the last decade, this "Christian Zionist" approach to 
the Middle East has been espoused from an increasing variety of "pul- 
pits": local churches, the broadcast media and even the halls of Con- 
gress. 

Senator Roger W. Jepsen, a first-term legislator from Iowa, told 
the 1981 annual policy conference of AIPAC that one of the reasons for 
his "spirited and unfailing support" for Israel was his Christian faith. 
He declared that "Christians, particularly Evangelical Christians, have 



240 They Dare to Speak Out 

been among Israel's best friends since its rebirth in 1948." His views 
are hardly unique, even among members of Congress, but his state- 
ment on this occasion aptly expressed the nearly mystical identification 
some Christians feel toward Israel: 

I believe one of the reasons America has been blessed over the years is because 
we have been hospitable to those Jews who have sought a home in this country. 
We have been blessed because we have come to Israel's defense regularly, and 
we have been blessed because we have recognized Israel's right to the 
Land. . . . 

Jepsen cited his fundamentalist views in explaining his early oppo- 
sition to the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia but then credited divine 
intervention as the reason he switched position the day before the 
Senate voted on the proposal. On election day, November 6, 1984, 
Iowans — spurred by the Israeli lobby — did their own switching, reject- 
ing Jepson's bid for a second term. 

Jerry Falwell, leader of the Moral Majority and a personal friend of 
Menachem Begin and Yitzhak Shamir, has been described by The 
Economist of London as "the silk- voiced ayatollah of Christian revival- 
ism." Acclaimed in a Conservative Digest annual poll as the most- 
admired conservative outside of Congress (with President Reagan the 
runner-up), Falwell embodies the growing Christian-Zionist connec- 
tion. He has declared: "I don't think America could turn its back on the 
people of Israel and survive. God deals with nations in relation to how 
those nations deal with the Jew." He has testified before Congressional 
committees in favor of moving the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to 
Jerusalem. Falwell is perhaps the best known of the pro-Israel fun- 
damentalist spokesmen, but he is by no means the only one. 

In the summer of 1983, Mike Evans Ministries of Bedford, Texas, 
broadcast an hour-long television special called "Israel, America's Key 
to Survival." Evangelist Evans used the program to describe the "cru- 
cial" role played by Israel in the political — and spiritual — fate of the 
United States. Since the show was presented as "religious pro- 
gramming," it was given free broadcast time on local television stations 
in at least 25 states, in addition to the Christian Broadcasting Network 
cable system. Yet the message of the program was by no means entirely 
spiritual. 

Interspersing scripture quotations with interviews of public and 
military figures and other evangelists, including Pat Robertson, Oral 
Roberts and Jimmy Swaggart, Evans made a number of political asser- 
tions about Israel. These included the wild contention that if Israel 
gave up control of the West Bank and other territories occupied after 
the 1967 war, the destruction of Israel and the United States would 



Church and State 241 

follow; and the implication that Israel is a special victim of Soviet 
pressure in the form of "international terrorism," which would other- 
wise be brought to bear directly against the United States and Latin 
America. 

Evans concluded the broadcast with a climactic appeal for Chris- 
tians to come to the support of "America's best friend in that part of the 
world" by signing a "Proclamation of Blessing for Israel." Stating that 
"God distinctly told me to produce this television special pertaining to 
the nation of Israel," Evans argued that the proclamation was particu- 
larly important since "war is coming, and we must let our President and 
Prime Minister Begin know how we, as Americans, feel about Israel." 
He has since presented the proclamation to both Prime Minister 
Shamir and President Reagan, and in a recent publication he con- 
gratulated his supporters: "You never thought you would be having 
such an effect upon the two most powerful leaders in the entire world! 
But, yes, you are!" 

Still, Evans was dissatisfied with Reagan's response. In an August 
1984 fund-raising appeal, Evans blamed the U.S. for Israel's economic 
woes: "Because of America's encouraging Israel to give up the Sinai 
and its oil [they lost, he said, $1.7 billion] and because of Israel's 
assistance to America through defense of the Middle East, Israel is on 
the verge of economic collapse." He said Reagan was "hesitant" to 
"alleviate Israel's great pressures." 

The Evans theme linking America's survival to Israel was echoed 
in a full-page ad for the National Political Action Committee, a pro- 
Israel fund-raising organization, in the December 18, 1983, New York 
Times. It proclaimed that "Israel's survival is vital to our own," and 
"Faith in Israel strengthens America." 

Radio and television broadcasts by Jim Bakker, Kenneth Cope- 
land, Roberts, Swaggart and others routinely proclaim the sanctity of 
Israel through scriptural quotation, usually from the Old Testament, 
and then reinforce it with political and strategic arguments supplied by 
the broadcaster. 

The arguments find a considerable audience. Most estimates place 
the number of evangelical Christians in the United States in the neigh- 
borhood of 30 million. Jerry FalwelFs "Old Time Gospel Hour" is aired 
on 392 television stations and nearly 500 radio stations each week. 
Former Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin describes Falwell as 
"the man who represents twenty million American Christians." 

Nor is the American style of evangelistic programming confined to 
U.S. shores. Its pro-Israeli message is now broadcast from the Middle 
East itself. The High Adventure Holyland Broadcasting Network of 
George Otis has maintained the Voice of Hope radio station in southern 



242 They Dare to Speak Out 

Lebanon since the first Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1978. He de- 
scribes it as an effort "to bring the Word of God to an area that has not 
had the Word of God in many centuries." Otis named his broadcast 
ministry after his personal conviction that "Jesus [is] high adventure"; 
but over the last several years the station has been actively involved in 
adventure of a more secular sort. 

The late Major Saad Haddad, before his death the Lebanese com- 
mander of the Israeli-backed militia which controlled southern Leba- 
non prior to the Israeli invasion in 1982, frequently used the Voice of 
Hope to broadcast his military objectives, including threats against 
civilians. Evangelist Otis, overlooking grim aspects of Haddad's rule, 
described Haddad as a "born-again" Christian who was a "good spiri- 
tual leader" to the people of southern Lebanon. The U.S. State Depart- 
ment confirms that Haddad often carried out threats to shell civilian 
areas, including the city of Sidon, "without previous warning." Haddad 
rationalized these attacks as reprisals against the Lebanese govern- 
ment for not meeting his demands for salary payment. (The Lebanese 
government ceased paying the salaries of Haddad's forces after he was 
dishonorably discharged from the Lebanese army). 

In the spring of 1980, Haddad forces used five U.S.-built Sherman 
tanks in an attack on a Boy Scout Jamboree near the city of Tyre, 
killing 16 boys. Haddad's gunners also shot down a Norwegian 
medivac helicopter which arrived to help the wounded. The scout 
gathering, which was sponsored by the Christian Maronite Church, 
was just beyond the limits of the "Free Lebanon," or "Haddadland," 
the area controlled by Haddad's Israeli-backed army. Haddad an- 
nounced at the time that such attacks would continue until the Leba- 
nese government provided more electricity to this area and recognized 
Haddad schools. 

With the support of both Israel and the remaining Christian forces 
in the south, High Adventure Ministries is going ahead with plans to 
establish the Star of Hope television station in southern Lebanon. Otis 
himself describes the Israeli support as "a miracle": "Did you ever 
think we would see the day when the Jews would push us for a Chris- 
tian station?" Yet since a television station will assure more effective 
communication with the public— for military and other purposes — 
Israeli approval seems more the product of sound strategic thinking 
than of divine intervention. Like the Voice of Hope before it, the new 
Star of Hope will be financed through tax-deductible contributions of 
money and equipment from donors in North America. 

Through such endeavors, American evangelical broadcasting sup- 
ports the Israeli government indirectly by emphasizing the moral and 
religious commitment to the Jewish state which many Americans al- 



Church and State 243 

ready feel and, directly, by broadcasting in the Middle East messages 
which promote the military objectives of Israel and its Lebanese allies. 

Jerry Falwell periodically conducts tours of Israel for "born again" 
Christians. Although Falwell is careful to avoid the appearance of 
money flowing from Israel to Moral Majority, former Israeli Prime 
Minister Menachem Begin demonstrated his commitment by arranging 
for a jet plane to be sold to FalwelFs organization at a substantial 
discount. 

Besides Falwell, there are many other Christian groups offering 
Israel their support. In eastern Colorado, more than ten churches coor- 
dinate an annual "Israel Recognition Day" involving films, lectures, 
cultural exhibits and sermons reaching more than 25,000 parishioners. 
The National Christian Leadership Conference for Israel (NCLCI) 
holds an annual conference in Washington attended by more than 200 
delegates representing Christian groups from all over the United 
States. As Dr. Franklin H. Littell, president of NCLCI, has noted, 
"Concern for Israel's survival and well-being [is] the only issue that 
some of the organizations ever cooperated on." 

Other publicized events have included a "Solidarity for Israel Sab- 
bath" at Washington's Beth Shalom Orthodox Synagogue in October 
1982 — in which evangelical leaders and local rabbis joined to "build 
bridges" and coordinate their efforts in behalf of Israel — and the "Na- 
tional Prayer Breakfast in Honor of Israel," which has become an 
annual event in the nation's capital. 

The third such breakfast conference, given February 1, 1984, at- 
tracted over 500 ardent supporters of Israel, most of them Christians. 
The setting was brightly decorated with Israeli flags and symbols, in- 
cluding apples bearing Star of David stickers. The printed program for 
the affair carried an impressive list of political and evangelical leaders, 
including Edwin Meese III (unable to attend, it was announced, be- 
cause of his just-announced nomination as attorney-general), Meir 
Rosenne, Israeli ambassador to the United States, and representatives 
from the National Religious Broadcasters and other conservative Prot- 
estant groups. Congressman Mark Siljander of Michigan, a member of 
the Middle East Subcommittee, delivered a stirring reaffirmation of 
evangelical solidarity with Israel: "It's not that we are anti-Arab. We 
seek peace in God's plan." 

The breakfasts are coordinated by The Religious Roundtable, a 
group which describes itself as "a national organization dedicated to 
religious revival and moral purpose in America," yet one of its primary 
purposes is advancement of the Israeli cause. Edward E. McAteer, 
president of the group, is known in the Washington area as a partisan 
speaker and editorial writer on behalf of Israel. He uses the religious 



244 They Dare to Speak Out 

format of his organization to back such political stands as closer U.S.- 
Israeli strategic cooperation, restriction of U.S. arms sales to Arab 
states, and transfer of the United States embassy in Israel from Tel 
Aviv to Jerusalem. In 1984 McAteer was an unsuccessful candidate in 
Tennessee for the Senate. 

Writing in the Washington Post on January 2, 1984, McAteer sup- 
ported the Israeli intervention in Lebanon, likening opponents of the 
invasion to "the pre-med student who proposed removing only half a 
cancerous growth [the PLO] because of the blood generated by 
surgery." Considering the fact that the invasion led to staggering civil- 
ian casualties, this crusading knight of The Religious Roundtable cer- 
tainly cannot be accused of fear of blood. 

Perhaps inspired by Mike Evans Ministries, the prayer breakfast 
committee created its own Proclamation of Blessing for Israel. Issued 
in the name of "America's 50-million-plus Bible-believing Christians," 
it included a curious mixture of religious and political/military points: 

A call for "Strategic Cooperation" with Israel is followed by an appeal to "the 
God of Israel, Who through the Jewish people, gave to the world of Scriptures, 
our Savior, Salvation and Spiritual blessings"; 

Scriptural selections affirming the divine right of the Jews to the Land follow 
language rejecting of "dual loyalty" charges against American Jewish support- 
ers of Israel; 

A call for the transfer of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem is accompanied by an 
exhortation that "the Scripturally-delineated boundaries of the Holy Land 
never be compromised by the shifting sands of political and economic expe- 
diency." 

Cooperation between Jewish and conservative Protestant groups 
has an important impact in the political sphere. At a recent address in 
Israel, Jerry Falwell declared that "The day is coming when no candi- 
date will be elected in the United States who is not pro-Israel." Al- 
though the Moral Majority has not had 100 percent success in putting 
its favorites in power, candidates for high office, regardless of their 
own religious inclinations, now often feel compelled to address the 
issues on the evangelical political agenda. Israel ranks high among 
these. 

Falwell's Moral Majority broadens its power base through voter 
registration drives in every state, the result that many members of the 
House and Senate — such as Siljander and Jepsen — welcome in order to 
emphasize the religious foundation of their political support for Israel. 

Many conservative Christians see a theological basis for this sup- 
port, as they ascribe to Israel a prominent role in the interpretation of 
Christian doctrine. On the one hand, it is maintained that Israel de- 



Church and State 245 

serves Christian support because it exists as the fulfillment of biblical 
prophecy. Old Testament passages are most often quoted in defense of 
this view. On the other hand, many Christians back Israel because they 
believe the Jewish people remain, as they were in biblical times, the 
chosen nation of God. The same advocate will often cite both argu- 
ments. The prophecy argument is held by the most conservative fun- 
damentalist groups, such as the Moral Majority, and has received more 
public attention, but the covenantal view is probably held by a larger 
segment of America's 40 million conservative Christians. 

Dr. Dewey Beegle of Wesley Theological Seminary commented on 
the differing views of Israel held by American Christians in his 1978 
book, Prophecy and Prediction: "All Christian groups claim to have the 
truth, but obviously some of these views cannot be true because they 
contradict other intepretations which can be verified." 

Like many biblical scholars, Beegle has concluded that the scrip- 
tural basis which pro-Zionist Christians often cite for the establishment 
of modern Israel does not withstand close scrutiny. His conclusions 
can be broadly summarized in two basic propositions: 

First, the prophesied return of the nation of Israel to Palestine was 
fulfilled by the biblical return from Babylon, and has nothing to do with 
twentieth-century Israel. 

Second, the covenant through which God promised Israel "the 
land" was not permanent but conditional; it was abrogated in biblical 
times when Israel failed to be obedient to God's commandments and 
thereby forfeited the promise. 

But the issue is not whether the scholarship of Beegle or the Moral 
Majority is the more sound, but the importance of open debate of such 
difficult issues. Here again the experience of Beegle is revealing. Be- 
cause his book treated the controversial issue of modern Israel and its 
relations to biblical tradition, many publishers, even those who had 
handled previous works by this scholar, declined to publish it. One of 
these told him bluntly: "Your early chapters on the biblical matters of 
prophecy and prediction are well done. The only chapter that seriously 
disturbs us is number 15 on 'Modern Israel Past and Present.' " Beegle 
was informed that his views on Israel, which accept the legitimacy of 
the modern Jewish state though not on biblical grounds, would be 
"bound to infuriate" many readers. 

Yet the fact that a book or a point of view is controversial is not, at 
least in the United States, usually grounds for rejection. Dr. Beegle 
views Christians and Jews who disagree with him in this way: "We 
know that these people think alike and feel alike and are going to help 
each other. It's perfectly natural. All I'm saying is we ought to have 
just as much right on the other side to speak out openly and put the 



246 They Dare to Speak Out 

information out there." His book finally was published by Pryor Petten- 
gill, a small firm in Ann Arbor, Michigan. 

Many Christians who are neither fundamentalist nor evangelical 
are also inclined to accept the supposed counsel of prophecy as 
justification for Israel's dominant role in the Middle East. The presi- 
dent of the United States appears to be among their number. 

President Reagan, in his October 1983 telephone conversation 
with AIPAC executive director Thomas A. Dine, turned a discussion of 
Lebanon's present-day problems into a discourse on biblical prophecy: 

I turn back to your ancient prophets in the Old Testament and the signs foretell- 
ing Armageddon and I find myself wondering if ... if we're the generation 
that's going to see that come about. I don't know if you've noted any of those 
prophecies lately but, believe me, they certainly describe the times we're going 
through. 

Reagan's views are not unprecedented, even in the Oval Office. 
His views reflect the wide credence given to biblical prophecy — and its 
use to justify Israel's existence. 



A Puzzling Paradox 

Yet, recognizing Israel as the fulfillment of biblical prophecy impli- 
cates the Christian — and even more so the Jew — in several paradoxes. 
First, conservative and "premillennial" Protestants have traditionally 
sought to convert Jews to Christianity, and relations between the two 
groups have often been less than cordial. Jews instinctively mistrusted 
Southern Baptist Jimmy Carter in 1976 because, as Jewish author 
Roberta Feuerlicht writes, "In Jewish history, when fundamentalists 
came, Cossacks were not far behind." 

Ironically, the Christian groups most likely to accept a biblical 
basis for supporting Israel are also those most likely to feel the neces- 
sity of Jewish conversion to Christianity, an extremely sensitive issue 
to Israelis. Dan Rossing, director of the Department for Christian Com- 
munities in the Israeli Ministry of Religious Affairs, states the problem 
succinctly: the evangelical "theological scheme clearly implies that 
Jews have to become Christians — clearly not today, but some day." 

Many evangelical organizations carry on missionary activities in 
the Middle East, particularly in Israel, which are strongly opposed by 
many Israelis. The evangelists openly proselytize, seeing conversion of 
the Jews as another precursor of the times which the "recreation" of 
Israel in 1948 is said to foretell. 

The International Christian Embassy in Jerusalem, an organiza- 
tion which works to foster support for Israel in twenty nations, is one 



Church and State 247 

of a number of evangelical organizations which have come under fire 
recently for missionary activities inside Israel. The "embassy" was 
opened in Jerusalem in October 1980 as a gesture of "international 
Christian" support for the controversial transfer of the Israeli capital to 
that city from Tel Aviv. 

Despite expressing political support for the state of Israel, the 
International Christian Embassy has devoted some of its efforts to the 
conversion of Jews to Christianity, becoming controversial in the eyes 
of many Israelis. 

In Israel, Orthodox Jews have been active in pressing for legisla- 
tion banning foreign missionaries and organizing opposition against 
them. Despite the monetary support and goodwill brought to Israel by 
these organizations, they are widely regarded as Trojan horses. There 
have even been physical attacks on their members. 

The dilemma faced by the Israeli government in dealing with 
Christian groups like the International Christian Embassy is essentially 
the same as that faced by American Jewish groups in forming their 
relations with conservative Christian groups in the United States. 
While spokesmen within Israel, such as Rabbi Moshe Berliner, decry 
the inherent threat to Judaism posed by proselytizing fundamental- 
ists — "Are we so gullible as to take any hand extended to us in friend- 
ship?" — the Israeli government under both Begin and Shamir has 
offered an emphatic reply: "Israel will not turn aside a hand stretched 
out in support of Israel's just cause." 

In November 1980, Jerry Falwell was awarded a medal in recogni- 
tion of his steadfast support of Israel. The award came at a New York 
dinner marking the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Zionist leader 
Vladimir Jabotinsky and was made at the behest of Prime Minister 
Begin. Opposition to the presentation was intense. Henry Siegman, 
executive director of the American Jewish Congress objected to "the 
way [Falwell] conducts his activities and the manner in which he uses 
religion." In Israel, the Jerusalem Post quoted Alexander M. Schind- 
ler, former chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Ameri- 
can Jewish Organizations, as saying that it was "madness and suicide if 
Jews honor for their support of Israel right-wing evangelists who con- 
stitute a danger to the Jews of the United States." 

What Schindler meant was illustrated by a remark Falwell had 
made at a Sunday service in his own Liberty Baptist Church in Lynch- 
burg, Virginia. He declared that God did not "hear Jewish prayers." He 
later expressed regret over this remark, but for many Jews it confirmed 
their suspicion that Falwell was more interested in their conversion 
than the security of Israel. His protestation that "the Jewish people in 
America and Israel and all over the world have no dearer friend than 



248 They Dare to Speak Out 

Jerry Falwell" has not made Jewish leaders forget his fundamentalist 
religious bias against Judaism, yet they openly continue to cultivate the 
support of American evangelicals in backing Israel. The paradox is 
striking. 

New View from Mainline Churches 

The pro-Israel alliance between American Jews and conservative 
Protestants comes at a time of friction between the Jewish community 
and the mainstream American Christian community. The friction has 
increased recently with the widespread objection among Christians to 
the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. 

In September 1981, United Methodist Bishop James Armstrong 
issued a letter to Indiana United Methodist ministers in which he 
sharply criticized the "Falwell gospel" and the "Moral Majority mental- 
ity." He pointedly observed that 

Israel was seen as God's "chosen people" in a servant sense. Israel was not 
given license to exploit other people. God plays no favorites. 

Christian concern over events in the Middle East, particularly the 
suffering of Palestinian refugees, has been a source of tension between 
Jewish and Christian groups for some time. Though traditional efforts 
toward ecumenical cooperation between American Judaism and the 
mainline churches continue — as reflected in the recent announcement 
by the American Jewish Congress that a new Institute for Jewish- 
Christian Relations was being established to study the common Judeo- 
Christian scriptural heritage — the larger denominations have in recent 
years begun to view the Middle East in a new light. 

The mainline churches focus more and more on the need to re- 
spect the human rights of the Palestinian refugees, as reflected in a 
series of church policy statements which show more sympathy for the 
plight of these refugees than many Jewish groups And acceptable. The 
United States Catholic Conference, United Presbyterian Church, 
United Methodist Church, American Baptist Churches, United Church 
of Christ, and others have called for mutual recognition of the Israeli 
and Palestinian right to self-determination, Palestinian participation in 
peace negotiations and Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied in the 
1967 war. Several of the churches have identified the PLO as the legiti- 
mate representative of the Palestinian people. 

As Father Charles Angell, S.A., associate director of Graymoor 
Ecumenical Institute, has observed, for the American churches to 
commit themselves to such an "evident clash between their position 
and that of the state of Israel abroad and the majority of the American 



Church and State 249 

Jewish organizations at home" represents a break with the past. He 
feels that the "fundamental shift" occurred after the 1973 war, when 
Christians responded sympathetically to appeals for a peaceful settle- 
ment from the Arab side. 

Members of the Jewish community have largely received the state- 
ments of the mainline churches as threats to their religious rights. 
Despite more than forty official statements by Protestant and Catholic 
organizations in the past two decades condemning anti-Semitism as un- 
christian, Christian officials who assert the right of all peoples — not 
just Israelis — to territorial security and a decent standard of living are 
accused by the Israeli lobby of anti-Semitism. 

Christian churches have been accused of "self-delusion" in oppos- 
ing both anti-Semitism and at the same time Israeli government policies 
which restrict or violate the human rights of Palestinian refugees. Even 
confirmed humanitarian and pacifist groups like the Quakers have been 
branded anti-Semitic for urging greater restraint and mutual under- 
standing upon all of the contending parties of the Middle East. Journal- 
ist Ernest Volkmann even sought to pin the anti-Semite label on the 
Reverend William Howard, president of the National Council of 
Churches, for his criticism of the June 1981 Israeli air strike against the 
Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq. 

The paradox thus becomes compounded: mainline Christians who 
accept the legitimacy of the Jewish faith but question some policies of 
the Jewish state are branded anti-Semitic, while evangelical Christians 
who back Israel but doubt the theological validity of Judaism are wel- 
come as allies. 

The experience of the National Council of Churches is instructive. 
An NCC insider describes the relationship between the council and the 
American Jewish community as "the longest case record of Jewish 
influence, even more than in government." For many years no one in 
the Jewish community had serious complaints about the council. 
Whenever disagreement arose, the Jewish leadership demanded — and 
usually received — prompt action. As a former NCC official described 
it, Jewish leaders would come "en masse with the heads of depart- 
ments of about half a dozen different Jewish agencies and then really 
lay it out. They felt that they had a special right to get direct input to 
the council leadership." 

A Committee on Christian-Jewish Relations, long a part of the 
council hierarchy, gives special attention to fostering cooperation and 
understanding between Christians and Jews in the United States. In 
addition, Inter-Faith, a division of the NCC devoted to humanitarian 
programs, was, despite its ecumenical title, until recently composed 
solely of Jewish and Christian groups. 



250 They Dare to Speak Out 

The Committee on Christian-Jewish Relations has traditionally 
been known to share whatever information or new council materials it 
considered important with the American Jewish Committee. This prac- 
tice was troubling to some council officials, as the American Jewish 
Committeee is not a religious body. Although it maintains a religious 
affairs department, it is mainly a lobbying organization. Jewish organi- 
zations of a primarily religious nature, such as the Synagogue Council 
of America, are not so closely involved in the workings of the council. 
But because top-level administrators at the NCC are understandably 
sensitive about the charge of being anti-Israel or insensitive to Jewish 
concerns in any council actions or publications, the oversight of NCC 
activities and literature — up to the point of accepting long critiques of 
proposed materials from the American Jewish Committee — has been 
accepted as standard procedure. 

A representative of one of the largest Protestant denominations 
observes that the American Jewish Committee had "much more effect" 
on the content of National Council study materials than his office, even 
though his denomination accounted for the purchase and distribution 
of three-quarters of these publications. 

After several years of mounting Jewish criticism — during which 
the council had debated but failed to adopt a number of resolutions on 
the suffering of Palestinian refugees — the NCC decided in December 
1979 to issue a Middle East policy statement. As Allan Solomonow 
puts it, "because of strong Jewish criticism it became apparent that the 
NCC, which up to that point did not have a clear stand on the Middle 
East, had to have one." The consensus was that "the only way to limit 
criticism was to say exactly what you feel about these issues." But the 
Middle East policy statement which ultimately appeared was never- 
theless unacceptable to many American Jewish groups. 

Declaring that "the role of the National Council of the Churches of 
Christ in the U.S.A. is to seek with others peace, justice and reconcilia- 
tion throughout the Middle East," the controversial final section in- 
cluded a call for control of arms transfers to the Middle East and an 
appeal for "reciprocal recognition of the right of self-determination" by 
the government of Israel and the PLO. 

The Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, which had not pre- 
sented its views in open forum, quickly denounced the statement as "a 
naive misreading of the contending forces and issues in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict which can have mischievous consequences." 

Pro-Israel writers and commentators seized upon the policy state- 
ment as an example of growing anti-Semitism within the NCC — despite 
the clear emphasis of the text on secure peace for all peoples and 



Church and State 25 1 

denunciation of violent acts on every side. Journalist Ernest Volkman, 
in his book A Legacy of Hate: Anti-Semitism in America, somehow 
manages to cite the policy statement as the prime example of "an 
indifference to American Jews that has occasionally strayed into out- 
right anti-Semitism." The Campaign to Discredit Israel, the "enemies 
list" assembled by AIPAC, goes to the length of claiming that "some 
segments of the National Council of Churches" are tools of a "sys- 
tematic effort" to attack Israel's image in the United States. 

A high-ranking NCC official at the time summed up the matter this 
way: "For years no one in the Jewish community had any serious 
complaints about the National Council; and then when they started to 
have political decisions that ran afoul of conventional pro-Israeli opin- 
ion, all of a sudden it became anti-Semitic and suspect." 

Critics do not like to note, however, that the policy statement 
recognized the right of Israel to exist as a "sovereign Jewish state" 
rather than a "sovereign state" as some on the panel preferred. Butler 
identified this as "one of the most hotly debated phrases in the policy 
statement," because some members of the drafting committee refused 
to vote for the completed document unless it specified the Jewish iden- 
tity of Israel. 

The document also explicitly reaffirms the long and continuing 
close relationship between the Jewish community and the National 
Council of Churches. 



God's Empire Striking Back? 

As interest in the Middle East and humanitarian concern for the 
Palestinian refugees becomes more widespread among Americans of all 
religious persuasions, many Jewish groups and their pro-Israel allies 
are more adamant in rejecting open discussion as a means to broader 
public understanding. Under such pressures, even activist religious 
groups which are involved in campaigning for social justice and world 
peace often grow timid when the Middle East becomes a topic of 
discussion. 

The Sacramento Religious Community for Peace (SRCP), a group 
which works to foster ecumenical cooperation in support of peace and 
social issues, in October 1983 organized a major symposium on "Faith, 
War and Peace in the Nuclear Age" at the Sacramento Convention 
Center. A large number of religious organizations, including the Sac- 
ramento Jewish Relations Council, co-sponsored the symposium under 
the auspices of the SRCP. 

In early September, as publicity for the symposium was being 



252 They Dare to Speak Out 

arranged, the Sacramento Peace Center (SPC), another well- 
established local activist group, asked that a flier publicizing its memo- 
rial service for victims of the refugee camp massacres in Lebanon be 
included in the SRCP mailings for the symposium. Since it is routine 
for peace organizations in the area to cooperate in this way, Peggy 
Briggs, co-director of the peace center, was shocked to be informed 
that the flier could not be included in the promotional mailing. 

The SRCP told Briggs that the Jewish Community Relations Coun- 
cil — the strongest local Jewish group and a major participant in SRCP 
activities — had made it known that if the flier appeared in the mailing, 
Jewish participation in the symposium would be withdrawn. This 
would have meant not only diminished support from the large local 
Jewish community, but also the loss of a rabbi scheduled as one of the 
keynote speakers. 

Helen Feeley, co-director of the SRCP, further informed the Peace 
Center that no literature prepared by the SPC Middle East task force 
could be displayed during the proceedings. In discussing the matter 
later, Feeley was emphatic: "The Middle East task force has absolutely 
inflamed the Jewish community here, because they do not uphold the 
right of Israel to exist. That material is just inflammatory." 

Greg Degiere, head of the SPC Middle East task force, protested 
that his group does recognize Israel's right to exist. He pointed out that 
the SPC calls for an end to war in the Middle East, respect for the 
human rights of all persons in the region and mutual recognition be- 
tween Israel and the PLO. 

The prohibition on discussion of the Middle East, along with the 
restriction on the Peace Center's right to distribute information, was 
accepted as the cost of Jewish participation in the symposium. Lester 
Frazen, the rabbi who served as a keynote speaker and thus helped 
provoke the issue, had unusual credentials for a showdown over free 
speech. He had boldly asserted his own First Amendment right at the 
outset of the 1982 Israeli march into Lebanon. He was among the 
leaders of a Sacramento march consisting mainly of fundamentalist 
Christians who expressed their joyous support for the invasion with a 
banner proclaiming: "God's empire is striking back!" Yet Frazen and 
his backers denied the Sacramento Peace Center the right to 
memorialize the victims of that invasion or to call for a negotiated end 
to killing on both sides. 

In light of this background, it is not surprising that although the 
official title of the gathering was "Faith, War and Peace in the Nuclear 
Age," the agenda failed to address conflicts in the Middle East — in the 
region many observers believe to be the most likely center of nuclear 



Church and State 253 

confrontation. As Joseph Gerson, peace secretary for the American 
Friends Service Committee in New England observes, "The Middle 
East has been the most consistently dangerous nuclear trigger. Presi- 
dents Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson and Nixon all threatened to use 
nuclear weapons there. . . ." 

The Uproar over Palm Sunday 

Despite Jewish-fundamentalist cooperation and the pressures 
brought to bear against those who publicly advocate negotiation and 
reconciliation in the Middle East, a few religious leaders have had the 
courage to speak out. Foremost among them is the Very Reverend 
Francis B. Sayre, who took the occasion of Palm Sunday, 1972, to raise 
a number of questions to which American Christians are still debating 
the answers. 

Throughout his twenty-seven years as dean of National Cathedral 
in Washington, the hearty and dramatic Dean Sayre took controversial 
stands on a wide variety of public policy issues. In the early fifties he 
fired some of the first salvos in the campaign to discredit McCarthyism. 
Declaring the Wisconsin senator's followers "the frightened and 
credulous collaborators of a servile brand of patriotism" brought Sayre 
a torrent of hate mail, but the possibility of criticism never caused him 
to shy away from speaking out on issues that stirred his conscience. He 
worked as an early advocate of civil rights for blacks, and in the sixties 
and seventies he stood in the forefront of opposition to the Vietnam 
War. 

Dean Sayre is the grandson of Woodrow Wilson, and his father 
had been a diplomat, law professor and eminent Episcopalian layman. 
Sayre continued the family tradition of leadership, relishing his posi- 
tion as leader of the cathedral's influential congregation. Offered a 
government post by the newly installed Kennedy administration in 
1960, his reply was swift: "No thanks. I already have the best job in 
Washington." 

He once described his role as dean of the cathedral as a "liaison 
between church and state" and as a platform for "moral guidance" for 
government leaders. He explained his activism with characteristic can- 
dor: "Whoever is appointed dean of a cathedral has in his hand a 
marvelous instrument, and he's a coward if he doesn't use it." 

On Palm Sunday 1972, Dean Sayre used his prestigious pulpit to 
deliver a sermon which was perhaps the most powerful — and certainly 
one of the most controversial — of his career. He spoke on Jerusalem, 
identifying the ancient city as a symbol of both the purest yearnings 



254 They Dare to Speak Out 

and darkest anger of the human heart. Historically, he proclaimed, 
both extremes were embodied in events of the single week between 
Jesus's triumphal entry into the city and His crucifixion. 

Amidst the pageantry and exultation of Palm Sunday, Jerusalem was the em- 
blem of all man's dreams: a king that will someday come to loose us from every 
bondage; dream of peace that shall conquer every violence; holiness of heaven 
driving out the dross of earth. 

But just as Jerusalem symbolized "man's yearning for the tran- 
scendently good," so did it demonstrate his capacity for "hateful evil": 

Her golden domes are also known as 'the Place of the Skull/ . . . Jerusalem, in 
all the pain of her history, remains the sign of our utmost reproach: the zenith 
of our hope undone by the wanton meanness of men who will not share it with 
their fellows but choose to kill rather than be overruled by God. 

Having recognized Jerusalem as a portrayal of "the terrible am- 
bivalence of the human race about truth, about himself, about God," 
Sayre spoke compassionately about the meaning of Jerusalem for the 
people now living in Israel: 

Surely one can sympathize with the loving hope of that little state, which 
aspires to be the symbol, nay more: the embodiment of a holy peoplehood. For 
her, Jerusalem is the ancient capital; the city of the Temple that housed the 
sacred Ark of the Covenant. To achieve a government there is . . . the 
fulfillment of a cherished prayer tempered in suffering, newly answered upon 
the prowess of her young men and the skill of her generals. Around the world 
Hosannah has echoed as Jewish armies surged across the open scar that used 
to divide Arab Jerusalem from the Israeli sector. 

Yet Dean Sayre's sermon was fired by a troubled sense that since 
the military victory of 1967, five years before, something had gone 
terribly wrong. 

By 1972 Jerusalem was completely under Israeli control. But, to 
Dean Sayre, mankind's moral tragedy had been reenacted in Israeli 
treatment of the city's Arab population. As he saw it, the dream had 
been tarnished: 

Now oppressed become oppressors. Arabs are deported; Arabs are imprisoned 
without charge; Arabs are deprived of the patrimony of their lands and homes; 
their relatives may not come to settle in Jerusalem; they have neither voice nor 
happiness in the city that after all is the capital of their religious devotion too! 

Addressing the moral consequences of the Israeli annexation of 
Jerusalem, Dean Sayre quoted Dr. Israel Shahak — a Jewish survivor of 
the Nazi concentration camp at Belsen, a professor at Hebrew Univer- 
sity, and a dissenter from Israeli policy — who branded the annexation 



Church and State 255 

"an immoral and unjust act," and called for recognition that "the pre- 
sent situation of one community oppressing the other will poison us all, 
and us Jews first of all." 

Sayre explained that Israel's treatment of the Arabs mirrored "that 
fatal flaw in the human breast that forever leaps to the acclaim of God, 
only to turn the next instant to the suborning of His will for us." 

He was not the only Washington clergyman to express a theme 
critical of Israel that day. Dr. Edward Elson, pastor of the National 
Presbyterian Church and chaplain of the U.S. Senate, chided "those 
Christians who justify Israel's actions in Jerusalem on the basis that 
they are the fulfillment of prophecy." And the Armenian Orthodox 
legate to Washington, Bishop Papken, called on Israel to recognize that 
"Jerusalem belongs to all men." 

But because of his reputation and eminent position in American 
religion, Sayre was singled out to bear the brunt of the criticism. Rabbi 
Joshua O. Haberman of the Washington Hebrew Congregation re- 
ported to Sayre that the sermon was "so distressing to the Israel gov- 
ernment that there had even been a cabinet meeting on the subject — 
what to do about this minister who had been friendly always to the 
Jews but who was so misguided." The response was not long in com- 
ing. Two leaders of the Washington Jewish Community Council issued 
a statement denouncing all three sermons and taking particular excep- 
tion to the address of Dean Sayre. Drs. Harvey H. Ammerman and 
Isaac Frank said Jews, Christians and Moslems "freely mingle in the 
reunited city and live and carry on their work in peace." They charac- 
terized the Sayre sermon as "an outrageous slander." 

Their position received support in a Washington Post editorial 
which called Sayre's sermon "an intemperate denunciation of current 
Israeli policy in Jerusalem." The Washington Post editors objected to 
Sayre's assertion that "even as [Israelis] praise their God for the smile 
of fortune, they begin almost simultaneously to put Him to death." 
They found the statement "painfully close to a very old, very familiar 
line of the worst bigotry." 

An angry editorial letter in the Washington Post dismissed Sayre's 
sermon as "non-factual garbage": 

This churchman illustrates well the typical liberal gentile bleeding-heart at- 
titude to the Jews — we'll commiserate with you as long as you're dependent on 
our goodwill for your survival, and we'll weep for you when you are slaugh- 
tered every few years by our coreligionists — but Lordy, don't you start winning 
and controlling your own destiny! The hell with them, I say. 

Several such letters appeared in the Washington press in the weeks 
after Palm Sunday, yet few challenged Sayre's central contention that 



256 They Dare to Speak Out 

Israeli policy did not grant equal treatment to Arabs and Jews living in 
Jerusalem. The situation in Jerusalem was a matter of fact, subject to 
relatively easy refutation — or confirmation — through inquiry. Yet Say- 
re's critics, in the manner of the Post editors, largely confined their 
attacks to the tone and lack of "temperance" in his sermon. Sayre 
received widespread criticism, not for being wrong, but for being a 
forthright critic of uryust Israeli policies and therefore, in the eyes of 
some critics, anti-Semitic. Despite his long career of humanitarian ac- 
tivism, partisans of Israel sought to discredit Sayre himself since they 
could not discredit his arguments. Writer Ernest Volkman charged that 
Sayre demonstrated "mindless pro-Arabism [which] had undone many 
years of patient effort to improve relations between Christians and 
Jews. 1 ' 

David A. Clarke of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference 
wrote to defend Sayre: "I do view with some distrust the emotional 
rebuttals which follow any question of the propriety of Israeli con- 
duct." He likened such emotionalism to the initial reaction against 
those who first challenged long-established concepts of racial superior- 
ity. Referring to U.S. policy in the Middle East, he expressed gratitude 
"that one of such intellectual integrity as Dean Sayre has given a differ- 
ing view so that our perspective will not be one-dimensional." 

But influential Christians remained divided in their reaction to the 
speech. Some shared Sayre's troubled disapproval of Israeli policy in 
the Holy City. Others continued to invoke the spectre of anti-Semitism. 

The Reverend Carl Mclntire, an outspoken Protestant fundamen- 
talist, took exception to Sayre's sermon in a letter published in the 
Washington Star. He and Sayre had clashed previously, when Mclntire 
had sought to disrupt a rally against the Vietnam War at the Washing- 
ton Cathedral and Sayre had personally ushered him away from the 
gathering. "The liberals represented by the dean have long since de- 
parted from the historic Christian view concerning Israel and 
Jerusalem," proclaimed Mclntire. Describing the 1967 war as "a thrill- 
ing example of how to deal with aggressors and the forces backed by 
Communism," he invoked scriptural justification for Israeli possession 
of conquered territory: 

It is for those of us who believe the Bible to be the Word of God [to] come now 
to the assistance of our Jewish neighbors. What God has given them they are 
entitled to possess, and none of the land which they have won should be 
bartered away. 

Some mainline clergymen joined in the fundamentalist outcry over 
the Palm Sunday sermon. Two leaders of the Council of Churches of 
Greater Washington issued a public statement declaring it "distressing 



Church and State 257 

and perplexing that men of goodwill should choose the start of this holy 
week for both Christians and Jews to make pronouncements which 
would inevitably be construed as anti- Judaic." 

Two Catholic clergymen — an official of the Secretariat for Catho- 
lic-Jewish Relations and a director of the United States Catholic Con- 
ference—joined in an attempt to discredit Say re. First they questioned 
the propriety of Sayre's quoting Israel Shahak, a dissident, to substan- 
tiate his charges of Israeli injustice in Jerusalem: "Is it not too close to 
the old anti-Semitic stratagem of using passages from the Hebrew 
prophets in order to scold Jews?" More significantly, they asserted that 
they had "failed to find any evidence of Israeli oppression" during a 
recent trip to Jerusalem. 

Yet an article at the same time in Christianity Today reported a 
quite different reaction from the editor of the United Church Observer, 
an official publication of the United Church of Canada. The Reverend 
A. C. Forrest praised Dean Say re for "the courage, knowledge and 
insight to speak prophetically about one of the most disturbing situa- 
tions in the world today." Citing United Nations reports on Jerusalem, 
he said Sayre's charges "are kind of old stuff to anyone who's done his 
homework or traveled enough in the Middle East." 

Support for Sayre was voiced by Jesuit educator Joseph L. Ryan 
of Georgetown University. Explaining that he spoke in response to the 
injunction of Pope Paul — "If you wish peace, work for justice" — Father 
Ryan cited statements by the Pope and by Catholic leaders in several 
Middle Eastern countries expressing concern about Israeli actions in 
Jerusalem and about the misery of Palestinian refugees. He pointed out 
that Israeli oppression of Christians and Muslims in Jerusalem was 
documented by publications of the Israeli League for Human Rights 
and the United Nations. "There is no dearth of evidence," he wrote. "If 
the public raising of these cases of oppression is shocking, the reality is 
incomparably more shocking." 

Father Ryan reserved his strongest language for criticizing unques- 
tioning Christian supporters of Israeli policies: 

Further, a few Catholics and Protestants propagate the insinuation that to be 
anti-Zionist (that is, critical of Israel) is to be anti-Semitic. In their anxiety to 
wipe out racism, these spokesmen go to extremes. This insinuation which they 
try to make widespread hinders, instead of helps, the development of proper 
relations between Christians and Jews, and inhibits the free and open discus- 
sion of fundamental differences for Americans as citizens of their country and 
of the world community is essential in the search for justice and peace. 

Dean Sayre remained largely detached from the tempest he had 
stirred on Palm Sunday. His only public action was to state through an 



258 They Dare to Speak Out 

aide that he would not retract any of his comments. Years later he 
acknowledged that, while he had given previous sermons on the plight 
of the Palestinian refugees, the 1972 Palm Sunday address was his first 
direct criticism of Israel. "Of course I realized that it would make a big 
splash," he said. "But if you put it more mildly, as I had [previously], it 
made no dent at all. So what are you going to do?" 

Prior to the controversial sermon, Sayre had enjoyed high stand- 
ing with the American Jewish community. A local Jewish congregation, 
at Sayre's invitation, held services in the cathedral until its synagogue 
was built. Jews respected him for the work he had done as president of 
the United States Committee for Refugees. In this capacity he had 
worked to resettle Jews from Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. As an Epis- 
copal minister in Cleveland after World War II, he had been head of the 
diocese's committee to settle refugees, many of them Jews, from East- 
ern Europe. 

The sermon had personal implications. Sayre and his family expe- 
rienced a campaign of "very unpleasant direct intimidation" through 
letters and telephone calls. On a number of occasions, when his chil- 
dren answered the phone they were shouted at and verbally abused. 
The phone would ring in the middle of the night, only to be hung up as 
soon as a member of the Sayre family answered. "Even when I went 
out, I would be accosted rudely by somebody or other who would 
condemn me in a loud voice." Such harassment continued for about six 
months, Sayre said, "even to the point where my life was threatened 
over the phone; so much so that I had the cathedral guards around the 
house for a while." 

The ecumenical spirit between Sayre and community rabbis was 
strained again six months after the sermon. When eleven Israeli ath- 
letes were killed at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich, while being 
held capture by the radical "Black September" guerrillas, Dean Sayre 
shared the shock and revulsion felt around the world. Together with 
rabbis and other Jewish leaders in Washington, he immediately began 
to plan a memorial service in the cathedral. 

Three days after the tragedy Israeli warplanes attacked Palestinian 
camps in Syria and Lebanon, killing 40 people. Sayre then told the 
rabbis of his intention to "make this a more general service than just for 
victims of Arab killing," memorializing the dead Palestinians as well. 

Confronted with this prospect, the rabbis did not participate after 
all. There were, however, a number of Jews among the approximately 
500 persons who attended the broadened memorial service. They heard 
Dean Sayre describe the Arab guerillas as "misguided and desperately 
misled" victims "of all the bitterness their lives had been surrounded 



Church and State 259 

with since birth, bitterness bora of issues left callously unresolved by 
any international conscience/ 9 

He condemned the Israeli retaliation: "An eye for an eye, tooth for 
tooth is the rationale of that violence, by which I am desolate to think 
the government of Israel has sacrificed any moral position of injured 
innocence." The Dean invoked the broader historical and humanitarian 
view which had marked his Palm Sunday sermon in words which might 
well be repeated for every victim of Middle East violence: 

I perceive that the victim of the violence which we mourn today is not only a 
latter-day Jew upon the blood-stained soil of Germany, nor yet the Arab pris- 
oner of an equally violent heritage. The victim is all of us, the whole human 
race upon this earth. 

Despite these words, unexceptional in their Christian message, 
Sayre was treated as though he somehow was a preacher of extremism. 
His career never had quite the shine it had before his forthright words 
on the Middle East. 

Now in semiretirement on Martha's Vineyard, an island off Cape 
Cod, Sayre serves as chaplain at the local hospital but has no regular 
church responsibilities. One morning in 1983, 1 delayed his project for 
the morning — digging clams — to ask if the controversial Palm Sunday 
message had had any effect on his career. Still robust in voice and 
spirit, Sayre answered without hesitation: "Yes, very definitely. I knew 
it would. It's not popular to speak out. I don't like to speculate about it, 
because no one knows what would have happened. But I think I was a 
dangerous commodity from then on, not to be considered for bishop or 
anything else." 



"I Felt I Had to Do Something" 

The American religious community has seen few figures with the 
stature of Dean Sayre willing to speak out forcefully for peace and 
justice for all Middle East peoples. At the time of the Palm Sunday 
sermon in 1972, he was one of the most prominent spokesman of 
American Christianity: a powerful and intellectually gifted man wield- 
ing the authority of Washington Cathedral's prestigious pulpit. Despite 
the price Sayre paid for his courageous stand, younger voices are 
emerging which express similar resolve and depth of commitment. 

The Reverend Don Wagner, a Presbyterian from Chicago, has 
risen quickly to the forefront of those within the religious community 
who seek to educate the public on realities in the Middle East and to 
counter the religious bias which often obscures awareness of those 



260 They Dare to Speak Out 

realities. His experiences have also brought him firsthand acquaintance 
with the intimidation which such efforts call forth. 

Wagner first became involved in public debate over the Middle 
East while serving as associate pastor of a large Presbyterian church in 
Evanston, Illinois. He was at the time, in his own words, "very pro- 
Israel." In the wake of the first oil crisis, in 1974 the young pastor 
helped organize a series of speakers within the church, alternating 
between pro-Israeli and pro-Arab points of view. He felt the series 
would aid his parishioners to understand better this unprecedented 
event. Wagner was quite surprised when, halfway through, he began 
receiving pressure to stop the series. A barrage of anonymous tele- 
phone calls threatened picketing outside the church and more severe, 
unspecified reprisals if the series continued. 

Wagner did not stop. In the end, however, the series was marred 
by the refusal of two Jewish members of the final panel to take 
part. They announced a half-hour before the scheduled discussion 
that the presence of an Arab academic on the panel rendered the event 
anti-Semitic and that they consequently refused to dignify it with their 
presence. They implied that Wagner had deceived them about the 
make-up of the panel and the nature of the discussion, although the 
topic of the discussion and the list of participants had been publicized 
well in advance. 

Wagner suspected that these men had been pressured to quit the 
conference by their rabbis. This suspicion was reinforced later when he 
learned that many of the earlier telephone calls had also been from 
members of the local Jewish community. One of the callers even told 
him directly: "I am a Jew, and this kind of activity is very anti-Semitic. 
For a Christian to be doing this is unconscionable." This was an eye- 
opening experience for Wagner. He discovered, as have others who 
have dared to speak out and become involved, that one need not actu- 
ally criticize the Jewish people or the state of Israel to be labelled anti- 
Semitic. Simply raising questions about Middle East issues and 
assuming that the answers may not all be obvious is enough to evoke 
the charge. 

Wagner first traveled to the Middle East in 1977. He paid his own 
way but traveled with representatives of the Palestine Human Rights 
Campaign (PHRC), an organization concerned with the protection of 
Palestinian rights. After spending time with refugees and other resi- 
dents in Beirut, the West Bank and Jerusalem, Wagner felt his long- 
standing sympathy for the displaced Palestinian refugees growing into a 
strong personal imperative. "I felt I had to do something," he recently 
recalled. 

After his return to United States, he learned how difficult it could 



Church and State 261 

be to "do something." Shortly before his departure for the Middle East, 
Wagner had arranged a church speaking engagement for Dr. Israel 
Shahak, a prominent Israeli critic of government policy. He returned to 
discover that the senior minister of his church had acceded to pressure 
from local rabbis to cancel the Shahak engagement without informing 
either him or Shahak. The senior minister explained that the local 
rabbis had convinced him that it would be "in the best interests of the 
church and Jewish relations" if the appearance of such a well-known 
critic of Israeli policy were cancelled. 

Undeterred, Wagner became increasingly active in speaking up 
about the Palestinian plight, offering Sunday morning prayers for the 
refugees, promoting more educational activities, and even bringing Pal- 
estinian Christians to his pulpit to speak. His activities led not only to a 
continuation of public criticism and pressure but also to problems 
within the staff of his own church as well. One associate frequently 
referred to him as "the PLO pastor," and staff friction grew as Wagner 
proceeded with plans for the First LaGrange Conference, (La- 
Grange I), named for the Illinois town in which it was held in the spring 
of 1979. 

This conference, like LaGrange II which followed in May 1981, 
was aimed at raising awareness of the Palestinian refugee situation 
among American church groups and leaders. Both meetings were at- 
tended by a broad ecumenical body of Christians, including Evangel- 
ical, mainline Protestant, Roman Catholic and Orthodox. The first 
conference was jointly sponsored by PHRC and the Middle East task 
force of the Chicago Presbytery. The second was sponsored by PHRC 
and the Christian peace groups Pax Christi and Sojourners. The theme 
of these conferences was summed up in the title of LaGrange II: "To- 
ward Biblical Foundations for a Just Peace in the Holy Land." 

After a series of speakers and panels, each conference issued a 
statement. These two documents have become a topic of debate within 
the American religious community. The statements stress the common 
humanity of Arabs, Jews, and Christians and call upon the American 
Christian churches to be more active in spreading information and 
promoting reconciliation and peace. Specifically, the churches are en- 
joined to "encourage dialogue with other Christians as well as Jews and 
others concerning the priorities of peace in the Holy Land" and to 
"inform and educate their people of the historical roots of the Israeli 
Palestinian conflict." 

The participants in LaGrange I and II made a significant step in 
ecumenical cooperation for greater public understanding of the Middle 
East. Unfortunately, the opponents of cooperation and understanding 
were also in attendance. 



262 They Dare to Speak Out 

Prior to the convening of LaGrange I, the Chicago Presbytery 
received pressure from the local chapter of the Anti-Defamation 
League, led by associate director Rabbi Yechiel Eckstein, to withdraw 
Presbyterian sponsorship of the conference. There were telephone 
calls, an extensive letter-writing campaign, and finally meetings be- 
tween Jewish leaders and members of the church hierarchy. 

The elders of the church stood by Wagner, but the Jewish commu- 
nity promptly passed judgment on the conference. The day before the 
conference convened, the ADL issued a press release condemning its 
"anti-Semitic bias." 

Efforts to discredit the conference did not end there. The slate of 
speakers had been planned to include Father John Polakowski, a noted 
writer on the Holocaust and active Zionist. The morning of the confer- 
ence Father Polakowski sent a registered letter to Wagner announcing 
his withdrawal from the conference. He had been fully informed as to 
the nature of the conference and the identity of many of the other 
speakers, but he denounced the conference as unfairly biased against 
the Israeli perspective. He fulfilled his own prophecy. His decision to 
deprive the conference of his own perspective caused the Zionist view 
to be underrepresented at LaGrange I. 

LaGrange II witnessed a virtual repeat of the same tactic. Rabbi 
Arnold Kaiman had agreed to address a section of the conference 
entitled "Religious People Talking from Their Perspectives." He had 
been invited to speak partly because of his long-standing personal 
friendship with Ayoub Talhami, co-convenor of the conference. 
Talhami had discussed the planned conference with Rabbi Kaiman in 
detail, even sending him a draft copy of the conference flier, and, of 
course, the rabbi was aware of the previous conference. The day of the 
conference Kaiman sent a special delivery letter to Wagner, Talhami 
and others announcing his withdrawal from the conference. The letter 
denounced Talhami and the convenors of the conference for having 
"misled" and "deceived" him. Talhami felt that the letter was intended 
mainly for Kaiman' s congregational board, both because the chairman 
of that board was a co-addressee of the letter and because the accusa- 
tions of deceit were so preposterous. 

Whatever his reasons, Kaiman went beyond a personal refusal to 
speak and repudiation of the conference. He provided copies of his 
letter to reporters, so that the withdrawal of a pro-Zionist could be 
publicized before the conference could issue its statement. 

To Wagner, the last-minute withdrawals of Polakowski and Kaiman 
after it was too late to schedule other pro-Israel speakers suggested 
that these supporters of Israel were more concerned with discrediting 
opposing points of view than with stating their own in an atmosphere of 



Church and State 263 

free and open debate. These withdrawals added color to subsequent 
ADL charges that the LaGrange Conferences were "anti-Israel confer- 
ences" or "PLO gatherings," despite the balanced character of the 
statements which emerged from the conferences. 

However, the most disturbing incident to emerge from LaGrange I 
and II did not involve attempts to discredit the conferences them- 
selves, but false charges made against one of the participants. 

Sister Miriam Ward, a professor of humanities at Trinity College in 
Vermont and a Catholic nun, has a long record of humanitarian con- 
cern for Palestinian refugees. By her own description, her role in La- 
Grange II was modest. "I had doubts about whether I could justify the 
expense of going," she recently recalled. Sister Miriam moderated a 
panel discussion and received an award for her humanitarian endeavors. 
Like Mr. Wagner, she knew from experience the price of speaking out 
on Palestinian questions. Her activities had also attracted hate mail and 
personal innuendoes. Still, she was not prepared for the smear which 
resulted from her participation at LaGrange. 

Sister Miriam was singled out for a personal attack in The Jewish 
Week-American Examiner, a prominent New York City Jewish publica- 
tion. The June 21, 1981, issue gave prominent coverage to a scheme to 
disrupt Israeli policy on the occupied West Bank which Sister Miriam 
had supposedly advanced at the conference. The article claimed that 
she had urged that "churches finance a project with staff in the U.S. 
and fieldworkers in Israel and the West Bank for the purpose of 'spying 
on the Israelis.'" She was reported saying, "By the time the Israelis 
caught on to what was going on and expelled a fieldworker, they 
[presumably Sister Miriam and her co-conspirators] would have a re- 
placement ready." The Jewish Week article added that "the proposal 
was accepted without dissent, and ways of obtaining church funds for 
it were discussed." 

The report was a complete fabrication. No one at the LaGrange 
Conference had suggested such a plan, least of all Sister Miriam, and 
she was stunned when Wagner telephoned from Chicago informing her 
of the printed allegations. She had always shunned publicity for her 
humanitarian activities, and felt intimidated and intensely alone at be- 
ing singled out for attack. "1 was physically ill for some time," she 
recalls, "and could not even discuss the matter with other members of 
my religious community." 

After pondering how — and whether — to respond, she finally 
sought the advice of a prominent biblical scholar then guest-lecturing at 
TVinity College. He advised her to see an attorney about the possibility 
of legal action. The attorney was sympathetic and agreed to take at 
least preliminary action free of charge. After several letters from the 



264 They Dare to Speak Out 

attorney elicited no response from the newspaper, the same scholar— 
himself a prominent member of the New York Jewish community — 
personally telephoned the editor. Sister Miriam feels that it was his call 
that impelled the editor to act. 

In January 1982 — more than six months after the original 
charges — a retraction was finally printed in The Jewish Week-American 
Examiner. The editors admitted that, "on checking, we find that there is 
no basis for the quotations attributed to" Sister Miriam. They ex- 
plained that the story had been "furnished by a service" and "was not 
covered by any staff member of the Jewish Week." In their retraction, 
the editors added that they were "happy to withdraw any reflection 
upon" Sister Miriam. 

Yet, as Sister Miriam discovered, the published apology could not 
erase the original charge from the minds of all readers. Later the same 
year, a Jewish physician from New York was visiting Burlington as part 
of a campus program at THnity College. In a conversation between this 
woman and another member of Sister Miriam's religious order, the 
name of the biblical scholar involved in Sister Miriam's case came up. 
The nun mentioned that he had recently visited THnity at the invitation 
of Sister Miriam. 

Recognizing the name from the original Jewish Week article, the 
physician repeated with indignation the accusations made against Sis- 
ter Miriam. She had not seen the retraction. The visitor was quickly 
informed that the charges were false. Sister Miriam cited this as an 
example of why she is convinced that the damage to her reputation can 
never really be undone. "It's the original thing that does the harm. I 
just don't want it to happen to anybody else." 



Chapter 10 



Not All Jews Toe the Line 



In its efforts to quell criticism of Israel, the pro-Israel community's first 
goal is to still Jewish critics. In this quest it receives strong support 
from the Israeli government. 

Every government of Israel gives high priority to maintaining 
unity among U.S. Jews. This unity is regarded as a main line of Israel's 
defense — second in importance only to the Israeli army — and essential 
to retaining the support Israel must have from the United States gov- 
ernment. 

American Jews are made to feel guilty about enjoying safety and 
the good life in the United States while their fellow Jews in Israel hold 
the ramparts, pay high taxes, and fight wars. As Rabbi Balfour Brick- 
ner states: "We hide behind the argument that it is not for us to speak 
our minds because the Israelis have to pay the price. 9 ' 

For most Jews, open criticism of Israeli policy is unthinkable. The 
theme is survival — survival of the Zionist dream, of Judaism, of Jews 
themselves. The fact that the Jewish community in the United States 
has produced little debate in recent years on Middle East questions 
even within its own ranks does not mean that all its members agree. 

In private, many American Jews hold positions in sharp dis- 
agreement with official Israeli policies. The differences are startling. A 
1983 survey by the American Jewish Committee revealed that about 
half of U.S. Jews favor a homeland for the Palestinians on the West 
Bank and Gaza and recommend that Israel stop the expansion of settle- 
ments in order to encourage peace negotiations. Three-fourths want 
Israel to talk to the Palestine Liberation Organization if it recognizes 
Israel and renounces terrorism. Only 21 percent want Israel to main- 
tain permanent control over the West Bank. On each of these proposi- 
tions, the plurality of American Jews takes issue with the policies and 
declarations of the Israeli government. 

265 



266 They Dare to Speak Out 

A plurality also holds that American Jews individually, as well as 
in organized groups, should feel free to criticize Israeli policy publicly. 
Of those surveyed, 70 percent say U.S. Jewish organizations should 
feel free to criticize. On this question, even Jewish leaders say they 
welcome criticism: 40 percent say organizations should feel free to 
criticize; 37 percent disagree. This means that only one-third of the 
leaders say they want to stifle organizational criticism of Israel. The 
vote by individual Jews for free and open debate is even stronger. Only 
31 percent declare that American Jews individually should not criticize 
Israeli policy publicly; 57 percent disagree. On this question, leaders 
and non-leaders vote exactly alike. 

The results of the survey are not easily reconciled with the facts 
about public dissent. While American Jews say they strongly oppose 
some Israeli policies and believe that organizations and individuals 
should feel free to criticize these policies openly, the simple fact is that 
public criticism is almost non-existent. The views expressed in the 
survey must be regarded more as a "wish list" than a statement of 
principles which the people surveyed actually try to carry out. 

In public, Jewish organizations in the United States support Israeli 
policies with a unanimity that is broken only in rare circumstances. 
They either give open support or remain silent. The leaders of B'nai 
B'rith and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) ex- 
pressed guarded support for President Reagan's Middle East peace 
plan immediately after it was announced in September 1982, but these 
expressions occurred before the Israeli government had stated its posi- 
tion. Once Israeli opposition was known, these organizations dropped 
the subject. 

"Trampled to Death" 

Of the more than 200 principal Jewish organizations functioning on 
a national scale, only the New Jewish Agenda and its predecessor, 
Breira, have challenged any stated policy of the Israeli government. 

In return for their occasional criticism of Israel's policies, the two 
organizations were ostracized and kept out of the organized Jewish 
community. Breira lasted only five years. Organized in 1973, its peak 
national membership was about 1,000. Named for the Hebrew word 
meaning "alternative," it called on Jewish institutions to be "open to 
serious debate," and proposed "a comprehensive peace between Is- 
rael, the Arab states, and a Palestinian homeland that is ready to live in 
peace alongside Israel." Prominent in its leadership were Rabbis Ar- 
nold Jacob Wolf, David Wolf Silverman, Max Ticktin, David Saper- 
stein, and Balfour Brickner. 

The counterattack was harsh. The National Journal reports that 



Not All Jews Toe the Line 267 

Briera was "bitterly attacked by many leaders of the Jewish establish- 
ment" and that a Breira meeting was "invaded and ransacked" by 
members of the militant Jewish Defense League. Some members of 
Breira came under intense pressure to quit either the organization or 
their jobs. Jewish leaders were warned to avoid Breira or fund raising 
would be hurt. 

Israeli officials joined rabbis in denouncing the organization. Caro- 
lyn Toll, a reporter for the Chicago Tribune and formerly on the board 
of directors of Breira, quotes a rabbi: "My bridges are burned. Once 
you take a position like this [challenging Israeli positions], the orga- 
nized Jewish community closes you out." Officials from the Israeli 
consulates in Boston and Philadelphia warned Jews against attending a 
Breira conference. 

Breira came under attack from both right and left within the Jew- 
ish community. A pamphlet branding some of its members as "radi- 
cals" was quoted by Jewish publications and later distributed by 
AIPAC. Breira was accused of being allied with the radical U.S. Labor 
Party. An unsigned "fact sheet" suggested that it really was a group of 
Jewish radicals supporting the PLO. The Seattle Jewish Transcript said 
it was run by a "coterie of leftist revolutionaries" who opposed Israel. 

Irving Howe, speaking at the final national conference of Breira in 
1977, said the tactics used to smear the organization were an "outrage 
such as we have not known for a long time in the Jewish community." 
At the same meeting, retired Israeli General Mattityahu Peled, who was 
often boycotted by Jewish groups while on U.S. lecture tours, said, 
"The pressure applied on those who hold dissenting views here [in the 
U.S.] is far greater than the pressure on us in Israel. I would say that 
probably we in Israel enjoy a larger degree of tolerance than you do 
here within the Jewish community." Breira disbanded shortly 
afterward. 

In December 1980, 700 American Jews gathered in Washington, 
D.C., to found another organization of dissenters, the New Jewish 
Agenda. Composed mainly of young liberals, it called for "compromise 
through negotiations with the Palestinian people and Israel's Arab 
neighbors" and opposed Israeli policies in the West Bank and Leba- 
non. 

It was soon barred from associating with other Jewish groups. In 
June 1983, its Washington, D.C., chapter was refused membership in 
the Jewish Community Council, a group which included 260 religious, 
educational, fraternal and social service organizations. The council 
members voted 98 to 70 to overturn the recommendation of the group's 
executive board, which had voted 22 to five for admission. Irwin Stein, 
president of the Washington chapter of the Zionist Organization of 



268 They Dare to Speak Out 

America charged that the group was "far out" and "pro-Arab rather 
than pro-Israel." Moe Rodenstein, representing the Agenda, said the 
group would like to be a part of "the debate" and added, "We're proud 
of what we're doing." 

"It Is a Form of McCarthyism" 

Like the Jewish organizations, individual Jews rarely express 
public disagreement with Israel policies, despite the broad and funda- 
mental differences they seem to hold. The handful who have spoken up 
have had few followers and even fewer defenders. To Carolyn Toll, the 
taboo against criticism is powerful and extensive: 

I believe even Jews outside the Jewish community are affected by internal 
taboos on discussion — for if one is discouraged from bringing up certain sub- 
jects within the Jewish community, think how much more disloyal it could be to 
raise them outside! 

Toll laments the "suppression of free speech in American Jewish 
institutions — the pressures that prevent dovish or dissident Jews from 
organizing in synagogues, Jewish community centers, and meetings of 
major national Jewish organizations" and denunciations of American 
Friends Service Committee representatives as "anti-Semitics" and 
"dupes of the Palestine Liberation Organization" for insisting that "any 
true peace must include a viable state for the Palestinians." 

A successful Jewish author suffered a different type of "excom- 
munication" when she wrote a book critical of Israel. In The Fate of the 
Jews, a candid and anguished history of U.S. Jewry and its present-day 
dilemma, Roberta Strauss Feuerlicht explains that Zionism has become 
the "religion" for many Jews. This is why, she writes, that "opposition 
to Zionism or criticism of Israel is now heresy and cause for excom- 
munication," adding that the idealism attributed to Israel by most sup- 
porters has been marred by years of "patriotism, nationalism, 
chauvinism and expansionism." She declares, "Israel shields itself 
from legitimate criticism by calling her critics anti-Semitic; it is a form 
of McCarthyism and fatally effective." 

A year after its publication in 1983 by Times Books, the book was 
still largely ignored. The Los Angeles Times was the only major news- 
paper to review it. The publisher undertook no advertising, nor even a 
minimal promotional tour. Feuerlicht, the author of fifteen successful 
books, was subjected to what Mark A. Bruzonsky, another Jewish 
journalist, described as a "combination of slander and neglect." When 
copies sent to prominent "liberal Jews, Christians, civil libertarians 
and blacks" brought no response, Feuerlicht concluded, "It would 



Not All Jews Toe the Line 269 

seem that with universal assent, the book is being stoned to death with 
silence." 

Other Jews who dare voice guarded criticism of Israel encounter 
threats which are far from silent. Threatening phone calls have become 
a part of life for Gail Pressberg of Philadelphia, a Jewish member of the 
professional staff of the American Friends Service Committee. In her 
work she is active in projects supporting the Palestinian cause. She 
reports that abuse calls are so frequent that "I don't pay any attention 
anymore." One evening, after receiving several calls on her unlisted 
telephone in which her life was threatened for "deserting Israel," in 
desperation she left the receiver off the hook. A few minutes later the 
same voice called on her roommate's phone, also unlisted, resuming 
the threats. 

In my 22 years in Congress, I can recall no entry in Congressional 
Record disclosing a speech critical of Israeli policy by a Jewish mem- 
ber of the House or Senate. Jewish members may voice discontent in 
private conversation but never on the public record. Only a few Jewish 
academicians, like Noam Chomsky, a distinguished linguist, have spo- 
ken out. Most, like Chomsky, are protected in their careers by tenure 
and thus are able to become controversial without jeopardizing their 
positions. 

"Dissent Becomes Treason" 

Journalism is the occupation in which Jews most often and most 
consistently voice criticism of Israel. Richard Cohen of the Washington 
Post is a notable example. 

During Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Cohen warned: "... 
The administration can send Begin a message that he does not have an 
infinite line of credit in America — that we will not, for instance, ap- 
prove the bombing of innocent civilians." 

In a later column, Cohen summarized the reaction to his criticism 
of Israeli policy: "My phone these days is an instrument of torture. 
Merely to answer it runs the risk of being insulted. The mail is equally 
bad. The letters are vicious, some of them quite personal." He noted 
that U.S. Jews are held to a different standard than Israelis when they 
question Israel's policies. 

Here dissent becomes treason — and treason not to a state or even an ideal 
(Zionism), but to a people. There is tremendous pressure for conformity, to 
show a united front and to adopt the view that what is best for Israel is 
something only the government there can know. 

In a world in which there are plenty of people who hate Jews, it is ridiculous to 



270 They Dare to Speak Out 

manufacture a whole new category out of nothing more than criticism of the 
Begin government. Nothing could be worse for Israel in the long run than for 
its friends not to distinguish between when it is right and when it is wrong. 

Mark Bruzonsky, a persistent journalistic critic of these Israeli 
excesses, concludes, "There's no way in the world that a Jew can 
avoid a savage and personal vendetta if his intent is to write a truthful 
and meaningful account of what he has experienced." 

Being Jewish did not spare the foreign news editor of Hearst news- 
papers from similar problems. In early 1981 John Wallach produced a 
television documentary, "Israel and Palestinians: Will Reason Pre- 
vail?" funded by the Foundation for Middle East Peace, a nonprofit 
institute established by Washington lawyer Merle Thorpe, Jr. His goal 
was a fair, balanced presentation of the problems confronting Israel in 
dealing with the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza. Public televi- 
sion broadcast the program without incident in Washington, D.C., New 
York and other major cities, but Jewish leaders in Los Angeles de- 
manded an advance showing and upon seeing the film put up such a 
strong protest that station KCT inserted a statement disclaiming any 
responsibility for the content of the documentary. 

Wallach received many complaints about the presentation, the 
most common being that it portrayed Palestinian children in a favorable 
light — some were blond and blue-eyed, and all attractive — a departure 
from the frequently negative stereotype of Palestinians. Before the film 
was produced, Israeli Ambassador Simcha Dinitz called Wallach, urg- 
ing him to drop the project. When Wallach persisted, invitations to 
receptions and dinners at the Israeli embassy suddenly stopped. For a 
time he was not even notified of press briefings, 

Wallach found himself in hot water again in 1982 when con- 
troversy erupted after a formal dinner he had organized to recognize 
Ambassador Philip Habib's diplomatic endeavors in Lebanon. Several 
cabinet officers, Congressmen and members of the diplomatic commu- 
nity attended the dinner. During the program, messages from several 
heads of government were read. Wallach asked Senator Charles Percy, 
chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, to read the one from 
Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin to the audience. On Wal- 
Iach's recommendation, Percy did not read these two sentences: 

In the wake of the Operation Peace in Galilee, Phil Habib made great efforts to 
bring about the evacuation of the bulk of the terrorists from Beirut and Leba- 
non. He worked hard to achieve this goal and, with the victory of the Israel 
Defense Forces, his diplomatic endeavors contributed to the dismantling of that 
center of international terrorism which had been a danger to all free nations. 

Moshe Arens, the Israeli ambassador, was furious. He sent an 



Not All Jews Toe the Line 27 1 

angry letter to Percy expressing his shock and stating, "Although I 
realize that you may not have agreed with its contents, . . . this glaring 
omission seems to me to be without precedent." He also wrote to 
Wallach, complaining of "unprecedented discourtesy" and calling the 
omission an attempt to "cater to the ostrich-like attitude of some of the 
ambassadors from Arab countries." Arens also wrote protest letters to 
the management of Hearst Corporation, which had picked up the tab 
for the dinner. 

Wallach told another journalist the next day why he had recom- 
mended the omission: "I thought it was insulting to the Arabs [who 
were present] to have a message about war and terrorism at an evening 
that was a tribute to Phil Habib and peace." 

Wallach said, "The irony was that, while I got lots of harsh, critical 
mail from those supporting Begin, I got no words of support or com- 
mendation from the other side. It makes one wonder — when there is no 
support, only criticism, when one risks his career." 

Similar questions are raised by Nat Hentoff, a Jewish columnist 
who frequently criticizes Israel and challenges the conscience of his 
fellow Jews in his column for the Village Voice. During the Israeli 
invasion of Lebanon in 1982 he lamented: 

At no time during his visit here [in the United States] was [Prime Minister] 
Begin given any indication that there are some of us who fear that he and Ariel 
Sharon are destroying Israel from within. Forget the Conference of Presidents 
of Major American Jewish Organizations and the groups they represent. They 
have long since decided to say nothing in public that is critical of Israel. 

Hentoff deplored the intimidation that silences most Jewish 
critics: 

I know staff workers for the American Jewish Congress and the American 
Jewish Committee who agonize about their failure to speak out, even on their 
own time, against Israeli injustice. They don't, because they figure they'll get 
fired if they do. 

The threat of being fired was forcefully put to a group of em- 
ployees of Jewish organizations in the United States during a 1982 tour 
of Lebanon. Israel's invasion was at its peak, and a number of em- 
ployees of the Jewish National Fund — a nationwide organization which 
raises money for the purchase and development of Israeli land — were 
touring Lebanese battlefield areas. Suddenly, while the group was 
traveling on the bus, Dr. Sam Cohen of New York, the executive vice- 
president of the JNF, stood up and made a surprising announcement. A 
member of the tour, Charles Fishbein, at the time executive for the 
Washington office, recalls, "He told us that when we get back to the 



272 They Dare to Speak Out 

United States, we must defend what Israel is doing in Lebanon. He 
said that if we criticize Israel, we will be terminated immediately." 

Fishbein said the group was on one of several hastily arranged 
tours designed to quell rising Jewish criticism of the invasion. In all, 
over 1,500 prominent American Jews were flown to Israel for tours of 
hospitals and battlefields. The tours ranged in length from four to seven 
days. The more prestigious the group of visitors, the shorter, more 
compressed the schedule. Disclosing only Israeli hardship, the tours 
were successful in quieting criticism within the ranks of Jewish leader- 
ship and also inspired many actively to defend Israeli war policies. 



"The Time May Not Be Far Off" 

Peer pressure does not always muffle Jewish voices. A man who 
pioneered in establishing the state of Israel and helped to organize its 
crucial underpinnings of support in the United States later became a 
frequent critic of Israeli policy. 

Nahum Goldmann is a towering figure in the history of Zionism. 
He played a crucial role in the founding of Israel, meeting its early 
financial problems, influencing its leaders, and organizing a powerful 
constituency for it in the United States. His service to Zionism 
spanned nearly fifty years. During World I, when Palestine was still 
part of the Ottoman Empire, Goldmann tried to persuade Turkish au- 
thorities to allow Jewish immigration. In the 1930s he advocated the 
Zionist cause at the League of Nations. During the Truman administra- 
tion, he lobbied for the United Nations resolution calling for partition 
of Palestine and the establishment of Israel. 

After the 1947 U.N. vote for the partition, unlike most Jews who 
were eager to proclaim the state of Israel, Goldmann urged delay. He 
hoped that the Jews would first reach an understanding with the Arab 
states and thereby avoid war. 

He lamented the bitter legacy of the war that ensued. He wrote, 
"The unexpected defeat was a shock and a terrible blow to Arab pride. 
Deeply injured, they turned all their endeavors to the healing of their 
psychological wound: to victory and revenge." To the Israelis, 

The victory offered such a glorious contrast to the centuries of persecution and 
humiliation, of adaptation and compromise, that it seemed to indicate the only 
direction that could possibly be taken from then on. To brook nothing, to 
tolerate no attack, cut through Gordian knots, and shape history by creating 
facts seemed so simple, so compelling, so satisfying that it became Israel's 
policy in its conflict with the Arab world. 

When the fledgling nation was struggling to build its economy, 



Not AllJews Toe the Line 111 

Goldmann negotiated with West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
the agreement under which the Germans paid over $30 billion in com- 
pensation and restitution to Israel and individual Jews. 

Yet he was bitterly condemned by some Israelis for his efforts. 
Philip Klutznick of Chicago, Goldmann's close colleague in endeavors 
for Israel, recalls the tremendous opposition, particularly from such 
extreme nationalists as Menachem Begin, to accepting anything from 
Germany. "At that time many Jews felt that any act that would tend to 
bring the Germans back into the civilized world was an act against the 
Jewish people. Feelings ran deep." 

Goldmann's disagreement with Israeli policy toward the Arabs 
was his central concern. To those who criticized his advocacy of a 
Palestinian state, he responded, 

If they do not believe that Arab hostility can some day be alleviated, then we 
might just as well liquidate Israel at once, so as to save the millions of Jews 
who live there. . . . There is no hope for a Jewish state which has to face 
another 50 years of struggle against Arab enemies. 

Goldmann respected the deep commitment to the Jewish people of 
Israel's first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, but he regretted that 
Ben Gurion was "organically incapable of compromise" and that his 
"dominant force" was "his will for power." Goldmann's essential opti- 
mism and his instinctive striving to temper hatreds and seek compro- 
mise were qualities that distinguished him from so many of his 
contemporaries — on both the Arab and Israeli sides of the conflict. 

"Goldmann might have been prime minister of Israel," Stanley 
Karnow wrote in 1980, "but he chose instead to live in Europe and act 
as diplomatic broker, frequently infuriating Israeli officials with his 
initiatives." Seeking an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict, he attempted to 
visit Cairo at the invitation of Egyptian President Nasser in 1970. But 
the Israeli government headed by Golda Meir resented his maverick 
ways and blocked the mission. 

Goldmann was sharply critical of the Israeli government of 
Menachem Begin. He decried what he saw as Israel's denial of the 
original Zionist vision. He rejected the claim of some Israelis that they 
must occupy "Greater Israel" because it was promised to them by God. 
He called this thesis "a profanation." 

Goldmann understood the need for U.S. support. He lived in the 
United States for more than 20 years and knew American Jewry well. 
In 1969 he wrote approvingly of Zionist political action in the United 
States: "It is not fair to single out Zionist pressure for censure. Democ- 
racy consists of a mutiplicity of pressure-exerting forces, each of which 
is trying to make itself felt." 



274 They Dare to Speak Out 

Near the end of his life, however, Goldmann's views of the pro- 
Israel lobby changed. In 1980 he warned: 

Blind support of the Begin government may be more menacing for Israel than 
any danger of Arab attack. American Jewry is more generous than any other 
group in American life and is doing great things. . . . But by misusing its 
political influence, by exaggerating the aggressiveness of the Jewish lobby in 
Washington, by giving the Begin regime the impression that the Jews are strong 
enough to force the American administration and Congress to follow every 
Israeli desire, they lead Israel on a ruinous path which, if continued, may lead 
to dire consequences. 

He blamed the Israeli lobby for U.S. failures to bring about a 
comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. "It was to a very large 
degree because of electoral considerations, fear of the pro-Israel lobby, 
and of the Jewish vote." 

He warned of trouble ahead if the lobby continued its present 
course. "It is now slowly becoming something of a negative factor. Not 
only does it distort the expectations and political calculations of Israel, 
but the time may not be far off when American public opinion will be 
sick and tired of the demands of Israel and the aggressiveness of 
American Jewry." 

In 1978, two years before he wrote his alarmed evaluation of the 
Israeli lobby, New York magazine reported that Goldmann had pri- 
vately urged officials of the Carter administration "to break the back" 
of the lobby: "Goldmann pleaded with the administration to stand firm 
and not back off from confrontations with the organized Jewish com- 
munity as other administrations had done." Unless this was done, he 
argued, "President Carter's plans for a Middle East settlement would 
die in stillbirth." 

His words were prophetic. The comprehensive settlement Carter 
sought was frustrated by the intransigence of Israel and its U.S. lobby. 

President Ronald Reagan revived the idea of a comprehensive 
Middle East peace just four days before Goldmann's death in Septem- 
ber 1982. A state funeral was conducted in Israel. As Klutznick, Israeli 
Labor Party leaders Shimon Peres, Yitzhak Rabin and others stood on 
Israel's Mount Herzl awaiting the great Zionist leader's burial along- 
side the five other former presidents of the World Zionist Organization, 
the conversation centered on the Reagan plan, which Prime Minister 
Begin had already rejected. 

Symbolic of organized Jewry's reaction to Goldmann's life was 
the response of the Israeli government to his death. Begin gave permis- 
sion for the burial but did not attend. In a strikingly empty commentary 
on the life of a man who had done so much to bring Israel into being 



Not All Jews Toe the Line 275 

and give it strength, Acting Prime Minister Simcha Ehrlich said only, 
"We regret that a man of so many virtues and abilities went the wrong 
way." It was a callous epitaph for one of Israel's great pioneers. 



"You Must Listen When We Speak III" 

At 7:45 a.m. the towering John Hancock Building in Chicago's 
downtown loop area was just beginning to come to life. On the fortieth 
floor were the offices of Philip Klutznick — attorney, developer, former 
U.S. secretary of commerce, president emeritus of B'nai B'rith, orga- 
nizer and former chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major 
Jewish Organizations, president emeritus of the World Jewish Con- 
gress. At that hour only Philip Klutznick was at work. 

He was on the phone, seated on a sofa at one end of his spacious 
office, his back to a panoramic view of the building across the street 
where he and his wife make their home. On the walls were autographed 
photographs of the seven presidents of the United States under whom 
he has served. 

This morning, in the fall of 1983, he was talking with Ashraf Ghor- 
bal, Egypt's ambassador to the United States and a friend of many 
years. Ghorbal was preparing for a visit to the United States by his 
leader, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. He wanted to make sure the 
right people would be available to meet with him. The right people 
included Klutznick. 

Klutznick's vigorous appearance and unrelenting pace belie his 
seventy-six years. His deep, rich voice echoes around the near-empty 
offices. His eyes smile through heavy glasses, and his firm, confident 
manner is that of a man in the prime of life. 

But his apparent confidence about the flexibility of U.S. Jews be- 
lies his own experience working within — and outside — the establish- 
ment for sixty years. A visitor sharing coffee and conversation would 
never guess that this short, handsome, optimistic man — whose persist- 
ence and spirit helped to create Israel, pay its bills and provide its 
arms — had become, in the eyes of many Jews, a virtual castaway. 

Measured by offices held and services rendered, his credentials in 
the Jewish establishment are impeccable. But in the eyes of most 
Jewish leaders, he is guilty of a cardinal sin: daring publicly to chal- 
lenge Israeli government policy. This puts him at odds with the very 
Jewish organizations he did so much to bring into being. 

He speaks from a base of confidence that includes business suc- 
cess, public office in both Democratic and Republican administrations, 
and high honors in the Jewish community. After seeing his savings 



276 They Dare to Speak Out 

wiped out by the Great Depression, he recovered, became a successful 
community developer, a millionaire, a leader of the Jewish community, 
and a diplomat. 

In early years he worked to bring strength and unity to the Jewish 
community, a quest that took on urgency in 1942 when word arrived of 
Adolf Hitler's barbaric program to annihilate European Jews. Henry 
Monsky, an Omaha lawyer and president of B'nai B'rith, convened a 
meeting in Pittsburgh, inviting the membership of 41 major Jewish 
organizations. This gathering, identified as the American Jewish Con- 
ference, marked the first serious effort to unite U.S. Jews against the 
Holocaust. 

"You know, we are an unusual group of people," Klutznick chuck- 
les. "We fight over anything." This time the fight was over whether 
Jews would back the establishment of a national homeland. Monsky, 
the first committed Zionist to head B'nai B'rith, pulled the organization 
from its neutral stance into advocacy. When the conference met in 
early 1943 and cast its lot with Zionism, two of the largest Jewish 
organizations — the American Jewish Committee and the Jewish Labor 
Committee — walked out in protest. 

"Anyway," Klutznick continues, "that meeting started a move- 
ment that stayed alive for four years." It also brought him for the first 
time in close association with Nahum Goldmann. 

Klutznick and Goldmann wanted the American Jewish Confer- 
ence to be permanent. In this effort, Klutznick battled to win the 
support of B'nai B'rith. "It was an enormous fight, and we lost," Klutz- 
nick recalls. 

The bruises were still felt ten years later when Klutznick became 
president of B'nai B'rith. His first decision put him at odds with Gold- 
mann, who wanted him to help re-create the American Jewish Confer- 
ence. Despite his earlier effort, Klutznick now felt it would be divisive. 
"I looked him square in the eye and said, Tm not going to do it. If I 
tried it now it would split B'nai B'rith right down the middle. At this 
moment B'nai B'rith is too weak. I need these people together.' " 

Klutznick told him he would "go all the way" on a program for a 
Jewish homeland, but he had what he believed to be a better plan for 
coordination of American Jews, an organization consisting of just the 
presidents of the major organizations. For one thing, the leaders 
needed to get acquainted with each other. "Believe it or not," Klutz- 
nick recalls, "many had attained these high positions without even 
meeting the presidents of other major organizations." Klutznick told 
Goldmann: "If we really want to do something, the presidents are the 
powerhouses." Goldmann agreed to the plan. 

Klutznick's recalls changes: "The fact is during the 1950s people 



Not All Jews Toe the Line 277 

weren't as intense as they are now." As an example, he cites the Jewish 
response to the Eisenhower Doctrine, which pledged U.S. help to any 
nation in the Middle East threatened by international Communism. 
Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion opposed a commitment that 
sweeping, arguing that it could lead to U.S. support for nations hostile 
to Israel. The Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations 
decided to support the U.S. position. 

Klutznick recalls the confrontation. "I presided at that meeting, 
and we took the position that we should not oppose the president of the 
United States, and we didn't. In those days," he said after a long 
pause, "we could have those arguments. There was mutual tolerance.'* 

Dealing with Israeli officials sometimes tested Klutznick' s toler- 
ance. In 1955 the U.S. was horrified at the Israeli massacre of Arab 
civilians in the Gaza raid, and Klutznick, as president of B'nai B'rith, 
reported the reaction to Jerusalem. He told Israeli Prime Minister 
Moshe Sharett: "Moshe, it was terrible. It wasn't the fact Israeli forces 
were defending Israel. It was the overwhelming response. It looked 
like a disregard for the value of human life." 

After a pause, the prime minister answered quietly, "You know, 
Phil, I did not even know this was taking place. He [Defense Minister 
David Ben Gurion] did this on his own. I hope you will tell him what 
you told me." Klutznick met Ben Gurion the next day. "It wasn't long 
before he said, 'Phil, what was the reaction to the Gaza raid?' It was 
exactly the same question Sharett had asked, and I gave exactly the 
same answer." 

Klutznick was astonished at Ben Gurion's response : 

He stood up. He looked like an angry prophet out of the Bible and got red in the 
face. He shouted, 'I am not going to let anybody, American Jews or anybody 
else, tell me what I have to do to provide for the security of my people.' 

When the prime minister stood up, Klutznick stood up too. Ben 
Gurion asked, "Why are are you standing up?" Klutznick answered, 
"Well, obviously I have offended you, and I assume that our discussion 
is over." Ben Gurion said, "Sit down. Let's talk about something else." 
Klutznick recalls, "That's the way it happened. So help me God. 
That's just the way it happened, and we had a wonderful talk." Klutz- 
nick says Ben Gurion could be as "tough or tougher than Begin," but 
when he had made his point he could go back to "being friends." 

Klutznick had a similar experience years later with Prime Minister 
Begin. In the wake of the Camp David Accords, President Carter 
called in Klutznick and seven other Jewish leaders. The president said, 
"Look, I need some help. I think I can handle [Egyptian President] 
Sadat. We have an understanding, but I am not sure that I can convince 



278 They Dare to Speak Out 

the Prime Minister [Begin]." One of the group interrupted and changed 
the subject: "Mr. President, Israel is upset because there will be arms 
sent to Arab countries. There is already a bill pending, as you know." 
Then the next man said, "Can't you do something to make it more 
comfortable for Israel?" Several men in a row spoke in a similar vein. 
Klutznick noted Carter's irritation and undertook the role of 
peacemaker: 

Mr. President, I don't think we've quite got your message. There are all of 
these requests for arms. I think what my colleagues are trying to say, if I may 
interpret them, is whether there is some way to defer these requests until the 
negotiations are over. I don't think it is for us with our limited knowledge to tell 
you who should get arms and who should not. 

He recalls, "I said that if the questions of arms sales had to be 
answered during the Camp David negotiations, whichever way the 
president answered them would be difficult." Klutznick says he added, 
"And I am not here representing anybody except you, Mr. President. 
Our country has to back you as fairly as it can." 

Klutznick's remarks got the discussion back on the track Carter 
wanted, but they were badly twisted in a news report published the 
next day in Israel, where Klutznick was quoted as having told Carter 
that he was at the White House meeting representing Egypt, not Israel. 
He had, of course, said nothing of the kind and sent a cable to Begin 
denying the story. The next day when reporters asked about the inci- 
dent, Begin said simply, "I have received a cable from President Klutz- 
nick of the World Jewish Congress. He denies any such statement was 
made, and that's the end of it." 

But that was not the end of it. Klutznick flew to Israel in a few 
days for previously scheduled meetings, including an appointment with 
Begin. Klutznick recalls the frosty scene. It was the first time Begin did 
not stand up and greet him with an embrace. Klutznick spoke first: 

Look, Menachem, I know you are angry, but I'm the one that's angry and 
entitled to be. When you told the press you got a cable from Klutznick and he 
denies it and that's the end of it — is that the right thing to say? I say no. If 
someone had said that about you to me, I would have said, i had a cable from 
the Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister denies it. And I've known the Prime 
Minister for a long time, and his word is good enough for me.' 

Begin turned to his assistant and said, "Get that cable." He read a 
cable from his ambassador to the United States which gave an inaccu- 
rate account of what Klutznick had told Carter, and asked, "What 
would you have done?" Klutznick responded, "I would have fired the 
ambassador. In his cable he wasn't writing about Phil Klutznick. He 



Not All Jews Toe the Line 279 

was writing about the president of the World Jewish Congress. If he 
had any such information his first duty was to call me, not you. He 
never called me." Overcome with emotion, Begin stood and embraced 
his visitor. 

Despite such shows of affection, Klutznick did not pull punches in 
his criticism of Begin's later policies and his recommendations on what 
the U.S. government should do. In 1981 he deplored the Israeli air 
attacks, first on the Iraqi nuclear installation and then in Lebanon. 
Later that year he traveled to the Middle East with Harold Saunders, a 
former career specialist on the Middle East who served as assistant 
secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs under Presi- 
dent Carter, former diplomat Joseph H. Greene, Jr., and Merle Thorpe, 
Jr., president of the Foundation for Middle East Peace. On returning, 
Klutznick joined in the group's conclusion that the Camp David peace 
process was not enough and that the Palestine Liberation Organization 
should be brought into negotiations. 

Later in the year, when Saudi Arabia announced its "eight-point 
peace plan," Klutznick called it "useful" and argued that Israel at least 
"should listen to it." 

All of these positions, of course, were violently opposed by Israel 
and its U.S. lobby. But Klutznick was not deterred. In mid- 1982 in the 
Los Angeles Times and other major newspapers Klutznick wrote: 

It is up to the Reagan Administration to face the realities of the Middle East as 
boldly as did the Carter Administration. The first step is to halt the conflict in 
Lebanon immediately and have Israel's forces withdrawn. This must be fol- 
lowed by an enlarged peace process that includes all parties to the conflict — 
including Palestinians. Only by doing so without apology and with 
determination can America pursue its own best interests, promote Israel's 
long-term well-being and protect world peace. 

Despite public condemnation for these statements from the Jewish 
leadership in the United States, Klutznick privately received praise: 
"When I opposed the Iraqi raid, my mail from Jews was about four to 
one supportive, and about three to one when I proposed dealing di- 
rectly with the PLO," he recalls. "But, you know, some of that support 
has to be discounted. There are people in the Jewish community who 
will assure me of their support even when they think I'm wrong." 

Many more believed him wrong and said so. Abbot Rosen, Mid- 
west director of the Anti-Defamation League in Chicago, rejected 
Klutznick' s proposal to bring the PLO into the peace process and to 
establish a state for the Palestinians as "pie in the sky." He reported to 
the Chicago Sun-Times one of the lobby's tired cliches, "Under the 



280 They Dare to Speak Out 

present political circumstances, another Palestinian state, adjacent to 
Israel and Jordan, would provide an additional Soviet foothold in the 
region." 

Robert Schrayer, chairman of the Public Affairs Committee of the 
Jewish United Fund of Metropolitan Chicago, joined the protest with 
another shibboleth: "Since no sovereign nation can be expected to 
negotiate its own destruction, Israel should not be pressured to 
negotiate with the PLO." 

The Near East Report, a weekly newsletter published by the 
American Israeli Public Affairs Committee, editorialized against Klutz- 
nick's views, and accused him of promoting a "sinister canard" in 
calling the Palestinians "a special people in the Arab world, in some 
ways like the Jews were in the West following World War II." 

The next year Klutznick took his crusade to P&ris, where he joined 
forces with his old, ailing compatriot, Nahum Goldmann, and Pierre 
Mendfcs-France, a Jew and a former prime minister of France, in a plea 
to end Israel's war in Lebanon. 

Klutznick' s reason for going to Paris was to attend a meeting of the 
World Jewish Congress, but as soon as he landed, Goldmann, then 
living in Paris and critically ill, told him, "We've got to get fifty of the 
most distinguished Jews of the world to sign a statement to bring this 
war in Lebanon to an end." Klutznick responded, "But, first, let's see 
if we can write a statement." 

Goldmann agreed and took up the subject at lunch the next day 
with Mendfcs-France, Le Monde correspondent Eric Rouleau, and 
Klutznick, agreeing to consider a draft statement the next day. 

That night Klutznick, with the help of his aide, Mark Bruzonsky, 
wrote a brief statement which became the basis for the next day's 
discussion. 

Klutznick recalls the scene, "Mendfes-France is one of the best 
editors I've seen in my life. He would look at a word in typical French 
fashion in several languages, turning it around every which way. Four 
hours later, after sitting there fighting over every word, we had a state- 
ment." 

Its conclusion was forceful: 

The real issue is not whether the Palestinians are entitled to their rights, but 
how to bring this about while ensuring Israel's security and regional stability. 
Ambiguous concepts such as 'autonomy' are no longer sufficient, for they too 
often are used to confuse rather than to clarify. Needed now is the determina- 
tion to reach a political accommodation between Israel and Palestinian 
nationalism. 

The war in Lebanon must stop. Israel must lift its seige of Beirut in order to 
facilitate negotiations with the PLO, leading to a political settlement. Mutual 



Not All Jews Toe the Line 28 1 

recognition must be vigorously pursued. And there should be negotiations with 
the aim of achieving co-existence between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples 
based on self-determination. 

When it was finished, Klutznick asked, "What do we do with the 
damned thing?" Goldmann said, "We've got to get those other fellows. 
Branch out and find them." Klutznick protested that there was not 
enough time and suggested that Goldmann and Mendds-France issue it 
in their own names. The former prime minister said, "I've never done 
anything like that. I don't sign statements with other people." Gold- 
mann and Rouleau added their encouragement, and, finally, Mend&s- 
France said, "I'll sign provided you can get an immediate answer from 
Yasser Arafat." 

Isam Sartawi, a close associate of Arafat, was in Paris at the time 
and arranged this response by the PLO leader: 

Coming at this precise moment from three Jewish personalities of great worth, 
worldwide reputation, and definite influence at all levels, both on the interna- 
tional scene and within their own community, that statement takes on a 
significant importance. 

Klutznick took the podium at the meeting of the World Jewish 
Congress, then underway in Paris, to explain the declaration. The at- 
mosphere, he recalls, was anything but cordial: 

Heated is not the right word. If it had been heated it would have been better. It 
was sullen, solemn and bitter. I tried to have the delegates understand why we 
spoke up as we did. I told them it was the first such statement Mend&s-France 
had ever made. And I said they also should know that Nahum Goldmann does 
what he thinks is right. And he's not been condemned just once. He's been 
condemned many times in the past by those who later chose to follow him. 

The declaration brought headlines around the world, wide discus- 
sion, and some editorial praise. But it received little support among 
leading Jews and was largely rejected by Jewish organizations as "un- 
representative and unhelpful." It was Goldmann's last public state- 
ment. He died within a month, and a month later Mend&s-France also 
died. 

A few Jews helped Klutznick defend the statement. Newton N. 
Minow, a prominent Chicagoan who served in the Kennedy administra- 
tion, praised Klutznick's "exemplary lifetime of leadership to Jewish 
causes and Israel" and "his independence and thoughtful criticism" in a 
column published in the Chicago Sun-Times. "As an American Jew 
pondering past mistakes, I believe that the American Jewish commu- 
nity has made some serious blunders in the past few years by choosing 
to remain silent when we disagreed with Israeli government policy." 



282 They Dare to Speak Out 

Shortly after the Paris declaration, the world was horrified by the 
massacre of hundreds of civilians in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian 
camps at Beirut. After four months of silence, Klutznick spoke at a 
luncheon in New York in February 1983. He launched a new crusade, 
pleading for the right of Jews to dissent: 

We cannot be one in our need for each other, and be separated in our ability to 
speak or write the truth as each of us sees it. The real strength of Jewish life has 
been its sense of commitment and willingness to fight for the right [to dissent] 
even among ourselves. 

In November, Klutznick took his crusade to Jerusalem, attending, 
along with forty other Jews from the United States and fifteen other 
countries, a four-day meeting of the International Center for Peace in 
the Middle East. Klutznick drew applause when he told his audience, 
which included several Israelis: "If you listen to us when we speak 
good of Israel, then you must listen to us when we speak ill. Otherwise 
we will lose our credibility, and the American government will not 
listen to us at all." 

Despite his proven commitment to Israel, his leadership in the 
Jewish community and his unquestioned integrity, Philip Klutznick 
today is rejected or scorned by many of his establishment contem- 
poraries. Two professionals in the Jewish lobby community, for exam- 
ple, say simply that Klutznick is not listened to any longer. One of them 
adds sadly, "I admire Phil Klutznick but he is virtually a non-person in 
the Jewish community." The other is harsh and bitter, linking Klutznick 
with other critics of the Israeli government as "an enemy of the Jewish 
people." 

Charles Fishbein, for 1 1 years a fundraiser and executive of the 
Jewish National Fund, provides a partial explanation for the treatment 
Klutznick has received: 

When you speak up in the Jewish community without a proper forum, you are 
shunted aside. You are dismissed as one who has been 'gotten to.' It's non- 
sense, but it is effective. The Jewish leaders you hear about tend to be very 
very wealthy givers. Some give to Jewish causes primarily as an investment, to 
establish a good business and social relationship. Such people will not speak up 
for a non-conformist like Klutznick for fear of jeopardizing their investment. 

These thoughts echo that of Klutznick himself: "Tty to under- 
stand. See it from their standpoint. Why should they go public? They 
don't want any trouble. They are a part of the community. They have 
neighbors. They help out. They contribute." He pauses, purses his lips 
a bit, then adds, "They have standing. And they want to keep it." 

Klutznick smiles. "They say to me, 'You are absolutely right in 
what you say and do, but I can't. I can't speak up as you do.' " Another 



Not All Jews Toe the Line 283 

pause. "Maybe I would be the same if I hadn't gotten all the honors the 
Jewish community can give me." 

He sees Washington policy as a major obstacle to reforming the 
lobby's tactics: "Let's not underestimate the damage that our own 
government does. Our government has been writing blank checks to 
Israel for a long time. As a result Begin would come over here for a 
tour, then go back home and say, 'What are you complaining about? I 
go to the United States, where the government supports me and all the 
leaders of the Jewish community applaud and support me.' " 



"A Growing Gap in Our Liberal Tradition" 

"Jews never had it so good as they've had in the United States," 
muses I. F. Stone, one of America's most respected Jewish journalists 
who calls himself a radical. Famous for his periodical, /. E Stone's 
Weekly, which he issued for 19 years, and for his independent views, he 
discontinued the weekly because, as he says with typical self-mockery, 
he became "tired of solving the problems of the entire world every 
week." 

Seventy-six years old and with eyesight so weak he has difficulty 
reading even large type, he is anything but retired. He is still a hero on 
campuses across the country and in liberal circles for his views on non- 
Middle East topics. Indeed, on those themes his following is en- 
thusiastic. A recent lecture series on the trial of Socrates was a sell- 
out. 

"Israel is on the wrong course," he says sadly, peering through the 
thick lenses of his eyeglasses. "This period is the blackest in the history 
of the Jewish people. Arabs need to be dealt with as human beings." 

"I am gloomy about the future," he says. He can name no one with 
the promise to lead Israel out of its disastrous policies. 

The conversation drifts to American Jews who dissent, and Stone 
recalls the day a publisher invited him to lunch and asked him to delete 
from a book he had written a passage recommending major changes in 
Israeli policy. The book, Underground to Palestine, deals mainly with 
Stone's experiences traveling with Jews from Nazi camps as they made 
their way through the British blockade to what is now Israel. The 
offending part was Stone's recommendation of a "binational solution, a 
state whose constitution would recognize the presence of two peoples, 
two nations, Arab and Jewish," to encompass all of Palestine. Stone 
refused to delete it, and as he wrote in the New York Review of Books, 
"that ended the luncheon, and in a way, the book. It was in effect 
proscribed." 

According to Jewish journalist Carolyn Toll, 



284 They Dare to Speak Out 

From then on, Stone, who might have been a hero on the synagogue lecture 
circuit as the first American newsman to travel with Holocaust survivors, was 
banned in any Jewish arena by leaders determined to close the debate on 
binationalism and statehood. 

In Israel, where Jews establish their identity by birth rather than membership 
in an organization, Stone would be a full-fledged dissident. But in the American 
climate of insecurity about non-Jewish majority views, such arbitrary loyalty 
tests have not been challenged by the same Jews who vehemently champion 
others 1 rights to speak freely. 

Two years later, Stone's book was published in Hebrew— in Is- 
rael — with the offending passage intact and read widely in the Middle 
East. 

While he objects to the "excesses'* of the lobby, Stone understands 
the motivations: 

The Jewish people are apprehensive, fearful. They are afraid about the future. 
They feel they are at war, and many of them feel they have to fight and keep 
fighting. 

He adds, after a pause, "When people are at war it is normal for civil 
liberties to suffer." 

Stone sees a dangerous gap growing in this liberal tradition: 

I find myself— like many fellow American intellectuals, Jewish and non- 
Jewish — ostracized whenever I try to speak up on the Middle East, [while] 
dissidents, Jewish and non-Jewish, in the Soviet Union are, deservedly, 
heroes. 

But in the United States they are anything but heroes: 

It is only rarely that we dissidents on the Middle East can enjoy a fleeting voice 
in the American press. Finding an American publishing house willing to publish 
a book which departs from the standard Israeli line is about as easy as selling a 
thoughtful exposition of atheism to the Osservatore Romano in Vatican City. 

Those who speak up pay a price, says Stone, noting that journal- 
ists with long records of championing Israeli causes are flooded with 
"Jewish hate mail, accusing them of anti-Semitism" if they dare ex- 
press "one word of sympathy for Palestinian Arab refugees." 

In an essay in the Washington Post on August 19, 1977, Stone 
voiced his concern over "Bible diplomacy," particularly the effort to 
cite the Bible as the justification for Israel's continued control over the 
West Bank: 

In the Middle Ages, as everyone knows, the Bible was under lock and key. The 
clergy kept it away from the masses, lest it confuse them and lead to schism 

and sedition Maybe it's time to lock the Holy Book up again, at least until 

the Israeli- Arab dispute is settled. 



Not All Jews Toe the Line 285 



"Anti-Zionist Jews" 



Two American Jews, Elmer Berger and Alfred M. Lilienthal, Jn, 
have much in common. From the very beginning they warned against 
Zionism, forecasting grave danger to Judaism in the establishment of a 
Jewish state. Without apparent trepidation they separated themselves 
from what has become the mainstream of Jewish thinking and devoted 
their lives to a lonely, frustrating and controversial crusade to alter the 
policies of the state of Israel. Long after Israel was established, 
broadly recognized and supported by the world community, they con- 
tinued to make a case against the Jewish states. Both are often scorned 
as "self-hating Jews." 

Both Lilienthal and Berger persist in their crusades despite at- 
tacks. The two are constantly on lecture tours, write extensively and 
appear at forums. They are as well known in the Arab world as in the 
United States, and more honored there than here. 

In personality, the two have little in common. Lilienthal began as a 
lawyer, Berger as a rabbi. Lilienthal is a hard-hitting advocate in man- 
ner and speech. His mood shifts rapidly. Thoughtful and subdued one 
moment, he can be challenging the next. Berger, by contrast, is calm 
and unruffled, a patient listener. Even when his words thunder, his 
delivery is that of the soothing cleric. 

Each has his audience, but neither has many outspoken disciples. 
The people who read the Lilienthal newsletter, "Middle East Perspec- 
tive," and follow his activities may not be numerous, but his books are 
found in public and personal libraries throughout the country and are 
frequently cited in speeches and articles. 

Rabbi Elmer Berger' s circle may be smaller still — international 
audiences are hard to measure — but it appears loyal. When he spon- 
sored a two-day seminar in May 1983 at the Madison Hotel in Washing- 
ton, D.C., the gathering attracted over 200 people, principally 
journalists, scholars, clergy, public officials and diplomats. All had at 
least two things in common: an interest in the Arab-Israeli dispute and 
affection for Elmer Berger. 

Lilienthal began his crusade against Israel soon after the govern- 
ment came into being in 1948 and at the age of seventy had not let up 
when I interviewed him in 1984. His 1949 Readers Digest article, "Is- 
rael's Flag Is Not Mine," warned of the consequences of Zionism. His 
first book, What Price Israel? in 1953 was followed by There Goes the 
Middle East in 1957 and The Other Side of the Coin eight years later. 

In 1978 Lilienthal published his largest and most comprehensive 
work, The Zionist Connection, which focuses on the development and 
activities of the Zionist movement within the United States. An im- 
pressive 872-page volume studded with facts, quotations, anecdotes 



286 They Dare to Speak Out 

and, here and there, colorful opinions and interpretations, it was de- 
scribed by Foreign Affairs quarterly as the "culminating masterwork" 
of Lilienthal's anti-Zionist career. 

By 1984, his crusade had taken Lilienthal to the Middle East 
twenty-two times and across the United States twenty-six times. 

For all his longstanding and vigorous endeavors for the peaceful 
reconciliation of Jews and Arabs, Lilienthal remains a lonely figure, 
often shunned in the United States, even by those whose banner he 
carries the highest. 

Lilienthal says some people kid him as being the "Man from 
LaMancha." And true to the characterization, he frequently brings 
audiences to their feet by quoting from the song which had Quixote 
"reaching for the unreachable stars." 

His greatest accomplishment, he says, is getting "some Christians 
to have the guts to speak up on this issue." Formally excommunicated 
from the Jewish faith by a group of rabbis in New York in 1982, Lilien- 
thal scorns the action: "Only God can do that. I still feel very much a 
Jew." 



Chapter 1 1 



Beyond the Banks of the Potomac 



Efforts by the pro-Israel lobby to influence American opinion and pol- 
icy most often focus on national institutions, particularly the federal 
government. Yet the lobby in its various forms branches out widely 
into American life beyond the seat of government on the banks of the 
Potomac River. Local political leaders, businesses, organizations and 
private individuals in many fields experience unfair criticism and in- 
timidation for becoming involved in the debate over Middle East is- 
sues. Many on "Main Street" have paid a price for speaking out. 
Particularly distressing are instances of discrimination against Ameri- 
cans of Arab ancestry. 

The Stigma of Arab Ancestry 

Pro-Israeli PACs contributed nearly a million dollars to Senate 
races alone in 1982, and many members of Congress place a value on 
AIPAC support which is beyond accounting in dollars. The political 
activism of such groups is legitimate and accepted as part of the Ameri- 
can political system; yet when Arab Americans attempt to become 
involved in the electoral process, they find doors closed to them. 

On October 14, 1983, W. Wilson Goode was in the midst of a hard- 
fought campaign to become the first black Mayor of Philadelphia. The 
widely respected front-runner, popular with virtually every segment of 
the city's electorate, attended a fund-raising gathering one evening in 
the home of Nairn Ayoub, a local businessman who had invited a 
number of friends — prominent academics, scientists, medical profes- 
sionals and business leaders — to meet Goode and contribute to his 
campaign. 

After a short social interlude, during which he was told of the 
discrimination often suffered by people of Arab ancestry, Goode ex- 

287 



288 They Dare to Speak Out 

pressed concern and declared, with feeling, "I renew my pledge to be 
mayor of all the people." Ayoub and his guests wrote checks to the 
Goode campaign. The candidate offered his thanks and departed. The 
total amount of the checks was $2,725, a small portion of the Goode 
campaign budget; yet it was enough to spark a heated controversy over 
Arab influence and the role of Israel in the campaign. 

In the increasingly bitter final weeks of the campaign, Goode's 
main opponent tried to inflate the contribution into a scandal by dis- 
closing that Ayoub was regional coordinator for the American- Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee — a nationwide organization dedicated 
to opposing discrimination against people of Arab ancestry. Goode, 
who had been courting the large Jewish vote in the crucial northeast 
wards by constantly reaffirming his support for Israel, responded by 
announcing that the checks from Ayoub and his friends were being 
returned. He explained: "I want to make certain that no one is able to 
question my support for the state of Israel." 

Jewish voters were apparently satisfied with Goode's explanation 
of his "mistake," as he went on to win the election with overwhelming 
Jewish support. Yet as one Jewish Philadelphian later observed, 

One need not support the entire program of the Anti-Discrimination Committee 
to share the shock and pain of many of its members and friends over such a 
highly publicized affront to one of its leaders acting in his private capacity. Rill 
participation in the political process should never be restricted to those who 
espouse only that which is currently popular. 

The Wilson Goode episode was the precursor of similar incidents 
involving Senator Gary Hart and former Vice-President Walter Mon- 
dale in their campaigns for the highest office in the land (see chapter 
four). 

Arab Americans who have tried to maintain contact with their 
heritage have found unexpected difficulties. Anisa Mehdi, a news di- 
rector with TV station WBZ in Boston, observes that it can be "a 
frightening thing" to be an Arab in America: 

I grew up in New York City with a very politically active father. If there would 
be a commemoration of the anniversary of the Deir Yassin massacre, usually 
that date would coincide with the Israeli anniversary parade. Jews would be on 
Fifth Avenue and we would be on Madison Avenue. 

There would be hundreds of thousands of people on Fifth Avenue and maybe 
ten of us on Madison Avenue. The point is there were at least 100,000 Arab 
Americans in New York City. Where were they? They were afraid to come out. 

Arab ancestry can also be a liability outside politics, as Dr. George 
Faddoul, a specialist in veterinary medicine at the University of Mas- 



Beyond the Banks of the Potomac 289 

sachusetts, can attest. Faddoul's origins are Lebanese, but he was born 
in Maine and has never had any interest in politics or international 
affairs. In 1974, Faddoul was working at the Suburban Experiment 
Station at Waltham, Massachusetts, a facility established by the uni- 
versity to service the farming community in the state. When the direc- 
torship came open, he decided to apply for it. After a distinguished 
career of more than 25 years, Faddoul felt that he deserved it and that 
such an administrative post would add an interesting new dimension to 
his work at the station. 

Only one other applicant came forward, and a faculty committee 
voted 7 to 6 in Faddoul's favor. The rules of the university stipulate that 
only a simple majority is necessary, but the dean failed to appoint him. 
Faddoul's own investigation into the reasons revealed that there had 
been a number of slurs against him in the committee deliberations 
because of his Arab background. In the discussions Arabs were de- 
scribed as "worthless." Faddoul's assistant, who possessed only a 
bachelor's degree, was named acting administrative director of the 
station. Only after pressing his case for seven years did Faddoul re- 
ceive the position. 

Another person of Arab ancestry, Mahmoud A. Naji, has lived in 
the United States for 19 years. His wife and three children are all U.S. 
citizens. He owns his own home in the Chicago area and has an impres- 
sive record of gainful employment and civic involvement. He has never 
been arrested or charged with any wrongdoing. Still, for reasons which 
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service will not disclose, he 
faces deportation from the United States. 

Naji, a native of Jordan, was living in the Dominican Republic as a 
permanent resident at the time of the American intervention there in 
1965. He was evacuated to the United States along with the other 
foreign residents of the island nation and at that time began his efforts 
to gain permanent residency status under U.S. immigration laws. Like 
many immigrants, Naji met with a number of administrative road- 
blocks and adverse rulings, but his persistence appeared to pay off as 
each was in turn overcome. His right to adjust his residence status was 
recognized by the INS district director late in 1980. 

But in February 1981 his petition was again rejected by the INS 
regional commissioner for a previously unmentioned reason: he had 
been declared a threat to U.S. security and ordered to leave the United 
States. 

Naji has been unable to learn the nature of the charges against 
him, except that the adverse ruling was based on "classified informa- 
tion which is relevant and material, and requires protection from unau- 
thorized disclosure in the interest of national security." Inquiries by 



290 They Dare to Speak Out 

Senators Charles Percy and James Abdnor and several House mem- 
bers have been unavailing. 

Naji speculates that misunderstanding of his participation in sev- 
eral Arab American organizations has given rise to the undisclosed 
charges, although neither he nor any of these groups has ever been 
accused of any illegal or subversive activity. 



"80 to 85 Percent . . .Are Terrorists" 

Arab Americans in the Detroit area have learned about discrimina- 
tion firsthand. In a June 1983 meeting at Detroit between U.S. Customs 
officials and airline officials concerning the processing of luggage, a 
senior Customs official declared that "80 to 85 percent of Arabs in the 
Detroit metropolitan area are terrorists and the rest are terrorist sym- 
pathizers." 

This harsh accusation came after the arrest in 1983 of a 29-year-old 
Arab Canadian who tried to bring heroin in a false-bottomed suitcase 
through the Detroit- Windsor tunnel, and a vendetta in which Customs 
officials began to single out motorists who "looked Arab" for interroga- 
tion and automobile searches. In one case, an 18-year-old girl was 
strip-searched. 

Though the Customs Service later apologized for the remark 
charging Arabs with terrorism — the offending official received only a 
reprimand — a local publication joined in the racial stereotyping. After 
the arrest of a military officer from the Yemen Arab Republic (North 
Yemen) for attempting to smuggle guns out of the United States, 
Monthly Detroit magazine carried a story entitled "The Mideast Con- 
nection: How the Arab Wars Came to Detroit." Though it cited no 
examples of Arab Americans being arrested for gun or drug-smuggling, 
the article portrayed the city's nearly 250,000 Arab Americans as a 
lawless and violent community. 

"We Will Destroy You Economically" 

Bias and intimidation assume many forms and know no geo- 
graphical boundaries. Mediterranean House restaurant became an in- 
stant success after it opened in Skokie, a predominantly Jewish suburb 
of Chicago, in 1973. With an Arab cuisine and a mainly Jewish clien- 
tele, owner Abdel-Hamid El-Barbarawi — a Palestinian-born natu- 
ralized American citizen — held his staff to a strict "no politics" policy. 
He fired two employees for becoming involved in political discussions 
with clients. 

At the peak of its success, Mediterranean House was recom- 



Beyond the Banks of the Potomac 29 1 

mended in all major Chicago dining guides and was frequently praised 
in newspaper articles. A growing business led Barbarawi to expand, 
opening several other restaurants under the same name in other areas. 

On a summer night in 1975 a 6-foot pipe bomb was thrown through 
the window of the one in Morton Grove. No one was injured because 
the attack came late at night, but the restaurant was destroyed. Fire 
experts said the bomb was meant to "level the building." 

TVouble returned a year later when Barbarawi and members of his 
staff emerged from his restaurant in Skokie about 3 a.m., discovering 
that one side of the building had been covered with posters proclaiming 
that "Mediterranean House food in your stomach is like Jewish blood 
on your hands," and "Money Spent Here Supports PLO Terrorism." 
The graphic impact of the posters' message was enhanced by red paint 
and raw liver thrown on the walls. Though the vandals were nowhere 
in sight, Barbarawi found the editor of the Chicago Jewish Post and 
Opinion taking pictures of the display. The editor said he just happened 
to be passing. 

The next month, under the headline "Skokie Jews Unknowingly 
Funding Arab Propaganda," the periodical published an article which 
urged local Jews to boycott the restaurant, basing its recommendation 
on the fact that the Mediterranean House advertised on a weekly one- 
hour radio program called "The Voice of Palestine." Ted Cohen, author 
of the article, described the program as a source of "anti-Jewish propa- 
ganda." 

Barbarawi points out that he advertised on six radio stations and 
also had commercials on several Jewish programs and an India-related 
program. "I was an advertiser, not a sponsor," he says. "I had never 
listened to the Voice of Palestine and was not interested in their edito- 
rial policy." 

Publication of the Cohen article marked the beginning of the end 
for Barbarawi. A propaganda campaign was mounted against the res- 
taurant. Leaflets urging local Jews to "Stop Paying for Arab Propa- 
ganda" were distributed door to door in Skokie. Large numbers of 
abusive calls and false orders forced Barbarawi to stop accepting or- 
ders by phone. One call threatened his life. In exasperation, Barbarawi 
interrupted a caller's invective with an anguished question: "Why 
don't you bomb the place like you did before?" The answer was chill- 
ing: "We wouldn't give you that satisfaction. We will destroy you eco- 
nomically. You will die while you are still living." 

In a Chicago Sun-Times commentary, columnist Roger Simon 
conceded that Voice of Palestine broadcasts were not anti-Semitic, as 
Cohen had charged, but concluded oddly by agreeing that Jews should 
hold Barbarawi "responsible for where his money goes" and backed 



292 They Dare to Speak Out 

the Jewish Post and Opinion in calling for a boycott. Barbarawi feels 
that this commentary damaged business more than any other single 
factor. 

Barbarawi appealed, to no avail, to local citizens of Arab ancestry, 
as well as to the local chapter of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai 
B'rith to intercede with the Jewish community. He was told that ADL 
had nothing against him. Director Abbot Rosen stated personal sym- 
pathy — "It's terrible; you should sue" — but did not counter the hate 
campaign mounted by the Jewish Post and Opinion and the unseen 
callers. 

Meanwhile Barbarawi saw his revenues drop from $40,000 a 
month to less than $7,000. As regular Jewish customers stopped com- 
ing, a number of non-Jews told Barbarawi that their neighbors were 
refusing to speak to them because they patronized his restaurant. 

Facing financial ruin, Barbarawi in desperation turned to legal 
action, but high costs and repeated court delays finally forced him to 
abandon this last hope. In the end, the hate campaign of unseen 
enemies put him out of the restaurant business completely. After losing 
$3 million dollars, Barbarawi had $3 in his pocket when the local sheriff 
came to close down his restaurant. 

Dick Kay, a reporter for Chicago television station WMAQ, 
summed up the fate of the Mediterranean House and its owner: "They 
really did a job on him, and it was the militant part of the Jewish 
community that did it." 

An official of a Jewish organization faced still another form of 
pressure. In mid-1983, the Seattle chapter of the American-Arab Anti- 
Discrimination Committee (ADC) initiated a formal dialogue with the 
Jewish Federation of Seattle under the sponsorship of the American 
Friends Service Committee. Anson Laytner, head of the Jewish Feder- 
ation, suddenly withdrew from the series, explaining to the Seattle 
ADC leader that his superior threatened his dismissal if he continued. 
He even asked that the ADC retract the report on the Seattle talks 
which had appeared in its national newsletter. 

Such intolerance can also damage longstanding personal friend- 
ships. In mid-1983, author Stephen Green took the bound page proofs 
of his new book, Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a 
Militant Israel, to Edgar Bronfman, president of the World Jewish 
Congress and a close friend of the Green family for many years. To- 
gether the two men had scattered the ashes of Green's father after his 
death five years before. The young writer wanted to explain his reasons 
for writing the book, which discloses intimate U.S.-Israeli military rela- 
tionships. Bronfman declined to see Green. He directed his secretary, 
whom Green has also known for years, to respond. Green recalls her 



Beyond the Banks of the Potomac 293 

words: "Mr. Edgar does not want to discuss this book with you, Steve. 
You've written it. It's your affair, and he doesn't feel he needs to 
discuss it with you." Green was devastated that the man he had known 
and respected for so long would refuse even to speak with him. He 
recalled with irony that years earlier Edgar's father had frequently 
upbraided his son for "not doing enough" for Israel. 

Vanessa Redgrave: An Activist Playing for Time 

The Middle East conflict has affected the career of Vanessa Red- 
grave, a British actress who is widely hailed as one of the foremost 
stage and screen talents of her generation. Yet her success in the 
United States has been limited by her long history of political activism. 
While many performers shy away from controversial issues for fear of 
damaging their careers, Redgrave has structured her life largely around 
her political passions. Her career has suffered accordingly. 

Redgrave's apprehension was apparent on Labor Day, 1983 when 
I interviewed her in a backyard studio in a residential area of Boston. 
She had just cut a tape for a program directed to Arab Americans and 
was ill at ease. She spoke quietly of threats against her life, while 
glancing nervously through an open door. "I don't feel safe here," she 
said. "I've had so many threats." 

Always controversial, Redgrave's opposition to the Vietnam war 
and sympathy for leftist causes led the U.S. government to refuse her a 
visa in 1971 when she wanted to come to the United States to discuss 
writing her autobiography and a possible motion picture. The refusal 
occurred despite the pleas of her publisher and the intervention of 
numerous public figures. Undeterred, she directed her activism in- 
creasingly toward support for the Palestinian people. 

In 1978, the Jewish Defense League picketed the academy awards 
ceremony in which Redgrave received an Oscar for her supporting role 
in the movie Julia. The JDL was protesting her narration and financial 
backing of a documentary called The Palestinians, which included an 
interview with PLO chief Yasser Arafat. In her acceptance speech, 
Redgrave described the JDL picketers as "a small bunch of Zionist 
hoodlums whose behavior is an insult to Jews all over the world" and 
thanked the Academy for standing up to their intimidation. Many in the 
audience hissed and booed. 

Another controversy arose in the summer of 1979 when it was 
announced that Redgrave would play the lead in a CBS-TV drama 
about Holocaust survivor Fania Fenelon, a member of the Auschwitz 
concentration camp orchestra who was spared death only to play 
music for other prisoners as well as camp officials. Many Jews were 



294 They Dare to Speak Out 

outraged that Redgrave was chosen for the part Fenelon herself de- 
clared, "Vanessa Redgrave playing me is like a member of the Ku Klux 
Klan playing Martin Luther King." The network was criticized for 
keeping "an unusually tight lid on the names of sponsors" for the 
broadcast, in an attempt to avoid expected pressures on them to with- 
draw. 

The two people most responsible for what one columnist called 
"the Vanessa thing" were Bernie Sofronsky, the CBS executive in 
charge, and Linda Yellen, the producer. CBS explained that it could not 
bow to pressure. Yellen responded to the criticism more directly: 

I had always adored her as an actress, and I turned to her as the best person for 
the part. Basically, I was unaware of her politically. I never considered firing 
her for her political beliefs. That would have been anathema to me, given what 
I know about blacklisting and the McCarthy era. I believe her performance is 
extraordinary, and speaks for itself. 

The critics were nearly unanimous in acclaiming Redgrave's per- 
formance. One asserted that it "may be the finest ever seen on televi- 
sion." But the excellence of the program did not quiet her detractors. 
The Simon Wiesenthal Center for Holocaust Studies in Los Angeles 
urged a nationwide boycott of the film, entitled Playing for Time, and 
some Zionist groups went even further by urging a boycott of products 
sold by its sponsors. 

Obviously Redgrave's talents as an actress were not the real issue. 
As the Los Angeles Times cogently observed, 

Her dazzling portrayal of a Holocaust survivor has no bearing on the con- 
troversy. . . . The principle involved is the simple one of keeping separate 
things separate — in this instance, separating the artist on the screen from the 
eccentric and grating political activist off the screen. 

The difficulty in keeping this distinction clear was demonstrated 
again in 1982, when Vanessa Redgrave was designated to narrate 
Stravinsky's Oedipus Rex in a series of April concerts by the Boston 
Symphony Orchestra. In the face of a vociferous outcry by the local 
Jewish community, the orchestra cancelled the concerts without expla- 
nation. The announcement did not mention Redgrave by name, but as 
columnist Nat Hentoff pointed out, "There was no mystery. Wishing to 
offend as few people as possible — particularly during the spring fund- 
raising season — BSO made its craven decision" not to do the perform- 
ances with Redgrave. 

Alan Dershowitz, a professor at Harvard Law School noted both 
as a Zionist and as a defender of civil liberties, defended Redgrave's 



Beyond the Banks of the Potomac 295 

statement that, "No one should have the right to take away the work of 
an artist because of political views." 

Redgrave, who was awarded $100,000 damages, represents a com- 
plicated case, in that her political views are disagreeable to more than 
just partisans of Israel. Nat Hentoff quite properly invoked the wisdom 
of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes to suggest how Americans should 
react: 

If there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for 
attachment than any other, it is the principle of free thought — not free only for 
those who agree with us, but freedom for the thought we hate. 



n A Consistent Pattern" 

Efforts to stifle public debate on the Middle East focus to a great 
extent on the centerpiece of free speech in our country: the press. Over 
the years, support for Israel has become a requisite for respectability in 
journalism, just as it has in politics and other professions. 

Edmund Ghareeb, a scholar who has written widely on the Middle 
East and the American media, observes that the media present "a rosy 
picture of Israel as the democracy in a sea of barbarians in the Middle 
East. . . ." On the other hand, the Palestinians are often referred to as 
"Arab terrorists," the Arab is portrayed as a camel driver, somebody 
who is a murderer, or something of this sort." Journalist Lawrence 
Mosher agrees: "They have stereotyped the Arab as an unsavory 
character with dark tendencies, and they have ennobled the Israeli as a 
hero." 

Even Time magazine is guilty of perpetuating such stereotypes. In 
1982 the magazine ran a four-color house ad with a photo of a sheik 
under a single-word headline: "Power." Columnist Richard Broderick 
described the sheik as "all you could want from an evil Arab — 
dyspeptic, garbed in traditional Saudi dress, he stares out at the camera 
with palpable malevolence." 

Such stereotyping of Arabs is common in editorial cartoons. As 
Craig Macintosh, editorial cartoonist for The Minneapolis Star, points 
out, "The Arabs are always in robes, the Palestinians always in 'terror- 
ist' garb, with an AK 47." Robert Englehart, editorial cartoonist for the 
Journal Herald (Dayton, Ohio), agrees: "I could depict Arabs as mur- 
derers, liars and thieves. No one would object. But I couldn't use 
Jewish stereotypes. I've always had the feeling that I'm treading on 
eggs when I try to do something on the Middle East. . . ." 

The Israeli lobby works diligently to keep journalists from rowing 



296 They Dare to Speak Out 

against the tide of pro-Israel orthodoxy. This mission is accomplished 
in part through carefully arranged, "spontaneous" public outcries de- 
signed to intimidate. Columnist Rowland Evans writes: "When we 
write what is perceived to be an anti-Israeli column, we get mail from 
all over the country with the same points and phrasing. There's a 
consistent pattern." 

The ubiquitous cry of "anti-Semitism" is brought to bear on short 
notice, and it is this charge which has been most responsible for com- 
pelling journalists to give Israel better than equal treatment in coverage 
of Middle East events. Even former Defense Department official An- 
thony Cordesman was not immune from this charge when he wrote in 
1977 an article for Armed Forces Journal International examining the 
Middle East military balance. Observing, for example, that the number 
of medium tanks requested by Israel for the decade 1976 to 1986 would 
approach the number to be deployed by the United States within the 
North Atlantic Tteaty Organization, Cordesman questioned the need 
for ever-increasing U.S. military aid to Israel. For this straightforward 
assertion, the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith denounced the 
article as "anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish." 



"Too Controversial and Fanatical* 

Journalist Harold R. Piety observes that "the ugly cry of anti- 
Semitism is the bludgeon used by the Zionists to bully non-Jews into 
accepting the Zionist view of world events, or to keep silent." In late 
1978 Piety, withholding his identity in order not to irritate his employer, 
wrote an article on "Zionism and the American Press" for Middle East 
International in which he decried "the inaccuracies, distortions and — 
perhaps worst — inexcusable omission of significant news and back- 
ground material by the American media in its treatment of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict." 

Piety traces the deficiency of U.S. media in reporting on the Mid- 
dle East to largely successful efforts by the pro-Israel lobby to "over- 
whelm the American media with a highly professional public relations 
campaign, to intimidate the media through various means and, finally, 
to impose censorship when the media are compliant and craven." He 
lists threats to editors and advertising departments, orchestrated boy- 
cotts, slanders, campaigns of character assassination, and personal 
vendettas among the weapons employed against balanced journalism. 

Despite this impressive list of tools for media manipulation, Piety 
draws from his own experience and blames the prevailing media bias 
more on editors and journalists who submit to the pressure than on the 
lobby which applies it. 



Beyond the Banks of the Potomac 297 

Pressure began to build against Piety's employer, the Journal 
Herald of Dayton, Ohio, in the late sixties as his growing interest in the 
Middle East led him to write editorial pieces critical of Israeli policy. 
His editor received a long letter, hand-delivered, from the president of 
the local Jewish Community Council, along with a lecture on Middle 
East politics. A column asserting that American Jews "were being 
herded, and willingly so, into the Zionist camp" brought a lengthy 
response from the Zionist Organization of America and a delegation of 
six Jewish leaders to the paper for a meeting with the editorial board. A 
1976 column on West Bank riots led Piety's editors to order him to 
write no more on the theme. 

Upon writing another column in April 1977 on the anniversary of 
the Deir Yassin massacres in which Jewish terrorists under Menachem 
Begin murdered more than 200 Palestinian villagers, he was sharply 
rebuked by his editors. Editor Dennis Shere informed Piety that he had 
received orders — presumably from the corporate management — to 
"shut you up or fire you." Piety was subsequently told that he was "too 
controversial and too fanatical" and that he would not receive a prom- 
ised promotion to editor of the Journal Herald editorial page. Under 
this pressure Piety left his position. 

Mediawatch Blinks Out 

During the summer of 1982, Minneapolis columnist Richard 
Broderick devoted several installments of his "Mediawatch" column — 
a weekly feature on media coverage — to exposing such inequities in 
American media coverage of the Israeli invasion. Among his findings: 

Tapes purportedly of [Yasser] Arafat's 'bunker' and 'PLO military headquar- 
ters' being bombed aired over and over again while tape of civilian casualties 
wound up on the edit room floor. . . . 

As Israeli ground forces swept through Southern Lebanon, the American press 
continued to employ the euphemism 'incursion' to describe what was clearly 
an invasion. 

In local newspaper coverage, Broderick found: 

While Palestinian and Lebanese civilians were being killed by the thousands, 
the Minneapolis Star and Tribune ran a front-page photo of an Israeli mother 
mourning her dead son. 

Later that same day, another photo showed a group of men bound and squat- 
ting in a barbed-wire enclosure guarded by Israeli soldiers. The caption de- 
scribed the scene as a group of 'suspected Palestinians' captured by Israeli 
forces. Simply being Palestinian, the caption implied, was sufficient cause to be 
rounded up. 



298 They Dare to Speak Out 

Broderick also used his column to relate scenes of horror wit- 
nessed by the Reverend Don Wagner, who had been in Beirut inspect- 
ing Palestinian refugee camps when the Israeli bombing began. Wagner 
saw a wing of the Gaza Hospital knocked down by the bombing and 
was in Akka Hospital while hundreds of civilian casualties were 
brought in. Wagner described his experiences to the Beirut network 
bureaus for NBC, ABC and CBS, but their reports beamed back to the 
United States were never aired. 

While such examples of bias are disturbing, still more so are the 
consequences suffered by the journalist who publicized them. Soon 
after the "Mediawatch" columns on Israel ran in the Twin Cities 
Reader, movie distributors of Minneapolis — who collectively represent 
the largest single source of advertising for the paper — began telephon- 
ing editor Deb Hopp with threats of permanently removing their adver- 
tising as a result of the Broderick column. Hopp mollified them by 
agreeing to print, unedited, the thousand-word reply to the offending 
column. Contrary to usual policy, Broderick was not allowed to re- 
spond to this rebuttal. 

Later in the summer, Broderick reported an attempt, as he saw it, 
by Minnesota Senator Rudy Boschwitz to manipulate public opinion 
through the local media. Boschwitz coordinated and appeared in a 
press conference with members of the American Lebanese League 
(ALL), an organization which endorsed the Israeli invasion. Boschwitz 
cited the testimony of league members in arguing that the people of 
Lebanon welcomed the Israelis. 

Broderick quoted in his column a report by the nationwide Ameri- 
can-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee which described the league 
as "the unregistered foreign agent of the Phalange Party and the Leba- 
nese Front. They work in close consultation with AIPAC, which 
creates for them their political openings." Senator Boschwitz, upset at 
seeing this information made public, castigated Hopp and Broderick in 
a lengthy telephone call. Three weeks later, Broderick was informed 
that his services would no longer be needed at the Twin Cities Reader. 

"Frau Geyer" Under Fire 

Concern over appearances and external pressure also led the 
Chicago Sun-Times to drop the regular column of veteran foreign cor- 
respondent and syndicated columnist Georgie Anne Geyer for several 
months during the 1982 war in Lebanon. The decision followed an 
outpouring of reader protest over Geyer' s columns criticizing the war 
and Israeli policy. Letters assailed Geyer as "a well-known Jew hater," 
"an anti-Semite par excellence," and "an apologist for the PLO" — the 



Beyond the Banks of the Potomac 299 

sort of innuendos to which Geyer has grown accustomed during many 
years of covering both sides of the Arab-Israel dispute. She is fre- 
quently denounced in print and harrassed at lectures with similar 
charges. Geyer, whose worldwide journalistic cdups have made head- 
lines for years, told me that receiving "this endless, vicious campaign 
of calumny and insults because you write what you know to be impec- 
cably true" is the most distressing aspect of her life as a journalist. 

Editor Howard Kleinberg of the Miami News also suffered criti- 
cism for carrying Geyer' s columns. He wrote in a 1982 editorial that 

I cannot remember receiving more outside pressure on anything than I have 
about Georgie Anne Geyer's columns on Israel. . . . Geyer' s antagonists have 
portrayed her not only as anti-Israel but anti-Semitic as well; 'Frau Geyer* 
some of them call her. 

Aware of the violent response, Geyer suggested that Kleinberg too 
not publish her Middle East column for a while, but he was adamant: "I 
steadfastly have refused to bow to the pressure." He added: "We carry 
syndicated columns of contrasting viewpoints because it is the role of 
newspapers to provide a vehicle for the exercise of free speech." 

Though the Sun-Times later resumed publication of her column 
and the criticism abated, Geyer finds that calling Middle East issues as 
she sees them exacts a personal price, noting sadly that her commen- 
taries seem to have damaged permanently valued relationships with 
Jewish friends. 



On and Off the "Enemies List" 

Branding critics and thoughtful analysts as "enemies" is another 
familiar tactic of the Israeli lobby. Those singled out for inclusion on 
enemies lists — particularly The Campaign to Discredit Israel, pub- 
lished by AIPAC, and the ADL's Pro-Arab Propaganda in America: 
Vehicles and Voices — rarely take issue with lobby criticism, probably 
in the belief that a direct response would only give undeserved credibil- 
ity to their detractors. But in December, 1983, a selective challenge to 
these enemies lists was offered by Anthony Lewis, a Jewish columnist 
who writes for the New York Times. 

In two installments of his regular column, Lewis took issue with 
the inclusion on the 1983 lists of Professor Walid Khalidi, a professor at 
the American University, Beirut, and a research fellow at Harvard. 
Klalidi, recognized as a leading Palestinian intellectual, has long argued 
for a Palestinian state living in peace and mutual recognition with Is- 
rael. He had outlined his position in a 1978 Foreign Affairs article, 



300 They Dare to Speak Out 

subsequently receiving sharp criticism from extremist groups in the 
Middle East and elsewhere. Hence Lewis was "astonished to find Pro- 
fessor Khalidi's name on lists of supposed anti-Israel activists." 

Lewis exposed the techniques used to implicate Khalidi in a puta- 
tive campaign to discredit Israel. First AIPAC quotes him as saying in 
the 1978 article that Israel's existence is "both 'a violation of the princi- 
ples of the unity and integrity of Arab soil and an affront to the dignity 
of the [Arab] nation. 9 " Khalidi in fact referred to this as an old view 
which has been discarded. 

The book identifies Khalidi as a member of the Palestine National 
Council, a body which serves as a PLO parliament and claims that on 
one occasion he "narrowly escaped expulsion" from the PNC for sup- 
porting George Habash's radical Popular Front. Khalidi responds that 
he has never attended a PNC meeting "because of [his] lifelong com- 
mitment to complete independence from all political organizations." 
Lewis adds that Khalidi's views are the antithesis of George Habash's. 

Lewis concludes: "Some people see his very moderation as 
dangerous. He is a Palestinian nationalist, after all, and one must not 
allow that idea to have any legitimacy." The Times published letters 
from both the ADL and AIPAC protesting the Lewis columns, and the 
ADL assigned a team of researchers to review previous Lewis columns 
in search of anti-Israeli bias. Lewis was also sharply criticized in the 
January 1984 issue of Near East Report, the AIPAC newsletter. 

The Perils of Non-Orthodoxy 

A New York businessman almost made an "enemies list," thanks 
to media coverage of his views. Jack Sunderland, businessman and 
chairman of Americans for Middle East Understanding, a national or- 
ganization which issues scholarly reviews, made statements supporting 
Palestinian self-rule and an end to Israeli West Bank settlement con- 
struction during a trip to the Middle East several years ago. His re- 
marks were widely reported in the U.S. and foreign media, and shortly 
after returning to his New York home, Sunderland learned that a man 
had visited several of his neighbors asking personal questions about his 
family, including his children's schedule and routes to and from school. 
Concerned for his family's safety, Sunderland engaged a private detec- 
tive. 

Working with FBI cooperation, the detective soon located a 
graduate student who admitted to the obtrusive questioning and also to 
illegally gaining access to computer information about Sunderland's 
finances and credit record. The student said he was an employee of 
B'nai B'rith and that Sunderland was being investigated as a prospect 



Beyond the Banks of the Potomac 301 

for inclusion on the organization's "enemies list/* Faced with the stu- 
dent's confession, B'nai B'rith officials refused to meet with Sunder- 
land personally but agreed not to mention his name in future 
publications. When the "enemies list" appeared in 1983, under the 
sponsorship of B'nai B'rith's affiliate, the Anti-Defamation League, 
the organization Sunderland heads was listed as a "vehicle" of "Arab 
propaganda." Several officers were mentioned by name but not Sun- 
derland. 

On a Saturday morning in 1977 producer Debbie Gage encoun- 
tered peril of a different sort when she put on a one-hour program of 
interviews with local people of Palestinian origin on Minneapolis Public 
Radio. The station's switchboard was promptly swamped with calls 
demanding equal time for the Israeli viewpoint. Gage demurred, re- 
sponding that she had decided to do her program because of the heavy 
coverage being given to the Israeli view in the local press. She saw her 
broadcast as "simply a small attempt to redress that imbalance/' 

The following Monday news director Gary Eichten informed Gage 
that her job would be terminated in three weeks and that a program 
devoted to pro-Israeli views would be aired the following Saturday. 
Eichten denied that he was pressured into doing the follow-up pro- 
gram, but, as station intern Yvonne Pearson observes, "If dozens of 
angry phone calls aren't pressure, I don't know what is." 

Even when the media make an effort to ignore the dangers and 
resist pressure and bias, the price can still be high for those who speak 
out. James Batal, a man of Lebanese ancestry, was interviewed on 
Miami TV during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. He was 72 years old at the 
time. Batal sought to explain the little-understood Arab view of the 
conflict. Following the broadcast of his interview, he received an abu- 
sive — and anonymous — phone call warning that his house would be 
burned down or bombed in retaliation for his remarks on television. 
Batal appealed to local police and the FBI, but was told that they were 
unable to provide protection. In desperation, he and his ailing wife 
closed their home and moved into a small apartment with her sister. 

Grace Halsell, a noted writer on the Middle East, tells of a similar 
incident which took place in late 1983. While in Jerusalem, she visited 
Amal, a young Palestinian woman with whom she had become friends 
while living in Jerusalem some years before. An American TV journal- 
ist had asked to interview Amal while she was employed as assistant to 
the U.S. vice-consul in East Jerusalem, and her American boss had 
agreed to her being interviewed. But when the interview was shown, 
she was fired. She explains, "I was thought to be too pro-Palestinian. I 
had merely said, in answer to a question, that my family lived in a 
house where Israelis now live." 



302 They Dare to Speak Out 

The consequences of publishing reports which do not convey such 
a congenial message can be even more drastic than loss of employment 
or public pressure from lobby groups. John Law, a veteran journalist 
who founded and edited the Washington Report on Middle East Af- 
fairs, a nonpartisan newsletter published by the American Educational 
Trust, once described the aim of the publication in these words: 

It would like to see Middle East issues approached in a way that will benefit the 
interests of the people of the United States, while being consistent with their 
standards of justice and fair play. 

On May 6, 1982, Law received a telephone call which threatened 
his physical safety and warned that he should "watch out." The follow- 
ing day John Duke Anthony, then an official of the American Educa- 
tional Trust, was assaulted by two men near his home. One subdued 
Anthony by striking him on the head with a brick. The "muggers" took 
neither his money nor his credit cards — only his personal address 
book. 

An editorial in the next issue of the Washington Report responded: 

The man who threatened Mr. Law and the two men who assaulted [Mr. An- 
thony] were presumably hoping to deter them from doing their work. This is 
not going to happen. 

"Conviction Under False Pretenses" 

Opinions which depart from the pro-Israeli line cost a New York 
journalist his job in early 1984. For ten years Alexander Cockburn 
contributed the popular "Press Clips" feature to the Village Voice in 
New York. Though his topics and views were often controversial, his 
candor and originality were widely respected. One reader hailed him as 
"Guinness Stout in a world of Lite journalism." 

In August 1982 Cockburn applied for and received a grant from the 
Institute of Arab Studies, located in Belmont, Massachusetts, to 
underwrite travel and research expenses for a book on the war in 
Lebanon. The grant was not secret. It was recorded in the IAS public 
report, but in January 1984 the Boston Phoenix published a long article 
exposing Cockburn's "$10,000 Arab connection." The article provoked 
a storm in the editorial offices of the Voice. 

Editor David Schneiderman decided that Cockburn should receive 
an indefinite suspension without pay, but permitted him to reply in 
print. Cockburn defended the grant, contending that the IAS is a legiti- 
mate non-profit organization, founded "to afford writers, scholars, art- 
ists, poets and professionals an opportunity to pursue the full 
exploration of the Arab dimension of world history through their spe- 



Beyond the Banks of the Potomac 303 

cial field of interest." He argued that the bottom line of the matter was 
that he "didn't properly evaluate the climate of anti-Arab racism." The 
book grant, he felt, constituted an ethnically dubious "connection" 
because it was "Arab money." 

Readers were outraged by Schneiderman's treatment of Cock- 
burn, and many wrote to protest his "conviction under false 
pretenses." 

It is sad that even in the United States, with its traditions of free speech, there 
are still people who, when it comes to Middle East issues, will use force and 
threats of force to try to prevent the dissemination of ideas they do not like. 

Dow Jones Stands Firm 

Major national media have not escaped these pressures. Orga- 
nized letter campaigns are a favored tactic of pro-Israel groups. Law- 
rence Mosher, a staff correspondent for the National Journal, observes 
that such groups have 

a seemingly indefatigable army of workers who will generate hundreds or 
thousands of letters to Congressmen, to newspaper editors, etc., whenever the 
occasion seems to warrant it. 

. . . Editors are sometimes weighed down by it in advance and inhibited from 
doing things they would normally do if they didn't know that an onslaught of 
letters, cables and telephone calls would follow if they write or show such and 
such. 

Mosher has himself experienced the pressures which speaking out 
bring. The National Observer of May 18, 1970, printed an article by 
Mosher on a hitherto little noticed court case then pending in Washing- 
ton, D.C. The case involved Saul E. Joftes, a former high official of 
B'nai B'rith, who was bringing suit against the organization and its 
officers. The charge: 

That the Zionists have used B'nai B'rith, a charitable, religious, tax-exempt 
American membership organization, to pursue international political activities 
contrary to the B'nai B'rith constitution and in violation of federal foreign- 
agent registration and tax laws. 

Joftes had been especially disturbed at the "employment" by B'nai 
B'rith of a woman whose post was funded and controlled by the Israeli 
consulate in New York City. She was given the job of providing "sat- 
uration briefings" for Jews visiting the Soviet Union, but her main duty 
was to "channel information back to the Israeli government on who 
went to the Soviet Union and what Russians visited the United States." 
The woman, Mrs. Avis Shulman, observed that "Jewish organizations, 



304 They Dare to Speak Out 

particularly B'nai B'rith, are especially useful" as a "base of opera- 
tion." Joftes was obliged to meet her request that "a subcommittee" be 
"invented with her as 'secretary' to give her a handle that could be 
relatively inconspicuous but meaningful." 

The one-year employment of Shulman was but one aspect of what 
Joftes saw as the Zionist "takeover" of B'nai B'rith's international 
operations. He resented being compelled to develop the organization 
to serve policy mandates of the Israeli government, with "the identity 
of B'nai B'rith itself taking a secondary role in fostering the interests of 
a foreign power." 

Mosher's article went on to discuss the broader issue of national 
versus extranational loyalties raised by Joftes's case, quoting the views 
of numerous national and international Jewish leaders. He disclosed 
the mechanisms through which tax-free donations from U.S. Jews were 
sent to Israel for purposes other than the designated "relief" and dis- 
cussed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings seven years 
before which had exposed and closed down an illegal Israeli propa- 
ganda operation in an organization called the American Zionist Coun- 
cil. 

Shortly after the article appeared, the offices of Dow Jones, which 
owned the National Observer, were visited by Gustave Levy, senior 
partner in a New York investment firm, and a group of other Jewish 
leaders. The group did not dispute the accuracy of the article but 
protested its publication as an embarrassment and an anti- Jewish act. 
They questioned the motives of Warren Phillips, then vice-president of 
Dow Jones, in publishing the Mosher piece: "Why create public focus 
on this information?" Despite the pressure, Phillips stood behind his 
writer, 

"Who Could Be Mad at Us?" 

In its April 1974 issue, National Geographic Magazine published a 
major article entitled "Damascus, Syria's Uneasy Eden." The article 
discussed ancient and modern life in the Syrian capital, but a brief 
segment on the life of the city's small Jewish community caused a 
storm of protest. 

Author Robert Azzi, a journalist with years of experience in the 
Middle East, found that "the city still tolerantly embraces significant 
numbers of Jews" and Sephardic Jews enjoy "freedom of worship and 
freedom of opportunity" although they live under a number of obtru- 
sive restrictions, including strict limitations on travel and emigration. 
He had learned that about 500 Jews had left Syria in the years following 
the 1967 war, and that "reprisals against the families of those who leave 
are . • . rare," 



Beyond the Banks of the Potomac 305 

A number of U.S. Jewish groups and many subscribers were out- 
raged by Azzi's portrait of Jewish life in Syria. A torrent of angry 
letters poured into the offices of the National Geographic Society pro- 
testing the "whitewash" of Syria's treatment of its Jewish citizens and 
the refusal of the editors to correct Azzi's "shocking distortions." Soci- 
ety President Gilbert M. Grosvenor later recalled that his offices re- 
ceived more than 600 protest letters. This correspondence was liberally 
seasoned with harsh charges, including "hideous lies," "disgraceful," 
"inhuman," "Communistic propaganda," and "as bad as Hitler's hatred 
for the Jews." One letter threatened Grosvenor' s life. As the con- 
troversy grew, the Society even received a letter from Kansas Senator 
Robert Dole expressing concern over the issue and forwarding a longer 
letter from the Jewish Community Relations Bureau of Kansas City. 

Unaccustomed to controversy, the National Geographic offices 
were shocked at the outcry raised over a small section of what had 
been seen as a standard article. Protestations by Grosvenor that the 
piece had been checked for accuracy by Western diplomats in Syria, 
the Syria desk officer at the U.S. State Department and even several 
rabbis — none of whom had found any problems with the text — were 
unavailing. 

The criticisms culminated in a public demonstration by the Ameri- 
can Jewish Congress outside the Society's Washington offices in late 
June. Informed of the picketing outside the Society's opulent head- 
quarters, a receptionist was incredulous: "Are you kidding? Who could 
be mad at us?" 

Phil Baum, associate executive director of the AJC, met with 
Grosvenor and declared that the picketing became necessary due to the 
refusal of National Geographic to acknowledge its "errors" in print. 
This was the first instance of picketing against the National Geographic 
Society since its establishment in 1888 to "increase and diffuse geo- 
graphic knowledge." As the picketers prepared to depart after 
marching in near 100 degree heat, one told a New York Times reporter, 
"The magazine doesn't print letters to the editor. This is our letter to 
the editor." 

Grosvenor views the picketing basically as an AJC fund-raising 
event: "A simple matter of dollars out, dollars in. You can hire pickets 
on short notice around this town." Though some of the picketers ar- 
gued vehemently with National Geographic staffers who went out to 
speak with them, many were quite amiable. "We served coffee, dough- 
nuts and bagels to the picketers," Grosvenor recalls. "In fact I think we 
picked up a few new members from the group." 

At the same time, Grosvenor did not ignore the pressure generated 
by Baum and the AJC. The Society decided to print an editorial com- 
menting on the episode — another "first" in the 86 years of the organiza- 



306 They Dare to Speak Out 

tion. Personally signed by Grosvenor, it conceded, u We have received 
evidence from many of our Jewish readers since the article appeared 
which convinces us that we unwittingly failed to reflect the harsh con- 
ditions under which that small [Damascene Jewish] community has 
existed since 1948. . . . Our critics were right. We erred.'* 

Yet the society's "confession" contradicts events in Syria itself. 
The Syrian government banned the controversial article and declared 
author Azzi persona non grata for spreading "Zionist propaganda/ 9 

"A Mimeograph Machine Run Rampant" 

During the same period, CBS-TV experienced a similar con- 
troversy over a "60 Minutes" segment dealing with the situation of 
Jews in Syria. The program, entitled "Israel's Toughest Enemy," was 
broadcast February 16, 1975, and featured correspondent Mike Wal- 
lace. 

As his point of departure Wallace said, "The Syrian Jewish com- 
munity is kept under close surveillance." He noted that Jews cannot 
emigrate, must carry special identification cards and must notify au- 
thorities when they travel inside Syria. 

Despite such restrictions, Wallace concluded, "today life for Sy- 
ria's Jews is better than it was in years past." Wallace backed this claim 
with a number of interviews with Jews who were making their way 
comfortably in Syrian society. The most striking of these was one with 
a Jewish teacher which included the following exchange: 

Wallace: Where do all these stories come from about how badly the Jews are 

treated in Syria? 
Teacher: I think that it's Zionist propaganda. 

CBS was swamped with angry letters, and the American Jewish 
Congress branded the report "excessive, inaccurate and distorted." 
Protests were also sent to the FCC and the National News Council. As 
the complaints continued pouring in, Wallace realized that for the first 
time he had "come up against a conscientious campaign by the so- 
called Jewish lobby — against a mimeograph machine run rampant." 

Wallace observed at the time, 

The world Jewish community tends somehow to associate a fair report about 
Syria's Jews with an attack on Israel because Syria happens to be Israel's 
toughest enemy. But the fact is there is not one Syrian Jew in jail today as a 
political prisoner. 

On 7 June "60 Minutes" again broadcast the segment on Syria, 
along with an account of the criticisms received and additional back- 



Beyond the Banks of the Potomac 307 

ground on the film. The program also included a promise that Wallace 
would "go back and take another look" at the situation of Jews in 
Syria. 

The second program, broadcast March 21, 1976, disappointed 
critics who expected the second report to prove their charges: instead, 
it confirmed the findings of the first. A Syrian Jew who had fled Syria at 
age 13 and lived in New York declared that Syrian Jews "in general 
are much more prosperous now than ever before." 

Critics have since turned to attacking Wallace personally. In fact, 
AIPAC still bears a grudge nearly ten years after the original program. 
The February 1984 issue of Near East Report, the AIPAC newsletter, 
carried an anti- Wallace commentary by editor M. J. Rosenberg. He 
was disturbed by Wallace's observation in the January 8, 1984, edition 
of "Sixty Minutes" that "nothing affronts Syrian dignity and pride more 
than the fact that Israel has Syrian land, the Golan Heights, and Syria 
wants it back." Rosenberg responded that Wallace "mouths Syrian 
propaganda as if he were a member of the Ba'ath party's young lead- 
ership group." Recalling the controversy of 1976-1977, he wrote that 
"Wallace didn't learn much from that episode. After all, Mike Wallace 
is Jewish. Does he feel that he has to bend over backward to prove that 
he is no secret Zionist?" 



"A Double Standard Toward Terror and Murder" 

CBS radio became a storm center about the same time as the 
Wallace controversy. On its "First Line Report" White House corre- 
spondent Robert Pierpoint used this forum in March 1973 to make a 
controversial statement on events in the Middle East. Focusing on two 
recent incidents — a commando-style raid against Palestinian refugee 
camps 130 miles inside Lebanon and the downing of a Libyan commer- 
cial airliner which strayed over then Israeli-occupied territory in the 
Sinai Desert — Pierpoint commented on the differing American re- 
sponse to acts of violence committed by Israelis and by Arabs. 

He observed that after the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 
Olympics Games in Munich, "the United States, from President Nixon 
on down, expressed outrage." Yet these two more recent acts by Israel 
had caused the death of more than a hundred innocent civilians, and 
there had been hardly a ripple of American response. Pierpoint's con- 
clusion was blunt: 

What this seems to add up to is a double standard in this country toward terror 
and murder. For so long Americans have become used to thinking of Israelis as 
the good guys and Arabs as the bad guys, that many react emotionally along 
the lines of previous prejudices. The fact is that both sides have committed 



308 They Dare to Speak Out 

unforgiveable acts of terror, both sides have killed innocents, both sides have 
legitimate grievances and illegitimate methods of expressing them. 

Knowing that he had voiced an opinion rarely heard over network 
airways, Pierpoint was not surprised when CBS switchboards in Wash- 
ington and New York were jammed for hours with protest calls after his 
broadcast. 

The reaction grew so heated, in fact, that Pierpoint became con- 
cerned about the attitude of CBS management. Vice-President Sand- 
ford Socolow told him ominously, "Bob, you're in real trouble," and 
Gordon Manning, another CBS executive added, "It doesn't look good 
for you" — even though both men felt that the commentary had been 
professionally done and should be defended. When they walked into 
the Salant's office to discuss the matter, they quickly learned that 
Salant had already decided not to bow to the pressure. "Wasn't that a 
terrific broadcast Pierpoint did!" Salant declared, thus bringing the 
matter to a close within the CBS hierarchy. 

For Pierpoint, however, the controversy lingered. He received 
over 400 letters on his broadcast, some labeling him "a vicious anti- 
Semite" and describing his report as "like Goebbels's propaganda ma- 
chine." He later remarked that his commentary had caused him to be 
perceived as a "public enemy" by some Jewish Americans. 

Soon after the "First Line Report" broadcast, Ted Koppel dis- 
cussed the Pierpoint affair for ABC radio's "World of Commentary." 
Koppel cited the swift reaction of the pro-Israel lobby: 

The Anti-Defamation League responded immediately. Regional offices of the 
ADL sent out letters the next day, enclosing copies of the Pierpoint report, and 
calling on friends of the ADL to send their protests to the local CBS affiliate 
station. 

That kind of carefully orchestrated "spontaneous reaction* disturbs me just as 
much coming from the ADL as it would from a politically partisan group. It is a 
tactic of intimidation. I hope that the Anti-Defamation League wasn't trying to 
get Robert Pierpoint fired, because he's a decent and responsible reporter. But 
I suspect he will think long and hard before he does another commentary that 
might distress the ADL — which is why I did this one. American newsmen 
these days simply can't afford to be intimidated — by anyone. 

Affordable or not, the "tactic of intimidation" made its mark. 
Under pressure, Pierpoint dropped a chapter relating the details of the 
broadcast uproar and its aftermath from his book, White House As- 
signment. In the draft chapter Pierpoint wrote that "a very powerful 
group of Jewish businessmen and representatives of national Jewish 
organizations had demanded to see CBS news president Richard Sal- 



Beyond the Banks of the Potomac 309 

ant" and that "a delegation of Jewish businessmen" called for a retrac- 
tion by CBS affiliate station WTOP in Washington. 

In the excised chapter, Pierpoint candidly explained its impact on 
his work as a newsman: "It was many months before I voluntarily 
discussed the Middle East on the air again." Recalling his decision, 
Pierpoint says Elisabeth Jakab, a book editor for the publisher, G. P. 
Putnam's, predicted that the controversial chapter would divert atten- 
tion from the rest of the book: "She told me Jews are major book 
buyers and might boycott my book." Another Putnam staff member 
had similar advice: "Joel Swerdlow told me he didn't like the chapter, 
but he admitted he was emotional about the subject because he is 
Jewish. He suggested that I change the text or drop it." "Finally," 
concludes Pierpoint, "I gave in." 

Indeed, Pierpoint admits that the intimidating pressure found its 
mark beyond his self-censoring decision on the book chapter: 

Ever since that strong reaction, I have been more aware of the possibility of 
getting into arguments with listeners and viewers, and therefore sometimes 
when I had a choice as to whether to do a broadcast on a topic like that or go in 
another direction I probably went in another direction. You don't like to have 
constant arguments, particularly with people you may like and admire but 
don't agree with. 



"Set Right This Terrible Thing" 

During 1981 Patsy Collins, chairman of the board of King Broad- 
casting in Seattle, was subjected to severe criticism for a series of 
reports on Israel and the West Bank. Just before the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon, she and a technical crew visited sites including Bir Zeit 
University in the West Bank, Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and the 
Israeli Knesset. They put together a series of eight four-minute seg- 
ments, which were broadcast on the evening television news over eight 
consecutive days. The reports sought to portray the life of the Palestin- 
ians under Israeli administration. A closing thirty-minute documentary 
was planned. 

Though public reaction to the reports was mild, the local heads of 
the American Jewish Committee and the ADL visited the station to 
"set right this terrible thing." They demanded and received a private 
screening of the final documentary before it was broadcast. Unable to 
cite any inaccuracies in the piece, they criticized its "tone and flavor." 
Among telephoned complaints was one accusing Collins of being in the 
payofthePLO. 

The Israeli consul general in San Francisco, Mordecai Artzieli, 



3 10 They Dare to Speak Out 

telephoned a stern demand that air time be provided to "refute the lies" 
in the program. The King stations in Portland and Seattle agreed to 
follow the closing summary with a 30-minute discussion between rep- 
resentatives of the Jewish and Arab communities moderated by a mem- 
ber of the broadcast company staff. The planned discussion did not 
materialize, however, as no Jewish group would agree to send a repre- 
sentative to share air time with an Arab American. Collins believes that 
the refusal to take part in the discussion was urged by Consul Artzieli. 

Reflecting on her experiences, Collins concludes: "I don't think 
there's any Israeli or Jewish control of the media at all. It's influence; 
and people can be influenced only if they allow themselves to be in- 
fluenced." 

Criticism of Collins evaporated with the 1982 Israel invasion of 
Lebanon — during which Collins herself cited shortcomings in network 
coverage of the daily progress of the fighting. At the onset of the 
action, NBC was covering the attack on Lebanon not from Lebanon, 
but from Israel. Despite the courage of NBC crews in filming the prog- 
ress and results of the Israeli advance to Beirut, film footage broadcast 
on the "NBC Nightly News" showed only Israel forces on their way to 
Lebanon. Moreover reports frequently described weapons used by 
Arabs as "Soviet-made," while the Israelis were never described as 
using "American-made" F-16s, or "U.S.-built" tanks. 

Her comments paralleled those of Alexander Cockburn, who had 
noted in his Village Voice column how New York Times editors struck 
the word "indiscriminate" from foreign correspondent Thomas Fried- 
man's August 3 report on the Israeli bombing of Beirut. The action 
violated usual Times policy. Friedman sent a lengthy telex expressing 
his outrage: 

I am an extremely cautious reporter. I do not exaggerate. . . . You knew I was 
correct and that the word was backed up by what I had reported. But you did 
not have the courage — guts — to print it in the New York Times. You were afraid 
to tell our readers and those who might complain to you that the Israelis are 
capable of indiscriminately shelling an entire city. . . . 

NBC Charged with Anti-Israel Bias 

Despite the instances of pro-Israeli bias on the part of NBC cited 
by Patsy Collins, Alexander Cockburn, Richard Broderick and others, 
eight affiliates of the network in New York came under pressure in 1983 
from partisans who alleged bias against Israel in "NBC Nightly News" 
coverage of the war in Lebanon. Americans for a Safe Israel (AFSI), a 
New York-based lobbying organization, filed petitions with the Federal 
Communications Commission to prevent the eight affiliates in New 



Beyond the Banks of the Potomac 3 1 1 

York from renewing their broadcast licenses. AFS1 director Peter 
Goldman described the NBC coverage as "deliberate distortion of the 
news," claiming that the network presented the war "in a manner fa- 
vorable to the Arabs." Goldman's campaign against NBC — presented 
in a film entitled "NBC in Lebanon: A Study of Media Misrepresenta- 
tion" — has been backed by the Committee for Accuracy in Middle East 
Reporting in America (CAMERA), a Washington-based group which 
focuses its efforts primarily against anti-Israel bias it finds in the Wash- 
ington Post. 

Lawrence K. Grossman, president of NBC News, called the AFSI 
charges "untrue and unfounded: The AFSI film distorted NBC News* 
coverage and selectively ignored important aspects of NBC's reports." 
He notes that the Columbia Journalism Review has praised the "overall 
balance" of NBC coverage, and Washington Journalism Review has 
criticized the AFSI film for "manipulation" of NBC's coverage of the 
war in Lebanon. Early in 1984 the FCC rejected similar AFSI petitions 
against seven NBC affiliate stations in New England, although the 
group did not relax its pressure. The petitions were revised and resub- 
mitted. 

Such attempts to stifle media coverage deemed uncomplimentary 
to Israel are augmented with a $2 million media campaign by Israel 
designed to "remind Americans that Israelis are 'nice, warm' people 
and not 'bloodthirsty militarists.' " 

William Branigin of the Washington Post covered the same event, 
but his editors did not delete "indiscriminate" from his front-page re- 
port. During the same period, however, Post editors experienced an 
intimidating presence in their newsrooms. 

Lobbyist in the News Room 

Fairness in reporting Middle East events has been a special con- 
cern of the Washington Post over the last several years. Complaints 
from pro-Israel groups about its coverage of Lebanon — especially the 
massacres at Sabra and Shatila — led to the unprecedented placement 
of a representative from a pro-Israel group as an observer in the Post 
newsroom. 

The idea arose when Michael Berenbaum, executive director of 
the Jewish Community Council of Greater Washington, council presi- 
dent Nathan Lewin, and Hyman Bookbinder, area representative of 
the American Jewish Committee, met with Post editors to inform them 
that the paper had "a Jewish problem." The meeting followed substan- 
tial correspondence between the Washington Post and Jewish commu- 
nity leaders. As an accommodation, executive editor Benjamin C. 



312 They Dare to Speak Out 

Bradlee agreed to have Berenbaum observe Post news operations for 
one week, provided he not lobby or "interfere with the editorial proc- 
ess in any way." 

Many members of the Post staff were unhappy at working under 
the surveillance of an outsider. News editor Karen De Young declared 
the idea u not the best in the world. . . . There's no question that 
someone following you around all day is an inconvenience." 

Columnist Nick Thimmesch found the experience "very intimidat- 
ing." He recalls a comment of one staffer which expressed the view of 
many: "Next thing you know, someone else will be in here." 

Post ombudsman Robert J. McCloskey termed the week a "worth- 
while experiment": "Irregular, yes, but so is the shelling newspapers 
are taking." Criticism from the Jewish community diminished some- 
what as a result, but editors of other major newspapers were critical of 
the whole episode. Boston Globe editor Thomas Winship commented, 
"I understand the pressures the Post has been under from the Jewish 
Community Council, and I have sympathy for what the Post did, but I 
would hope personally that I would not do it." Robert Gibson, foreign 
news editor of the Los Angeles Times, questioned the fairness of the 
Post's decision: "I honestly don't know how one could do it for Jews 
and refuse to do it for Arabs." 

When Moshe Arens arrived in Washington as Israeli ambassador 
to the United States in February 1982, he initiated monitoring and 
evaluation of the coverage given to Israel in American newspapers. His 
scoring system showed that the Washington Post had distinguished 
itself as "by far the most negative" in reporting on Israel and the 
Middle East in 1982 — the year of Israel's invasion of Lebanon. Arens 
noted with dismay that the massacre of hundreds of civilians in the 
Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in the fall of 1982 produced "a tremen- 
dous drop in the index, to the lowest point" since the beginning of the 
weekly survey. 

Armed with a battery of graphs and charts, Arens presented his 
findings to Meg Greenfield, editor of the Post editorial pages. 
Greenfield, who ranks among the most respected voices in U.S. jour- 
nalism, disputed the very premise of the ratings. She protested that the 
Post had fulfilled its "obligation of fairness" by having "as many of the 
important Arab and Israeli players as we could speak for themselves on 
our op-ed page." During the controversial Israeli invasion, commen- 
taries by Israeli Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Abba Eban, Henry 
Kissinger, Alfred Friendly, Shimon Peres, and Arens himself had been 
printed. Two long editorials from respected Israeli newspapers had also 
appeared in the Post. 

The Boston Globe was the only other paper contacted by Arens 



Beyond the Banks of the Potomac 313 

because of the low rating he gave its stories about Israel and the Middle 
East. Editor Winship recalls that Arens "started right off going after 
the American press on what he felt was very much a bias against 
Israel." He described the Globe as "one of the newspapers with the 
most negative attitide," and he made this view known to the local 
Jewish community. 

Like Greenfield, Winship rejects the idea of the Israeli ratings 
system: "My feeling is that having such a list smacks of the Nixon 
enemies list and strikes me as pretty close to harassment of the media." 
Globe staff writer Ben Bradlee, Jr. describes the Arens study and his 
meetings with newspaper executives as "an unusually bold demonstra- 
tion of Jerusalem's effort to put the American press on the defensive 
and make itself heard among opinion-shapers." 

Pressure to "Stop the Ads" 

Direct pressure to reject paid advertising unsympathetic to Israeli 
interests was applied beginning in late 1982 against major media in 
Maryland, Pennsylvania and the District of Columbia. The National 
Association of Arab Americans (NAAA), a Washington-based private 
membership organization, purchased radio air time in these areas for 
commercials questioning the U.S. government's decision to increase 
aid to Israel. 

Typical of the messages was this one aired in Pennsylvania: 

While there are more than 12 million Americans unemployed, with over half a 
million from Pennsylvania alone, Congress decided to give Israel two billion, 
485 million of your tax dollars. Senator Arlen Specter [D-PA] is on the Senate 
Appropriations Committee that wanted to give Israel even more. Is funding for 
Israel more important than funding for Pennsylvania? Call your senators and 
ask them if they voted to give your tax dollars to Israel." 

Thirteen Pennsylvania stations contracted to carry the NAAA 
message, but four of these cancelled the ads after only three days of an 
agreed-upon five-day run. Mike Kirtner, an ad salesman representing 
two stations in Allentown, informed the NAAA that its ads were being 
taken off the air because "they were getting a lot of calls, hate calls, 
and a lot of pressure was coming down on the station to stop the ads." 
Station management refused to comment on who was pressuring the 
station to take the ads off the air. 

Mike George, salesman for an Erie station which canceled the ads, 
was more frank. He informed the NAAA that the station owner had 
been called by "a group of Jewish businessmen who told him that if he 
did not cancel the ads immediately, they were going to cause his radio 
and television stations to lose hundreds of thousands of dollars." 



314 They Dare to Speak Out 

In Maryland the NAAA sponsored similar messages citing the 
prominence of Congressman Clarence "Doc" Long (D-Md) in support- 
ing aid to Israel (see chapter one). Although the ads were aired on four 
stations in Washington and four in the Baltimore area, a number of 
stations rejected them as "anti-Semitic." 

Later, in California the NAAA found stations in San Francisco, 
San Mateo, Berkeley and Santa Clara unwilling to carry the NAAA's 
paid message, despite editorial statements in some local newspapers 
supporting the NAAA's right to free speech. The stations offered no 
reason for their refusal. 

Ron Cathell, communications director for the NAAA, is not sur- 
prised: 

This has happened to us before. People have been threatened with financial 
losses to prevent them from having a talk show with us or running our ads. 
[But] it hasn't happened to this degree before. This week was really pretty 
stunning. 

Cathell adds; 

The only way to get [the Middle East conflict] resolved is to talk about it. And 
if we can't talk about it here in the United States, how do we expect them to 
talk about it in the Middle East? 



Chapter 12 



Repairing the Damage 



In gathering material for this book I sought answers to troubling ques- 
tions: Was my congressional experience at the hands of the Israeli 
lobby "just politics" or part of a broader attempt to silence criticism of 
Israeli policy? Do other Congressmen and officials of government en- 
counter similar pressures? What about people in other occupations — 
on the campus, in business, the pulpit, the news rooms, in everyday 
life? The answers I found are not reassuring. They can be summed up 
in a single sentence: A dangerous erosion of free speech is occurring in 
the United States. 

It is clear that many Americans do not feel they can speak freely 
on one of most complicated and challenging current issues: the Arab- 
Israeli dispute. The relatively few people who have ventured into this 
arena have found their cherished vision of the free and open society an 
illusion. Unlike other controversies, those on one side of the argument 
leave no room for honest disagreement. The only side that can be 
advocated with impunity is the Israeli side. 

Those who criticize Israeli policy in any sustained way invite pain- 
ful and relentless retaliation, and even loss of their livelihood, by pres- 
sure by one or more parts of Israel's lobby. Presidents fear it. Congress 
does its bidding. Prestigious universities shun academic programs and 
grants which it opposes. Giants of the media and military leaders 
buckle under its pressure. Instead of having their arguments and opin- 
ions judged on merit, critics of Israel suddenly And their motivations, 
their integrity, and basic moral values called into question. No matter 
how moderate their criticism, they may be characterized as pawns of 
the oil lobby, apologists for Arab terrorists, or even anti-Semitic. 

The charge of anti-Semitism is a worrisome one, particularly be- 
cause its use is becoming more widespread. Listen to Ben Meed, presi- 
dent of the American Gathering of Jewish Holocaust Survivors: "Years 

315 



316 They Dare to Speak Out 

ago they used to call it anti-Semitism. Today they call it anti-Zionism, 
but actually it's the same thing." In other words, by his definition, if 
you are against Israel, you are against all Jews. 

In its latest usage, the term anti-Semitism stands stripped of any 
reference to ethnic or religious descent, signifying nothing more than a 
refusal to endorse all policy decisions of the government of Israel. As 
such, it no longer refers to a despicable social phenomenon — classic 
anti-Semitism — but is a charge employed by pro-Israel partisans as a 
weapon. Although no longer used to describe only the ethnic and reli- 
gious bigotry which originally gave the word meaning, Israel's most 
spirited supporters have found that the mere accusation of anti- 
Semitism is enough to silence most critics. It has been a powerful 
factor in stifling debate of the Arab-Israeli dispute, causing many peo- 
ple in the United States, religious and secular, to censor their own 
speech, not on the basis of truth but rather on how their remarks will be 
construed by Israel's lobby, a particular group with a strong vested 
interest in silencing critics. 

The lobby has already attained strength far beyond the level its 
numbers would suggest. Those active in its ranks constitute a tiny part 
of the population of the United States, but their demographic concen- 
tration in states critical to deciding national elections, combined with 
their unique ability to mobilize campaign resources and public opinion, 
gives them influence in the political process far out of proportion to 
their numbers. Even more significant is the remarkable commitment 
and devotion which lobby partisans bring to their cause. They give 
generously of their time, money and energy. Many are leaders in gov- 
ernment, public information, education and politics. Their activities 
are supported by the government of Israel, openly through its embassy 
in Washington and consulates in our major cities and clandestinely 
through the extensive operations that Mossad, Israel's foreign intelli- 
gence service, undertakes throughout the United States. 

The lobby's success in stifling dissent is shocking, particularly in 
Congress. Polls show that a plurality of American Jews — and of the 
American people as a whole — oppose certain Israeli policies. Normally 
this division would be reflected in the statements and voting records of 
their legislators. But on this issue, the views of these pluralities are not 
represented. In fact, the gulf between the expressions in Congress on 
the Arab-Israeli dispute and the views held by private citizens is prob- 
ably greater than on any other topic. 

The lobby has made free speech a casualty by skillful use of our 
free institutions. In most cases, it stays carefully within the letter of the 
law, but it abuses the spirit of fairness and tolerance that is so vital to 
public debate, effectively denying those who oppose its policies the 



Repairing the Damage 3 17 

constitutional right to free speech. It's one thing to know before you 
speak out that people will disagree with you. It's quite another to know 
they will seek to discredit you and destroy your reputation. To say the 
least, the threat of this kind of retaliation curbs the open exchange of 
ideas that is essential to the development of sound policy in a democ- 
racy. 

The result is that most people come to consider Middle East issues 
"too hot to handle" and keep their views to themselves. They see what 
happens to their bolder colleagues and hesitate to voice their opinions. 
They censor themselves out of fear that the Israeli lobby will censure 
them if they do not. 

The damage to U.S. institutions is clear. What may not be clear is 
why the lobby came into being and pursues its intimidating activities 
with such zeal. 

Its origin and motivation can be summed up in just one word: fear. 
Many Jews are afraid, and their fear is understandable. Remembering 
Adolf Hitler's terrible program, which exterminated six million Jews, 
they see Israel as a place of refuge, perhaps the only one, if such horror 
should someday return. A resident of Potomac, Maryland, Perry J. 
Saidman, expressed this fear in a letter to the editor of the Washington 
Post: 

Nearly all Jews believe that the survival of Israel is synonymous with the 
survival of Judaism. This is easy to understand in view of the Holocaust, since 
Jews in the diaspora now know that the only country that will not refuse them 
during the next Holocaust will be the Jewish state of Israel. 

To Saidman, and to many other Jews, another holocaust is entirely 
possible, especially if criticism of Israel goes unpunished. To such 
people, the Holocaust is not only a historical event but a personal 
ordeal in which relatives or family friends were ruthlessly destroyed. 

Fear of future ordeals is deep-seated. During his earliest shuttle 
diplomacy mission to the Middle East, Secretary of State Henry Kis- 
singer, musing privately over the possibility that unwise policy by Is- 
rael might someday provoke a wave of anti-Semitism in the United 
States, said to a colleague, "I worry about my son when he grows up — 
a Jew in America." A Jewish woman who voted for Jesse Jackson in 
the 1984 Michigan primary election was warned by her outraged 
brother, "You will die someday in a gas chamber." 

Jewish ties to Israel are powerful and intimate for other reasons, 
too. Beyond being a place of ultimate refuge, Israel is the physical 
repository of Judaism, the fulfillment of age-old Jewish dreams and the 
symbol of Jewish resilience and achievement. Equally important, it is 
linked by family ties to American Jews, most of whom have relatives 



318 They Dare to Speak Out 

and other acquaintances there and feel keenly the sorrow of Israeli 
families who have suffered death or injury in conflicts with Arabs. 

These ties are deepened and made urgent by Israel's own sense of 
insecurity. Despite its unmatched war machine and expanding military 
capability, Israel remains at war with all its neighbors except Egypt. 
The nation is widely seen by its citizens and other Jews as struggling 
for survival in a vast and growing sea of hostile Arabs. It is a tiny 
country, only about nine miles wide at one point. This bleak prospect 
keeps military forces on a constant state of alert, produces in many 
Israelis a siege mentality and causes them to accept restrictions on civil 
liberties that they would consider anathema in other circumstances. 
The press, both Israeli and Arab, is censored, and Arab populations, 
especially in the occupied areas of the West Bank and Gaza, have their 
liberties restricted and are often brutalized. 

This siege outlook pervades not just Israel but much of the U.S. 
Jewish community. Because Israel remains at war, many U.S. Jews feel 
they too are at war. Worried about Israel's survival in a generally 
inhospitable world, they accept tactics which stifle dissent in their own 
communities and throughout America as necessary measures which, in 
their view, enhance the likelihood that the United States will continue 
to serve as Israel's lifeline. 

And, indeed, the United States is Israel's lifeline. Most observers 
feel that Israel could not have won the 1967 war without U.S.-supplied 
weapons. In the 1973 war, Israel's survival was in question until the 
United States undertook two extraordinary measures: ordering its own 
forces to a high state of alert worldwide in order to forestall a larger 
Soviet role in the war, and ferrying vast armor and supplies to Israel in 
an intercontinental airlift. The rescue operation demonstrated Israel's 
loneliness. Faced with the necessity of refueling its air transport fleet 
during the long journey to Israel, the United States found Portugal the 
only nation among our allies in western Europe willing to permit the 
use of its bases for this purpose. If another war with Arab states should 
occur — and many Jews feel it is only a matter of time — most Jews are 
convinced that Israel's prospects will be bleak without unqualified 
United States help. 

For many concerned Jews, establishing the conditions which as- 
sure continued U.S. backing is a task which merits the highest prior- 
ity — and one that justifies extraordinary measures. Consciously or not, 
leaders of the pro-Israel lobby accept the impairment of free speech in 
the United States as a price that must be paid to assure Israel's sur- 
vival. 

Whenever anti-Israel or pro-Arab expressions appear, the lobby's 
response is usually prompt and overwhelming. The aim is to protect 



Repairing the Damage 3 19 

Israel from all criticism, but the tactics go beyond legitimate response 
to argument. They are varied and sometimes ugly: smear and in- 
nuendo, complaints to superiors at the workplace, mention in pub- 
lished "enemies lists/' ostracism, hate mail, anonymous phone calls, 
threats to one's personal safety, and, in a few cases, physical attack. 
This is a process which most Americans know only second hand. We 
recognize it and never cease to condemn it in the Soviet Union and in 
other totalitarian societies; yet it recalls an ugly chapter from our own 
past as well. 

Thirty years ago we knew it in a more virulent form as McCarthy- 
ism. After a shameful delay, we finally found the will to expose it, 
denounce it and put a stop to it. Now, as then, the people most ridden 
by fear are the ones most intolerant of dissent. In their zeal to silence 
critics they employ extreme measures. 

Few are aware that these measures — and the fear that made them 
so effective — have found their way back into our political process. In 
new hands now, in response to a different issue, the tools of intimida- 
tion are wielded less visibly, less crudely, but no less effectively. And 
those who wield them are driven by a similar conviction of moral 
righteousness. The process is less visible because, unlike Senator 
Joseph McCarthy of yesterday, today's would-be enforcers of political 
conformity often shun the limelight. Despite its success, the pro-Israel 
lobby is little known. It prefers to avoid public attention and scrutiny, 
working behind the scenes, motivating other individuals or institutions 
to take the lead. 

The lobby works diligently in the wings and the corridors to pro- 
vide Israel with uncritical support. Whatever Israel undertakes is 
characterized as helpful to the United States, an attitude that makes 
criticism of Israel "un-American" and therefore unthinkable. Its parti- 
sans have defined the terms for discussing Middle East issues so rigidly 
that debate itself is excluded. "If you are not for us," its members say, 
"you are against us." There is no middle ground. Issues are painted in 
black and white. The gray area where truth is often found is considered 
too dangerous. 

Driven by deep-rooted fears, activists for Israel create fear in 
others. In conducting interviews for this book, time and again I found 
professors, politicians, business leaders and others anxious lest their 
identity as a source of information become known. One said, "If my 
name gets into this, my career will be ended." When a university 
administrator supplied me a document issued by the American Jewish 
Committee, he warned, "You must never tell anyone — not anyone — 
where you got this." Others said, "I applaud what you are doing and 
would like to help, but I am afraid." A Texas professor, after suggesting 



320 They Dare to Speak Out 

a source of information in Arizona, pleaded, "Please forget you made 
this call." A businessman said: "I am taking a big chance in telling you 
this. I hope I can trust you to keep this confidential," A scholar who 
supplied details of his own encounters with lobby pressure, called in 
anguish, "I can't let you publish that information after all. I fear for my 
very life." A well-known retired diplomat, now providing consulting 
services part-time in Washington, encouraged me to write this book, 
but withdrew his offer to write a public endorsement when he learned 
this would upset his major client. "I'm embarrassed to admit it," he 
said ruefully, "because my decision is an example of the intimidation 
which is the central theme of your book." 

I was struck by the fact that many of the people who dare to speak 
out have personal income that is not jeopardized by their forth- 
rightness. Most academicians who speak out are protected in their 
careers by tenure. So, too, J. William Fulbright, Adlai E. Stevenson 
III, George W. Ball, Dean Francis B. Sayre, Philip M. Klutznick, Rabbi 
Elmer Berger, Alfred M. Lilienthal, Jr., speak from a base of financial 
security. 

Public awareness of this critical erosion of free speech is espe- 
cially important at this time when the Middle East looms as a possible 
arena of superpower confrontation. Today, more than ever before, the 
American people — Jews and non-Jews alike — must examine the lob- 
by's methods openly, hold it accountable for its actions and insist on 
the right of all to be heard. 

In the months ahead life-and-death decisions must be made con- 
cerning the role of the United States in the Arab-Israeli dispute, and 
these should emerge from an atmosphere of civility in which arguments 
are heard and judged on their merits, without labelling or emotional- 
ism. The dispute is a ticking bomb that grows steadily more dangerous. 
Renewed fighting in the Middle East would carry the risk of increasing 
U.S. military involvement, as well as escalating political and economic 
costs. Recent conflict in the Middle East has claimed the lives of 264 
Marines, and even after our military withdrawal from Lebanon more 
than 1 ,000 U.S. troops remain stationed near the border between Egypt 
and Israel as a peacekeeping force. Israel and Syria, as well as several 
other neighboring states, are engaged in an accelerating buildup of 
highly destructive new weapons, and no reconciliation of their mutual 
hostility is in sight. 

If our citizens, whether in private life or public office, are able to 
hear only one side of the issue, they are seriously handicapped as they 
attempt to define intelligently their interests and set wisely the policies 
to be followed. From a fettered and unbalanced dialogue truly awful 
decisions may emerge. 



Repairing the Damage 32 1 

In a democracy, the position taken by a large citizens* group — like 
those making up the Israeli lobby — must, of course, be taken into 
account. The United States, in addition to its moral interest in the 
survival of Israel, has a legitimate reason and an obligation to act in 
accordance with the wishes of its citizens, so long as the preferences of 
a particular special interest group do not violate the interests of the 
majority. But this does not require blind conformity. Surely one can 
criticize Israeli policies without being anti-Israel, just as one can 
criticize American policies without being anti-American. 

Getting free speech off the casualty list requires realism, attention 
and commitment on the part of us all. As a starter, we must disenthrall 
ourselves from the false notion that the Israeli lobby is "bigger than 
life." Its members are neither superhuman nor especially blessed with 
the truth. The lobby consists of a relatively small group of people, not 
more than 200,000 at the most, and the core activists who keep things 
rolling are but a fraction of that total. Although its leaders are highly 
professional and highly committed, these same qualities can be found 
in other citizens. The lobby raises a lot of money and marshals broad 
support, but it cannot prevail over an informed and determined major- 
ity of our citizens. 

Knowledge is power— as the lobby well knows — and the best way 
to demolish its facade of invincibility is to understand its tactics. It is 
often able to create a false impression of numbers. For example, sev- 
eral years ago one hundred identically worded telegrams were sent to 
Senator Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois, protesting against legislation he 
was proposing. The telegrams bore serial numbers in sequence, indi- 
cating that they were ordered by a single individual even though each 
carried a different name. During the same period, Senator Abraham 
Ribicoff of Connecticut received twenty-eight telegrams. All carried 
identical wording and were charged to the same telephone number in 
Hartford, but each bore a different name as the sender. 

Even two or three telephone calls can create the image of substan- 
tial constituent protest, even though the few actually placing the calls 
may be the sum total of protesters. Only a few telephone calls per- 
suaded fourteen freshmen Congressmen in 1983 to take the exceptional 
step of changing their votes on legislation providing aid to Israel. These 
calls would have had far less impact if counterbalanced by even one 
call expressing the opposite view to each wavering Congressman. 
When Congressmen hear only one side of an issue by mail, telegram, 
telephone call, personal visit — or in public debate — they naturally as- 
sume there actually is only one side worth considering. 

My own defeat in 1982 is often cited as an example of the lobby's 
power. It need not be so viewed. My margin of defeat was so narrow, 



322 They Dare to Speak Out 

less than one percent of the total votes cast, that it could be blamed 
entirely on any one of several other political and economic de- 
velopments: redistricting, which added large new Democratic areas to 
my district; the recession, which caused record unemployment in De- 
catur, my largest new city; or a general downturn in economic condi- 
tions, which caused unrest throughout the district, especially among 
farmers. 

Yet for understandable reasons, the Israeli lobby claimed responsi- 
bility for my defeat. In fact, the lobby's principal role was in simply 
supplying my opponent with extraordinary amounts of money. Under 
the circumstances my vote total could be cited as a moral victory. 
Despite the many varied challenges, I nearly won. Money from Jewish 
sources poured in against me, but my supporters matched these contri- 
butions. 

I was subjected to this nationwide attack because I was the only 
critic of Israeli policy on the Congressional scene. In the future if just a 
few brave souls speak out on Capitol Hill at the same time, the lobby 
will face multiple problems and cannot therefore focus exclusively on 
the defeat of just one of its critics. 

Until now, the lobby has been effective mainly because it has had 
the field of Middle East policy largely to itself. It has no serious compe- 
tition in the corridors and chambers of government. Other highly pro- 
fessional, committed people are needed to counter its arguments, 
challenge its theories and match its enthusiasm in the public arena. 

The lobby's influence rests mainly on mythology which a reason- 
ably broad educational program can readily destroy. 

For example, the lobby has successfully promoted the myth that 
an oil lobby, sometimes called an Arab oil lobby, operates in the United 
States, menacing our institutions of higher education. Jerome Bankst, 
research director for the Anti-Defamation League in New York, warns: 
"Our main concern is the possibility that academic freedom will be 
compromised. We're concerned that there could be Arab influence on 
the objectivity of teaching at these universities and discrimination 
against Jewish faculty." Bankst uses the word "Arab" as a negative 
stereotype, a form of bigotry that would evoke cries of outrage if one 
were to substitute the words "Jewish" or "Israeli" for the word "Arab." 

While Arab governments and oil companies have contributed to 
educational projects, this money has not been used as a device to harm 
scholarly objectivity. Research for this book disclosed no instance in 
which oil interests attempted to impair academic freedom or influence 
selection of faculty. Considering the enormous damage done to 
academic freedom in recent years by Jewish activists, as chronicled in 



Repairing the Damage 323 

earlier chapters of this book, Bankst's warning might more suitably be 
directed against his colleagues in the Israeli lobby. 

Nor does the "oil lobby" attempt to control U.S. policy toward the 
Middle East. The late Evan Wilson, a specialist in the Middle East, 
concluded that the oil companies exert little or no pressure on U.S. 
policymakers. Professor Seth Tillman of Georgetown University cor- 
roborates Wilson's assertion: 

Supporters of Israel sometimes cite the major oil companies as participants in 
the "Arab lobby/ but the allegation does not stand up under close scrutiny. 
Outside the realm of energy costs, uses, and taxation, the oil companies have 
in fact been chary of taking public positions on Middle East issues, much less 
of pressing these on Congress. 

The lobby also benefits from other public misconceptions. 

• There is the unfounded reputation that the lobby can deliver a 
powerful Jewish constituency on election day. Few Congressional dis- 
tricts have a constituency that is more than one percent Jewish. In only 
twelve states do Jews make up as much as three percent of the popula- 
tion. Even making adjustment for the fact that a higher percentage of 
Jews vote on election day than non-Jews, they can be crucial only in 
extremely close races. 

• Few people are aware of the magnitude of aid to Israel. They do 
not know that one-fourth of all U.S. aid worldwide goes to that one 
country — the equivalent of $750 a year for each Israeli man, woman 
and child. This unawareness has added importance in light of the gen- 
eral disfavor of the U.S. public toward foreign aid. 

• Most citizens have little knowledge about U.S. policy in the 
Middle East. If constituents held House and Senate members closely 
accountable for their positions on aid to Israel, for example, substantial 
changes in either membership or positions might soon occur. In the 
spring of 1984, 379 Congressmen voted for a $250 million gift to help 
Israel enlarge its own fighter aircraft industry. Only 40 Congressmen 
voted no. Given the importance of the U.S. aircraft industry to the U.S. 
economy, not to mention the heavy deficit in the U.S. federal budget, 
the vote to provide a substantial direct subsidy to foreign competition 
was extraordinary. Constituents could reasonably demand that the 379 
explain why they supported this unprecedented subsidy. 

• The Israeli lobby has the Middle East policy field largely to 
itself. To help correct this extreme imbalance, Americans of Arab an- 
cestry need to discover the ingredients of successful political action. 
Democratic Congressman Merwyn L. Dymally of California observes 
that most ethnic Americans do not engage in lobbying activity because 



324 They Dare to Speak Out 

they do not understand its importance. Nor do they, he adds, have a 
"sense of political philanthropy." American Jews give generously of 
both money and energy to political candidates while Arab Americans 
rarely give either. Although the Arab American population at two mil- 
lion is one one-third the size of the Jewish population, this base is 
sufficient to provide enough people, financial resources and commit- 
ment to offset substantially the activities of the Israeli lobby. 

In assessing the strength of the Israeli lobby, it is important to 
remember that a majority of American Jews disagree on important 
points with the policies of the Israeli government and the work of its 
lobby. A few thousand highly motivated citizens willing to work to- 
gether and acquire the sense of political philanthropy Dymally men- 
tions could profoundly influence public discourse. 

The activities of the American- Arab Anti-Discrimination Commit- 
tee and the National Association of Arab Americans are signs of prog- 
ress, but neither group has established a program rivaling the 
grassroots activism that gives the Israeli lobby influence even where 
Jewish numbers are small. A dramatic illustration of this weakness 
occurred in June 1984 when the forty House members who voted for 
the amendment cutting U.S. aid to Israel's fighter aircraft industry 
were smothered with protests from pro-Israel activists but received 
almost no calls or letters supporting their action. In the wake of that 
experience, the forty Congressmen are unlikely to support similar 
amendments in the future. 

People of Arab ancestry often shy away from asserting their inter- 
ests. One day on the floor of the House of Representatives I asked 
James Abdnor, a Republican from South Dakota who is of Lebanese 
ancestry and now serves in the Senate, to join me and several other 
Congressmen in signing a letter protesting Israel's use of U.S.-supplied 
weapons in Lebanon. Abdnor paused and said, "Oh, I'd better not — 
because of my nationality." I did not sense that he was trying to hide 
his ancestry; rather, he just did not want his colleagues to think he was 
parading it. In contrast, Jewish members of Congress rarely fail to take 
a stand for Israel. 

The U.S. Jewish community, acting alone, could retrieve free 
speech from the casualty list, and this action would be consistent with 
the great Jewish tradition of supporting civil liberties and opposing 
intimidation and oppression. Indeed, some of the most thoughtful and 
outspoken critics of Israel are Jews. But they speak out as individuals. 
They are not seen as Jewish leaders. 

More voices of individual conscience would be welcome, but the 
greatest need is for forthright statements by leaders of Jewish organiza- 
tions. Philip M. Klutznick set a courageous example in 1958 when, as 



Repairing the Damage 325 

chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organiza- 
tions and president of B'nai B'rith, he supported the Middle East Reso- 
lution recommended by President Dwight Eisenhower, despite strong 
opposition by Israel's prime minister. In 1982 the leadership of B'nai 
B'rith, after responding warmly to President Reagan's September 
Peace Plan, fell silent once Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin 
announced his opposition. 

Nowhere is free speech more restricted in America than within the 
organized Jewish community. Jewish leaders are afraid to speak out 
against Israeli policy or even defend the right of others to do so. They 
look the other way when lobby activists stain the reputation of Israel's 
critics through misuse of the term "anti-Semitism." 

Few Jews expressed concern over the 1983 decisions by AIPAC 
and the Anti-Defamation League to publish "enemies lists" or spoke up 
in 1982 against the flood of smear and innuendo against Adlai E. 
Stevenson III when he campaigned for governor of Illinois. A few 
leading Jews haltingly voiced concern for a while over the brutal 1982 
Israeli attack against Beirut, but under lobby pressure most of them 
changed positions, either defending the war or saying nothing. Ameri- 
can Jews flocked to dinners in 1983 featuring former Israeli Defense 
Minister Ariel Sharon, despite his own responsibility for the circum- 
stances a few months earlier that led to the massacre of Palestinians at 
the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. Few Jews speak up for academic 
freedom at Palestinian universities on the occupied West Bank, where 
Israeli troops routinely arrest students and order the schools closed on 
the slightest pretext. 

In part, Jewish silence results from ignorance. Unfortunately, Is- 
rael and its lobby attempt to shield U.S. Jewish leaders from harsh 
reality when they visit Israel. These leaders usually see only selected 
places and people, have no opportunity for candid conversations with 
Arabs in the occupied territories, and return to the United States un- 
aware of the brutality of the Israeli occupation. 

The manipulation of Jewish leaders continues in the United States, 
where they receive a constant stream of messages and visits from 
Israeli officials and other lobbying agents. These U.S. leaders would 
render a great service to their fellow Jews, as well as to their country, 
by insisting on setting their own agenda when they visit the Middle 
East — having private discussions with Arab leaders inside and outside 
Israel, and interviewing Palestinians to learn what life is like in the 
West Bank. This would help to sweep away stereotypes and prejudices 
that infect both sides. 

But ignorance cannot excuse Jewish silence on lobby excesses 
that occur in this country. During the University of Arizona's three- 



326 They Dare to Speak Out 

year ordeal at the hands of Carol Karsch and the TUcson Jewish Com- 
munity Council, Jews were silent. With the exception of Professor 
Jerrold Levy, they said nothing and did nothing when blind loyalty to 
the Israeli cause damaged academic institutions. Several officials of 
national Jewish organizations privately said that Karsch had gone too 
far, but they complained only to each other. If just a few people, local 
or national, had joined Levy in protesting publicly, the excesses might 
have ended. 

The danger in the Karsch "success" reaches beyond TUcson. 
While the tactics she used were designed and carried out locally, they 
may be used elsewhere. One "success" inspires others and, indeed, 
chapter seven demonstrates that this fanaticism — reflecting the mania 
that produced the Salem witch-hunts in early U.S. history — is already 
spreading. 

Most Jewish Americans will be troubled by the examples of fanati- 
cism reported in the pages of this book. But if they react by keeping 
their concerns to themselves, they permit the fanatics to create the 
impression that all American Jews are joined in a plot to alter our 
schools and other institutions of our society in order to shield Israel 
from criticism and stigmatize its Arab neighbors. 

Chapter eleven recounts episodes involving people in various oc- 
cupations widely scattered throughout the country. Many of them have 
one thing in common: they were harassed and stigmatized for their 
ethnic heritage — which happens to be Arab. If Jews suffered the same 
treatment, a national uproar justifiably would ensue, and people of all 
faiths would join in the protest. Yet despite their memory of similar 
mistreatment, Jews, with few exceptions, remain silent — as do most 
other Americans — at discrimination against Arabs. 

Their silence is but a part of the unwillingness of Americans gener- 
ally to discuss troubling issues arising from the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
This larger conspiracy of silence engulfs much of the U.S. Christian 
community as well. Some conservative Christian leaders accept, even 
rejoice in, the violence and shedding of blood to serve Israel's political 
ends. After the Israelis used U.S.-supplied F-16 aircraft to strike 
against the Iraqi nuclear reactor, evangelist Jerry Falwell congratulated 
Israel on "a mission that made us very proud that we manufacture 
those F-16s." Similarly, evangelist Mike Evans proclaimed as "a mira- 
cle" the safe return of all Israeli aircraft from strikes against unfortified 
targets in the commercial heart of Beirut — raids which resulted in 
countless civilian deaths. 

As moral leaders the clergy have a duty to champion the op- 
pressed and denounce racism, but few church leaders have challenged 



Repairing the Damage 327 

the inaccurate and inflammatory misuse of the term "anti-Semitism" or 
the ugly stereotypes applied generally to Palestinians and other Arabs. 
Instead, they duck controversy and thus strengthen the position of 
those who wish no debate at all. Many defer to Israel's historic claims 
out of convenience rather than conviction. 

For centuries the region has held many religious and ethnic 
groups, and the issues which divide them are complex. The application 
of biblical principles will certainly aid in the quest for peace, but as the 
Reverend Jesse Jackson has advised, "We shouldn't try to use the 
Bible as a real estate guide." Solutions are simply not that easy. The 
way to discerning the divine plan for the Middle East certainly involves 
meditation and prayer, but in a free society like ours, we should also be 
able to enjoy the benefit of insights gained and shared through free and 
open debate in an atmosphere of tolerance and recognition of common 
purpose. 

Public officials cannot escape a major responsibility to promote 
free discussion of Middle East policy. Chief among them, of course, is 
the^president of the United States. Zbigniew Brzezinski, national se- 
curity adviser in the Carter administration, observes: 

Success depends very much on the willingness of the President to have a 
confrontation with the lobby. If the issue is drawn in terms of whether the 
President will be supported or not, most presidents will be backed by Con- 
gress. 

House and Senate members have a similar responsibility. My own 
experience notwithstanding, most Congressmen could survive even a 
sustained attack by the Israeli lobby. But, like other politicians, they 
crave public approbation, and, in this regard, they don't respond just to 
the threat of losing an election. They respond first to the threat of 
losing a supporter, for whatever reason. Thus, as long as pro-Israeli 
activists care enough to threaten to withhold approbation while others 
are indifferent, the situation cannot change. To most Congressmen, 
taking a controversial position which might leave them standing 
alone — even in their own party— just does not make sense. 

From this, I must conclude that public officials are unlikely to take 
the initiative to restore healthy discourse. Reform must come from 
citizens at the community level. 

All Americans — not just Jews, Christian clergy, Arab Americans 
and politicians — have a stake in promoting open debate of Middle East 
policy. Our young people will have to assume the military risks of our 
present policy, and all citizens must share in meeting the other costs: 
the budgetary outlays and, more important, the damage to our institu- 



328 They Dare to Speak Out 

tions. AH citizens, therefore, should demand accountability from those 
who seek and serve in federal office, insisting that they take positions 
and then defend them. 

On the 1984 presidential and congressional campaign trails the Arab- 
Israeli dispute was a non-issue. Except for brief statements by presiden- 
tial candidates Jesse Jackson and George McGovern, no candidate for 
any federal office challenged basic U.S. policies in the Middle East— 
at least not loudly enough to receive national attention. Even those con- 
sidered "shoo-ins"— those running unopposed for election— made no 
recommendations for course changes. The 1988 elections were the same. 

More surprising, not even an echo was heard bemoaning the 
unprecedented $3 billion grant that is going to Israel, as well as the $2. 1 
billion to Egypt, at a time when popular U.S. domestic programs are 
being cut. Candidates and public officials are silent on these issues because 
their constituents permit them to be silent. The arena in which reform 
must occur is not Capitol Hill in Washington but Main Street, in suburbia 
and in rural America. 

Fortunately, the open character of the U.S. political system places 
the process of effective challenge within everyone's reach. 

Congressmen and candidates for Congress are accustomed to an- 
swering specific questions on public policy from the League of Women 
Voters, organized labor, business councils and other interest groups. 
Furthermore, most Congressmen and candidates respond to such ques- 
tions during public meetings. If they are pressed during their can- 
didacies or public service, most will eventually take a position on a 
carefully defined issue. They can duck and dodge only so long. 

As the Israeli lobby has proven, a small number of highly com- 
mitted people can have substantial effect on public policy. Partisans of 
Israel press early and often through the American Israel Public Affairs 
Committee, political action committees, other organizations and as 
individuals. They seem never to sleep, guarding Israel's interests 
around the clock. 

Those citizens who favor a more balanced U.S. policy in the Mid- 
dle East based on fundamental ideals of justice and peaceful settlement 
of international disputes, like the pro-Israel activists, may work 
through established organizations and supplement this work with per- 
sonal activity. If they bring a high level of commitment to these en- 
deavors, candidates and officials will respond. The majority of 
Congressmen resent heavy-handed tactics by the Israeli lobby and will 
welcome constituent pressure to modify their habit of voting for what- 
ever Israel wants. 



Repairing the Damage 329 

This process of challenge would help not just the United States, 
but the interests of Israel as well. The usual objection to a more con- 
ciliatory Israeli policy is that Israel possesses no margin for error — that 
any concession to Arabs, particularly Palestinians, will endanger the 
country's existence. Yet national security is not exclusively — or even 
principally — a military proposition. The survival of Israel does not 
entail simply the retention of a specified number of acres of land. In the 
modern era a hill or river no longer provides security from attack. As 
Nahum Goldmann, pioneer in the creation of Israel and first president 
of the World Jewish Congress, observed: 

In a period when warfare is based on supersonic airplanes and missiles, the 
importance of borders, from a security point of view, has not disappeared but 
has greatly decreased. 

Thie security arises more from the values and ethical principles, 
the way of life, which give a country its character. Military policy must 
serve the principles which the country seeks to live by and keep alive, 
and the security of a democracy like Israel — or the United States — is 
preserved more effectively through respect for the ideals of freedom 
and democracy than through demonstration of the force of its arms. 
Thus an atmosphere conducive to free discussion in the United States 
will also improve the scene in Israel, where opponents of government 
policy often declare that uncritical support provided by the United 
States only strengthens the hand of the hard-liners who oppose negoti- 
ations and advocate narrow military solutions to complex social and 
political problems. 

Israel's problems are, however, unique. The layers of mutual dis- 
trust, bitterness and hatred that separate Israel from its neighbors are 
so numerous and deep that the parties cannot be expected to overcome 
these barriers without substantial outside encouragement and help. 
With that in mind, I introduced in several different Congresses a reso- 
lution under which the United States would guarantee Israel's pre- 1967 
borders within the context of a comprehensive settlement which would 
end the state of war, establish normal diplomatic relations among all 
parties, and extend the right of self-determination to the people living 
in territory under Israeli military occupation. I felt that this proposal, if 
adopted by the United States, would provide the necessary incentive 
to bring Israelis and Arabs together and provide the best hope for 
enduring peace in that region. 

But U.S. policy in the Middle East must be tested first and fore- 
most by our own national requirements. In this process, Israel must be 
an important consideration but not the only one. On a number of issues 



330 They Dare to Speak Out 

United States interests are not identical to those of Israel. Considering 
the differences in history, region, culture, and international respon- 
sibilities, this is not surprising. 

Interests and policies differ sharply, for example, on nuclear 
weapons policy. In order to discourage the proliferation of weapons 
and carry out treaty obligations, the United States provides a "nuclear 
umbrella" over many nations. It encourages all nations in the Middle 
East to ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation TVeaty under which sig- 
natories pledge not to acquire nuclear weapons. Israel has refused to 
ratify the treaty and carries forward nuclear research and development 
in secrecy at Dimona, where experts believe it has clandestinely pro- 
duced a number of nuclear warheads. 

During the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Israel attempted to shoot down a 
U.S. reconnaisance aircraft which overflew Dimona, even though the 
U.S. at the same time was ferrying arms to Israel. Admiral Thomas L. 
Moorer, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, reports 
that Israel picked up the aircraft on its radar, identified it correctly as a 
U.S. SR-71 and "ordered its fighter planes to down it." Israel considers 
secrecy that important when it comes to Dimona. Fortunately, Moorer 
adds, "The plane was flying too high for the Israeli fighters to reach/ 9 
and it returned safely. 

While Israel may be convinced that it must take extreme measures 
to shield its nuclear facilities, such a policy is in conflict with our govern- 
ment's long-standing commitment to prevent nuclear proliferation in the 
Middle East. Nuclear weapons policy is but one of the fundamental differ- 
ences which separate the United States and Israel. Other obvious ones 
are the occupation of territory taken by force of arms and relations with 
Israel's Arab neighbors. 

In fashioning our policies toward the Middle East, we must recog- 
nize that we will differ with Israel on important issues while cooperat- 
ing fully on others. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk observes, 
"Israel has demonstrated over and over again that it is not a satellite of 
the United States. It is just as important for everyone to recognize that 
the United States is not a satellite of Israel." 

Our goal must be decency, fair play, and security for all parties in 
the region. In particular, we must demonstrate our concern for the 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza who have lived under Israeli 
military occupation for more than twenty-two years. All through our 
history, we have recognized self-determination as the most fundamental 
aspect of democracy. It is hallowed in our traditions, and on several 
occasions the United States has taken the ultimate step, going to war in 
order to promote, among other objectives, self-determination for the 
people in Western Europe, Korea and Vietnam. It is inconsistent, to 



Repairing the Damage 33 1 

say the least, for the United States to advocate self-determination for 
everyone except Palestinians. While we should not — and need not — 
use military force to demonstrate our concern for the Palestinians, we 
must avoid uncritical support of Israel's military policies which deny 
human rights to these people and degrade the great moral traditions of 
Judaism — lest our own nation's moral values suffer. 

Indeed, the United States can serve Israel best by regaining its 
position as the respected advocate of even-handed policies that are fair 
to all parties. There is already a realization by many Israelis that their 
democracy will best be preserved, not through unquestioning support 
by the United States, but through thoughful analysis and free debate by 
all — Jews as well as non-Jews. U.S. support could go far in furthering 
the goal of a comprehensive Middle East peace, but it cannot be ap- 
plied effectively so long as the lobby, as the voice of the U.S. Jewish 
community, demands that the United States give unquestioning sup- 
port to the sterile military view of national security now current in 
Israel. 

As Washington columnist Richard Cohen warned during the Is- 
raeli war in Lebanon in 1982: 

The age-old dream of an Israel that incorporates the very best of Judaism, the 
dream that propelled kids like me out of the house with a cannister for the 
Jewish National Fund, is turning very slowly into a nightmare. 

For the American Jewish community to defend the indefensible would only 
isolate it from the American community at large and transform a moral force in 
this country into nothing more than a lobby. 

Our concern must reach beyond the damage being done to the 
moral force represented by our Jewish community, even though all 
citizens suffer as this force withers. All Americans must recognize the 
broader threat — the damage being done to our cherished institution of 
free speech as citizens fear to speak out on Middle East policy. 

We could hardly do better than follow the vision — and heed the 
warning — which Israeli writer Amos Oz offers for his own country: 

If there are people who could 'cure 1 us of the curse of pluralism, and open, with 
a strong hand and an outstretched arm, the eyes of whoever does not see the 
light as they do, then there is bound to be an ugly, even a dangerous, struggle. 
[But] if the confrontation is a matter of lobbying, with recognition of the legiti- 
macy of differing positions and a willingness to be persuaded, then there will be 
fertile, creative tension. 

Throughout history, the greatest threat to our society has come 
from within: the tendency of fearful people to trample on the rights of 
their fellow citizens. Abraham Lincoln warned that those who, in the 



332 They Dare to Speak Out 

name of national security, "destroy the spirit that prizes liberty as the 
heritage of all men in all lands everywhere" have effectively "planted 
the seeds of despotism around your doors." Democracy cannot func- 
tion in an atmosphere in which citizens fear to speak out. 

If one powerful group can succeed in inhibiting free expression on 
a particular topic, others inevitably will be tempted to try the same in 
order to advance their favorite causes. If the great institutions of edu- 
cation can be forced to ignore challenges to academic freedom on one 
subject, they will be fair game on other subjects. If a great newspaper 
can be pressured into letting the agent of a lobby look over the shoul- 
ders of editors as they prepare coverage of the war in Lebanon, other 
lobbies have a precedent on which to base similar demands. If a Catho- 
lic nun and an Episcopalian dean can be vilified as anti-Semitic because 
they apply religious principles to the tragedy of the Middle East, and if 
these same principles can be bent to political ends, religious freedom 
everywhere is endangered. If a lobby can force government officials 
into ignominious silence in one vital area of public policy, other parts of 
the body politic could be similarly disabled. 

In short, when a lobby stifles free speech nationally on one contro- 
versial topic — the Middle East — all free speech is threatened. 



Chapter 13 



America's Intifada 



When the first edition of this book appeared in 1985, I had little 
reason to expect that voices at the community level would soon begin 
a healthy discourse concerning U.S. policy in the Middle East. Heard 
only from scattered places in the countryside during 1986, the voices 
have steadily become louder and more numerous, suggesting the begin- 
nings of America's own uprising. 

The populist uprising known as the Palestinian intifada began in the 
Israeli occupied West Bank and Gaza in 1987, and, of course, it reaches 
far beyond America's intifada in violence, intensity, and human mis- 
ery. The one in the occupied territories is broad, deep, and powerful— 
shaking Israeli society to its roots. The one in America, by contrast, is 
only beginning and is perhaps tentative. But, despite their vast differ- 
ence in form, process, and effect, the movements continue in both places, 
reinforcing each other and challenging the status quo with growing 
strength. 

In the territories occupied by Israel, the Palestinian movement 
responds to violations of human rights that are visible, brutal, and often 
lethal. After living for twenty-two years in degrading circumstances under 
the Israeli gun and waiting vainly for outside sympathizers to redress 
their grievances, Palestinians have literally taken matters into their own 
hands— throwing rocks and setting fire to tires in one of history's most 
spontaneous rebellions. They demand reform and often pay with their 
lives. 

In the United States, the threat is to the integrity of institutions, not 
to life itself. The American uprising comes from citizens who, for the 
first time, see the dark side of Israel— radically different from past images. 
They see a foreign state that infiltrates and corrupts the U.S. political 
process, hires spies to steal classified documents, lies repeatedly to our 
highest officials, reneges on solemn promises, and, to an alarming degree, 
undercuts our national security interests to suit its own purposes. Still 
worse, they see an Israel that violates brutally the human rights of the 
Palestinians it holds in captivity. 

333 



334 They Dare to Speak Out 

Their concern is deepened by the spectacle of U.S. inaction amid 
this human tragedy, the failure of our government to respond to the agony 
of Palestinians in the occupied territories, where Israel— using U.S.- 
supplied weapons— meets the uprising with measures that leave hundreds 
dead, thousands maimed and homeless, and thousands more imprisoned 
without due process. They are shocked to find the U.S. government, 
universally recognized as Israel's military and financial patron, kept under 
the Israeli thumb as firmly as the Palestinians themselves. 

These alarmed citizens conclude that Israel, long regarded as our 
most devoted friend and ally, at times betrays our friendship and sub- 
verts its own principles and ideals. They respond by taking in hand pens, 
petitions, and ballots— not rocks— and by igniting fires of public con- 
science. 

As readers of preceding chapters must recognize, Israel, like other 
states, has always had shady corners it tried to hide. From its earliest 
days it spied on the United States, manipulated our political system, made 
illegal use of U.S.-supplied weapons, and often brutalized its Arab 
neighbors. 

But until America's intifada, the searchlight of publicity rarely illu- 
minated these infractions. A vigilant nationwide watch by Israel's friends 
in the United States stifled most critical reports and commentary, while 
carefully-regulated tours of the Holy Land and a torrent of publicity about 
Israel's positive achievements served to perpetuate the faulty vision of 
an unblemished, gallant outpost of human rights and democracy. 

Accustomed to criticism of their own government and society but 
not of the Jewish state, those taking part in this U.S. uprising see for 
the first time an Israel with warts and scars. The elaborate public rela- 
tions mechanism that for years kept only the attractive side of Israel before 
American eyes now finds itself overwhelmed by the sheer volume and 
diversity of Israeli misdeeds. 

"Aid Dollars Into the Pockets of Traitors' 9 

The first nationwide Shockwave that revealed Israel in an untrust- 
worthy posture emanated from a bizarre spy case, one of the most extraor- 
dinary in American history. Jonathan Jay Pollard, Jr., 31, a Navy 
counterintelligence analyst, was arrested in November 1985 for stealing 
classified documents as a paid spy for Israel. 

"We have a moral problem," a former official of Israel's principal 
spy agency, Mossad, said when he learned of the arrest. "You can't 
take the money of the United States, and then use that money to buy 
information about that country." Immoral or not, that is exactly what 
happened. 



America 's Intifada 335 

Before the arrest, the prosecution of Israeli espionage had been taboo 
at the Federal Bureau of Investigation despite long-standing evidence that 
placed other federal employees under suspicion. Like officials at the State 
Department, where a senior diplomat describes as "fantastic" the level 
of spying for Israel, FBI officials habitually chose to look the other way, 
viewing pro-Israel political influence as great enough to make attempted 
prosecution an exercise in futility. 

The FBI "knew of at least a dozen incidents in which American 
officials transferred classified information to the Israelis," according to 
Raymond W. Wannal, Jr., a former assistant director of the FBI. None 
was prosecuted. The files gathered dust. 

John Davitt, a career official and former chief of the Justice Depart- 
ment's internal security section, says: "When the Pollard case broke, 
the general media and public perception was that this was the first time 
this had ever happened. No, that's not true at all." He adds that, during 
his tenure, only the Soviet Union did more spying in the United States 
than Israel. 

Pollard's thievery, however, was so gross and frequent it could not 
be ignored. On several occasions he took large boxes of classified docu- 
ments from the Pentagon, abusing flagrantly his "courier" clearance. 

In the wake of Pollard's arrest, William Safire, a columnist who 
rarely criticizes Israel, warned, "The stark fact is that if the espionage 
charges hold up in court, American aid dollars will have been channeled 
by Israel into die pockets of American traitors. That will blow up, not 
over." 

Supporting this forecast is the volume of publicity the case continues 
to produce. From the day of his arrest until this writing, aspects of the 
scandal have appeared frequently in nationwide headlines and newscasts. 

As it came to light, the Pollard case had all the trappings of a fic- 
tion thriller— free luxury trips to faraway places, expensive gifts for the 
spy's wife, shady spymasters who handled the cash and stolen documents, 
dashes to elude surveillance teams, and finally arrest just steps away from 
political asylum— in the Israeli embassy. 

The spy deal was cut in the summer of 1984 when Pollard, an ardent 
Zionist, met Aviem Sella, an Israeli aviation hero who doubled in espi- 
onage. He promised Sella military secrets in return for $1 ,500 a month 
compensation. The process began with a flourish. Pollard and his wife, 
Anne, 26, traveled first class to Paris for a luxury holiday and meetings 
with Sella, as well as with Rafael Eitan, the famous Israeli Nazi-hunter 
and spymaster who gave the Pollards $10,000 to cover expenses. Anne 
received a sapphire ring worth $7,000 from their hosts. They were also 
introduced to Joseph Yagur, a member of the Israeli embassy staff in 



336 They Dare to Speak Out 

Washington who subsequently became Pollard's main ••handler/* 

Returning to Washington, Pollard stole documents from U.S. mili- 
tary files about three times a week and delivered them for copying to 
either Yagur or Irit Erb, another embassy employee. 

The next spring, the Pollards enjoyed another $10,000 luxury trip— 
this time to Israel— where Jonathan received an Israeli passport under 
a new name, a raise in pay to $2,500 a month, and a promise that the 
pay would continue for the next nine years. He was informed that a Swiss 
bank account had been established in his name. 

Six months later— just over a year after the espionage began— the 
operation fell apart. FBI agents stopped Pollard for questioning in the 
parking lot near his Washington work station. Pollard broke away long 
enough to telephone his wife and, with the code word ••cactus," warned 
her to remove all stolen documents from their apartment. While he 
returned for further questioning by the agents, Anne gathered remain- 
ing papers and took them in a suitcase to Erb's residence. 

Shaken by the interview, Pollard asked Yagur for guidance. He sug- 
gested that the Pollards <4 lay low" for awhile, elude their FBI surveil- 
lance, and then find political asylum at the Israeli embassy. On November 
21 , 1985, they made the break but failed to shake their surveillance. They 
were refused asylum just inside the embassy gates and arrested as they 
left the property. Meanwhile, Yagur and Erb left for Israel. 

After Pollard's arrest, embarrassed Israeli officials apologized for 
the spying. They denounced it as an unauthorized "rogue" operation 
unknown by anyone at cabinet level, and offered full cooperation in a 
U.S. investigation. They pledged that * 'those responsible will be brought 
to account." 

Secretary of State George Shultz warmly accepted the apology, and 
the State Department quickly attempted a cover-up. Shultz sent a team 
headed by legal adviser Abraham Sofaer, an ardent Zionist who main- 
tains a home in Israel, on a brief investigation there. Returning, Sofaer 
falsely reported that Israel had provided "full access" to all persons with 
knowledge of the facts. Within a month of the arrest, the department 
announced that Israel had returned all stolen documents and that the United 
States had resumed sharing intelligence with Israel "in all fields." The 
"matter," for the State Department, was now closed. 

9 'More Damage Than Terrorists Could Dream Of' 

Elsewhere, the "matter" was far from closed. 

At the Justice Department, U.S. Attorney Joseph E. diGenova pressed 
the prosecution vigorously, and the case remained in the headlines for 
more than three years, giving the American people frequent reason to 



America 's Intifada 337 

question Israeli cooperation and reliability. For example, the Pollard spy 
ring, far from being a "rogue" operation, reported to the highest levels 
of the Israeli government, including the Defense Ministry. 

The "return" of stolen documents was a mockery. Of the thousands 
copied by the Pollards, Israel bothered to return only 163 and, given 
its appetite for top secrets, surely retained extra copies of these as well. 

Instead of cooperating, Israel stonewalled attempts by U.S. Justice 
Department to investigate the spy ring, refusing to permit key officials 
to be interviewed either in the United States or Israel. One U.S. official, 
reflecting on the Sofaer mission, said, "The question is whether we got 
the truth. Quite frankly we didn't." 

The two Israelis who had the most prominent roles in the spy epi- 
sode were "brought to account" by the Israeli government in a curious 
way. Each won higher position. 

Colonel Aviem Sella, identified by Pollard as his first principal "han- 
dler" and later indicted by a U.S. court for complicity with Pollard, was 
later promoted to commander of Israel's Tel Nof air base, usually the 
last rung in the command ladder before becoming air force commander. 
As a further reward, Israel refused to permit Sella to return to the United 
States for prosecution. Rafael Eitan, the man who headed the spy pro- 
gram, received similar "punishment"— appointment as the chief execu- 
tive officer of Israel's largest state-owned company. 

The promotions inspired embarrassing headlines and a delegation 
of Jews flew to Israel, urging the government to rescind the decisions. 
In the face of these protests, Sella resigned as air base commander but 
later quietly assumed a posh job at Electro-Optic, a major defense cor- 
poration. When they learned of this latest salute to Sella, the outraged 
editors of Defense News, a respected publication, called for a $200 mil- 
lion cut in Israeli aid each year until the U.S. government has recovered 
the full cost of the Sella-Pollard espionage. 

The case returned to prime news coverage on June 4, 1986, when 
Jonathan Pollard, after engaging in extensive plea-bargaining interviews, 
pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide U.S. military secrets to the Israelis, 
and Anne to conspiring to receive and embezzle government property. 

In return for Jonathan Pollard's cooperation, the prosecution did not 
ask for a life sentence, but the judge, Aubrey Robinson, impressed by 
a forty-six-page memorandum from Secretary of Defense Caspar Wein- 
berger, selected that punishment nonetheless. He sentenced Anne Pol- 
lard to five years. 

Weinberger wrote that the thievery caused "substantial and irrevoca- 
ble harm," risking the lives of U.S. agents and creating the danger that 
"U.S. combat forces, wherever they are deployed in the world, could 



338 They Dare to Speak Out 

be unacceptably endangered through successful exploitation of this data. " 
He added that Pollard had "both damaged and destroyed policies and 
national assets which have taken many years, great effort, and enormous 
national resources to secure." 

In the wake of sentencing, Israel doubled Pollard's pay. The same 
government that earlier denounced the affair as an unauthorized "rogue" 
operation now deposits in Pollard's bank account $5,000 each month, 
assuring the Pollards a comfortable life in Israel if he isLreleased for good 
behavior. 

The imprisonment of the Pollards, U.S. officials believe, has not 
ended Israeli espionage in the United States. Most of the secret informa- 
tion, as in the past, is furnished by U.S. citizens without compensation. 
One official complains, "Mossad is the most active foreign intelligence 
service on U.S. soil." 

For years Israel has been able to learn virtually every secret about 
U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East. Reporter Charles Babcock of 
the Washington Post, basing his estimate on a 1979 CIA report and recent 
interviews with more than two dozen current or former U.S. intelligence 
officials, concludes, "This remarkable intelligence harvest is provided 
largely, not by paid agents, but by an unofficial network of sympathetic 
American officials who work in the Pentagon, State Department, con- 
gressional offices, the National Security Council, and even the U.S. intel- 
ligence agencies." 

Meanwhile, Pollard became a cause celebre in both the United States 
and Israel, where public protests against his sentence were organized 
and legal defense funds raised. These funds were only a pittance, as the 
Israeli government provided most of the $200,000 that American law- 
yers for the two Pollards collected. 

Alan Dershowitz, a Harvard professor and an attorney for Pollard, 
cited Weinberger's assessment of U.S. security damage as the main reason 
why the court ordered a life sentence, which Dershowitz considered exces- 
sive, and challenged Weinberger to prove that Pollard's thievery actu- 
ally harmed U.S. security.^ 

It was a limp challenge, because the public record already disclosed 
overwhelming evidence of damage. Items stolen by Pollard included pho- 
tographs of security-related installations taken by high-flying U.S. sur- 
veillance planes, sensitive data on laser technology and U.S. weapons, 
secret information on naval forces, mines, and port facilities in the Mid- 
dle East, and the text of a large handbook nicknamed the "bible," which 
contained strategies the U.S. Navy would use if attacked. The stolen docu- 
ments were voluminous enough, the court was told, to fill a box six by 
six by ten feet in dimension. 



America 9 s Intifada 339 

Israel made quick use of the secrets. Information provided by Pol- 
lard enabled Israeli warplanes to evade U.S. naval and air surveillance 
in the Mediterranean during their October 1985 air strike against the Tunis 
headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The precision-like 
attack, first dismissed by President Ronald Reagan as "legitimate self- 
defense" but later denounced by other administration officials, left nearly 
one hundred dead, mostly Tunisian civilians, and the PLO headquarters 
in shambles. 

The gravest harm to U.S. interests occurred when the Soviet Union 
acquired documents stolen by Pollard, perhaps all of them. The Soviets 
acquired the data through two separate secret channels. Israel opened 
one of them directly, offering U.S. secrets in an attempt to influence 
Moscow's policy on Jewish emigration. Using some of these same con- 
tacts, the KGB, Moscow's intelligence service, opened the other chan- 
nel without the knowledge of Israeli leadership, establishing a spy network 
within Mossad. 

These shocking revelations came in a news report distributed by 
United Press International on December 13, 1987. The author, Richard 
Sale, reported that the Soviet Union had breached Israeli intelligence and 
that information stolen by Pollard "was traded to the Soviets in return 
for promises to increase emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel." A State 
Department source told Sale, "It began as a straight data-for-people deal," 
but through it the Soviets "penetrated the Israeli defense establishment 
at a high level." 

This new scandal belied Pollard's excuse that, in helping Israel, he 
did not hurt the United States. U.S. intelligence sources said stolen docu- 
ments reaching Moscow by this route included "sensitive U.S. weapons 
technology and strategic information about the defense forces of Tur- 
key, Pakistan, and moderate Arab countries, including Saudi Arabia." 

Soviet acquisition of documents stolen by Pollard was discussed dur- 
ing an urgent review of the scandal by CIA, FBI, and other U.S. intelli- 
gence officials: "One of the guys was commenting that if Pollard had 
stolen the stuff, at least it was going to a U.S. ally, but a CIA guy spoke 
up and said that if Mossad was involved it meant that copies of every- 
thing were going to [the KGB's] Moscow center." 

The Israel-Moscow spy link enabled "highly placed" Soviet "moles" 
to penetrate Mossad, the most serious blow to Israeli intelligence in twenty 
years. One U.S. intelligence analyst fixed the blame on "right-wing Jews" 
in Israel. U.S. agents first learned of the Israeli-Soviet spy link when 
information stolen by Pollard was "traced to the Eastern bloc." 

The reported diversion of stolen documents to Moscow made head- 
lines in nine newspapers but competing news services and television net- 



340 They Dare to Speak Out 

works ignored it. The New York Times and the Washington Post printed 
not a word. 

In another episode, Israel used data stolen by Pollard as the basis 
for a proposed military strike. Alarmed by the possibility that Pakistan 
might be building its own nuclear weapons— a concern shared by India— 
and armed with satellite photographs stolen by Pollard that showed a 
secret nuclear facility, Israel officials approached New Delhi in June 1985 
with a daring plan. They urged that the two governments destroy the 
facility in a joint air attack. India refused. 

The Pollard case continued to make headlines. In April 1988, Israel 
refused to let Howard Katz visit the United States for questioning. In 
June, two committees of the Israeli parliament, previously citing "lies, 
whitewash, and contradictions," closed their official report on the Pol- 
lard affair by blaming senior officials of both Labor and Likud parties 
but recommending no action. 

From all this, columnist Safire concludes, "The Pollards in America, 
and their spymasters in Israel, have done more damage to their respec- 
tive countries than any terrorists could dream of doing." 

Safire's assessment is not overdrawn. The damage to the United States 
is incalculable in security terms, causing consternation in many friendly 
capitals, especially in Arab states, which must now assume that both Israel 
and the Soviet Union have all the military information useful to them 
that is possessed by the United States. 

CIA officials agonize over the possibility that Pollard may have com- 
promised the way the United States gathers intelligence and enabled Israel 
to crack secret U.S. codes. 

The damage to Israel, too, is incalculable. As the American people 
learn the awesome extent of damage— especially the transfer of highly 
sensitive data directly to the Kremlin— they inevitably will rethink 
America's Israeli connection. Citizens, Jewish and non-Jewish alike, who, 
in their innocence, believed the Jewish state to be honest, open, and trust- 
worthy in all its U.S. dealings are already expressing their outrage. 

4 'You Can V Let Jews Be Tried By Gentiles" 

Pollard's accomplices are not the only people the government of Israel 
shields from prosecution for crimes committed in the United States. Head- 
lines in June and July 1988 reported that Robert S. Manning, 36, a Los 
Angeles-born member of the Jewish Defense League who is wanted in 
connection with a 1980 mail bomb murder of a California woman, is 
also a prime suspect in the October 1985 bombing that killed Alex M. 
Odeh, 41, who was employed part-time as the west coast director of the 
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. 



America's Intifada 341 

Odeh, a quiet, scholarly father of three young children and a natural- 
ized citizen born in Palestine, became a bomb victim twelve hours after 
he praised PLO chairman Yasser Arafat as a "man of peace" during 
an evening interview on a Los Angeles television news program. Dur- 
ing the program he deplored the killing of Leon Klinghoffer, brutally 
murdered the day before aboard the Achille Lauro cruise ship in the Med- 
iterranean. But Odeh asserted, "The media has mistakenly linked the 
(Klinghoffer murder) with the PLO." 

When Odeh opened the door of the committee office the next morn- 
ing, he triggered a blast that nearly severed his body and ripped through 
the office suite. In a similar occurrence earlier in 1985, two policemen 
were critically injured trying to defuse a bomb left at the door of the 
organization's Boston office. Manning was also suspected in that bombing. 

Manning, a self-styled demolition expert, is also wanted in connec- 
tion with two bombings aimed at men suspected as former Nazis. Along 
with three other suspects in the Odeh murder, he now lives in Kiriat 
Arba, a Jewish settlement in Israeli-occupied West Bank territory where 
followers of Rabbi Meir Kahane congregate. Kahane is a founder of the 
U.S. Jewish Defense League and heads Israel's anti-Arab Kach party, 
a group so radical it could not receive permission to field a slate of can- 
didates in Israel's November 1988 general election. 

Kahane's party, however, retains great political strength. Its influence, 
and that of other right-wing forces in Israel, is one reason that Manning 
and his cohorts have not been arrested. Many Israelis, including some 
of Kahane's supporters, view Jews who kill PLO supporters as heroes, 
not criminals. They try to frustrate the prosecution of Israelis who engage 
in anti-Arab crime. For example, when twenty-eight Gush Emunim ter- 
rorists were convicted in 1985 of bomb and grenade attacks against the 
West Bank Arabs, protests generated by right-wing elements were so 
heavy that all but seven have since been set free. 

This type of pressure is so great that Israel's officials refuse to cooper- 
ate with the FBI's long-standing effort to secure telephone and travel 
records so that the agency can keep track of the movement of JDL mem- 
bers like Manning to and from the United States. In fact, despite his indict- 
ment in the United States, Manning served recently in the Israeli Defense 
Forces as an active duty reservist near Nablus in the occupied West Bank. 
The California prosecutor, Assistant U.S. Attorney Nancy Stock, is not 
optimistic about securing Manning's extradition, because no one has been 
extradited from Israel for thirty-two years. She says, simply, "The rec- 
ord speaks for itself." 

Another fugitive, Richard K. Smyth, owner of Milco International, 
indicted in California for illegally exporting nuclear triggering devices 



342 They Dare to Speak Out 

to Israel, jumped bail in 1985 and, after rumors of kidnapping and mur- 
der, turned up in Israel. 

A senior Israeli official explains, * 'There's a sort of feeling here 
that you can't hand a Jew over to be tried by Gentiles. It has to do with 
2,000 years of Jewish history, of Jewish persecution at the hands of 
Gentiles." 



"Zone of Danger" for "Enemies of Israel" 

Public relations experts who specialize in protecting Israel's image 
in the United States have a busy life. 

In December 1985, FBI Director William H. Webster, noting Odeh's 
murder, warned that Arab Americans had entered a "zone of danger" 
and were targets of violence by groups seeking to harm "enemies of 
Israel." In an annual report three years later, the Justice Department 
reported 160 episodes of violence or harassment of Arab Americans. 
Concerning attacks on Arab-American groups, Mordechai Levy, who 
heads the Jewish Defense Organization, a group denounced by other 
Jewish organizations, adds a militant note, "We aren't claiming credit, 
but it couldn't happen to better people, more deserving people." Former 
Senator James G. Abourezk, national chairman of the American-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee, comments, "The authorities are finally 
beginning to realize that we've been brought into a war situation against 
our will." 

Examples of some recent Israeli "image" problems: 

• Despite public protests, Maj. Gen. Amos Yaron, reprimanded and 
stripped of command for his role in the 1982 massacres that left over 
eight hundred dead in Palestinian camps in Beirut, was welcomed to 
Washington four years later as Israeli's new military attache. Yaron, the 
senior Israeli officer on the scene at Sabra and Shatila, had failed to stop 
the commander of Lebanese Christian Phalangist forces from ordering 
the massacre of women and children in the camps. 

• In July 1986, network television news reported that U.S. Cus- 
toms Service and Justice Department officials were investigating charges 
that Israel illegally smuggled U.S. technology to build cluster bombs, 
which, when detonated, release hundreds of small explosives. The United 
States has prohibited the export of these bombs since 1982, when Israel 
violated agreements by using them against civilians during its invasion 
of Lebanon. The Reagan administration apologized for the publicity sur- 
rounding the allegations, and, as one of its last acts, resumed shipments 
of the bombs to Israel in late 1988. 

• Americans watched with astonishment the treatment Israel accorded 
its citizen, Mordechai Vanunu, a nuclear technician who movkd to 



America 's Intifada 343 

England and furnished classified information about Israel's nuclear facil- 
ities to the London Times. 

The Mossad used female attraction to lure Vanunu from London 
to Rome, then abducted him froih a Rome street and hustled him to Israel 
for trial in secret. While being hauled off in a Jerusalem van, Vanunu 
provided a bizarre finale to the drama by displaying to reporters through 
a van window a message written on the palm of his hand, "kidnapped 
in Rome." He received an eighteen-month sentence for divulging state 
secrets. 

For defenders of Israel, a greater— and graver— public relations chal- 
lenge lay ahead. 

"Shoot on Sight" 

Just as the Pollard spy scandal, which damaged the U.S. image of 
Israel as nothing before in history, receded from the headlines and eve- 
ning newscasts, the American people began to receive daily glimpses 
of even more shocking Israeli behavior. This time the offensive conduct 
was in response to a popular uprising that has become historic in its spon- 
taneity and sustained power. 

Beginning in December 1987, Palestinians, principally women and 
young people, began expressing their opposition to Israel's control over 
their lives in the West Bank and Gaza by pelting stones at the occupying 
forces. The Israeli occupation had entered its twenty-first year with no 
end in sight. Nearly unanimous in their loyalty to the Palestine Libera- 
tion Organization and its leader, Yasser Arafat— long outlawed by 
Israel— and weary of waiting for outsiders to address their grievances, 
the protesters took to the streets, harassing military personnel with stones 
and blocking streets with piles of burning tires. 

The grievances that produced the uprising are overwhelming. Life 
for 1 .7 million Palestinians is rigidly controlled— even the planting of 
a tree or the digging of a well requires an Israeli permit— and the thou- 
sands of Palestinians who have jobs in Israel, most of them menial, must 
return each night to their homes in the occupied territories. Israel has 
permitted no elections there since 1976, and today every community except 
Bethlehem is governed by a mayor chosen by Israeli authorities. 

Although they have not enjoyed independent statehood for 
centuries— they were successively under Ottoman, British and Jordanian 
control— Palestinians now find Israel threatening all hope for national 
identity. 

The threat comes from relentless policies that make almost every 
aspect of Palestinian life miserable. Especially damaging is the Israeli 



344 They Dare to Speak Out 

program of constructing Jewish settlements at strategic points scattered 
throughout the West Bank and Gaza, a process that began within months 
after Israel conquered the territories in the June 1967 war. These settle- 
ments keep expanding in number and size, encompassing more and more 
arable land, and shrinking the space on which the growing population 
of Palestinians must struggle for existence. Efforts by the world com- 
munity, led by the United States, to persuade Israel to return conquered 
Arab territory in exchange for peace agreements, have succeeded only 
in the Sinai, a desert area returned to Egypt under the Camp David 
Accords. 

The Likud party, which has dominated Israeli politics since 1977 
and negotiated the deal with Egypt, has defiantly opposed any land-for- 
peace arrangement with the Palestinians, contending that the West Bank 
and Gaza historically belong to Israel and are not subject to bargaining. 
Leaders of the party, including Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, were 
prominent in acts of terrorism against Arabs during the early days of 
Israeli statehood. These included the massacre of Deir Yassin village 
and the bombing of the King David Hotel. Even its present-day partner 
in the governing coalition, the Labor party, talks less and less in favor 
of land-for-peace, because each new settlement built in the occupied ter- 
ritories is seen as a step toward ultimate annexation. 

The settlements have become flashpoints of controversy. Populated 
by heavily-armed militants, the settlements now total 110 in the West 
Bank, encompass 55 percent of the land area, control 70 percent of the 
water resources and have an aggregate population of 67,000. Nearly a 
million Palestinians live on the remaining 45 percent of the land with 
only 30 percent of the water. Even more painful is the situation in Gaza, 
one of the world's most heavily populated areas, where 2,500 Jews live 
in settlements that occupy 35 percent of the land, while 650,000 Pales- 
tinians are crowded into the remainder. Israel plans to build eight addi- 
tional "flashpoints" in the near future, and the U.S. government, although 
opposed to the plan and possessing ample leverage over Israel, does not 
force the issue. When Israel went ahead in March 1989 with the first 
of the new settlements, the Bush administration uttered barely a word. 

In its own powerful way, the uprising forces the issue— not just the 
question of new settlements but harmful facets of military occupation, 
posing an unexpected challenge that the Israeli military machine— one 
of the world's strongest— has been unable to master. 

Protests grow in intensity as military measures become more harsh. 
In 1988, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin authorized his troops 
to arrest and imprison Palestinians for up to six months without due proc- 
ess in any form, and prisons soon bulged with over four thousand Pales- 
tinians. He announced a policy of "force, might, and beatings" to put 



America 's Intifada 345 

down the uprising. This gave Israeli troops authority to club unarmed 
civilians even to the point of fracturing bones, and prison officials, in 
clear violation of international convention, began routine beatings of those 
in prison. Three months later, a team of U.S. physicians reported that 
several thousand Palestinians had suffered bone fractures. 

In the wake of sporadic fires, Israeli civilians were authorized to 
"shoot on sight" anyone seen carrying a fire bomb. 

The brutality of the repression is such that a growing number of 
Israeli soldiers refuse to serve and mass demonstrations within Israel are 
commonplace. In May 1988, American Ambassador Thomas Pickering 
notified Israel that the United States is "deeply opposed" to Israel's "harsh 
measures," including "deportations, administrative detentions, and the 
destruction or sealing of houses , . . without due process," but the diplo- 
mat served no ultimatums or even warnings. In July, 350 Israeli scien- 
tists, academics, and retired generals, protesting the violation of Palestinian 
human rights and warning that these violations will damage Israel's prin- 
ciples and idealism, publicly urged their government to withdraw from 
the occupied territories. 

The most significant result of the uprising, from the standpoint of 
the American people, is its intense and sustained coverage by television 
networks. For more than two decades, the Palestinians had experienced 
repeated humiliations, even torture, but news of these harsh measures 
rarely received attention in the U.S. media. Now, reports of Israeli bru- 
tality, including a running total of killings, have become daily fare. Tel- 
evision viewers see homes of suspected protesters blown up, young 
Palestinians beaten, and women and children dragged off to prison. 

For the first four months of the uprising— until Israeli authorities 
kept journalists from areas of greatest protest— the coverage was close 
up and vivid. One unforgettable sequence, filmed by a CBS cameraman 
hidden inside a building, showed two Israeli soldiers using rocks to engage 
in a prolonged beating of a young Palestinian, finally fracturing one of 
his arms. Broadcast worldwide, the episode probably made the greatest 
impact of any single event. When Palestinians in Gaza killed a soldier 
by dropping a concrete block on his head, Israeli troops fractured the 
skull of a six-year-old girl and shot to death a twenty-year-old man. 

Israel's use of clubs, tear gas, bulldozers, gunfire, indiscriminate 
arrests, deportations, curfews, closing of schools and universities, and 
even torture seems to quicken, not quell, the spirit of the protesters. 

With all its horror and sacrifice, the uprising has brought a profound 
unity and self-confidence to families in the occupied territories. Women 
and children have new respect, as they stand with adult males on the 
ramparts of resistance and often lead the charge against offending Israelis. 



346 They Dare to Speak Out 

A Quaker Palestinian who helps young people suffering from stress in 
Gaza, reports, "Women now have equal rights. Period." She witnessed 
an episode in which a group of unarmed women overwhelmed two sold- 
iers until a nine-year-old Palestinian they were beating could escape. Visit- 
ing a ten-year-old recovering in a hospital from stomach wounds inflicted 
by a plastic bullet, she was shocked by the intensity of his response when 
she asked, "Could I look at your wound?" Pointing first to his stom- 
ach, then to a shoulder wound sustained in an earlier altercation with 
Israeli troops, his face beamed with pride as he asked eagerly, "Which 
one?" 



4 Troops Used Clubs to Break Limbs" 

In the wake of mounting international criticism, Israel nonetheless 
employed still tougher measures. Rabin authorized the use of plastic bullets 
in situations that are not life-threatening, making gunfire more preva- 
lent and harmful, although the army acknowledged later that the bullets, 
far from being non-lethal, caused forty-seven deaths during the first four 
months of their use. Responding to complaints about killing, blindness, 
and other injuries from the plastic ammunition, Rabin said, "The rioters 
are suffering more casualties. That is precisely our aim." 

Some behavior is barbaric. The cameras did not record a near-tragedy 
in which four Palestinians, deliberately buried alive by an Israeli-manned 
bulldozer, miraculously survived when dug out by neighbors. Meanwhile, 
leaders of the uprising have dealt harshly with those suspected of dis- 
loyalty. Thirteen Palestinians accused of conspiring with Israeli authori- 
ties have been murdered. 

Nor do journalists escape Israeli-inflicted violence. Bob Slater of 
Time magazine, chairman of the Israeli foreign press association, reported 
more than one hundred attacks on foreign journalists during the first four 
months of the uprising. 

Here and there are touches of humor: the owner of a Nablus ice 
cream shop, forced by Israeli soldiers to open for business in the win- 
ter, remonstrated, "But nobody here buys ice cream in the winter," and 
the NBC commentator who remarked, "Here you see Israel's new open 
door policy," as the news film showed an Israeli truck using chains to 
break open the locked shutters of a Palestinian shop. 

Otherwise, it is grim business. Although journalists are now kept 
from direct coverage of protest areas, news of the violence filters out, 
partly from U.S. citizens who visit the occupied territories. Rev. John 
B. Jamison, returning to his Springfield, Illinois, Methodist pastorate, 
after living four weeks in a village near Bethlehem, says, "I find that 
I cannot keep silent. I have to speak out." Similar responses come from 



America 's Intifada 347 

Americans who have traveled to the scene of the uprising under the spon- 
sorship of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee. 

America's media coverage of the uprising has inspired widespread 
editorial criticism of Israeli brutality, letters to editors, and even a few 
complaints from Capitol Hill, where comments critical of Israel are almost 
unknown. In March 1988, over two thousand Arab Americans marched 
in protest past the White House, while a few blocks away, in a rare pub- 
lic sign of sympathy for Israel, about three hundred Jews chanted out- 
side the Washington offices of ABC, expressing their resentment over 
the network's vivid coverage of the uprising. 

In April 1988, Ted Koppel, in an unprecedented television event, 
broadcast his popular "Nightline" program live from Jerusalem in a week- 
long series devoted entirely to the uprising. The series included filmed 
history and discussion, presented from both Israeli and Arab viewpoints. 
The climaxing program featured a debate between panels of Israelis and 
Palestinians separated by a low wall— described by Washington Jewish 
Week as "a town hall meeting of people who don't recognize each other's 
existence." According to Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 
the series "set a new high- water mark in balanced U.S. media coverage 
of this divisive half-century-old dispute, which so many mainstream 
American editors and commentators have just wished away." It enabled 
many Americans to consider the Arab-Israeli dispute for the first time 
in an arena of civil discourse. 

King Hussein of Jordan gave the uprising new importance in July 
1988 and focused its political objectives when he abandoned all Jorda- 
nian claims to the West Bank and announced his support for Palestinian 
statehood. This eliminated from the diplomatic scene the "Jordanian 
option," a proposal to solve the Palestinian problem by establishing a 
confederal link between Amman and the West Bank— a possibility that 
United States and Israeli officials had mentioned frequently and hopefully. 

The American response to Israel's repression reached a powerful 
and surprising new level when, shortly after the inauguration of Presi- 
dent George Bush, the State Department, in its sharpest criticism ever, 
devoted twenty-one pages of its annual worldwide report to Israeli human 
rights violations. In sharp contrast to the mild references of previous years, 
the report used plain language: 366 Palestinians killed; including 13 by 
beating and 4 from tear gas; over 20,000 wounded, and "about 10,000" 
imprisoned; 36 deported in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. 
Eleven Israelis have been killed and 1,100 others injured in the course 
of the uprising. These figures represent the victims in just one year. 

The report charged Israel with "forcing prisoners to remain in one 
position for prolonged periods, hooding, sleep deprivation, and cold 
showers," practices employed to elicit "false confessions" as the basis 



348 They Dare to Speak Out 

for lengthy prison terms. "There were five cases in 1988 in which 
unarmed Palestinians in detention died under questionable circumstances 
or were clearly killed by the detaining officials." 

4 Troops used clubs to break limbs and beat Palestinians who were 
not directly involved in disturbances or resisting arrest," the report went 
on, "Soldiers turned many people out of their homes at night, making 
them stand for hours ... At least 154 houses of Arabs were demolished 
or sealed . . . prior to trial and conviction." 

In an exceptional reference, the report said that some human rights 
violations occur in Israel itself, "where Arab citizens of Israel, who con- 
stitute 17 percent of the population, do not share fully in the rights granted 
to, or the duties levied on, Jewish Israeli citizens." 

Although congressional reaction consisted mainly of complaints that 
the State Department did not fully "understand" Israel's problems, two 
key committee chairmen spoke up. Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) and 
Representative David Obey (D-WI) warned that foreign aid might be 
jeopardized if Israel's maltreatment of Palestinians continues. 

Copley newspapers joined a nationwide chorus of editorial criticism 
with these words, "Until Israel figures out how to defuse the Palestin- 
ian unrest in ways consistent with the Jewish state's democratic values 
and traditions, it will risk losing far more than just the uprising." Ger- 
ald G. Toy, a retired actuary in Portland, Oregon, puts it bluntly, "Israel 
is giving Jews a bad name." 

"The Deadly Silence Has Ended" 

Meanwhile, other powerful, historic currents added force to the 
American tide of sympathy for Palestinian statehood. An unprecedented 
political movement conceived and organized early in 1988 by Dr. James 
Zogby, a street-smart Arab-American activist and articulate former univer- 
sity professor, altered the national political landscape as it moved slowly 
but surely through the Democratic presidential nominating process. 

It reached national media attention in February when more than two 
hundred Democratic party caucuses in Iowa, inspired mainly by sup- 
porters of the presidential candidacy of the Rev. Jesse Jackson, approved 
resolutions backing self-determination for Palestinians. These resolutions 
did not mention statehood, but declared the right of people living in the 
occupied territories to decide their political future without outside inter- 
ference. Similar resolutions were soon approved by more than one hun- 
dred caucuses in Texas. 

The Zogby forces continued their successes at the state level, where 
the more precise goal of statehood was endorsed by Democratic party 
conventions in Washington, Vermont, Maine, Oregon, New Mexico, 



America 's Intifada 349 

and Illinois. Resolutions supporting self-determination won approval in 
Texas, Minnesota, and Iowa. 

In Illinois, the pro-Palestinian forces won mainly by catching estab- 
lishment Democrats asleep. Two hundred pro-Jackson delegates from 
Chicago converged unexpectedly on Springfield, the state capital, where 
they surprised party regulars at the convention by swiftly winning approval 
of a resolution endorsing "the rights of Palestinians to safety, self- 
determination, and an independent state," as well as Israel's right to live 
within secure borders. Approval occurred so late in the deliberations that 
pro-Israel forces from north Chicago who normally control party posi- 
tions on Middle East questions had no time to counterattack. But that 
did not end their efforts. 

With the convention adjourned, State Senator Vincent Demuzio, 
Democratic state chairman, responded to pressure from outraged Jew- 
ish delegates by charging Jackson supporters with "irresponsibility" and 
warning that the resolution would threaten Democratic success by dividing 
the party. In desperation, he considered taking an informal poll by tele- 
phone, through which the party's state central committee could some- 
how delete the resolution from the platform, but, confronted with its 
obvious illegality, dropped the scheme. Instead, the party made no refer- 
ence to the offensive resolution in its annals. The record of its approval 
survived only in newspaper accounts of the proceedings. 

Zogby moved the statehood issue to national center-stage in Atlanta 
in June 1988. There he gained unprecedented official approval for the 
question of Palestinian statehood to be debated before die Democratic 
platform committee and then, the next month, before the full conven- 
tion, after agreeing, on each occasion, that he would not press the issue 
beyond a voice vote. The Washington Jewish Week called the debate 
"quietly historic." It was historic but not quiet. For the first time in 
history, the emotion-packed question of Palestinian statehood, a theme 
anathema to most Zionists, became the topic of open debate at a national 
gathering of a major U.S. political party. 

In televised deliberations before the platform committee, Zogby noted 
"a greater awareness and sensitivity in this country on the question of 
Palestinian rights." When the issue reached the convention floor, Zogby 
and Congressman Mervyn Dymally of California, speaking for Pales- 
tinian statehood, squared off against Senator Daniel Inouye of Hawaii 
and Congressman Charles E. Shumer of New York before the conven- 
tion hall audience dominated by delegates waving pro-Palestinian posters. 
An acrimonious debate raged for twenty minutes, with full coverage by 
all television networks creating an enormous audience, probably the largest 
ever to hear a discussion of Palestinian rights. Inouye rejected the Pales- 
tinian resolution as "an enormous kick in the teeth of American interests 



350 They Dare to Speak Out 

in that part of the world. " When Shumer tried to dismiss Zogby's argu- 
ments as "clever but duplicitous," booing became so loud that Speaker 
Jim Wright, chairing the convention, had to bang the gavel for order. 
Dymally declared, "I am proud of this debate. This is history. Jesse Jack- 
son and his call for peace and security can be heard." 

Zogby summed up, "The deadly silence on Palestinian rights has 
ended. Peace in the Middle East is too important to be left without a 
principled debate. What is so clear today is that Israeli peace and secu- 
rity and Palestinian peace and security are interdependent." Denounc- 
ing Israel's treatment of Palestinians, Zogby declared to a wildly cheering 
convention hall, "We are already winning. We don't need a vote today." 

Pro-Palestinian delegates rejoiced, citing the debate itself as a sig- 
nificant victory. Salam Al-Maryati, a member of the California delega- 
tion staff, looking over the vast sea of Palestinian posters, declared, "It 
looks like Palestine for president!" Fifteen hundred of the 5,500 delegates 
signed a pro-statehood petition circulated on the convention floor, and 
a network-sponsored poll showed that a majority of the delegates would 
approve Palestinian statehood if the vote were secret. Pro-Israel delegates 
blamed the support on "the Palestinian uprising's effect on public 
opinion"— as though that isn't what is supposed to happen in a democracy. 

The Jewish Journal of Los Angeles saw challenges still ahead: 4 'There 
is a growing sense in political circles that the pro-Israel forces were out- 
generaled by Jim Zogby," and predicted that Zogby, "not one to rest 
on his laurels," will soon "launch a nationwide campaign to generate 
state and local resolutions similar to the defeated platform plank." 

Zogby continues his political activism for Palestinian statehood and 
other Arab-related issues, as executive director of the Arab American 
Institute, a Washington-based group that encourages citizens of Arab 
ancestry, Republicans and Democrats alike, to engage in partisan activity. 
One of his achievements is the formation of Democrats for Middle East 
Peace, which consists of over one hundred Arab Americans and Jewish 
Americans who served as delegates, alternates, and standing committee 
members at the 1988 Democratic national convention. 

Palestinian statehood showed remarkable support in two referendums 
on election day, November 8, 1988. In the communities of Cambridge 
and Newton, Massachusetts, voters approved, 53 to 47 percent, a propo- 
sition supporting both self-determination and statehood for Palestinians 
and an end to U.S. financial support for Israel's occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza. In San Francisco, statehood won the support of one- 
third of the voters. 



America 9 s Intifada 35 1 



'The Ball Is in the American Court" 



As the post-convention presidential campaign— totally lackluster on 
the Arab-Israel conflict— came to a close in November 1988, the Pales- 
tine Liberation Organization brought to top billing internationally the state- 
hood issue that the Jackson forces had advanced months earlier on the 
U.S. domestic scene. A series of surprising developments won broad 
new support for the Palestinian cause and diminished, perhaps demolished, 
the negative stereotype that has long handicapped the PLO cause in the 
United States. 

In Algiers, executive committee chairman Yasser Arafat persuaded 
the Palestine National Council— the PLO's congress— to take two historic, 
controversial steps: first, to endorse United Nations resolutions 242 and 
338 as the basis for peace negotiations and, second, to declare the exis- 
tence of a Palestinian state encompassing the occupied territories of the 
West Bank and Gaza. 

These decisions proclaim PLO acceptance of a new Palestinian state 
side-by-side and at peace with Israel and the abandonment of the organi- 
zation's long-standing commitment to "one democratic state for all of 
Palestine," in which Israel would cease to exist. 

The decisions offer hope for better days to both the Palestinians in 
the uprising and their Israeli masters. The statehood proclamation pro- 
vides a practical, worthy political objective behind which those engaged 
in the Palestinian intifada can rally and, equally important, the promise 
to the Israelis that the turmoil, so threatening to Jewish values and tradi- 
tions, can be ended without sacrificing Israel itself. 

They provide a powerful impetus, as well, to the uprising in America, 
where many citizens sympathetic to Palestinian grievances have long been 
troubled by the PLO's insistence that Israel must disappear when the new 
Palestine comes into being. Support for the survival of Israel is so per- 
vasive in the United States, that, forced to choose between Israel and 
a new Palestine, most Americans— including those deeply supportive of 
Palestinian rights— would choose Israel. Actually, in recent years the PLO 
has finessed this grim choice, approving at Palestine National Council 
meetings several resolutions that show clear support for a two-state solu- 
tion, while remaining ambiguous at other times. 

The Algiers resolutions, of course, do not stop criticism of Arafat, 
Palestine's new president. Critics question his ability to control his own 
members, citing occasional cross-border attacks on Israel and other "ter- 
rorism." These episodes reflect the wide assortment of splinter groups 
within the PLO organization— some strongly opposed to the Palestine 
National Council's decisions— and the dispersal of the Palestinian popu- 
lation throughout the Middle East. 



352 They Dare to Speak Out 

In making his announcement in Algiers, Arafat declared, "Our polit- 
ical declaration contains moderation, flexibility, and realism, which the 
West has been urging us to show. We feel now that the ball is in the 
American court." 

A few weeks later, the U.S. Secretary of State hit the ball back in 
another development of historic importance that improved the PLO's pub- 
lic standing in the United States. It occurred just a few days before the 
close of Ronald Reagan's presidency. After a dismal December, during 
which Secretary of State George Shultz, acting against the advice of most 
of his advisers, prohibited Yasser Arafat from addressing the United 
Nations in New York, Shultz gave in to mounting international pres- 
sure. He shocked the world by announcing that the United States would 
begin direct talks with PLO officials. 

The decision came as a surprise even to the American-Israel Public 
Affairs Committee, Israel's powerful lobby in Washington, an organi- 
zation that traditionally not only keeps close tab on all Middle East 
developments but normally has a big voice in making U.S. policy in that 
region. It learned of the decision only an hour before Shultz's public 
announcement. 

Quiet but effective work by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak made 
the difference. On the telephone frequently with Arafat and Shultz dur- 
ing the tense weeks following the Algiers declaration, he persuaded each 
to accept changes in wording that finally produced the U.S. decision to 
talk with PLO representatives. Although protesting that he had already 
met every requirement, Arafat gave a final, convincing clarification in 
a press conference in Stockholm. The respected New York attorney Rita 
Hauser, prominent in the work of the American Jewish Committee, sat 
at Arafat's side and imparted a unique Jewish respectability to his position. 

The U.S. decision to open direct talks and the PLO decisions at 
Algiers gave the Palestinian organization a promising new image in the 
United States. Public opinion polls showed rising support for Palestinian 
statehood, and, at the same time, lessening support for Israel. 

A February 1989 Washington Post- ABC survey reported that a 
majority of Americans— 56 percent— characterize Israel as an "unreli- 
able ally" of the United States, the highest negative rating since the poll 
began eight years ago. Only 44 percent expressed a favorable view of 
Israel— one percentage point less than the 45 percent who viewed the 
Soviet Union positively. 

"Not a Single Pro-Israel Letter in Six Months" 

Other less visible events and activities reinforce America'suprising. 
The American-Israel Public Affairs Committee lost its aura of invin- 



America 's Intifada 353 

cibility when its 1988 campaign endeavors failed to either unseat Sena- 
tor John Chafee of Rhode Island or reelect Senator Lowell Weicker of 
Connecticut. The organization, registered to lobby for the interests of 
Israel, also found itself prominently on the defensive when the CBS "Sixty 
Minutes" television program, a report in the Washington Post, and a 
complaint filed by a group headed by former Ambassador George W. 
Ball charged the lobby with engaging in illegal partisan activities in fed- 
eral general elections. 

The lobby has retained enough influence on Capitol Hill, however, 
to inflict heavy damage on the U.S. arms industry. The staggering eco- 
nomic burden it has imposed came prominently to public attention in 
October 1988. The retiring secretary of defense, Frank Carlucci, charged 
that Israeli opposition to selling arms to Arabs had cost the United States 
economy "tens of billions of dollars worth of jobs," not to mention the 
cost in terms of lost political influence in the Arab world. His comment 
came just before Saudi Arabia announced it would buy $36 billion in 
fighter planes from Britain and mobile missiles of undisclosed value from 
the People's Republic of China. 

Carlucci's statement followed a precedent-breaking speech in which 
Senator Chafee, addressing his Senate colleagues, incurred the ire of 
Israel's lobby by deploring congressional disapproval of arms sales to 
Arab states. In recent years, Congress, bowing meekly to lobby pres- 
sure, has routinely blocked these sales or imposed restrictions no self- 
respecting government would accept. On one such occasion, Senator Barry 
Goldwater expressed a vain plea, "I hope this is the last time that we 
are subjected to the intense pressure, money and threats of another 
country." 

Secretary Carlucci's "tens of billions of dollars worth of jobs" fig- 
ure is a conservative appraisal. The fifteen-year loss may rise as high 
as $260 billion. This figure is based on losses caused by Israeli opposi- 
tion to the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia alone. The estimate is derived 
by compiling the aggregate value of the sale of merchandise and serv- 
ices that normally occur as the result of basic arms sales. When the total 
value of arms sales to other Arab states— lost as the result of Israeli 
opposition— are added, the cost to the United States economy rises still 
higher. The London Economist estimates that Israel's lobbying against 
arms sales to Arab states cost the U.S. economy as much as $20 billion 
in 1986 alone. Opponents warn that arms sales tend to escalate a dan- 
gerous build-up of arms in the Middle East, but the U.S. decision to 
sell, or not, has little to do with the pace of escalation. As recent events 
prove, Arab states need not look to the United States as a source of 
weapons and equipment. 



354 They Dare to Speak Out 

The loss to the United States in political and security terms cannot 
be measured. Leaders of Arab states, embarrassed publicly by repeated 
congressional rebuffs, will be less dependent on U.S. spare parts and 
training as they look to Britain and other countries for arms. As this proc- 
ess continues, the United States will still need to protect its own vital 
national interests in the region but will have fewer avenues through which 
it can influence the decisions of Arab states. 

While U.S. jobs and international influence are being destroyed by 
lobby "money and threats," several Washington-based organizations are 
moving forward projects that improve public understanding of Arabs, 
Islam, and the political problems of the Middle East. 

Two retired U.S. foreign service officers, Andrew I. Killgore and 
Richard H. Curtiss, founders of the American Educational Trust, launched 
in 1982 a highly successful monthly magazine, Washington Report on 
Middle East Affairs, and provide a growing book, film, and lecture serv- 
ice. Through newspaper advertising, they enlivened the 1988 political 
campaign by inviting voters to telephone a toll-free number and learn 
how much money, if any, pro-Israel political action committees provided 
to their local senators or congressmen. The organization answered more 
than four thousand calls. 

Since 1983, the National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations, headed 
by Dr. John Duke Anthony, has conducted fifty-one study tours of Arab 
states, each ten to fourteen days in duration. These tours have provided 
firsthand knowledge of the region to more than five hundred political 
leaders and academicians in the United States. 

The American Arab Affairs Council, headed by George Naifeh, a 
former U.S. foreign service officer, publishes a scholarly quarterly and 
organizes two-day conferences about three times a year on university 
campuses where professors, journalists, diplomats, and business leaders 
debate Middle East issues. 

Fortunately, America's intifada is also being expressed in direct polit- 
ical action. Citizens of Arab ancestry, who number over four million, 
are beginning to assert themselves after years of political quietude. 

The American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, founded by 
former senator James Abourezk, the Arab American Institute, and the 
National Association of Arab Americans— all with increasing effect are 
providing Americans of Arab ancestry with opportunities to work together 
in order to influence public policy. United States citizens of Muslim faith, 
now approaching eight million, are making headway on the political front. 
They do so in a variety of ways— through new groups based on Muslim 
affiliation, as well as through membership in Arab-American organiza- 
tions and direct participation in the activities of Republican and Democratic 
party organizations. The untapped potential of these citizens is enormous, 



America 's Intifada 355 

as only a relatively few citizens of Arab ancestry or Muslim affiliation 
have been aroused to political action or even to organizational mem- 
bership. 

Also being heard on the political front are the voices of Jewish citizens 
who are alarmed at the damage Israel is doing to both the United States 
and to Judaism. Among the groups strongly criticizing Israeli policies 
are the New Jewish Agenda and the Jewish Committee on the Middle 
East. In a surprising development, Theodore R. Mann, prominent in the 
American Jewish Congress, has endorsed an Israeli think-tank proposal 
that contemplates a Palestinian state. Professor Jerome Segal of the 
University of Maryland is the author of a book, Creating the Palestin- 
ian State: A Strategy for Peace. 

The Jewish News of New Jersey, the nation's largest Jewish weekly, 
reported in March 1989 a "sharp" increase in mail to Capitol Hill criti- 
cal of Israel: "One strongly pro-Israel senator revealed that his office 
has not received a single pro-Israel letter in more than six months." In 
some Capitol Hill offices, mail critical of Israel outnumbered suppor- 
tive mail by as much as eight to one. Heaviest criticism followed publi- 
cation of the State Department report that charged Israel with widespread 
violations of human rights in its treatment of Palestinians. 

"You Call the Big Contributors First" 

No matter what their national origin or religion may be, citizens 
who are concerned about the damage being done by Israel's lobby to 
cherished national institutions, as well as to our national interests in 
the Middle East, can make a difference. As James Zogby demonstrated 
in the 1988 Democratic presidential nominating process, the commit- 
ment of just one individual can have great impact. 

Each citizen can easily become an instrument of political action 
in the public arena— for example, as a monitor demanding equal time— or 
space— for response whenever news reports are unbalanced or biased, 
or, equally important, whenever the accusation of anti-Semitism is made 
recklessly. Success in these endeavors requires perseverance, as news 
editors tend to ignore or reject an initial request but, being human, will 
usually yield to pressure that is firmly but decently applied. 

Citizens can also become committees-of-one, each following the 
political scene in Washington, keeping track of performance by 
representatives in both the House and Senate and, when circumstances 
suggest, challenging them with questions and advice. Even more effective 
are the messages delivered publicly during the "town meetings" that 
most congressmen conduct periodically for their constituencies. 



356 They Dare to Speak Out 

Each person can also engage in political action in the partisan arena, 
undertakings that may be less conspicuous but often are more produc- 
tive than public appeals. The first step is to establish a personal rela- 
tionship with candidates seeking election, or reelection, to Congress 
by helping in their partisan campaigns, either with money or time, or 
both. Suggesting the importance of this relationship, Senator Paul Simon 
of Illinois, with surprising candor, recently told a reporter: "At the 
end of a busy day, you find a stack of yellow slips on the spindle, each 
a call-back request. You can't call them all. Which calls are you going 
to return? If there are any big contributors in the stack, you start with 
them." 

Still better is group action. When like-minded people band together, 
the effect can be multiplied, as the supporters of Israel demonstrate every 
day. A group that demands equal time or space from the editor of a 
newspaper or the director of a radio or television program will usually 
get cooperation more quickly than an individual. And a congressman 
is certain to pay close attention to a viewpoint, whether expressed pri- 
vately or at a "town meeting," if he or she knows that it represents 
a group of constituents. 

The responsibility for political action should not be placed only on 
citizens with ethnic ties to the Middle East. The damage caused by 
Israel's lobby hurts citizens, like myself, who have no such ethnic ties 
whatever. Donald McHenry, United States Ambassador to the United 
Nations during the administration of Jimmy Carter, in effect, challenges 
all citizens with this somber warning: "Because of the [Israeli] lobby's 
influence, our government is unable to pursue its own national interests 
in the Middle East." 

The task of breaking Israel's grip on U.S. policy-making is so urgent 
and crucial that it needs the support of many citizens. For this reason, 
I report with great satisfaction and high hopes the organization of a new 
lobby. With my support, a group of United States citizens experienced 
in business, foreign policy, and politics, has established the Council 
for the National Interest. Motivated, as the name suggests, by the national 
interest of our country in Middle East policy, it is in the process of 
organizing a network of citizens throughout the United States who will 
respond with political activism when opportunities and challenges arise. 
The organization seeks support in each congressional district. Those 
interested should address the Council for the National Interest, Post 
Office Box 53048, Washington, D.C., 20009. 

This new organization provides a way for all citizens, regardless 
of religious affiliation or national origin, to speak out in an effective 
way. Those who participate can help advance the national interest in 



America *s Intifada 357 

the Middle East and at the same time help repair the damage being done 
to our political institutions by the over-zealous tactics of Israel's lobby. 
Sustained work throughout the countryside, I firmly believe, can 
transform America's embryonic intifada into successful political action 
of immense value to our nation. It has the prospect of extending, within 
a short period of time, a badly-needed freedom and vigor to the public 
discussion of U.S. policy in the Middle East. It can enable our govern- 
ment once more to pursue its own national interests as it deals with 
the complexities and hazards that seem to grow each day in the Middle 
East. 

"We Shall Nobly Save, or Meanly Lose" 

Have the uprisings in the occupied territories and in America brought 
the Arab-Israeli conflict to an historic watershed? Startling changes sug- 
gest that this may be the case. 

The Palestine Liberation Organization recognizes the existence of 
Israel and pledges that the newly-proclaimed provisional State of Pales- 
tine will exist entirely within the West Bank and Gaza areas and remain 
at peace with Israel. Thus, the PLO carries, along with a handful of 
stones, the olive branch of peace, while Israel, once seen as a plucky 
little nation fighting for its life against brutal neighbors, is cast as the 
tyrant who breaks limbs and fires lethal weapons at defenseless civilians. 

In Washington, changes are equally sweeping. Although reiterat- 
ing its opposition to an independent Palestinian state, the U.S. govern- 
ment conducts direct talks with the PLO and publishes a document citing 
in great detail Israel's widespread violation of Palestinian human rights. 
The United States declares that Israel has no sovereign rights to the 
West Bank and Gaza. The U.S. Secretary of Defense denounces Israel's 
lobby for blocking Arab arms sales that could bring "tens of billions 
of dollars in jobs" to American workers. Considering the record of 
the previous twenty-five years, during which each succeeding United 
States administration avoided almost all public criticism of Israel and 
provided the Jewish state with increasing levels of cooperation and sup- 
port, these developments are astounding. 

The changes beyond the banks of the Potomac are also remarka- 
ble. The chilling taboos of yesterday seem to be eased. Here and there, 
one can express a sympathetic word about Palestinians or denounce 
Israel's policies of repression without being accused of anti-Semitism. 

For the first time, Palestinian statehood is an acceptable topic for 
discussion on many editorial pages, on radio and television talk shows, 
and on campuses. In an editorial, USA Today calls for Palestinian "inde- 
pendence." Statehood is even debated during a presidential nominat- 



358 They Dare to Speak Out 

ing convention and within Jewish organizations. The scandalous behavior 
of Israel leads many Jews to agonize publicly over what is happening 
to the once-glistening principles and idealism of the Jewish state. 

Do these happenings and trends herald a lasting change in the pol- 
itics of the Middle East and in the terms of discourse in the United States? 
Or, is the American intifada only a passing phenomenon that will van- 
ish as the inevitable Israeli public relations counterattack takes shape? 

The answers to these fundamental, urgent questions will be found 
mainly in the American countryside, not on the banks of the Potomac, 
or even in the capitals of the Middle East. Our countryside remains 
the primary field of battle where the great struggles for peace and jus- 
tice in the Middle East will be settled. 

America's intifada has been the basic cause of changes in govern- 
ment policies in Washington, Tunis, and Jerusalem— not the other way 
around. This uprising created the domestic atmospherics that motivated 
the PLO to make its historic declarations in Algiers and Stockholm, 
led Egypt's President Mubarak to become the behind-the-scenes con- 
ciliator, prompted U.S. Jews like Rita Hauser to embrace the PLO, 
and, ultimately, produced the agreement for direct talks between the 
United States and the PLO. 

The events do not reflect a newly-developed courage, conviction, 
or vision on the part of U.S. leaders. They, and their predecessors, 
have known all along what should be done. Missing, until recently, has 
been the assurance of public support for a confrontation with Israel. 
America's intifada provides this essential political base, but this posi- 
tive trend in U.S. policy can be expected to continue only as long as 
the American uprising exerts pressure. 

Public memory is abysmally short. For example, the April 1989 
ABC- Washington Post poll showed that Israel's approval rating had 
returned to 59 percent— where it was before the uprising. If the people 
of the United States should lose interest in the agony of the Palestin- 
ians or in the threat Israel's lobby poses to the integrity of our cherished 
institutions, further progress toward peace is unlikely to occur. U.S. 
talks with the PLO will dwindle off to nothingness. Radicals will inevita- 
bly gain strength in both Israel and within the Palestinian movement, 
and the Middle East will once more become a ticking bomb, posing 
awesome danger to the entire world. 

Intimidation and ignorance, the twin obstacles to peace with jus- 
tice in the Middle East, seem less formidable than before, but the extent 
of ignorance is still staggering. How many of your neighbors are aware 
that the U.S. treasury sends a gift of $3 billion to Israel each year? How 
many of them know that Israel hired a spy to steal our country's most 
precious military secrets, traded some of these secrets to the Soviet 



America 's Intifada 359 

Union, paid the spy's legal defense costs when he was arrested and 
prosecuted, then doubled his pay when he went to prison? How many 
realize that the weapons Israel uses to bomb villages in southern Leba- 
non and to kill and brutalize defenseless Palestinian civilians are provided 
free of charge by the U.S. government? 

The greatest struggles lie ahead. The government of the United 
States must assert, at long last, its own national interests in the Middle 
East. 

Israel's policies are giving a bad name to America, not just to the 
Jewish state. The world views our nation— accurately— as Israel's essen- 
tial partner in its military adventurism and its suppression of human 
rights. America must clear its good name of this complicity. Opening 
talks with the PLO and challenging Israel's right to the occupied terri- 
tories are a good beginning, but only a beginning. 

The next logical U.S. steps: declare that the people in occupied 
territories have the right to self-determination and, if they choose, 
independent statehood; demand that Israeli forces cease the detention 
of Palestinians without due process, as well as halt the beatings of Pales- 
tinians, the destruction of their homes and the use of plastic bullets and 
other lethal weapons against them; demand that new Israeli settlements 
in the occupied territories be prohibited. The United States has ample 
leverage with which to force compliance with these demands. 

At some point— the sooner, the better— the United States must issue 
a clear ultimatum: notify the Jewish state that all U.S. aid will cease 
unless Israel, in exchange for border guarantees, withdraws its forces 
from Arab territories. This would be a bold step, but, with each pass- 
ing day, the immoral burden of complicity in Israel's misdeeds becomes 
heavier. 

Only Washington can deliver these demands in credible terms, 
because only Washington serves as Israel's lifeline; no Israeli govern- 
ment could defy an ultimatum from its sole benefactor and survive. And 
only citizens in the American countryside can persuade Washington to 
act. 

The challenge is awesome, but, once informed and aroused, the 
American people have shown a remarkable capacity to rise above any 
difficulty. The words Abraham Lincoln wrote 125 years ago to a nation 
convulsed in civil war ring clearly today as a challenge to the Ameri- 
can people: "We, even we here, hold the power and bear the responsi- 
bility. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, this last best hope of earth." 

Perhaps today's challenge is not the last hope, but surely it is the 
best. Circumstance has placed squarely on us the opportunity, as well 
as the responsibility, to rescue ourselves from impending calamity. And, 



360 They Dare to Speak Out 

in making a stand for basic human rights in the occupied territories, 
we will also be liberating ourselves from the heavy hand Israel's lobby 
lays on our cherished political institutions here at home. We must bestir 
ourselves, for the opportunity may be fleeting. 



Notes 



CHAPTER ONE: KING OF THE HILL 

26 A former Congressman: Paul N. McCloskey, address before Conference on "U.S. Economic 

and Policy Challenges in the Arab World," sponsored by American Arab Affairs Council, 

Birmingham, Alabama, March 4, 1983. 
26 A professional: A number of professionals in pro-Israel lobbying groups provided information 

for this chapter but, fearing an adverse impact on their future careers, preferred to remain 

anonymous. 
26 This was illustrated: James G. Abourezk, interview, July 27, 1984. 

26 No major Jewish: See New York Times, September 7, 1982. M. J. Rosenberg, editor of Near 
East Report, stated in an interview on September 5, 1983, that his publication does not publish 
criticism of Israeli policies lest this be construed as a schism within the pro-Israel Jewish 
community. 

27 "At the State": Letter to the author from Don Bergus, July 10, 1984. 

27 Stephen S. Rosenfeld: Present Tense, Spring 1983. 

28 Certainly Israel: See Washington Post, September 27, 1983. 

28 The White House: Interview with confidential Capitol Hill source. 

29 Nine of the: Richmond Times-Dispatch, October 2, 1983. 

29 The Post quoted: White House Press Release, October 18, 1983. 

29 A candid tribute: John K. Wilhelm, statement to the Board for International Food and Ag- 
ricultural Development, January 5, 1984. 

31 In November: Interview with confidential Capitol Hill source. 

31 In mid-March: See New York Times, March 15, 1984. 

31 One development which: See Washington Post, April 10, 1984; also see Wall Street Journal, 
July 19, 1984. 

31 At the time: Interview with confidential source. 

31 After he rejected: The United States had engaged in indirect talks with the PLO during the 
Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and earlier during the Carter and Nixon administrations. 

36 Paul Weyrich, who: NationalJournal, May 13, 1978. 

38 As they voted: Congressional Record, October 3, 1984, page H 10961; hearings. Trade Sub- 
committee, Ways and Means Committee, May 22, 1984. 

38 Chairmanships: Mideast Observer, November 15, 1984. 

42 Pro-Israel PACs: Mideast Observer, November 1, 1983; Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1983. 
Also in the highest range were doctors, milk producers, realtors and automobile workers. 

43 Richard Altman: Jewish Exponent (Philadelphia, Penna.), November 1 1 , 1983. 

44 Golder explains: Stephen D. Isaacs, Jews and American Politics. 
47 A non-Jewish: Ibid. 

47 After the 1982: Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1983. 

49 Columnist Nat Hentoff: Village Voice, June 14, 1983. 

49 After the 1982: Thomas A. Dine, address before Jewish community leaders, Austin Texas, 

November 1982. 
49 Later, when he: YedVot Aharonot (Jerusalem), November 27, 1984. 



CHAPTER TWO: STILLING THE STILL, SMALL VOICES 

50 In offering: Congressional Record, June 5, 1980; also see Near East Report, June 1 1 , 1980. 

51 "Friend and foe": Paul N. McCloskey, interview, May 10, 1983. 

51 Representative James Johnson: Congressional Record, June 5, 1980. 

52 This was true: See New York Times Magazine, April 18, 1971 . 

52 The wrong decisions: McCloskey, address to the Kenna Club, Santa Clara, Calif., August 13, 

1982. 
52 He charged it: Paul N. McCloskey, Truth and Untruth, Political Deceit In America. 
52 Although the Californian: See McCloskey, Truth and Untruth, Political Deceit in America. 
52 McCloskey agonized over: See HaKol (Stanford University), March 1981 



362 Notes 

52 McCloskey knew war's: See New York Times Magazine, April 18, 1971; also see New York 

Magazine, June 14, 1971. 

52 He later explained: McCloskey, interview, May 10, 1983. 

52 For protesting the: New York Magazine, June 14, 1971. 

52 "At least fifty": Ibid. 

53 He was twice: San Jose Mercury, October 23, 1978. 
53 As a college: McCloskey, interview, May 10, 1983. 

53 He reminded a: Letter from McCloskey to Earl Raab, August 11, 1981; also see HaKol 
(Stanford University), March 1981; also see Heritage Southwest Jewish Press (Los Angeles, 
Calif.), July 17, 1981. 

53 McCloskey also vigorously: Los Angeles Times, August 2, 1981. 

53 Still, McCloskey had: Ibid. 

54 One of the: Redlands Daily Facts, April 1 1 , 198 1 . 

54 On the other: San Francisco Examiner, August 17, 1981 . 

54 A few days: San Francisco Examiner, August 26, 1981 . 

54 An article in: B'nai B'rith Messenger (Los Angeles, Calif.), August 7, 1981 . 

54 The charge was: Letter from McCloskey to B'nai B'rith Messenger, October 2 1 , 1983. 

54 The Messenger published: B'nai B'rith Messenger (Los Angeles, Calif.), October 2, 1981 . 

54 In an interview: Douglas Bloomfield, interview, October 8, 1983. 

55 The Messenger charged: B'nai B'rith Messenger (Los Angeles, Calif.), August 7, 1981 . 

55 Another Jewish publication: McCloskey, interview, May 10, 1983; also see Palo Alto Times- 
Tribune, August 17, 1982. 

55 An article in: Heritage and Southwest Jewish Press (Los Angeles, Calif.), August 7, 1981 . 

55 One of a: San Francisco Examiner, August 15, 1982. 

55 Josh Teitelbaum, who: McCloskey, interview, May 10, 1983. 

55 McCloskey's views on: See Sacramento Bee, December 17, 1982. 

55 One former supporter: Los Angeles Times, August 2, 1981 . 

56 In the closing: See Congressional Record, August 1 1 , 1982. 
56 On September 22: Congressional Record, September 22, 1982. 
56 In the closing: Congressional Record, December 21 , 1982. 

56 "Many of my": McCloskey, interview, May 10, 1983. 

56 Ken Oshman, president: Ibid. 

57 McCloskey accepted a: Ibid. 

57 The group distributed: The memorandum, dated March 1, 1983, was headed: "To ADL 

regional directors from Justin J. Finger." 

57 McCloskey accepted an: Letter to McCloskey from David Marks of the Guest Professorship 

Board of ASSP; also see Stanford Daily, November 9, 1982. 

57 His own remuneration: See Washington Post, July 28, 1983. 

57 Howard Goldberg: Stanford Daily, February 8, 1983. 

57 Student leader Seth: See Stanford Review, May 25, 1983. 

57 According to a: San Jose Mercury News, May 27, 1983. 

57 One student, Jeffrey: Stanford Daily, April 29, 1983. 

58 Responding, Professor Hubert: Letter to Jeffrey Au from Prof. Hubert Marshall, April 19, 
1983. 

58 McCloskey reacted sharply: San Francisco Chronicle, May 5, 1983. 

58 The San Francisco: Ibid. 

58 By mid-May: See Washington Post, July 28, 1983. 

58 McCloskey told the: Peninsula Times-Tribune, July 27, 1983. 

58 In September 1983: McCloskey, address before the International Conference on the Question 
of Palestine, Geneva, Switzerland, September 1, 1983. 

59 Andrew Young resigned: Washington Post, August 16, 1979. 

60 To show support: Washington Star, August 21 , 1979. 
60 Fauntroy said he: Washington Post, August 21, 1979. 
60 While Terzi said: Ibid. 

60 "I don't think": Ibid. 

60 Prominent Jewish businessman: Ibid. 

60 In an attempt: Washington Post, August 22, 1979. 

60 Howard Squadron, president: Ibid. 

60 Some said they: Washington Star, August 23, 1979. 

60 Fauntroy said: "In": Washington Post, August 23, 1979. 

61 The Washington Post: Ibid. 

61 The validity of: Washington Post, August 27, 1979. 

61 It didn't cripple: The Rev. Walter Fauntroy, interview, July 26, 1983. 

61 As they departed: Washington Post, September 17, 1979. 

61 Fauntroy recalls the: Washington Post, September 24, 1979. 



Notes 363 

61 Jews in the United States: See Washington Post, September 18, 1979; Washington Star, 
September 24, 1979. 

62 The controversy deepened: Washington Post, September 23, 1979. 

62 Rabbi Joshua Haberman: Ibid; also see Washington Post, October 29, 1979. 

62 At a news: Washington Post, September 23, 1979. 

62 Before the vote: Washington Post, January 26, 1980; February 7, 1980; February 21, 1980; 

March 9, 1980. 

62 In an editorial: Washington Post, January 30, 1980; January 31, 1980. 

62 Fauntroy called the: Washington Post, February 1, 1980. 

63 The amendment was: See Washington Post, March 20, 1980. 

63 Fauntroy's Middle East: Washington Post, October 16, 1979; also see Washington Post, 

October 24, 1979. 

63 Some black leaders: Newsweek, October 22, 1979. 

63 Before leaving for: Washington Post, October 17, 1979. 

63 Other blacks supported: Washington Post, October 16, 1979. 

63 "Any civil rights'*: Ibid. 

63 Even before these: Washington Post, October 12, 1979. 

63 Fauntroy added that: Washington Post, October 16, 1979. 

63 Announcing her intention: Washington Post, May 15, 1982. 

63 A month later: Washington Post, June 29, 1982. 

64 Both candidates gave: Jewish Week (Washington, D.C.), July 1-7, 1982. 
64 The challenger's campaign: See Washington Post, November 6, 1980. 
64 He agreed with: Washington Post, August 13, 1983; August 14, 1983. 

64 Reflecting on the: The Rev. Walter Fauntroy, interview, July 26, 1983. 

65 Michael Nieditch, a: Jews Speak Out: Views from the Diaspora, a pamphlet published by 
International Center for Peace in the Middle East (Tel Aviv). 

65 Morris Amitay, then: Michael Nieditch, interview, September 24, 1983. 

65 Republican Charles Whalen: Charles Whalen, letter to the author, February 17, 1984. 

65 Richard Nolan, now: Richard Nolan, interview, February 17, 1984. 

67 Afterwards he told: Chicago Sun-Times, October 17, 1981; also see Houston Chronicle, 

October 16, 1981. 

67 Columnist Carl Rowan: Washington Post, October 25, 1981. 

67 In the following: Mideast Observer, November 1 , 1983. 

67 As Stephen S. Rosenfeld: See Washington Post, May 12, 1983. 

68 They based their: New York Times, January 1 1 , 1977. 

68 Zablocki dismissed the: Congressional Quarterly, January 15, 1977. 

68 Zablocki declared that: Washington Post, January II, 1977; also see Washington Post, De- 
cember 17, 1976. 

68 He told columnist: Washington Post, January 10, 1977. 

68 Despite the lobby's: New York Times, January 19, 1977; 7977 Congressional Quarterly Al- 
manac. 

68 An aide said: Interview with confidential source. 

70 Solarz's zeal: Public meeting, Room 2200, Rayburn Building, Washington, September 26, 
1984. 

70 He asked Chairman Howard Wolpe: Ibid. 

70 A veteran Congressman: Regard for the influence of pro-Israeli lobbying interests compelled 
the Congressman to request anonymity. 

71 He says, "When": Mervyn M. Dymally, interview, March 8, 1984. 

71 The first encounter: Ibid. 

72 Dymally met the: Ibid. 

72 Moreover, to make: Letter from Dymally to Barry Binder, February 29, 1984. 

72 Carmen Warshaw, long: Dymally, interview, March 8, 1984. 

73 While one staff: Ibid. 

73 He told the: Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1983. 

73 Whenever he complains: Dymally, interview, March 8, 1984. 

73 Taking part in: Hearings of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, February 28, 
1983. 

74 At fund-raising: Interview with confidential source. 

75 Dymally spoke: Hearings of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, April 12, 
1983. 

75 During the same: Ibid. 

76 Asked for comment: Washington Post, May 11, 1983. 
76 He warned that: Ibid. 

76 Democratic Congressman George: Ibid. 
76 But Kansas Republican: Ibid. 



364 Notes 

76 A lobbyist for: Confidential interview with a member of the Congressional liason staff of AID. 

76 Pritchard, witnessing Israel's: Washington Post, May 1 1, 1983. 

76 "I must confess": Mervyn M. Dymally, interview, March 8, 1984. 

77 "What is tragic": Ibid. 
77 Dymally notes that: Ibid. 

77 Dymally believes the: Ibid. 

78 Donald J. Pease: Donald J. Pease, interview, September 20, 1983. 
78 The resolution provided: See New York Times, November 11, 1983. 
78 When the roll: Congressional Record, November 8, 1983. 

78 "The Jewish community": As with many other knowledgeable Capitol Hill sources, this 
Capitol Hill insider would speak candidly about the workings of the Israeli lobby only on the 
condition that he remain anonymous. 

79 Silvio Conte, senior: Congressional Record, November 10, 1983. 
79 Republican leader Bob: Ibid. 

79 To Republicans Conte: Ibid. 
79 When the roll: Ibid. 

79 But the excuse: Ibid. 

80 During debate of: Near East Report, May 11, 1984; also see Washington Report on Middle 
East Affairs, May 28, 1984. 

80 Rahall recalls that: Nick J. Rahall II, letter to the author, June 6, 1984. 

81 The "brave" Congressman: Ibid. 

81 He received "less": Rahall, interview, June 8, 1984. 
81 In all, 91 : Congressional Record, September 28, 1983. 

81 A veteran Congressman: Interview with a confidential Administration source present at the 
discussion. 

82 In late February: Interview with confidential source. 
82 Asked to explain: Interview with confidential source. 
82 Confronted by the: Interview with confidential source. 

82 The panel approved: Mideast Observer, March 15, 1984; also see Washington Report on 

Middle East Affairs, March 5, 1984. 
82 Written by AIPAC: Interview with confidential source. 

82 In either form: See Washington Post, February 28, 1984. 

83 When King Hussein: See New York Times, March 15, 1984; also see Washington Report on 
Middle East Affairs, April 2, 1984. 

83 Meanwhile Democratic Congressman: Hearings of the House Subcommittee on Europe and 
the Middle East, June 7, 1984; also see Washington Post, April 27, 1984; also see Near East 
Report, August 17, 1984. 

83 Democrat Larry Smith: Subcommittee Hearings, June 7, 1984. 

83 Republican Larry Winn: Ibid. 



CHAPTER THREE: THE DELIBERATIVE BODY 
DECLINES TO DELIBERATE 

84 This phenomenon: Hassan, Crown Prince of Jordan, interview, May 11, 1983. 

85 Thompson, a Republican: See Time, September 20, 1982. 

85 A crucial part: See Jewish Chicago, October 1982; also see Chicago Sun-Times, September 

14, 1983; September 16, 1983. 
85 Stevenson was attempting: See Illinois Issues, November 1977; Nation, December 11, 1976; 

March 3, 1979; May 5, 1979; Foreign Affairs, October 1974. 
85 Time magazine described: Chicago Magazine, June 1979. 
85 Effective in committee: Chicago, June 1979. 

85 Chicago Daily News: November 1 , 1974. 

86 Although a "blue-blood": See New York Times Magazine, February 22, 1970; also see Wash- 
ington Post, November 24, 1970. 

86 During his second: New Republic, February 24, 1979; also see Christian Science Monitor, 
February 5, 1979. 

86 "I'm going to": Washington Post, February 9, 1979; also see Nation, March 3, 1979. 

86 Stevenson ultimately decided: Adlai E. Stevenson HI, interview, June 9, 1983. 

86 Several of the: Ibid. 

86 Stevenson himself had: The Israel Bond "Man of the Year" designation was awarded to 
Stevenson on December 15, 1974, and recorded in the Congressional Record, January 10, 
1975. The AJC in 1977 awarded Stevenson a commendation and a plaque for his work 
opposing the trade boycott against Israel. The Weizman Institute established the Adlai E. 



Notes 365 

Stevenson III Chair in endocrinology and reproductive biology in recognition of the Senator's 
steadfast support of the Institute and its work. 
87 But trouble developed: Jacksonville Journal Courier (Jacksonville, III.), August 31, 1982. 
Though the Washington office of AIPAC had produced the defamatory document, an AIPAC 
spokesman at the time expressed displeasure at seeing AIPAC material thus used in a political 
campaign. Such political smear tactics have become less common for AIPAC under the more 
sophisticated leadership of present director Thomas A. Dine. 

87 In fact, the: Adlai E. Stevenson, The Middle East: 1976, report to the Committee on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, on his study mission to the Middle East 
conducted between February 10 and February 25, 1976 (GPO, Washington, 1976). 

88 The anti-Stevenson: Congressional Record, June 17, 1980; October 11, 1979. 
88 In speaking for: Congressional Record, June 17, 1980. 

88 After the vote: Stevenson, interview, June 9, 1983. 

89 Stevenson was actually: See Rennan Lee Teslik, Congress, The Executive Branch and Special 
Interests: The American Response to the Arab Boycott of Israel; also Stan Marcus, interview, 
October 7, 1983. 

89 For this achievement: Stevenson, interview, June 9, 1983. 

89 The chairman of: Letter from Theodore R. Mann to Adlai E. Stevenson III, July 28, 1977. 

89 Jewish Chicago, making: Jewish Chicago, October 1982. 

89 A flyei distributed: Jacksonville Journal Courier (Jacksonville, III.), August 31 , 1982. 

90 The word was: See Sentinel, September 30, 1982; also see Waukegan News Sun, November 9, 
1982. 

90 The political editor: Chicago Sun-Times, June 27, 1982. 

90 When Republican Senator: Chicago Sun-Times, September 14, 1982. 

90 "I learned after": Stevenson, interview, June 9, 1983. 

90 Phil Klutznick's daughter: Bettylu Saltzman, interview, June 16, 1983. 

90 Stevenson's running-mate: Grace Mary Stern, interview, October 18, 1983. 

90 "Many of my": Stevenson, interview, June 9, 1983. 

90 In the end: Time, November 15, 1983. 

90 Fed up by: Chicago Tribune, September 10, 1982. 

91 The Chicago Sun-Times: Chicago Sun-Times, September 16, 1982. 
91 Philip Klutznick, prominent: Stevenson, interview, June 9, 1983. 
91 The election was: Time, November 15, 1982. 

91 Stevenson asked for: See Illinois Supreme Court Docket No. 57637, Agenda 52, November 
1982. 

91 A post-election: Waukegan News Sun, November 9, 1982. 

92 Campaign manager Joseph: Chicago Sun-Times, September 14, 1982. 
92 Press secretary Rick: Rick Jasculca, interview, October 18, 1983. 

92 Thomas A. Dine: Present Tense, Spring 1983. 

92 Stevenson too believes: Stevenson, interview, June 9, 1983. 

93 "When all of": New York Times Magazine, November 24, 1974. 

93 Fulbright first gained: Haynes Johnson and Bernard N. Gwertzman, Fulbright, The Dissenter. 

93 Because of this: Ibid. 

93 Twenty-five years: New York Times, June 2, 1974. 

93 His deepest and: See Foreign Affairs, Spring, 1979. 

93 But Fulbright also: Time, June 10, 1974. 

94 Fulbright put no: See J. W. Fulbright, The Arrogance of Power. 
94 In 1963 Fulbright: Congressional Record, August 1, 1963. 

94 Pincus recalls that: Walter Pincus, interview, November 14, 1983. 

94 Both Fulbright and: Ibid. 

94 The Fulbright hearings: See National Journal, May 18, 1970. 

94 Despite his concern: New York Times, August 23, 1970. Also see National Observer, August 
31, 1970; New Republic, October 10, 1970. 

95 In 1971 , he: New York Times, April 5, 1971 ; also see J. W Fulbright, The Crippled Giant. 
95 Appearing on CBS: "Face the Nation," April 15, 1973. 

95 Six weeks after: Washington Post, May 31, 1973. 

95 His criticism of: See Christian Science Monitor, January 24, 1974; New Republic, April 27, 

1974; Newsweek, June 10, 1974. 
95 Fulbright hadn't expected: J. William Fulbright, interview, June 3, 1983; also see Saturday 

Review, January 11, 1975. 

95 Walter Pincus, who: Walter Pincus, interview, November 14, 1983. 

96 The New York Times: New York Times Magazine, May, 1974; November 1974. 
96 "I don't think": J. William Fulbright, interview, June 3, 1983. 

96 Marked "confidential": Memorandum from the Washington office of B'nai B'rith, May 7, 
1974. 



366 Notes 

96 In a speech: See National Observer, November 16, 1974. 

96 His central concern: Washington Post, November 5, 1974; Fulbright, address at Westminster 
College, Fulton, Missouri, November 2, 1974. 

% Pondering the future: Fulbright, interview, June 3, 1983. 

97 Yet the determination: National Observer, November 16, 1974. 

97 Soon after he: James G. Abourezk, interview, August 1, 1984. 

98 Blitzer's report: Near East Report, February 13, 1974. 

98 The mailing: I. L. Kenen, letter to Ms. Carol V. Bernstein, February 25, 1974. 

99 The next day: AIPAC later sent a memorandum to its Connecticut membership, as well as 
state leaders, denouncing Ribicoff for his attendance at the luncheon. {Jewish Ledger 
[Connecticut], March 23, 1978). 

99 A major storm: See James Abourezk, On Democracy and Dissent (Middle East Affairs 

Council, 1977). 
99 The Israeli lobby's: See Boston Globe Magazine, April 29, 1984. 
100 This involvement began: Interview with confidential source. 
100 The letter was: Interview with confidential source. 
100 Over the years: Ibid. 
100 Hathaway cooperated in: The letter was sent to President Ford on May 21, 1975. See 

Gerard G. Sheehan, The Arabs Israelis, and Kissinger; also see Richard H. Curtiss, A Chang* 

ing Image: American Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 

100 Ford, dissatisfied with: See Washington Post, March 8, 1978. 

101 Three years later: Ibid. 

101 Lobbying on both: See Washington Post, May 7, 1978. 

102 The Washington Post: Ibid. 

102 In the wake: Washington Post, April 22, 1978. 

102 Concerning the book: Ibid. 

102 Senator Wendell Anderson: Interview with confidential source. 

102 In an interview: Wall Street Journal, March 13, 1978. 

103 One of them: Interview with confidential source. 
103 A staff member: Ibid. 

103 Israeli officials opposed: See Washington Star, April 16, 1981. 

103 Even before Reagan: Associated Press Wire Service, September 21, 1981. 

104 Lobbyist Frederick Dutton: Washington Post, September 28, 1981. 
104 The Post reported: Ibid. 

104 Senator John Glenn: Associated Press Wire Service, September 21 , 1981 . 
104 Syndicated columnist Carl: Washington Post, November 25, 1981 . 

104 When the Senate: Boston Globe Magazine, April 29, 1984; also see Seth Tillman, The United 
States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles, 

104 His opposition to: Washington Post, July 9, 1973. 

105 In a December: Washington Post, December 5, 1971. 

105 Mathias was alarmed: See Nation, December 8, 1975; also see Washington Post November 

26, 1975; February 15, 1976. 
105 The late Clarence: Biography of Sen. Charles McC. Mathias Jr. , prepared by the office of Sen. 

Mathias, June 1, 1978. 
105 In fact, early: Baltimore Sun, December 3, 1980. 
105 A resident of: Washington Post, June 2, 1974. 
105 The controversial article: Washington Post, June 28, 1981. 
105 The same year: Baltimore Sun, December 8, 1980. 

105 As the Baltimore Sun: Ibid. 

106 He was exhibiting: Biography of Sen. Charles McC Mathias Jr., prepared by the office of 
Sen. Mathias, June 1, 1978; also see Frederick Post (Frederick, Md.), April 12, 1980; Congres- 
sional Record, December 18, 1979. 

106 These qualities led: Foreign Affairs, Spring 1981 . 

107 The Baltimore Jewish Times: Jewish Times (Baltimore, Md.), July 3, 1981 . 

107 Arnold Blumberg, a: Evening Sun (Baltimore, Md.), July 13, 1981. 

108 A prominent Jewish: Jewish Times (Baltimore, Md.), July 3, 1981 . 

108 Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal: Baltimore Sun, November 5, 1981. 

108 Other critics expressed: Discussion of difficult issues involving the Middle East, Israel and 
American Jews, such as the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia, always raises the issue of anti- 
Semitism on Capitol Hill. See Washington Post, November 29, 1981; New York Times, Octo- 
ber 28, 1981 ; Near East Report, November 20, 1981. 

108 A spokesperson for: Jewish Times (Baltimore, Md.), July 3, 1981 ; Baltimore Sun, July 6, 1981 . 

108 One critic, identified: Jewish Times (Baltimore, Md.), July 3, 1981 . 

108 Mathias dismissed the: Charles McC. Mathias, interview, August 3, 1983. 



Notes 367 

109 In his first: Baltimore Jewish Times, October 29, 1982. 

109 His honeymoon: Washington Post, June 28, 1975. 

109 That same year: Jewish Times (Baltimore, Md.), October 29, 1982. 

1 10 A full-page: Chicago Tribune, July 21 , 1983. 

1 10 Although Percy: Confidential interviews, November 12, 1984. 

1 10 By mid-August: New York Times, August 16, 1984. 

111 By election day: Washington Post, December 7, 1984. 

Ill In addition: Journal-Register (Springfield, HI.), December 8, 1984. 

1 1 1 Former Senator: Chicago Sun-Times, November 5, 1984. 

1 12 When the votes: Journal-Register (Springfield, III.), December 8, 1984, and Washington Post, 
November 12, 1984. 

112 The Middle East figured: Paul Simon, interview, December 7, 1984, and Journal-Register 
(Springfield, HI.), December 8, 1984. 

1 12 Reviewing the impact: Interviews, Percy, November 13, 1984, and Simon, December 7, 1984. 

1 13 AIPAC's Dine told: Yedi'ot Aharonot (Jerusalem), November 27, 1984. 



CHAPTER FOUR: THE LOBBY AND THE OVAL OFFICE 

1 14 It was a: Charles Bartlett, interview, November 1 , 1983. 

1 IS After learning of: Myer Feldman, interview, October 30, 1983. 

1 15 Mr. and Mrs. Arthur: Confidential interview with informed source. 

1 16 Zionists began: See John Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote and the Creation of Israel; also 
see Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948; 
Roberta Feuerlicht, The Fate of the Jews. 

1 16 When Ihiman continued: Snetsinger, op. cit. 

1 16 Two-thirds of: Feuerlicht, op. cit. 

1 17 Their spokesman, Ambassador: Evan M. Wilson, Decision On Palestine; also see Christian 
Science Monitor, June 16, 1981. 

1 17 In fact, pro-Israeli: Confidential observation of a person currently prominent in Middle East 
policy activities. 

1 17 In fact, pro-Israeli: "At 6: 1 1 P.M. on May 14, 1948— eleven minutes after the expiration of the 
British mandate and ten minutes after the coming into existence of the state of Israel — the 
White House announced American de facto recognition of the new state and its provisional 
government." (Seth Tillman, The United States in the Middle East, Interests and Obstacles). 

1 17 Secretary of State: Evan M. Wilson, Decision On Palestine. 

1 17 During a 1949: Quoted by Tillman, op. cit. 

1 17 In September 1953: Stephen Green, Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant 
Israel; also see Wilbur Crane Eveland, Ropes of Sand: America' s Failure in the Middle East. 

1 18 Predictably Eisenhower's decision: Green, op. cit. 
1 18 Dr. Israel Goldstein: Ibid. 

1 18 Eisenhower faced the: Ibid. ; also see Tillman, op. cit. 

1 18 Despite partisan assaults: Stephen D. Isaacs, Jews and American Politics. 

1 19 Despite protests: Green, op. cit.; also see Kennett Love, Suez: The Twice-Fought War. 
1 19 Informed that the: Ibid. 

119 That night the: Ibid. 

1 19 A determined President: Ibid.; also see Tillman, op. cit. 

1 19 Dulles complained: Green, op. cit. 

1 19 Eisenhower persisted, declaring: Ibid. 

120 Although there is: See above, pp. 1 14-15; Isaacs, op. cit. 
120 He approved for: Eveland, op. cit. 

120 But Israel's military: Green, op. cit. 

120 Friends of Israel: Ibid. 

120 The latter often: So close was Johnson's friendship with the Krims that they were the first 

beyond the Johnson family to learn of the President's decision not to seek re-election in 1968. 

(See Donald Neff, Warriors at Suez) 

120 In a September: Donald Neff, interview, May 23, 1984. 

121 In early June: Green, op. cit. 

121 Although Johnson's successor: See Stephen D. Isaacs, Jews and American Politics. 

122 Privately, Nixon criticized: See Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval. 

122 In July: Richard M. Nixon, interview, July 26, 1984. 

123 The Manchester Guardian: Manchester Guardian, October 10, 1976. 

124 He took the: George W. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, 



368 Notes 

124 Ball declined, believing: Ibid. 

124 Ball was one: See Foreign Affairs, Winter 1975/76; New York Times, August 25, 1982. 

126 Enlisted the year: Washington Post, July 1 1 , 1982. 

126 He admitted that: George W. Ball, interview, June 10, 1983. 

128 A senior diplomat: Confidential interview with informed source. 

129 Connally's campaign theme: See Economist (London), October 20, 1979. 
129 He argued that: New York Times, October 12, 1979. 

129 Connally became the: New York Times, October 22, 1979. 

130 Henry Siegman, executive: Washington Star, October 13, 1979. 

130 Christian Science: Christian Science Monitor, October 16, 1979. 

131 Writing in: The Nation, November 3, 1979. 

131 The Washington Post: Washington Post, October 15, 1979. 

131 Within a few: See Los Angeles Times, December 29, 1974. 

131 The New York Republican Committee: Washington Post, November 6, 1979. 

131 The Washington Post, Ibid. 

132 Columnist William Safire: New York Times, October 15, 1979. 
132 But he had: See Washington Post, December 27, 1983. 

132 Polls showed: Ibid. 

132 In April 1983: Ibid. 

132 After meeting with: See Chicago Tribune, December 5, 1983. 

132 In addition: $300 million was to be spent in the United States for development of the Israeli 
Lavi fighter plane, while an additional $250 million was authorized to be spent in Israel. This 
$250 million, an unprecedented U.S. subsidy to a foreign industry, was the issue behind the 
Rahall amendment. See chapter two. 

132 Near East Report: Near East Report, December 23, 1983. 

132 In March, Reagan: See Washington Post, March 16, 1984. 

133 Hussein told a: New York Times, March 15, 1984. 

133 Mondale accused Hart: See New York Times, March 22, 1984. 

133 Hart accused Mondale: Ibid. 

133 When Donald McHenry: See Washington Post, March 2, 1980. 

134 Three days later: Washington Post, March 5, 1980. 

134 Both the nation: See Wall Street Journal, March 5, 1980; March 7, 1980; also see Washington 

Post, March 6, 1980; March 12, 1980. 

134 Arabs were outraged: Ibid. 

134 Sharon told Jews: Roberta Feuerlicht, The Fate of the Jews. 

134 In November: See Washington Post, November 6, 1980; November 9, 1980. 

135 In June 1984: Albert Joscpi., interview, August 15, 1984. 
135 Upon learning that: Wall Street Journal, March 23, 1984. 
135 Hart's competitor for: Los Angeles Times, July 14, 1984. 

135 As a Senator: United States Senator Gary Hart on the Issues: Israel and the Middle East 
(two-page summary prepared by the Hart presidential campaign, undated); also see Near East 
Report, January 13, 1984. 

135 Senator Ernest Hollings: See New York Times, September 15, 1983; also see Near East 
Report, January 6, 1984; January 13, 1984. 

135 In the past: See Boston Globe, February 15, 1983; February 20, 1983. 

136 Bitten by the: Ibid. 

136 In a speech: New York Times, September 14, 1983; also see Washington Post, September 15, 

1983. 
136 One of Glenn's: Confidential interview with an Ohio Congressman. 
136 The speech caused: Lucius Battle, interview, May 21, 1983. 
136 McGovern called for: New York Times, February 4, 1979. 
136 In a speech: Ibid. 
136 The "Super Tuesday": Washington Post, March 14, 1984. 

136 Jackson became controversial: Washington Post, October 6, 1979; also see Rocky Mountain 
News (Denver, Colo.), August 7, 1983. 

137 By the time: Washington Post, October 12, 1984. 

137 He immediately enlivened: See Newsweek, January 16, 1984. 

137 He proclaimed, •The": Ibid. 

137 In televised debates: See Washington Post, March 29, 1984; also see New York Magazine, 

January 9, 1984; Sun (Baltimore, Md.), February 6, 1984. 
137 Jackson found himself: See Chicago Sun-Times, February 27, 1984. 

137 Inspired by attacks: See Washington Post, April 7, 1984; April 8, 1984; April 15, 1984; April 
18, 1984, inter alia. 

138 In advance of: Confidential interview with informed sources; also see New York Times, 
November 11, 1983. 



Notes 369 



CHAPTER FIVE: PENETRATING THE DEFENSES 
AT DEFENSE AND STATE 

139 "The leaks to": This chapter is based upon interviews with 17 present and former officials 
from the Department of Defense, the Department of State and the White House. Where 
considerations of career security permit, these sources have been identified. 

141 Thomas Pianka, an: Thomas Pianka, interview, November 17, 1983. 

141 Richard Helms, director: Donald Neff, Warriors For Jerusalem. 

142 Les Janka, a: Les Janka, interview, August 16, 1983. 

142 Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's: Zbigniew Brzezinski, interview, October 31, 1983. 

146 "Our officers cannot": Israel is the only country where the U.S. permits such limitations. 

147 On one occasion: Wilbur Crane Eveland, correspondence with the author, January 23, 1984. 

148 Young recalls: Andrew Young, interview, May 10, 1983. 
148 Young resigned as: See chapter two. 

148 This denial: Newsweek, September 3, 1979. 

152 The perpetrator was: Washington Post, March 2, 1977. 

153 A few days: Washington Post, February 18, 1977. 

153 When he read: James G. Abourezk, interview, August 1, 1984. 

153 Abourezk tried unsuccessfully: Legislation was introduced in 1984 to provide Israel with open 
U.S. financing for its foreign aid activities. See chapter two. 

154 The episode caused: Ambassador John C. West, interview, April 18, 1983; also see New York 
Times, April 20, 1980. 

155 West recalls: New York Times, April 20, 1980. 

155 If so, the: In the wake of the AW